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»Of the three chief Religions, which now flourish and are tolerated in Japan, 
the SINTOS. must be considered in the first place, more for its antiquity and 
long standing, than for the number of its adherents.« 
  
- Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716), The History of Japan, vol. 2, Book III (»Of the 
State of Religion In Japan«), ch. 1, p. 204 , London: Printed for the Publisher, 
1727.  
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PREFACE  
 
The history of modern Japan begins with a paradox. This period’s axiomatic 
starting point, the Meiji Restoration of 1868, was marked by intentions which, in 
further consideration, appear anything but modern: the restoration of seemingly 
archaic imperial rule. This apparent contradiction cannot be overlooked in any 
examination of the foundations of modern Japan and its concept of government. 
Along with the opening of the country, which was forced by the Western powers, 
the Meiji Restoration also brought the backward-looking concept of a reconstruc-
tion of earlier and supposedly autochthonous models of governance. Over the 
course of the Meiji period, this traditionalist idea was implemented in a compre-
hensive, religiously and politically based concept of government that postulated a 
uniquely Japanese »national polity« (kokutai). Up until Japan’s defeat in 1945, and 
even afterwards, this idea of the kokutai, which was centered on the idea of a di-
vine emperor and based on political Shintô thought, formed the official and bind-
ing Japanese concept of the modern state, in which the institution of the emperor 
served as the metaphysical and mythical core of the national family. 
The world of Shintô played a crucial role within this context. Without detract-
ing from the importance of foreign influences in the 19th century and the univer-
sal factors of modernity, it must be recognized that the critical impetus and con-
cepts for the development of the modern Japanese nation-state mainly originated 
in the pre-modern era in Japan itself. A Western-centered view of Japanese intel-
lectual history, with 1868 as an epochal breaking point, is unable to account for 
the fact that, during Tokugawa times and even earlier, Japanese thinkers them-
selves had developed their own kind of an ideal nation, based on religious con-
cepts associated with a generic system called »Shintô«. Among Shintô scholars 
and ideologues of that time it was in particular the construct of a mythical com-
mon origin of the Japanese people, based on the myths of the »Age of the Gods«, 
that was fundamental to this concept. This idea was transmitted through history 
and eventually elaborated into political radicalism by nativist ideologues like Mo-
toori Norinaga, and especially Hirata Atsutane and his school. Though a religious 
concept, it always contained within itself a clearly political dimension. So it must 
be doubted that the idea of political Shintô was an invention of modern times, as 
many scholars of modern Japan believe. All sources show the opposite, i.e. the 
enormous historical depth of this world of ideas. Meiji-era State Shintô seems to 
  
 
be an invention only insofar that it transmuted the political ideas of Shintô think-
ers of the Edo and pre-Edo periods into the practical politics of the modern Japa-
nese nation-state, painting the highly ideological picture of a Japanese national 
polity of divine origin. This was a completely new idea for a modern nation-state, 
but a quite old one for political Shintô thought itself.  
In order to do full justice to the historical development of Shintô, considera-
tion must be given to the above-mentioned fields of political and intellectual 
Shintô. In particular, the centrally important relationship between Shintô and 
Confucianism must be taken into account, as well as the highly relevant but com-
plicated topic of nativism. Just denying the pure existence of Shintô in premodern 
Japan, as some researchers do, especially inspired by Kuroda Toshio (cf. Teeuwen 
1999), does not promote our deeper understanding of this historical process. 
Without accounting for processes in the premodern era, the emergence of the 
modern Japanese empire would appear to be an incomprehensible miracle. 
Speaking about political Shintô in this context means explaining it as an extraor-
dinarily convincing example of religious ethnocentrism, which spawned a politi-
cal and religious ideology to provide a nation state like modern Japan with an 
ideological and religious foundation. In this sense the Japanese case also provides 
an extremely valuable example for comparative analysis of religion and politics in 
general. Since the worldwide interest in problems of religious ideology grew 
dramatically within the recent years, analyzing the Japanese case can substan-
tially contribute to the general understanding and historical deconstruction of 
such systems of thought. Additionally a revival of Shintô politics took place in 
Japan within recent years, highly emphasizing seemingly archaic images, e.g. that 
of Japan as a »divine country«, and thus proving the importance of Shintô topics 
for understanding the present state of Japan.  
All this led me to the idea to elaborate an English version of a book on the 
evolution of Shintô and kokutai, which had been published already in 1998 in 
German (Antoni 1998). In that former study an attempt was made to portray the 
history of modern Shintô in ideological terms mainly as a story of continuity, but 
also of breaks, between premodern and modern Japan. Shintô, it was argued, was 
constantly modified by »traditionalistic« inventions to adapt to the current politi-
cal context and played an important role as an ideological guide line within the 
historical process of Japan’s modernization. The study presented here in fact con-
sists of a slightly revised and enlarged translation of that former work. I wish to 
thank Anthony DePasquale and others for the translation of the text. 
Unfortunately it would have exceeded the scope of this study to include all 
the research on the topic of Shintô that has been done during the last years. I have 
  
tried to include some of the - in my view - most important works in this respect, 
but since current Shintô studies mostly do not focus on the historical develop-
ment from premodern to modern Japan and generally exclude the predominant 
role of Confucianism in this context, the point of my study seems not too out-
dated even after nearly twenty years. 
For the sake of a general distribution of publicly funded research and thus in 
accordance with the so called Open Access principles, this book is published and 
distributed freely by the University of Tübingen. The reader may spread the work 
within the academic community, when providing the correct bibliographical in-
formation.1 
 
 
Klaus Antoni      Tübingen, March 2016
                                                 
1 Please cite as: Klaus Antoni: Kokutai - Political Shintô from Early-Modern to Contemporay Japan. 
Eberhard Karls University Tübingen: Tobias-lib 2016. 
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1. SUBJECT AND OBJECTIVE 
 
Japan’s intellectual and religious history from the early modern era (kinsei; Edo 
period), through the modern era (kindai; Meiji period to early Shôwa period) and 
on into the present day (gendai; late Shôwa period to present) is marked by the 
creation of a new religious system that sought to provide the Japanese nation 
with its own cultural identity and the state with a legitimatory foundation. This 
system is modern Shintô. The widespread view of Shintô as a supra-historical, 
quasi ethnically defined national religion is an essential aspect of this religious 
ideology. This view, however, which is still present in contemporary discourse, 
does not represent an impartial, factual statement, but rather reveals itself as the 
product of an intellectual-historical process that increasingly determined the in-
tellectual discourse in Japan from the Edo period up to its climax in war propa-
ganda during WW II in what is known as State Shintô. 
For this reason, we must examine not only the theological, but also – and par-
ticularly – the ideological development of the religious as well as political system 
called Shintô. Among the main objectives of this study is to demonstrate the 
genesis of the intellectual, religious and ideological traditions that postulated 
Shintô as a politically useable Japanese national religion. A crucial element of this 
development was the concept of the kokutai, the Japanese »national polity« 
viewed by theorists and theologians since the Edo period as the central feature of 
religious ethnocentrism in Japan. The institution of the Japanese imperial family 
can be viewed as a visible manifestation of this concept of the kokutai in culture, 
history and society. Therefore, its development as well as its intellectual and re-
ligious foundations will be among the main focuses of this study. The usually 
drawn distinction between Folk Shintô (minkan shintô), Imperial Household 
Shintô (kôshitsu shintô), Sect Shintô (kyôha shintô) and Shintô theology and dogma, 
however, will not be pursued here in detail, since these are ultimately secondary 
distinctions (see also Naumann 1985b: 224). 
More than almost any other subject, dealing with »the« Shintô religion requires 
a critical analysis of Japanese culture and the Japanese self-conception. Is Shintô a 
national religion or a construct of the modern age? Should it be viewed as ancient 
ancestor worship or pan-Japanese folklore? Is it an esoteric doctrinaire religion or 
syncretistic ritualism? And finally, is it ethnocentric nationalism or peaceful na-
ture worship? Any stereotype regarding Japanese culture can also be found in the 
debate on »the« Shintô religion. In the ideological development of the modern 
age, Shintô took on the function of a synonym for the »unaltered,« »homogene-
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ous,« »unique,« ultimately »true« and thus essentialist form of Japanese culture 
which, cleansed of all foreign elements, supposedly offered a glimpse of Japan’s 
true essence. In this respect, the postulation of a Japanese national religion implic-
itly free from all foreign elements is itself a product of this modern Japanese 
autostereotype, which helped shape Japan’s image both within Japan and abroad 
as a supposedly authentic cultural statement. 
It goes without saying that any evaluation of Shintô’s claim to the status of Ja-
pan’s national religion requires a thorough investigation of the historical develop-
ments. Since certain methodological and terminological questions, especially 
those concerning the understanding of the terms »culture,« »tradition,« »the 
modern era,« cultural »images« and »stereotypes,« and finally »religion,« are of 
fundamental importance in this context, our first undertaking will be an excursus 
on these areas. 
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2. CLARIFICATION OF TERMS 
2. 1. Culture 
 
In order to understand the current state of a culture, its problems and future 
tendencies, it is first necessary to examine its intellectual-historical formation. 
This is especially true in the case of Japanese culture. The term »culture« is un-
derstood in this context in the sense of cultural anthropology, and not in its collo-
quial meaning, which refers broadly to the areas of the arts in what is often called 
»high culture,« such as literature, theater, and art. 
»Culture« in this context means all of humanity’s works as a category in con-
trast to »nature.«2 Just as the word »cultivate« refers to the act of making formerly 
untouched land suitable for the growing of crops, »culture« refers to all changes 
that have an effect on the natural environment. In the humanities, however, there 
exists no set definition for the term »culture,« but rather it includes the entire 
spectrum of approaches in the individual disciplines of the humanities and social 
sciences. Yet there is consensus on at least two points: 1) culture is mutable, not 
genetically determined; and 2) culture must be learned – that is to say, it is passed 
on as tradition. 
The importance of these two basic points can hardly be overstated. They show 
that human culture is learned by each individual within a certain context; it is not 
dependent on biological conditions, for example, in the sense of a biologistic the-
ory of the mind, but merely on tradition, or the handing down of customs. The 
cultural anthropologist Thomas Bargatzky (1985: 39) sums up this fundamental 
principle with persuasive clarity in the following definition: 
»Without human beings there can be no culture, but the reverse is even more 
significant: without culture there can be no human beings. Culture must be 
learned and passed on; [...] Yet human learning is symbolic learning, and it is 
the task of anthropologists to study how we learn to become human beings.« 
Understanding a culture therefore means understanding its lines of tradition – 
that is, the culture’s path of transmission up to its present state. 
 Edward B. Tylor, whose works have become classics in this area, outlined 
the term »the science of culture« as »that complex whole which includes knowl-
edge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits ac-
                                                 
2 Wolfgang Frühwald (1991: 40f.) speaks in this context of a »cultural form of the world« in which 
»culture« is understood as »the epitome of all human work and ways of life.« 
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quired by man as a member of society,« (Tylor 2010 [orig. 1871]: 1). Modern re-
search in this area emphasizes the diachronic aspect of the transmission of cul-
ture. H. K. Schneider, for example, states: »The core in the definition of culture is 
transmission of ideas from generation to generation,« (quoted in Bargatzky 1985: 
35). The cultural-scientific approach is therefore fundamentally diachronic, and 
its object is the understanding of each single case as part of a broad, comprehen-
sive and interconnected cultural system. Modern cultural anthropology, espe-
cially in the tradition of cultural hermeneutics (e.g. Dilthey) and the anthropology 
of symbolic forms (e.g. Cassirer), aims to decipher cultural systems and thus un-
derstand the culture in question. In the case of the analysis of Japanese religions, 
the external, »etic« view – that is, »the view from the outside,« in the sense of 
»hermeneutics of the outside,« (Krusche 1990; Krusche, Wierlacher 1990) or 
»hermeneutics of the alien,« (Bargatzky 1997: XV) – must always also take into 
account the »emic« view from within Japan.3 Axiomatic statements about Japa-
nese self-analysis and reflection, such as the tradition of the Kokugaku, for exam-
ple, often reveal their true meaning only through cultural-historical analysis. 
 Since culture is passed on as tradition, we must focus especially on the tra-
ditions themselves, or that which is passed on. Yet a mere analysis of tradition is 
not enough, since any cultural analysis will show that traditions themselves are 
subject to constant change. The idea of a static tradition that is suddenly con-
fronted with something new – usually the modern era – can only be described as 
naïve, regardless of its prevalence (cf. Antoni 1992). 
 
2. 2. Tradition and the modern era 
 
Hardly any other academic discovery has had such a revolutionary influence 
in this area as the concept of »invented traditions.« Its core premise states that the 
divide between tradition and the modern age, which – not just in the case of Ja-
pan – appears to be clear and stringent, does not adequately describe complex 
historical processes. Rather, this theory states, at least one additional category is 
necessary: invented traditions. It is often the case that, under critical and histori-
cal examination, what are thought to be long-standing traditions that embody a 
culture’s identity emerge not only as questionable and unreliable, but prove to be 
inventions of the modern era. 
                                                 
3 Concerning the antagonist concepts of »etic« and »emic« in cultural studies, especially in regard 
to Japan, cf. Antoni 2001a. 
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The (Austro-) British scholar Eric J. Hobsbawm and his colleagues have con-
tributed pioneering studies in this area that have shed light on the global genesis 
of such artificial traditions.4 This pattern of development can easily be recognized 
in Japan as well, especially since the Meiji period. Examples of the reinterpreta-
tion, manipulation and utilization of existing cultural elements in the sense of in-
vented traditions in modern and contemporary Japan are legion.5 
Hobsbawm’s observations have also shaped the view within the field of Japa-
nese studies that the process of the manipulation or even invention of traditions 
is by no means limited to Japan. Japan does not represent an exception as a coun-
try in which tradition and the modern age have entered into a supposedly unique 
relationship. On the contrary, the case of Japan proves to be an especially striking 
example of a process accompanying the formation of nation-states throughout the 
globe. The utilization of traditions is a fundamental aspect within this global de-
velopment in which the construction of religiously argued, national and national-
istic ideologies are central factors. 
A further author, Dietmar Rothermund, takes the critical methodological step 
toward clarifying this point. Rothermund, who, as a historian examines modern 
India and especially the ideology of Hindu nationalism, focuses on the term »tra-
ditionalism« in his research. This is an incredibly useful tool for analytically dif-
ferentiating between »true« and »artificial« traditions. Rothermund defines the 
term »traditionalism« as »the consciously selective interpretation of traditions [...] 
with the aim of establishing solidarity, which thus either simply denies those 
elements that are irreconcilable with this aim, or apologetically attempts to rein-
terpret them,« (Rothermund 1989: 144-145). We will examine this core topic in 
more detail in the course of this investigation (cf. chapter III: 4. 2.). 
 
2. 3. Religion 
 
Just as there are many definitions of the term »culture,« there are a vast num-
ber of ways of defining »religion.« In his discussion of the conditions for under-
standing religion, the religious ethnologist Josef Franz Thiel (1984: 14) states the 
basic dilemma of the analytical approach:  
                                                 
4 In the collection of essays compiled by Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983), The Invention of 
Tradition, the national systems of tradition of various Western nation-states are examined in a 
number of articles for their actual historical validity. The studies all come to the conclusion that an 
overwhelming number of those traditions claiming to be ancient are in fact products of the mod-
ern era, specifically of the late 19th century.  
5 Particularly see the works of the historian Fujitani Takashi (1986 and 1996 (1998)). 
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»Just as the scientist to a large extent lacks an understanding of the central act 
of the believer, so too does the believer lack the distance to analyze his relig-
ion objectively.« 
In seeking to define the place of religion within a culture, it first becomes ap-
parent that religion represents a »symbolic cultural system,« (cf. Bargatzky 1985: 
116 ff). The cultural-scientific view of religion is not concerned with the truth 
value of a given religious system; this is the fundamental difference separating it 
from theology, which operates under the assumption of the truth of its respective 
religion. 
Cultural anthropology assumes the existence of religion as an established fact 
and investigates its teachings and dogmas, its rituals and ethnic norms, and its 
function and effect in society at a certain historical point in time. As a cultural 
system, religion is by definition handed down; every religion undergoes a devel-
opment in space and time, up to the present day. Matthias Laubscher (1983: 235) 
emphasizes the cultural determination of religion and states in this context:  
»Religion is [...] the background that gives meaning which lies behind cul-
tural manifestations that are neither comprehensible by common sense, nor 
purely arbitrary.«  
Here too, as Thiel (1984: 10) makes clear, the concept of constant development 
and change is fundamental: »Anyone who deals with religious studies ultimately 
cannot forego a diachronic analysis.« Finally, the previously mentioned cultural 
anthropologist Bargatzky (1985: 119-120) sums up some important criteria of 
what religions bring about: 
»First of all, religions explain. They answer questions that have always 
moved us: questions on the origins of the world, the relationship between 
people and other living beings and the forces at work in this world. They an-
swer the question of why people die (or are born!), why they experience suc-
cesses and failures, and so on. Secondly: religions legitimate the status quo by 
assuming the existence of powers that support the reigning moral and social 
order. [...] Thirdly: religions have a strengthening effect on human efforts in 
the struggle against the perils of life such as illness, death, misfortune, failure, 
distress, catastrophes and so on. They offer the believer inner security by giv-
ing meaning to the world and that which occurs in it. Fourthly: religions in-
crease the feeling of belonging for the members of a group, for example, by 
giving them the opportunity to participate in rituals. Religion has – and here 
we come closer to answering the question of its purpose – at least two sides: it 
provides models of the world and models for behaving in the world.« 
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In the case at hand – the history of religion in Japan – a further problematic 
area emerges, namely the fact that the culture and religion in question are not 
those belonging to the observer, but foreign to him or her. 
Even if this problem seems insignificant at first, far-reaching consequences 
emerge as soon as we enter the area of spiritual culture – that is, religion and eth-
ics, philosophy and systems of social norms. The difference between terminology 
and categorization, for example, which generally remains unconscious, repre-
sents in this case merely one of the first and most obvious labyrinths of cultural 
mimicry, and we are confronted with the problem of translation not only of the 
overall language, but also of semantics. For instance, does our understanding of 
the word »god« also apply in Japan, or does it actually mean »spirit«? And what 
would the word »spirit« mean in this context? To expand upon this on another 
level, is the meaning of the Chinese character for »spirit« (神 shen) identical with 
the Japanese concept associated with the term kami, and does this correspond to 
the European concept of spirits, or rather to that of ghosts? In this context it is 
worth considering Klaus Kracht’s translation of the Japanese term kami in Ger-
man as Geist (»spirit«), and following from that, his translation of shintô as Geist-
Weg (»way of the spirit«; cf. chapter II: 2. 2). Josef Haekel (1971: 73) remarks on 
the problem that there is often an »unconscious tendency to rely on knowledge of 
the religious traditions of European and Western nations when describing and 
assessing the religious life of nations outside of Europe. However, this can easily 
lead to false interpretations of a foreign religion and give a distorted picture of 
it.« This states the matter succinctly. 
When viewing Japanese and other culturally different religions, we must first 
determine our own position in order to derive the assumptions behind our 
judgements. We must ask ourselves what is the position of the observer in rela-
tion to the cultural area under analysis – in this case Japan. 
The subtle codes, symbols and structural principles of the other religion are of-
ten felt to be mysterious, exotic, or at the very least, different. In this context it is 
the responsibility of cultural science to make the religion in question accessible, 
and in so doing, to create the conditions for intercultural understanding.6 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The distinction between one’s »own« culture and »foreign« cultures plays an essential role in the 
methods and self-conception of the cultural sciences, especially in cultural anthropology (cf. Bar-
gatzky 1997). 
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2. 4. Images and stereotypes 
 
It can be said without exaggeration that stereotypes about Japan outnumber 
those attached to almost any other country. While in earlier times Western imagi-
nations were captivated by concepts such as geisha and cherry blossoms, in the 
1930s and ‘40s images of war came to dominate stereotypes of Japan. Today these 
ideas have changed once again and are based more on economic terms and brand 
names than on ideas of war. And yet, though these ideas have changed, the fasci-
nation for the culturally different, which Japan still represents, has remained (cf. 
Antoni 1993b). 
 
2. 4. 1. Images as friend and foe 
 
When looking more closely at widespread views of Japanese culture, it be-
comes apparent that they often share a common denominator in one point: they 
present images of Japan that in most cases generalize and globalize to provide a 
holistic understanding of Japanese culture. From the most common outside per-
spective, Japan generally appears different, foreign, or promising. In some ac-
counts it takes on elements of an utopia in which everything is done completely 
differently – and much better – while other views portray it as a demonic force 
that seeks to surpass its former Western teachers after appropriating all their 
skills, processes and methods and exploiting them for its own use. This view 
clearly paints a picture of Japan as an unscrupulous imitator. 
 
2. 4. 2. Japan as paradise 
 
In looking for the deeper origins of these images of Japan, it is worth remem-
bering the voyages of Christopher Columbus of Genoa in the 15th century, who 
went in search of a legendary land of gold in the East reported by Marco Polo be-
fore him. This was a land whose palaces were said to be made of pure gold and 
which possessed fantastic riches. Marco Polo never reached this legendary em-
pire, but he did pass on its name: Zipangu.7 In fact, Marco Polo’s account of the 
                                                 
7 Cf. Kapitza 1990: 45ff.; Columbus’s journals (cf. Kapitza 1990: 45-53) show how much he was 
consumed with finding a passageway to this land of gold and plenty. One day, on October 23, 
1492, (Columbus was already anchored in Caribbean waters) his goal seemed just within reach. 
He recorded in his journal that the natives had told him of a rich land by the name of Cuba not far 
from his current location. Columbus wrote enthusiastically that he had finally found Zipangu, the 
land of gold, which was called Cuba here (cf. Kapitza 1990: 50). 
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land of gold referred to a very real country, namely Japan. The name Zipangu is 
merely the corrupted pronunciation of the Chinese word for Japan: Ri-pen-guo. 
Thus, Columbus was chasing after an age-old ideal that, centuries before him, 
another European, Marco Polo, had learned of in China and passed on to Europe. 
These reports established the earliest image of Japan in Europe: that of a heavenly 
country, an »earthly paradise,« a place in which everything was completely dif-
ferent than in the known world. 
The second, negative stereotype of Japan as an imitative culture can also be 
traced to its historical roots, as research in Japanese studies shows (cf. Kreiner 
1989: 22ff., among others). Even the first Portuguese missionaries who arrived in 
Japan in the 15th and 16th centuries praised the high morality of the Japanese peo-
ple. They immediately recognized Confucianism as the source of this ethical 
mindset. However, this view laid the foundation for a cliché that soon tuned 
radically negative and tarnished the once so positive image of Japan for a long 
time thereafter. The great minds of the European Enlightenment also praised Ja-
pan for its Confucian values at first, but they soon recognized all too clearly that 
the origins of Confucianism lay not in Japan, but in China. Intellectual interest 
thus shifted away from Japan and toward China. Now Japan was said to be a 
country capable merely of adopting and modifying foreign cultural influences, 
but not of producing its own cultural achievements. This marked the birth of the 
image of Japan as a cultural imitator. This image was propagated especially at the 
beginning of the modern era, i.e. the time after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. No 
other country appeared to submit to its superior former opponents abroad as 
willingly and uncritically as Japan. In fact, however, this served to protect Japan 
from the fate of becoming a colony. 
 
2. 4. 3. Heterostereotypes and autostereotypes 
 
At this point we will make a short detour into the field of stereotype theory in 
order to better understand the complex jungle of Japan’s views both of itself and 
of the outside world. If one looks up the word »stereotype« in a textbook or dic-
tionary, one finds several definitions, including the following very concise one: 
»Opinions about the personal attributes of a group of people. When these 
opinions are widely shared, they are called cultural stereotypes. The stereo-
type as a sociological concept was first posited by [Walter] Lippmann [in: 
Public Opinion, 1922], who defined stereotypes as ‘images in our minds,’ as 
opposed to the ‘world outside.’« (Bierhoff 1984: 199) 
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Werner Herkner specifies the following important criterion for our ability to 
understand others, whether they are individuals or groups: »If we learn the 
stereotype first, before we gain knowledge about individuals, the stereotype will 
dominate our judgments« (Herkner 1991: 493). Wolfgang Manz (1968: 3) remarks 
in agreement that »the ‘images in our mind’ need not agree with the ‘outside 
world’ in order to influence human behavior more strongly than the objective 
conditions.« 
The importance of these statements in the present discussion cannot be over-
stated: they state no less than that our ability to understand the outside world – in 
this case Japanese culture and religions – is influenced by »images in our minds« 
that we possess about the foreign culture in question. But stereotype theory takes 
an important further step. It differentiates between two fundamentally different 
yet interdependent and complimentary categories of stereotypes called »heteros-
tereotypes« and »autostereotypes,« which respectively refer to our image of the 
outside world and our image of ourselves. Stereotype theory is based on the 
complex network of relationships between heterostereotypes and autostereo-
types, which apply to individuals as well as groups, societies and nations. Stereo-
typical views of individual nations are an integral part of this system of ideas.8 
The definition of heterostereotypes and autostereotypes as a corresponding 
pair of opposites is crucially important. This demonstrates in theory and analysis 
the fact that our etic views on a culture are not only influenced by prejudices, cli-
chés and stereotypes from the outside, but that our view of our own group is also 
dominated to a much greater degree by »images in our minds« than a purely 
hermeneutic approach would suggest. This means the following for our investi-
gation: emic statements made by Japanese authors about their own culture – and 
thus implicitly also religion – cannot be said a priori to be authentic – that is to 
say, free of prejudice – but rather, they too must be examined for Japanese autos-
tereotypes. 
Remarkably, especially within Japan itself, firmly established stereotypes 
about Japanese culture and its relationship to the outside world are common, re-
sulting in clear ideas about how a »good« Japanese person should act. One of the 
key tasks of the cultural sciences is to comb through this jungle of historically 
formed images and stereotypes, both within and outside of Japan, thus making 
essentialistic characteristics of Japanese culture objectively comprehensible. 
                                                 
8 Cf. Hofstätter 1973: 110ff. Erich Witte (1989: 428) gives a concise outline of the individual catego-
ries with the example of the relationship between the Germans and the French: autostereotype = 
Germans’ view of the Germans; heterostereotype = Germans’ view of the French; perceived auto-
stereotype = the French’s view of how the Germans view themselves; perceived heterostereotype 
= the French’s view of how they are seen by the Germans. 
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2. 4. 4. Nihonjinron: how Japan sees itself 
 
The book market in Japan has its own extremely popular non-fiction genre that 
deals with the question of what it means to be a member of the Japanese culture. 
These works, which naturally differ widely in quality, are grouped into the cate-
gory of nihonjinron (»discourse on the Japanese«). 
As already the first »modern« emperor of Japan, Meiji-tennô (1852-1912), pro-
grammatically declared in the fifth paragraph of his famous Charter Oath of 
April 1868 (see chapter III: 1) shortly after the opening of Japan, the country 
should orient itself according to Western standards in regard to the economy and 
technology, while not losing its own character and thus Japanese identity. This at-
titude continues to provide the basis for the Japanese conception of government. 
It was no coincidence that Emperor Hirohito (Shôwa-tennô, 1901-1989), Meiji-
tennô’s grandson, made explicit reference to his grandfather’s historic mandate in 
his speech on January 1, 1946, which was crucial for Japan’s development in the 
post-war era (see chapter V: 1. 2. 2). 
This demand is based on the essentalist idea that the Japanese culture would 
be distinguished by various special characteristics not possessed by other coun-
tries, thus justifying its supposed homogeneity. According to the fundamental 
principles of this view, the Japanese people, language, culture, religion and soci-
ety are largely isolated and homogenous even today. Based on a long history 
whose roots lie in the rice-planting culture of pre- and early history, Japan thus 
distinctly shows all the characteristics of an island mentality. This shimaguni (»is-
land country«) mentality is especially evident in religion, and above all in Shintô. 
The traditional Japanese attitude toward outsiders is an important factor in this 
context (see below). 
 
2. 4. 5. Japanese perceptions of the outside world 
 
Foreign influences have historically been adopted into Japanese culture mostly 
in highly assimilated, Japanized forms. The adaptation of foreign elements to the 
standards of another culture is called »acculturation« in the cultural sciences, and 
the following discussion will attempt to briefly outline some of the basic patterns 
of Japanese processes of acculturation relevant to the present context.9 
                                                 
9 On the theory of the »foreign« in the present context, cf. Kreiner 1984: 84ff., Hijiya-Kirschnereit 
1988: 193-211; Krusche 1985 and 1990; Paul 1987, among others; see also the outstanding discus-
sion in Bargatzky 1997. 
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2. 4. 5. 1. Patterns of acculturation 
 
Upon examining Japan’s relationship to the outside world over the course of 
its history, two striking constants emerge. First, it becomes evident that foreign 
influences in Japan have mostly had an essential, often definitive impact on cul-
tural, and thus also religious, development, but brought about very different re-
actions, depending on the historical situation. Phases of extreme xenophilia 
(»love of the foreign«) alternated with periods of xenophobia (»fear of the for-
eign«) that at times reached fanatic levels. Secondly, however, the inhabitants of 
the Japanese islands hardly ever had the opportunity to encounter foreign influ-
ences directly, much less foreigners themselves. The true outside world was spa-
tially and mentally always far away, only tangible in nebulous ideas, and was 
therefore said to be threatening, even dangerous. 
Furthermore, Japan’s status as an island nation allowed the country to regulate 
contact with the outside world itself. Japan never experienced a free, uncontrolled 
influx of people or ideas from the outside. Foreign elements were allowed into 
the country for pragmatic reasons, in order to be integrated into Japan’s own cul-
tural context. Thus, Japan’s relationship with the outside world was always influ-
enced by efforts toward acculturation and adaptation, by the assimilation of non-
Japanese elements to Japan’s own cultural horizon. 
The 13th century, however, was marked by events that must be seen as a break 
in Japanese foreign relations: the failed attempts by Mongolian troops to invade 
Japan. This event has since taken on a traumatic – even archetypical – role in 
Japanese thought: foreigners, coming by sea, seeking to penetrate into and subju-
gate the home country by force. Since this time, nationalistic theologians have 
long attempted to utilize the Mongol attacks for religious and ideological pur-
poses. By attributing the saving of Japan to the influence of native gods – espe-
cially the sun goddess and ancestral deity of the imperial household, Amaterasu – 
the idea of Japan’s unique religious position was established. According to this 
interpretation, the country was only saved because it is a privileged »land of the 
gods« (shinkoku), and it was only thanks to the »wind of the gods« (kamikaze) sent 
by the gods of the shrines of Ise that saved Japan from the foreign threat.10 In the 
following centuries, these ideas were formed into an increasingly complete sys-
tem of religious and nationalistic maxims, according to which Japan and its in-
habitants, due to their »divine origins,« were viewed as having a unique position 
                                                 
10 On the »wind of the gods,« cf. Naumann 1994: 47, 50f., 119f., 134, 145, 169; on the concept of 
shinkoku cf. Nawrocki 1998. Kamikaze is the makurakotoba (epitheton ornans) for Ise. 
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among all the nations of the earth (cf. chapter IV: 2.). In the 1930s and ‘40s this 
concept of Japan’s religiously founded »uniqueness« reached its climax in the 
form of an ultranationalistic ideology. 
But how was this dogmatic concept justified in light of the clear fact that so 
many of the elements that make up the »Japanese spirit« (wakon), beyond the 
merely technological and pragmatic (yôsai), ultimately originated abroad? Even 
the most ardent supporters of the concept of the Japanese nation could hardly 
deny the fact that the Japanese writing system, for example, originally comes 
from China, as is the case with the ethical maxims of the great teachings of Con-
fucianism, which even today form an integral part of the Japanese system of eth-
ics. The origins of Buddhism in India are just as irrefutable as the foreign roots of 
Christianity in Japan. Modern philosophy, technologies and social systems in Ja-
pan also show diverse links to origins outside of the country’s borders. 
These facts do not present a problem to an enlightened perspective, which as-
sumes the global diffusion of culture to be an inevitability. For religious and eth-
nocentric thought, however – which constantly seeks to establish the superiority 
of the home culture over foreign elements and is only capable of recognizing 
these foreign influences according to the degree to which they have been assimi-
lated into the home culture – such questions indeed present an existential prob-
lem. Certain patterns of acculturation of foreign elements can be observed in 
Japanese history. This is especially true of the country’s religious culture, which is 
largely characterized by a specific pattern of adaptation of foreign influences that 
is best described as an »adapting« of foreign influences. 
The efforts of some Japanese scholars in various areas to show that a certain 
cultural element that originated abroad is actually Japanese, or at least is so Ja-
panized that its foreign origin becomes inconsequential, are well known. Accord-
ing to this view, foreign ideas consistently enter Japan, where they reach their ul-
timate perfection. Thus, Japan is to be seen not as a cultural imitator, as the mali-
cious Western cliché would have it, but rather as the cultural terminus of global 
intellectual activity.11 This model is best summarized as the »perfection« of for-
eign influences. 
There is also a further, more widespread approach to recognizing elements of 
one’s own culture in another, thus transcending its foreignness. In particular, 
Buddhism and Shintô have made use of this model, which states that deities of 
foreign religions are actually manifestations of indigenous, Japanese gods. This 
form of »identification,« as I would like to call this approach, originated in Indian 
                                                 
11 Josef Kreiner (1989: 35) refers to the general problem of this explanation and cites the Indonesian 
cultural critic Arifin Bey’s formulation of Japan as a »terminal culture.« 
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Buddhism and aimed to integrate polytheistic local and regional beliefs into the 
universal concept of Buddhism. And yet, nowhere has this approach been more 
successful than in Japan. Japan’s much touted religious tolerance is largely based 
on the syncretistic identification of indigenous and foreign deities which are thus 
incorporated into and made accessible to Japanese culture and religion. 
Finally, there is a third approach to adapting foreign elements to Japan, which 
I will call »eclecticism.« According to this view, the best elements of various for-
eign systems are selected and combined into something new and better. This new 
conglomeration is to be seen as Japanese and is definitely superior to the mere 
sum of its parts. An example of this is the state doctrine of the Meiji period, 
which, as can be seen in the example of the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 
(see chapter III: 3. 1), combined ethical values of different origins into an eclectic 
doctrine of ethics whose character was then transfigured into an expression of the 
essence of Japan. 
These three categories describe the basic patterns of acculturation in Japan. The 
idea of »perfection« holds that foreign ideas make their way to Japan, where they 
are brought to their highest form, refined, and finally perfected. The concept of 
»identification,« on the other hand, holds that foreign ideas, or elements of them, 
enter the country and are recognized as being essentially identical with ancient 
indigenous concepts. Finally, the »eclectic« approach holds that the best elements 
of various foreign ideas are combined in Japan into something completely new 
and superior, and thus made Japanese. 
All of these models of acculturation share the basic axiomatic principle that 
foreign elements ultimately can only be accepted in a Japanized form, and not in 
their original state. It appears that only when the irritating foreign elements have 
been eliminated and their Japanese core, whatever its nature may be, is revealed 
can they be accepted without risk. Thus, foreign elements that, for whatever rea-
son, cannot be adapted and assimilated must be perceived as a serious threat and 
are often painfully excluded from the majority culture (cf. Antoni 1995b, among 
others). 
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3. COORDINATES IN JAPANESE CULTURE AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY 
 
Since the problem of religion, and especially of Shintô – as we have seen – 
cannot be viewed separately from the fundations and dynamics of Japanese cul-
ture as a whole, the following discussion will summarize some important ele-
ments of Japanese religious history in order to prepare the ground for the follow-
ing discussion.12 
 
3. 1. History 
 
Unlike the situation in post-war Germany, in Japan the year 1945 has never 
been seen to the same degree as a historic turning point in the sense of a new be-
ginning unencumbered by history. The break provided by the Japanese defeat in 
the war indeed had lasting effects on Japanese society, for example, in the form of 
a modern(ized) Constitution and a political turn toward the United States, and 
yet continuities remain in Japan that can only be understood historically. 
This is especially clear in the fact that Japan still uses its own calendar system 
for years. The official Japanese calendar is not the Gregorian, or Western calen-
dar, but the traditional Japanese system based on the periods of rule of the Japa-
nese emperors (gengô, traditionally nengô). The psychological importance of this 
calendar in Japan can be seen, for example, in the fact that after 1945, the year of 
Japan’s defeat, the emperor not only retained his position, but also the era name – 
and thus the cycle of year numbers – remained unchanged. Only after the death 
of Emperor Hirohito (Shôwa-tennô) on January 7, 1989, was a new era name 
(Heisei) declared, marking the beginning of a new calendar cycle. 
This calendar system has the effect that in Japan history is not viewed as a lin-
ear progression, but rather in an insular manner.13 One cannot tell how far back 
in history an event lies simply from the calendar date on which it took place – for 
example, in the year Taihô 1. Only after placing it in a linear chronology is its true 
historical distance revealed, as in the case of Taihô 1, which corresponds to the 
year 701 A.D. 
                                                 
12 The following discussion summarizes some basic concepts of Japanese studies relevant to the 
topic at hand. Additional facts can be found in the standard reference works. 
13 For more details on Japanese concepts of time, cf. Kracht 1989; Tanaka 1993. 
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Obviously, this concept of time results in a different view of history, in which 
history becomes a kind of ocean with individual events scattered across it like is-
lands. In extreme cases, an event’s historical distance from the present is of only 
secondary importance. In the context of religions, this fact results in a general in-
difference toward an objective historical chronology. Taken to the extreme, this 
can allow the age of myths to be directly linked to the present. 
 
3. 1. 1. The power of genealogy 
 
A further characteristic of Japanese culture that continues to be influential to 
this day is the fact that the country’s history has always been shaped by large 
families, dynasties or clans. Whether for the imperial household, which proudly 
claims to have reigned without a change of dynasties since the mists of time (al-
though this is viewed much more critically by historians), the important families 
of the court nobility (and above all, the Fujiwara clan), the military nobility (espe-
cially the Minamoto and Tokugawa houses) or merchants and farmers, the crucial 
factor determining one’s position and reputation has always been one’s genea-
logical family membership – that is, one’s descent – which could also be attained 
by adoption. Stated in the extreme, the power of genealogy can be seen as the 
driving force in Japanese cultural history and is especially important in the relig-
ious legitimation of ruling power. 
 
3. 1. 2. Outline of ancient history (before 1868) 
 
The religiously justified genealogies are also of such great importance because 
they point directly to the problem of the origins of the Japanese people and state. 
In modern Japan, until the end of the Pacific War, State Shintô dogma held that 
the Japanese empire was founded by the mythical first emperor, Jinmu-tennô, 
who allegedly formed his government in the year corresponding to 660 B.C. This 
version of historical events can still be found today both in Japan and abroad, and 
the National Foundation Day (February 11) has even been made a national holi-
day again (see below). 
Nevertheless, it has been archeologically and historically proven that the sup-
posed founding of the empire by Jinmu-tennô is a legend that has nothing in 
common with the historical facts. Historical research has shown that the Japanese 
state, like the Japanese language, developed only gradually. Only about 1000 
years after the fictitious date of 660 B.C. did the Japanese state begin to develop 
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out of several smaller principalities. This state took shape only after the 5th cen-
tury through contact with China. (Cf. among others Antoni 2012a: 373ff.) 
China was the source of Buddhism and Confucianism, and therefore also pro-
vided the methods for ruling over a central government. Following the Chinese 
model, Japanese rulers were now called »divine rulers« (tennô) and claimed sov-
ereign power, supported by a host of magistrates. Unlike China, however, where 
the emperor’s power was based on a divine mandate that could theoretically be 
taken away, the emperor based his and his family’s power solely on his supposed 
divine origins as a direct descendant of the mythical heavenly deities – and in 
particular, of the sun goddess Amaterasu ômikami. This legitimation still applies 
to a large extent today. Although, under pressure from the allied forces, the em-
peror officially renounced his own divinity on January 1, 1946, the current em-
peror, Akihito, is still officially considered the 125th emperor in the direct line of 
descent leading back to the sun goddess (see chapter V: 3.). This is as clear a 
manifestation as any of the genealogical and religious mode of thinking. 
 
3. 1. 3. The modern era 
 
The history of modern Japan begins with a paradox. This period’s axiomatic 
starting point, the year 1868, was marked by an event whose intentions appear 
anything but modern: the Meiji Restoration. In this year, the political and social 
order that had characterized Japan during the Tokugawa period came to an end. 
Although the Meiji Restoration of 1868 is said to be the beginning of modern Ja-
pan, it was based on the idea of restoring the supposedly ancient institution of 
divine imperial rule. 
This apparent contradiction cannot be overlooked in any examination of the 
foundations of modern Japan and its concept of government. Along with the 
opening of the country, which was forced by the West, the Meiji Restoration also 
brought the backward-looking concept of a reconstruction of earlier models of 
governance. Over the course of the Meiji period, this traditionalist idea was im-
plemented in the comprehensive, religiously and politically based concept of 
government that postulated a uniquely Japanese »national polity« (kokutai). Up 
until Japan’s defeat in 1945, this concept of the kokutai, which was centered 
around the emperor and based on Shintô thought, formed the official and bind-
ing Japanese concept of the state. 
The more modern Japan became after the Meiji Restoration in the fields of 
technology, science and the economy, the more influential the Shintô-based state 
ideology became for the nation’s conception of itself. The worship of the emperor 
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was elevated to the level of a nationally mandatory religion, in which the em-
peror served as the metaphysical and mythical core of the national family. 
Thus came about the peculiar circumstance that the triumph of rational 
thought in Japan was accompanied by increasing irrationality in regard to the 
foundations of culture, the state and society. This process, however, by no means 
occurred on an unconscious, spiritual level, but rather was consistently the result 
of careful planning and implementation. The fact that the creators of the new 
Empire of Japan – which was born in 1868 and took on its true form in the Consti-
tution of 1889 – themselves took an extremely pragmatic position toward this is-
sue can be seen, for example, in the official commentary to the Constitution by 
the statesman Itô Hirobumi, one of the fathers of the so-called Meiji Constitution 
(see chapter III: 3. 1. 1.). 
Japan’s religions play an important role in Itô’s writings. Thus, in order to un-
derstand this development, we must briefly examine the essential elements of the 
three main strands of Japanese intellectual and religious history: Buddhism, Con-
fucianism and Shintô. 
 
3. 2. Religion and values: syncretism rather than denomination 
 
Japanese intellectual and religious history is widely said to be characterized by 
a marked tolerance in regard to the relations between the country’s various relig-
ions. Indeed, over the course of Japanese history, there have only seldom been 
phases of open religious intolerance, for example, from certain Buddhist sects 
(Nichiren) in the Japanese Middle Ages, or the »separation of gods and Buddhas« 
(shinbutsu-bunri) and dogmatic State Shintô during the modern era. Otherwise, 
the three intellectual and religious areas, each of which is itself remarkably het-
erogeneous, have usually existed peacefully alongside – and above all, along with 
– one another, and denominational fanaticism, as in European history, has gener-
ally not been common. Rather, the concept of syncretism, along with its various 
forms of acculturation, has consistently been Japan’s fundamental approach to re-
ligion. Under this approach, Shintô deities were identified with the higher beings 
of Buddhism – often by way of tenuous constructions and speculations – and, on 
a higher level of thinking, the two were considered to be identical.14 
Even today, Japan continues to be strongly influenced by syncretistic thought. 
This is especially apparent in the area of unorganized folk religions, along with 
                                                 
14 For an introduction to religious syncretism in the Japanese Middle Ages, cf. Kubota 1989; Ma-
tsunaga 1969; Naumann 1994; Scheid 2001; Teeuwen 1996. 
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their many local, regional and nationwide festivals that take place throughout the 
year, or in certain religious beliefs about individual saints and demons, which are 
the result of centuries of syncretism. The numerous new religions also make use 
of various forms of traditional spiritual culture, often creating new, sometimes 
seemingly bizarre religious systems that might include Buddha and the sun god-
dess Amaterasu just as well as Confucius, or even Jesus. This kind of religious 
thought is not the result of naivety or indifference toward religion, but rather 
simply the basic syncretistic belief that, on a higher level, everything is related 
and often interchangeable. In this sense, syncretism seems more alive today than 
ever. 
The »new« and »newest« religions in Japan, which have emerged in large 
numbers since the pre-modern era and continue to do so even today, generally 
take their teachings from the foundations of these three classic schools of Japa-
nese intellectual and religious history.15 
Only Christianity has not been able to become a determining factor in Japanese 
society and culture. The realization that in other parts of Asia Christian mission-
ary work and political colonization by the European powers always went hand-
in-hand was the reason behind the Tokugawa bakufu’s extremely severe suppres-
sion, and finally the prohibition, of Christianity already in the early 17th century. 
Even in modern Japan, the state continued to mistrust Christians until 1945. In 
post-war Japan Christian communities were free to develop, but today they play 
only a marginal role in society, regardless of the fact that the Japanese Christian 
community often voices its concerns over highly political questions, for example, 
the emperor’s responsibility for the war.16 
Thus, the three traditional systems – Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintô – 
play a key role in understanding Japan’s spiritual foundations, since they are all 
to some degree a part of nearly every syncretistic system of beliefs. The overall re-
lationship between these three systems of Japanese intellectual and religious his-
tory can be demonstrated in the form of a diagram, which shows that each of the 
three areas carries out certain functions within the entire value system of tradi-
tional Japanese culture. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Unfortunately, the topic of »new religions« cannot be further pursued in the present study. For 
a thematic introduction to this complex area of research in modern Japanese religious history, cf. 
Inoue 1990, 1994b; Inoue, Laube 1995; Matsuno 1990; Staemmler, Dehn 2011, among others. 
16 Cf. the case of the mayor of Nagasaki, who became a vocal participant in the debate over Ja-
pan’s responsibility for the war (see chapter V: 3. 1). 
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As this model shows, Shintô connects the areas of religion and the state, and 
especially the institution of the emperor. Buddhism bridges religion and ethics, 
with Amida Buddhism and Zen as two poles. Finally, Confucianism completes 
the system, linking the areas of ethics and the state. 
 
3. 2. 1. Buddhism 
 
In the 6th century, Buddhism had already developed into a sophisticated, com-
plex world religion and made its way from Korea to Japan. The ruler of the Ko-
rean kingdom of Paekche presented to the ruler of the Japanese state of Yamato a 
statue of Buddha as a gift, signifying the high regard for Buddhist teachings 
throughout known world at the time. Thus, this foreign religion embodied the 
prestige as well as the power of the foreign – the world outside Japan. And yet, 
over time, the formation of syncretistic systems became a specific characteristic of 
Japanese Buddhist theology. Tendai syncretism, for example, viewed Shintô gods 
as the manifestations of certain Buddhas or Bodhisattvas called gongen (»tempo-
rary incarnations«). According to this belief, the manifestations of Buddha left 
their traces in Japan as Shintô gods (honji-suijaku). The syncretism of Shingon 
Buddhism, on the other hand, which was founded by Kûkai (Kôbô Daishi, 744-
835), whose teachings emphasized the two virtues of the Buddha Vairocana 
(Japanese: Dainichi), saw the sun goddess Amaterasu as a manifestation of this 
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Buddha. Already the Monk Gyôki (668-749) consulted an oracle, according to 
which Amaterasu was declared the manifestation of Vairocana-Buddha.17 
The basic structure of Buddhist-Shintôist syncretism remained largely un-
changed up to the year 1868, when both areas were violently separated from one 
another under the modern Meiji state and artificially made into independent be-
lief systems (shinbutsu-bunri; see chapter III: 2. 2). In popular belief, however, the 
old syncretistic connections between kami and Bodhisattvas, or Buddhas, has re-
mained intact to this day. 
This complexity has long been a characteristic of Buddhism in Japan; a number 
of varieties of Hînayâna (»Inferior Vehicle«), Mahâyâna (»Great Vehicle«), eso-
tericism, and Nenbutsu (Amida Buddhism) have thrived as religions in Japan for 
ages. Today Buddhist places of worship, which, unlike Shintô shrines, are always 
called »temples« (tera, or ji), serve a more formalized religious function, especially 
for carrying out funeral ceremonies (while marriages are now usually carried out 
according to the modern Shintô ritual).18 Thus, essentially, the »final questions« 
of humanity relating to life after death are the domain of Buddhism, while the 
events of one’s lifetime are influenced by Shintô deities. 
In philosophically as well as theological terms, during the post-war era, it has 
been with considerable difficulty that Buddhism has been able to recover from 
the repression it suffered since the Meiji period, as well as from its earlier exploi-
tation by the state during the Tokugawa period. Especially in the new religions – 
for example, the Sôka Gakkai – Buddhist thought has been updated and is often 
used for political purposes. These groups are also undertaking extensive efforts 
toward worldwide missionary activities. 
 
3. 2. 2. Confucianism 
 
Especially in the current debate over so-called »(East) Asian values,« Confu-
cianism plays a dominant role. The ethical norms of Confucian philosophy are 
used to explain the cultural prerequisites for economic development in many 
countries in East Asia not only by various Western commentators, but also in-
creasingly in East-Asian discourse. In particular, Confucian social ethics are seen 
as contrasting with the individualistic notion of society in the West. This problem 
                                                 
17 Cf. Kubota 1989; Matsunaga 1969; Murayama 1972; Naumann 1994: chapter A; Wata 1985. 
18 Ôbayashi Taryô (1997) provides an introduction to this topic in his essay »The Origins of the 
Shintô Wedding,« in which the author demonstrates the historically recent character of these 
ceremonies. See also Antoni 2001b.  
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extends far into the area of political debate and touches on some sensitive topics, 
such as the universality of human rights. 
Japan takes on a special position in this context. Since the country began to 
turn toward the West already since the middle of the 19th century and has mod-
ernized its social, political and economic structures, the debates on »East Asian 
values« cannot be directly applied to Japan. Although Confucianism was an ex-
tremely important influence over the course of Japanese history, modern Japan in 
particular has officially distanced itself from the context of Confucianism. In fact, 
however, there are areas in which the Confucian value system still plays an im-
portant role in contemporary Japan (cf. Antoni 1996). 
 
3. 2. 2. 1. The history of Confucianism in Japan 
 
The history of Confucianism in Japan19 can be divided into several periods, of 
which the two broadest ones are 1) State Confucianism in ancient times, and 2) 
Neo-Confucianism during the Japanese Middle Ages and the pre-modern era. Yet 
here, too, it was most often the syncretistic hybrid forms that determined spiritual 
and ethical practice in Japan, and rarely ever any one »pure« religion. 
The State Confucianism of ancient times mostly applied to the modernization 
of government institutions and the establishment of a centralized government. 
Unlike the system in China, however, bureaucrats were recruited from the con-
siderable ranks of the court nobility. The position of the emperor in particular 
was not determined by ability or personal virtue (important criteria for rulers in 
China), but rather solely on the basis of ancestry (see discussion below). 
After a period of decline, Confucian thought experienced an exceptional ren-
aissance during the Edo period. The ethical norms of what is known as Neo-
Confucianism governed the social order to a large degree and determined even 
the smallest details of life in society (see chapter II: 2. 2. 1). Instrumental to this 
end were the Five Relationships (gorin), which continue to be an essential factor 
in the hierarchical nature of Japanese society to this day (see discussion below). 
Already in the Edo period, Confucianism had become closely linked with 
Shintô, but after 1868 this symbiosis had become so inextricable that ultimately its 
foundation of Confucian ethics began to lose importance and threatened to slip 
into obscurity. Since then, it has become a widely held belief in Japan that the 
character of the country’s basic system of ethics is the result of originally Japanese 
                                                 
19 For introductory literature on Japanese Confucianism, with an emphasis on pre-modern devel-
opments since the Edo period, cf. Boot 1992; Inoue 1897, 1918, 1945; Kracht 1986; Minamoto 1972; 
Nosco 1984; Ooms 1985; Smith 1973. See chapter II: 2. 2. 1. 
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values and has very little in common with Chinese Confucianism. This fact also 
adds considerably to the difficulty of debating so-called »Asian values« in Japan, 
since very few people there are conscious of the Asian – that is to say, originally 
Confucian – background of the country’s own value system, which is often identi-
fied with Shintô (cf. Antoni 1996: 134ff., among others). Today’s social values and 
norms in Japan (orderliness, diligence, hierarchy and harmony) have their roots 
in the school of Confucian thought that was so successfully made Japanese (in the 
sense of the principle of »perfection« discussed in chapter I: 2. 4. 5. 1) by the Meiji 
government and established within the national discourse. 
 
3. 2. 3. Shintô 
 
Setting aside all historical changes, which are the focus of this study, it is pos-
sible to determine some constant characteristics that are common to Shintô across 
its various schools and stages of development (see also Naumann 1985b). 
The first of these is the fact that in Shintô a vast number of deities are wor-
shipped (polytheism), while the common festivals (matsuri) serve a crucial role in 
religious practice. The shrine (jinja or yashiro) – the deity’s »house« – serves as the 
place of worship in Shintô, and never the temple, which refers exclusively to 
Buddhist places of worship. The entrance to every shrine is marked by a gate (to-
rii), usually made of wood, which separates the sacred space from the profane 
space around it. 
The concept of purity forms the core ethical belief of Shintô and can be found 
in all areas of life. Sickness and death are thought to be fundamentally unclean 
and thus are subject to extensive rules of avoidance. Therefore, these areas also do 
not fall under the scope of Shintô theology and are usually covered by Buddhism. 
Since the Edo period, the institution of the emperor has been the focus of Shin-
tôist theories, resulting in the concept of the kokutai as the expression of a specifi-
cally Japanese, religiously and culturally based ethnocentrism. For this reason, 
this study will deal extensively with the emperor, the kokutai and nationalism, 
while other relevant areas, such as popular belief, sect Shintô or new religions, 
cannot be discussed in the same scope. Since the entire complex of Shintô in the 
past went through a clear pattern of development, it can only be understood dia-
chronically. Static, ahistorical definitions would be misleading, rather than aiding 
our understanding. 
For this reason, a historical excursus on the early development of Shintô is nec-
essary in order to demonstrate that the core problems of the modern era were not 
historically isolated phenomena. Some of the basic aspects of its pre-modern and 
      CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND FUNDAMENTALS  n  43 
 
ancient development will therefore be summarized in the following discussion, 
since they are essential to understanding events in the modern era (see also An-
toni 1991: 11-29). 
Since only a short overview can be offered here, see also both works by Nelly 
Naumann (1988 and 1994) from the Handbook of Oriental Studies series for a com-
prehensive discussion of the eras up to the beginning of the Edo period. 
 
3. 2. 3. 1. Historical development 
 
The Japanese scholar Ôbayashi Taryô (1982: 135) defines Japan’s »indigenous 
religion,« Shintô, in the following manner: »generally speaking, the primeval re-
ligion of Japan; more precisely, a system that combined ancient forms of religion 
and Chinese elements for political purposes.« According to this definition, the 
term »Shintô« does not refer to a single religious system, but rather to a number 
of diverse belief systems that developed over the course of history. 
This definition does not characterize Shintô as nature or ancestor worship, but 
simply calls it an »primeval religion,« and mentions certain »political purposes.« 
This poses two questions: 1) What is to be understood under the concept of a 
Japanese »primeval religion,« and 2) what does the author mean by »political 
purposes«? 
Let us first go as far back as the written sources allow. The oldest written 
works in Japan, the Kojiki (»Records of Ancient Matters«) from the year 712 A.D. 
and the Nihonshoki (»Chronicles of Japan«) from the year 720 A.D., play a key role 
here. These works, which were conceived of as historical records, provide insight 
into the official conception of history at the time by describing the country’s his-
tory from its mythical beginnings up to the time they were written. At the same 
time, these works, and especially the Kojiki, are viewed to a certain degree as »sa-
cred books« of Shintô in traditional Shintô circles.20 
 
3. 2. 3. 1. 1. The legitimation of the imperial household 
 
The first chapters of these works are of particular importance in this context, 
since they contain the country’s mythical tradition and thus the religiously 
authoritative, and still current, foundations of the official Shintô doctrine. These 
include accounts of the creation of the world, the gods and their deeds, the ori-
gins of the imperial household and the basis for its power. 
                                                 
20 For a general discussion and interpretation of the Kojiki as a historicial source cf. Antoni 2012a: 
273-479. 
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This reveals a characteristic trait of Japanese mythology: it serves to legitimate 
the power of the imperial household. This purpose is also the reason for one of 
the core points in the above definition of Shintô, the question of »political pur-
poses.« 
This question is closely related to the events that occurred in ancient Japan, 
particularly in the 6th, 7th and 8th centuries A.D. Up until this time, the Japanese 
archipelago was politically divided into many different local dominions, each of 
which was ruled by the most powerful family or clan (uji) in the region. The 
heads of these ruling families were not only the chief political figures, but also 
presided over religious aspects of the clan’s territory. The genealogies of these 
families were recorded in myths, and of course the most politically powerful 
among them also played a prominent spiritual role. 
By the 6th century, however, this situation changed drastically. Whether by 
their own will or not, the clans combined into ever expanding domains until fi-
nally one clan, the so-called »sun clan,« was able to exercise hegemony over Ya-
mato, the central area of Japan around what is now Nara. 
Naturally, the question of how to manage the state and maintain control over 
its territories, which were enormous by the standards of the day, represented a 
problem of existential importance for this newly formed and still very unstable 
political entity. The solution to this problem was found in China, the »Middle 
Kingdom,« with its highly developed culture and statesmanship. Everything that 
might guarantee the security of the state was then systematically brought to Ja-
pan. Bureaucratic structures were created according to the Chinese model that 
still appear feasible and sensible even by modern standards. The state was com-
pletely Sinicized, that is to say, opened to Chinese culture. And in this case Chi-
nese culture means – besides Buddhism, which is of lesser importance in this con-
text – in particular the teachings of Confucius and his successors. 
The central part of this body of thought was the ideal state, led by an ideal 
ruler, the »Son of Heaven.« However, only a truly virtuous ruler could ensure the 
well-being of the state, since there was a deep mystical connection between the 
two. If the emperor lost his personal virtue and strayed from the correct path, 
then it was not only possible to depose him – it was his subjects’ moral duty to 
overthrow this ruler who had become so dangerous to the country. This school of 
thought was led by the Confucian philosopher Mencius (Mengzi)21 and was 
brought to Japan as part of the spread of Chinese thought. 
                                                 
21 On Mencius cf. Bryan William Van Norden: Mengzi. With selections from traditional commentaries. 
Indianapolis: Hackett 2008; see also Antoni 2012a: 317. 
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Significantly, it was this very issue of the possibility of deposing the emperor 
that marked Japan’s departure from the Chinese model. The entrenched interests 
of the ancient clan thinking were too strong for the ruling »Sun Dynasty« to ac-
cept the idea of a legal means of dethronement. The Japanese rulers, who had 
come to be called tennô (»divine ruler«), saw themselves as being equal, if not su-
perior, to the Chinese emperors,22 and they systematically sought to establish 
their own means of legitimizing their power over the empire that were con-
sciously differentiated from the Confucian model. 
The source of these means of legitimation was found in the traditional myths 
about the imperial family, which told of the divine origins of the progenitor of the 
imperial family and proclaimed the living emperors to be the direct descendants 
of the sun goddess. They claimed that the sun goddess had given her grandson, 
the first human emperor, and his descendants a mandate to rule the country of 
Japan for all time as a single dynasty (shinchoku).23 A change of dynasties, such as 
in China, was never to take place, nor was it possible to renounce this mandate to 
rule. 
This is the »political purpose« that Ôbayashi refers to in his definition of 
Shintô. At its core was the Japanese concept of rule that was developed by Japa-
nese court scholars in the 7th century, and which contrasted with the overwhelm-
ing influence of Chinese culture. The more the state was formally Sinicized – that 
is, influenced by Chinese cultural elements – the more clearly the Japanese em-
peror came to be characterized as the divine descendant of a heavenly being who 
was the source of all existence and meaning. This deification of the emperor, and 
ultimately of the entire country, is the essential meaning of the word shintô, as the 
»way of the gods of Japan.« Nelly Naumann (1970: 13) states in this context: 
»The concrete meaning of the word shintô can be said to consist in the ideal of 
a divine emperor of Japan, which includes the divinity of the ruling emperors 
as well as their mandate to rule, which was issued by the sun goddess.« 
This system, which is commonly called the »great tradition« of Shintô (this dis-
cussion does not cover the wide field of folk religion) was the result of the coun-
try’s confrontation with a culture that was far more advanced than its own and 
was viewed as being superior, but whose accomplishments the Japanese nonethe-
                                                 
22 This is already shown by the famous letter Empress Suikô wrote to the Chinese Emperor, ad-
dressing him as the Emperor of the West who respectfully is greeted by the Emperor of the East, 
i.e., Suiko-tennô counts herself as equal in value to the Chinese Son of Heaven. Cf. Nihonshoki, 
Suiko-tennô, 16/9 (NKBT, vol. 67: 192). 
23 Cf. Nihonshoki (NKBT, vol. 67: 147); Kojiki (NKBT, vol. 1: 126f.); Kogoshûi (GR, vol. 25: 5); Florenz 
1919: 246 and Antoni 1998: 77, n. 48. 
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less sought to emulate. It was possible to adapt these foreign cultural elements 
without risk as long as the central issue – in this case, the emperor’s right to rule – 
remained intact. The rulers who advanced this process were themselves pious 
Buddhists. Shintô, on the other hand, provided them with a political and meta-
physical justification to rule that did not fall under Chinese conceptions of the 
state. Thus, any effort to determine the essence of Shintô immediately reveals the 
religion’s fundamentally political orientation, the aim of which was to legitimate 
the power of the emperor. 
Only in the Japanese Middle Ages did an independent Shintô theology begin 
to develop (cf. Naumann 1994). Although the emperors had lost their power of 
direct rule to the military nobility and the bakufu, which ruled in the name of the 
imperial family and maintained its authority for the most part until 1868, in the 
circles of Shintô theology, the idea of Japan as a land under the special protection 
of the gods, or shinkoku (»land of the gods«), began to develop. Based on the 
mythical tradition, radical proponents of this view concluded that not only the 
imperial family was divine, but also the entire nation of Japan. They saw Japan as 
a country that was set apart from all the other nations of the world by its unique, 
indigenous spirit, the yamato-damashii, or »spirit of Yamato.« This marked the 
birth of pre-modern and modern religious nationalism and traditionalism in Ja-
pan, which was based on – or rather, identical with – Shintô. 
This formed the foundation upon which Shintô theology – beginning in the 
18th century, at the latest – returned to the political sphere and began to influence 
the onset of Japan’s relations with the European powers, and with the United 
States in particular. These questions will be examined in depth over the course of 
this study. 
 
3. 2. 3. 1. 2. The »primeval religion« of Japan 
 
The second of the questions posed above, on the other hand, about Japan’s 
»primeval religion,« is much more difficult to answer than the question of the 
emergence of political Shintô. Of course, pre-Buddhist religions certainly existed 
in Japan, but it should not be overlooked that the sources do not offer us a clear 
picture of these religions. Rather, information on this topic must be carefully 
gathered from the sources of tradition, and the field of religious studies is still far 
from reaching a unified view on this area. 
Alongside the few conclusions resulting from archaeological research – for ex-
ample, certain beliefs about life after death can be inferred from burial methods – 
once again it is the myths of the ancient written sources, in particular the Kojiki 
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and Nihonshoki, that offer a key to understanding. Individual elements of these 
myths, which were organized into a coherent system by Japanese statesmen in 
the 7th and 8th centuries with the purpose of legitimating the rule of the emperor, 
allow valuable conclusions to be drawn about the earliest Japanese belief systems 
– the »primeval religion of Japan.« 
The remains of ancient mythology can still be found in daily life in Japan to-
day. This is due to the function that the myths served in Japan over the centuries. 
First recorded in the previously mentioned chronicles in the 8th century A.D., 
these myths served to legitimate the rule of the imperial dynasty in the Chinese-
oriented imperial state in ancient Japan. Organized and recorded with the aid of 
scholars of the imperial court, they were intended to document this dynasty’s 
eternal right to rule. However, along with the decline of imperial power in the 
Japanese Middle Ages, the ancient chronicles – and the myths they recorded – 
were largely forgotten. Only in the pre-modern era did Japan return to an inten-
sive reception of the mythical tradition in the face of domestic problems as well as 
the aforementioned threat from abroad. The ancient sources were intended to 
help restore the construct of an »authentic« Japan, in the sense of nativism. The 
most important source in this context is the Kojiki. The preface by the work’s 
author or compiler, Ô no Yasumaro, from March 9, 712 A.D., sheds some light on 
how it was written.24 
It becomes evident that the mythology of the Kojiki, which was later raised to 
the status of a sacred tradition by Shintô theologians and ideologues, was influ-
enced from the beginning by the intentions of its compiler. That is, the work 
summarizes the (oral?) traditions and, in accordance with the imperial mandate, 
serves to prove the divine origins of the imperial house, and thus to legitimate its 
political power. A single »primeval religion,« however, such as was postulated by 
the Kokugaku school of the Edo period, cannot be deduced from the ancient writ-
ings. At the dawn of its history, Shintô appears in a dazzling array of forms; this 
work makes no mention of a unified thread of a homogenous primeval religion of 
Japan. 
Shintô mythology was thus clearly politically motivated toward legitimating 
imperial rule from the beginning. And yet, these first written sources also show 
                                                 
24 In the preface, Ô no Yasumaro laments that the ancient traditions were on the verge of being 
forgotten. For this reason, he continues, Emperor Tenmu, who died in 686, ordered the compila-
tion of a national history in order to preserve these traditions. Yasumaro recorded everything 
from the origins of heaven and earth to the rule of Empress Suiko (592-628) according to an oral 
account by Hieda no Are. The historical existence of the compiler has been established by grave 
finds (cf. the article »Ô no Yasumaro« in MN XXXIV/2, 1979: 257). Cf. Antoni 2012a: 324-330. 
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the diverse origins of individual myths, which were first formed into a single, 
continuous tradition by the compilers of the Kojiki. 
It is worth noting that in the second of these ancient sources, the Nihonshoki, 
the mythical content is presented in much more complexity than in the Kojiki. 
While the Kojiki tells a single, continuous story aimed at a certain purpose, the 
Nihonshoki usually offers several variants of a given story that differ from one an-
other. The many variants contained in the Nihonshoki show that several branches 
of the traditional myths were indeed known, which often differed greatly from 
one another. The Shintô doctrine of a single, homogenous tradition solely based 
on the Kojiki, which was constructed by the Kokugaku school in the pre-modern 
era, thus represented an illusion from the very beginning – an artificial invention 
made for the purpose of political legitimation. 
If one seeks to transcend this construct of political mythology and examine the 
work’s religious content, however, it becomes apparent that there are significant 
barriers to understanding. And the more we seek to understand the question of 
the Japanese »primeval religion,« the more complex this question becomes. In or-
der to shed new light on this topic, it makes sense to examine the details and in-
dividual elements of the mythological tradition as closely as possible. 
 
3. 2. 3. 1. 3. Modern mythological research 
 
This area of analytical and comparative mythological research has only been 
possible in Japan without limitations, however, since the end of World War II.25 
One of the founders of this area of research, Tsuda Sôkichi (1873-1961), experi-
enced severe reprisals in the decades before the war due to the fact that he did 
not recognize the myths as accounts of the historical truth, contrary to the official 
dogma of the time.26 He also rightly questioned the legend of the supposed 
founding of the empire by Jinmu-tennô in the year 660 B.C., a belief that is still 
widely taken as a fact to this day, and revealed the purely legendary character of 
these accounts. 
Since the end of the war, however, Japanese mythological and Shintô research 
experienced an enormous boom; finally, the path was clear for an ideologically 
unbiased approach. The most important result of comparative mythological re-
search may well be the recognition of the original heterogeneity of the entire 
mythological corpus, which was so well ordered in the literary tradition of the 
                                                 
25 For this passage see also Antoni 2014. Recent research on Japanese mythologies is also provided 
by Isomae 2000. 
26 For Tsuda Sôkichi see below, note 367. 
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Kojiki. It was recognized that only in the rarest of cases are the Japanese myths 
unique and without parallels to the world outside of Japan. And it became appar-
ent that certain mythological episodes, such as the accounts of the origin of death, 
at their core could also be found in neighboring cultures in China, Korea and the 
Malayo-Polynesian sphere.27  
Thus, although the organized myths as a whole can be characterized as »Japa-
nese mythology,« their individual components are of diverse origins, and Shintô 
therefore cannot be truthfully called a homogenous primeval religion. Also, it 
once again becomes apparent how closely religion, politics and ideology are con-
nected within this field. While the Shintô doctrine of the homogeneity and 
uniqueness of the Japanese people applied up to the end of the war (this is evi-
dent, among other things, in the Japanese mythology of the founding of the em-
pire), in the post-war era, the various elements within the entire body of myths 
now revealed not only that the myths had diverse sources, but also the heteroge-
neous origins of the Japanese nation itself! 
Research has been able to show that certain mythical motifs that were woven 
into the organized mythology in historical times originated in different popula-
tion groups from the Asian continent, Southeast Asia and the South Sea who set-
tled the Japanese islands during prehistoric times.28 
Therefore, the myths, and thus the question of the »primeval religion of Ja-
pan,« cannot be separated from the question of the ethnogenesis of the Japanese 
people. Today it is known that the inhabitants of the Japanese islands were origi-
nally made up of groups of very different origins that combined to a large extent 
over the course of millennia, finally resulting in the formation of the Japanese na-
tion probably in the 4th century A.D.. All these groups contributed their own re-
ligious beliefs, and it is now the task of comparative mythological research to rec-
ognize individual mythical complexes as such and assign them to their original 
cultural realms.29 
Clearly, the revelation of foreign – that is, Korean, Southern Chinese or Indo-
nesian – elements within Japanese mythology is not merely of academic interest, 
but also has implications for the core issues of modern Japan’s traditional image 
of itself. 
                                                 
27 Cf., among others, Matsumura 1954-58; Naumann 1971, 1996; Ôbayashi 1973, 1986; Antoni 1982, 
2012a, 2014. 
28 For a recent and fundamental study on comparative mythology cf. Witzel 2012. 
29 Already Basil Hall Chamberlain (1883 (1982)), the first translator of the Kojiki into English, rec-
ognized the heterogeneous character of Japanese mythology and differentiated between three cy-
cles: the Izumo cycle of myths, the Yamato cycle of myths and the Tsukushi cycle of myths. This 
cultural-historical division is upheld by current research. 
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The modern Japanese ideology of the absolute uniqueness of the national pol-
ity (kokutai) was based solely on the statements from the written sources of my-
thology from the 8th century that aimed to legitimate imperial rule. An objective 
scientific investigation of the myths, especially in the sense of comparative cul-
tural history, necessarily conflicted with this concept of the state, which was 
viewed as being sacrosanct, as can be seen in a number of cases. Any proof of 
connections between the native mythology and the traditions of the continent or 
the islands of the South Pacific conflicted with the belief in the self-contained 
Japanese land of the gods. 
Thus, the enlightening effect of unhindered academic research that began in 
the post-war era can hardly be overstated, and this study is also conceived as a 
part of this field of research. Without such critical, cultural-historical analysis of 
Japanese mythology, the dogmatic teachings of the pre-war era might remain un-
checked to this day as the foundation of Japanese religion and culture. Such re-
search paved the way for the recognition of the extraordinarily complex and his-
torically widespread origins of the Japanese culture, freeing them from their arti-
ficially constructed, ideologically motivated isolation and placing them in the 
wider context of not only East-Asian history, but human history in general. The 
idea of the supposed homogeneity of Japan – less based on religion than ideol-
ogy, and rooted in the traditionalist constructions of the pre-modern era – thus 
can no longer be maintained. Japan may be an island nation (shimaguni) in geo-
graphical terms, but not culturally! 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
It is already apparent from the brief outline of Japanese cultural and religious 
history given above that an ahistorical, static, »essentialist« approach cannot ac-
curately portray the complex realities of pre-modern Shintô. Buddhism, Christi-
anity and Confucianism do not represent clearly defined and unchanging entities 
and the same applies to the area of Shintô, a term that is understood here in the 
sense of a general category. However, a continuity of religion and ideology is ap-
parent from the Edo period to the present day that appears not to have been so 
dramatically influenced by the often emphasized divisions of 1868 (the Meiji Res-
toration) and 1945 (Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War). From this perspective, the 
contribution of the West to these transitional phases in Japan’s recent history, 
which current theories of modernization emphasize with often unveiled cultural-
ist pride, thus appear less important than they are often claimed to have been. 
The modern era in Japan did not begin only in 1868. The country was not 
shrouded in the darkness of late-medieval feudalism up until the Meiji Restora-
tion, waiting for enlightenment by the West. The intellectual structures of the 
modern era in Japan were drawn up in intellectual circles for the most part al-
ready during the Edo period and were merely applied in practice during the 
Meiji period, together with concepts imported from the West’s own modern de-
velopment. Without accounting for developments in the pre-modern era, the 
emergence of the modern Japanese empire would appear to be an incomprehen-
sible miracle. 
The world of Shintô played a critical role in this context. Without detracting 
from the importance of foreign influences in the 19th century and the universal 
factors of modernity, it must be recognized that the critical impetus and concepts 
for the development of the modern Japanese nation-state, which was centered 
around the emperor as its divine ruler, originated in the pre-modern era in Japan 
itself. 
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1. HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF THE EDO PERIOD 
 
In order to analyze historical processes, one must first organize historical facts 
that often appear confusingly heterogeneous. Yet any arrangement of historical 
material also brings with it the danger of reducing the course of history itself to 
categories of historiography and periodization. The more clearly the individual 
periods are outlined and defined, the less clear our understanding of formative 
phases in times of historical transition becomes. 
This problem is also highly relevant to the investigation of Japanese history, 
since the commonly used period names such as »Nara period,« »Heian period,« 
etc., with their exact beginning and end dates, give the illusion of static, unchang-
ing historical time periods. 
In the case of the Edo period in particular, such an inflexible system proves to 
be problematic. Historians generally agree on a division of the period into two 
eras roughly before and after the year 1800. 
Even more so than in the case of this division, however, the question of de-
termining a historically reasonable beginning for the Edo period is fraught with 
problems. Historical studies have agreed that a strict division – at the year 1600 
(the Battle of Sekigahara), for example – does not do justice to the complexity of 
the preceding transitional phase, and for this reason the second half of the 16th 
century (the Azuchi-Momoyama period) is increasingly included in discussions 
of the early Edo period. 
John W. Hall (1991: 4f.), for example, makes the following remark on the 
question of chronologies in the introduction to the fourth volume of the Cam-
bridge History of Japan, which covers the Azuchi-Momoyama period as well as the 
first two centuries of the Edo period (approximately 1550-1800): 
»The origin of the Tokugawa hegemony and the formation of Edo polity can-
not be explained without reference to the fundamental institutional changes 
that occurred under Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi.« 
On the other hand, the author does not seek to question the independence of 
the Azuchi-Momoyama period, an era that saw the rise of the Daimyô as well as 
the arrival of the Europeans, until the Tokugawa shogunate’s policy of national 
isolation (sakoku) resulted in the closing of nearly all portals to the outside world. 
According to Hall (1991: 5f.), the Tokugawa policy of isolation marked a depar-
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ture from the spirit of openness of the previous era and brought on a »transition 
from military to civil government« in Japan.30 
In the case of the historical background of the study at hand, this circum-
stance means that our investigation ideally should begin not at the start of the 
Edo period, but rather should also include the formative decades of the preceding 
Azuchi-Momoyama period. The discussion of this period will be brief, however, 
since the last decades of the 16th century, which are of critical importance to this 
period, have already been covered by Nelly Naumann in the second volume of 
her work on Japan’s indigenous religions (Naumann 1994). Therefore, the follow-
ing investigation will be mostly limited to the Edo period, and events occurring 
before this period will only be discussed where absolutely necessary. 
 
1. 1. The early Edo period 
 
Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616) was the first to successfully create a lasting he-
gemony on Japanese soil after the turmoil of the Sengoku period. While publicly 
maintaining his loyalty to the late Hideyoshi, he gradually acquired power and 
legitimacy. Upon providing proof – though fabricated – of his descent from the 
Minamoto (see below), Ieyasu was appointed Shôgun on March 24, 1603. 
Ieyasu thus took control of the political body that his predecessors had cre-
ated, but succeeded in establishing a stable hegemony (Hall 1968: 161). The sys-
tem that began under his rule was marked by the following basic characteristics: 
the permanent hegemony of the Tokugawa house, which ruled in a highly restric-
tive manner; the introduction of the baku-han system (Shôgun-Daimyô); the cere-
monial position of the imperial house; the shifting of the warrior class to adminis-
trative functions; the establishment of the four-class system, along with the rise of 
a firmly bourgeois culture; and the policy of isolation from the outside world. 
The late Edo period, on the other hand, is marked by signs of the decline of 
the Tokugawa shogunate, which are evident in social problems, in particular 
among the farmers and the Samurai, as well as in the rise of nationalism centered 
around the emperor. From the arrival of Commodore Perry on July 8, 1853, to the 
                                                 
30 Herman Ooms also begins his discussion on Tokugawa ideology (1985) with the first half of the 
16th century, a period marked by numerous wars and conflicts, a lack of overreaching power and 
the fragmentation of the country (cf. Ooms 1985: 18ff.). According to Ooms, however, the rise of 
Oda Nobunaga marked a new period in which »power« found a way to develop with the help of 
a new symbolic language that provided it with legitimation. »Power had to be converted into dis-
torting speech,« (Ooms 1985: 21). 
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final abdication of the last Shôgun Yoshinobu in 1867, the »Pax Tokugawa« fi-
nally came to an end (cf. Dettmer 1985: 90). 
 
1. 1. 1. The political system 
 
The baku-han system of the Edo period was defined by what is often called a 
»feudal« relationship between the Shôgun and the Daimyô, in which the heredi-
tary vassals (fudai daimyô), the largest group of Daimyô, played a critical role, 
even in the administration of religious matters (the office of the jisha-bugyô, 
among others; see discussion below). Thus, the power of the bakufu was estab-
lished on all levels, at least in theory. The system was intended to develop a uni-
fied national policy and universal laws on the basis of broadly recognized princi-
ples (cf. Hall 1968: 177). Tokugawa law was based on the assumption that a natu-
ral metaphysical order existed: the »natural class hierarchy« necessarily resulted 
in the functional differentiation between four major classes, not including the 
court nobility above and the pariahs below. The four classes were: shi (Samu-
rai/warriors), nô (farmers), kô (artisans), and shô (merchants), and relations be-
tween these classes were regulated by law. The Tokugawa government was 
marked overall by a strong, comprehensive administrative apparatus (Hall 1968: 
171) that essentially represented the continuation of a military regime in times of 
peace. The Samurai were now recruited as bureaucrats in the administrative 
structure. This circumstance had a lasting influence on the area of religion in par-
ticular – both in terms of content and administration.31 
 
1. 1. 2. The involvement of the imperial household 
 
Among the extensive measures that served to secure the hegemony of the To-
kugawa house, the involvement of the imperial household played an especially 
important role. The emperor was de facto prevented from exercising any political 
power, and he served an exclusively religious and ceremonial function. In ex-
change, the court, which during the Japanese Middle Ages had suffered serious 
financial problems, now received material support from the bakufu.32 
The Tokugawa policy sought to raise the prestige of the imperial court by 
transferring ceremonial duties to it, while at the same time keeping it under po-
litical control. Ieyasu’s decree of the »Laws Governing the Imperial Court and 
                                                 
31 Cf. Hall 1968: 171, 177; on the baku-han system, see the studies by Asao 1967; Fujino 1962; Kita-
jima 1978; Yamaguchi 1975. 
32 Cf. Hall 1968: 168; Meyer 1991. 
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Nobility« (Kinchû narabini kugeshohatto) in 1615, which will be discussed later, 
provided the basic system of rules that strictly regulated the sphere of activity of 
the emperor and the court (cf. Meyer 1991, among others). 
In the course of the unification, the emperorship was rediscovered as the 
highest official authority. The bakufu pursued a twofold objective regarding the 
court: on the one hand, the emperor was recognized as the highest (moral) 
authority and his prestige was ensured, while on the other hand, legal and politi-
cal measures were taken to control and isolate him from the Daimyô. Although 
the imperial family and the court nobility (kuge) received estates to ensure their 
livelihood, the court was also subjected to strict surveillance, and all free partici-
pation in matters of state was prohibited. The central government was moved to 
Edo, the seat of the bakufu, meaning that the emperor and his household in Kyôto 
were now also geographically removed from the center of power. The bakufu was 
able to precisely monitor and control all matters that were brought before the 
emperor through its representative in Kyôto as well as the court officials, who 
served as intermediaries. Even contact with the Daimyô was carefully limited. 
Ieyasu’s decree of 1615 strictly limited the activities of the emperor and the kuge 
to literary studies and ceremonial functions. It also required the advance agree-
ment of the bakufu for the appointment of higher officials. Furthermore, it regu-
lated the relationship between the imperial family and the main temples, and in-
troduced a system specifying that certain imperial princes become monks. Thus, 
the imperial household was completely disempowered and did not at first repre-
sent a general threat to the Tokugawa system. This changed only toward the end 
of the Edo period, when the court became the focus of the anti-Tokugawa move-
ment and ultimately of the efforts toward the restoration of the emperor. 
 
1. 1. 3. Economy and culture 
 
Regardless of all its ideal social constructions, the Edo period was also charac-
terized by numerous problems, especially regarding the economy (cf. Asao 1988). 
The ideal, according to which the Samurai govern, the farmers produce, and the 
merchants distribute, was unable to be maintained in practice, due to the rise of 
trade. Contrary to this theory, the merchants increased their status in society, 
since trade became largely independent of the bakufu and the han, while the 
Samurai became economically dependent on the merchants. This social change – 
the real rise in importance of the urban bourgeoisie, also deeply influenced relig-
ion. 
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On the other end of the social hierarchy, the farmer revolts (hyakushô-ikki) dur-
ing this era showed the real suffering of the farmers (cf. Walthall 1991), regardless 
of their supposedly high position in the four-class system. 
Due to the social separation of the Edo period, the Samurai, farmers and 
chônin each developed their own culture (cf. Ehmcke, Shôno-Sladek 1994). Re-
gardless of its often economically advantageous position, the bourgeoisie, and 
especially the merchants, did not acquire any political influence. Instead, an even 
more lively class-specific culture developed. 
At the latest in the Genroku period (1688-1705)33, an independent style of 
chônin culture, centered in Ôsaka, Kyôto and Edo, developed into a novel, vibrant 
element. The chônin were not allowed to participate in the government, and so 
they showed little interest in matters of state. Their world, which was character-
ized by enjoyment, was devoted to the ideal of the ukiyo. In addition to this, how-
ever, mandatory social values applied to the merchants, analogous to the bushidô 
of the Samurai, requiring loyalty in their business dealings, or simplicity, as in the 
rule of not wasting profits. 
Regardless of whether the culture of the Genroku period appears, from a his-
torical perspective, to have been much less defined by religion than any other cul-
ture before in Japan (cf. Hall 1968: 228), Engelbert Kaempfer’s detailed contempo-
rary reports (which are discussed below) show that this view, especially in regard 
to Shintô, is in need of revision. 
 
1. 2. The late Edo and bakumatsu periods 
 
1. 2. 1. General development 
 
The baku-han system, which was intended by its founders to maintain stabil-
ity, increasingly fell into the wake of political, social and economic crises starting 
from the end of the 18th century, which, combined with increasing external pres-
sures, ultimately led to the collapse of the Tokugawa state. There was no lack of 
attempts by the bakufu to systematically renovate the country’s broken social and 
economic structures. The statesman Matsudaira Sadanobu, for example, who was 
appointed guardian (hosa) of the young Shôgun Tokugawa Ienari (1773-1841) in 
1788, introduced such measures which, however, did not lead to any positive re-
sults (cf. Dettmer 1985: 86ff.). Under the next Shôgun, Ieyoshi (1793-1853), Mi-
zuno Tadakuni attempted to implement economic reforms, also unsuccessfully. 
                                                 
33 For an introduction, cf. Ishida 1961; Kodama 1966; Ôishi 1992. 
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While the domestic crisis was mounting, pressure from abroad on the bakufu 
also grew to end the policy of national seclusion. Russians arrived in Hokkaidô 
via the Kurile Islands, and American ships entered the bay of Edo already in 
1846. The Kanagawa Treaty of 1854 finally marked the end of the Japanese policy 
of sakoku with the opening of two harbors. The establishment of foreign offices in 
Edo led to fierce domestic conflicts. The assassination of Ii Naosuke, who had 
supported the treaty with the United States, and was thus in opposition to 
Kômei-tennô, was an early climax in the bloody conflicts over foreign policy at 
the time.34 
Generally, the emperor emerged as the unifying figurehead of the anti-
Tokugawa movement. The court nobility in particular rejected all foreign culture 
as non-Japanese, along with the trade agreements and the foreign offices in Japan. 
The nationalist spirit was epitomized by the slogan sonnô-jôi, »Revere the em-
peror and expel the barbarians.« The spiritual, ideological and ultimately relig-
ious connotations of this slogan, which increasingly placed the emperor in the 
center of a spiritual and political restoration movement, lent the political process 
its crucial force. Under this continuing pressure, Tokugawa Keiki (Yoshinobu), 
who was appointed the new Shôgun in 1867, resigned in November of the same 
year but retained the office of prime minister as well as possession of his estates. 
On January 3 of the following year, coalition troops led by Saigô Takamori occu-
pied Kyôto. The power of rule was officially »returned« to Emperor Mutsuhito 
(Meiji-tennô). The Tokugawa were stripped of their power, and their resistance 
forces were defeated after the battle at Toba-Fushimi on January 27, 1868. The es-
tablishment of a new form of government in the name of the emperor took place 
under the motto of a »restoration of the past« (fukko), a slogan that was coined by 
the Kokugaku in the Edo period. Thus, the Meiji Restoration was an attempt to 
implement political and intellectual goals in reality that had already been devel-
oped in a lengthy process by Kokugaku and Mito School thinkers starting in the 
early Edo period. 
                                                 
34 Cf. the detailed study of this topic by Eva-Maria Meyer (1997) 
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2. SHINTÔ AND GOVERNANCE IN THE EARLY EDO PERIOD 
 
2. 1. Shintô and the religious policy of the bakufu 
 
The fact that religion is largely determined by culture is a basic assumption of 
anthropological religious studies (cf. Antoni 1997b: 177, among others). Accord-
ing to Thomas Bargatzky (1985: 123), the theory of social systems states that it is 
»a well documented fact that there is a relationship between the type of ‘super-
natural background’ of a culture (or of a sociocultural system) and the type of po-
litical organization of the people in this system.« 
The validity of this general statement, especially in the case of Japan, is self-
evident. Upon examining the individual eras of Japanese history, it becomes ap-
parent that there is usually a direct relationship between religion(s) and the cur-
rent social, political and cultural environment. The connection between religion 
and political power is a significant characteristic in this context. Be it the systema-
tization of Japanese myths in ancient times or the construction of State Shintô in 
the modern era, the utilization of Zen monasteries under the Ashikaga in the 
Japanese Middle Ages or of the Buddhist clergy in the Tokugawa period, religion 
always also served to provide the ruling powers with spiritual legitimation. The 
Edo period is especially important in this context, and the effects of this era are 
clearly visible in present-day Japan. 
It is generally recognized that the official ideology of the Tokugawa state was 
derived from Neo-Confucianism, i.e. the interpretation of the Confucian classics 
in the tradition of Chu Hsi (Zhu Xi, (1130-1200), Japanese: Shushi; see chapter II: 
2. 2. 1). In scholarly research, however, justified doubts about the sole correctness 
of this view have been raised, and the exclusive position of Neo-Confucianism 
has been critically examined. The writings of Herman Ooms are particularly rele-
vant in this context, whose main work of 1985 offers a fascinating reevaluation of 
the intellectual-historical foundations of this formative phase for the era. Samuel 
Hideo Yamashita (1996: 27) notes in an article on his general conclusions: »Ooms 
concedes that the bakufu did turn to Neo-Confucianism but that it was a mixture 
of Neo-Confucianism and Shinto, not Chu Hsi’s philosophy or newly imported 
varieties of Neo-Confucianism.« Hermann Ooms’s remarks thus deserve to be 
given special attention in the present investigation of the development of Shintô 
since the Edo period. 
62  n  KOKUTAI - POLITICAL SHINTÔ FROM EARLY-MODERN TO CONTEMPORARY JAPAN   
 
Ooms articulated the central points of his thesis already in an article from 
1984 entitled »Neo-Confucianism and the Formation of Early Tokugawa Ideol-
ogy: Contours of a Problem« (Ooms 1984), which can be summarized as follows: 
Traditionally, Neo-Confucianism is viewed as the official ideology of the bakufu. 
Historical facts, such as the financing of the school of Hayashi Razan by the ba-
kufu, or the incorporation of Neo-Confucian scholars in the government, appear 
to support this view. According to Ooms, however, more recent insights have 
shown that this view represents an over-interpretation. Although Confucian 
thought doubtlessly influenced Tokugawa Japan on many levels, it is highly 
doubtful that they possessed a monopoly position and could have thus become 
the official state doctrine. The core statement of this view is that Neo-
Confucianism in no way took on a primary importance at the beginning of the 
Tokugawa period, as opposed to the enormous contributions made by the state to 
Buddhism and Shintô. This assertion stands in stark contrast to the general theory 
that Ieyasu consciously sought to create a bridge to Neo-Confucianism by ap-
pointing Hayashi Razan to the civil service. According to Ooms, Razan spent his 
entire life fighting to secure his position as a teacher, and it was only in his biog-
raphy, which was compiled by his sons, that his position was exaggerated and 
the fiction of the bakufu’s supposed support for Neo-Confucian ideology was cre-
ated. This served, Ooms writes, to secure the position of the Hayashi family both 
retroactively and for the future, and was consistently continued by students of 
the Hayashi School. 
However, Ooms states that the increasing importance of this ideology in the 
government cannot be denied, although its establishment was not »an event but a 
process,« (Ooms 1984: 36). Only one purely ideological document appears to have 
been commissioned directly by the bakufu: the so-called »testament« of Tokugawa 
Ieyasu.35 Although this document portrays Ieyasu’s rule as the embodiment of 
the Confucian concept of the Way of Heaven (tendô), he does not appear to be an 
absolute ruler, but rather, a person who acts with duty and loyalty to the tendô. 
The warriors support his rule, drawing their motivation from the Buddhist con-
cept of »mercy« (jihi) and the Shintô concept of »straightforwardness, honesty« 
(shôjiki, see discussion below). 
Ooms states that over the course of the social developments of the early Edo 
period, first the ruling class, then the social order and finally the people were ac-
corded a cosmological and religious importance that consisted of various ele-
ments of Buddhism, Shintô and folk religion, as well as Neo-Confucianism. The 
                                                 
35 Tôshôgû goikun = NKB 8, 1910-1911: 252-342; cf. Ooms 1985: 66. 
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latter, however, took on a position that was anything but dominant, and in fact 
this process represented the utilization of heterogeneous elements with the pur-
pose of constructing a cohesive social system. The »social ideology« applied ex-
clusively to the ruling class. According to Ooms, this was not merely a matter of 
exchanging one ideology for another, but rather of the first appearance of ideol-
ogy in Japanese history, the »beginning of ideology.« 
The goal of any ideology, Ooms states, is to obscure the true reasons for a 
given group’s claim to power and to establish the aspired-to or already realized 
new order as a »natural« order. »Both Shinto and Neo-Confucianism made avail-
able a language that could perform this task,« (Ooms 1984: 57). 
Thus, none of the spiritual systems enjoyed the exclusive support of the ba-
kufu during the Tokugawa period. In order to avoid going underground, like the 
Christians, for example, many groups vied for the favor of the bakufu. 
»From beginning to end, the bakufu was never at a loss for volunteers, ready 
to purvey teachings speaking eloquently about man and society (but keeping 
silent about power) in a way most inoffensive to its own interests.« (Ooms 
1984: 61) 
Without discussing Ooms’s work in full detail, it can be noted that his re-
search shows that Edo period Shintô plays a far greater role in understanding the 
Tokugawa state than the generally accepted opinion, which focussed nearly ex-
clusively on Buddhism and Confucianism, as until recently suggested, without 
questioning the role of Shintô in this context. 
 
2. 1. 1. The deification of the »unifiers of Japan« and the Tôshôgû in Nikkô 
 
As Bitô Masahide (1991: 393-395) writes, the practice of deifying people as 
kami, which emerged in the late Muromachi period, represented a significant in-
novation in the world of religion. The enshrining of Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 1599 
as Toyokuni daimyôjin in a shrine that was built in his honor in Kyôto can be 
seen as a key event in this development.36 Before that time, historical figures (for 
example, Ôjin-tennô, Sugawara Michizane, etc.) were in fact worshipped at cer-
tain shrines. However, there was no precedent that a person who had died under 
normal circumstances, was deified according to his own wishes, and what is 
more, that this happened so soon after his death. According to Bitô, this event can 
be explained by the religious conditions of the time, which effectively recognized 
                                                 
36 For an introduction to Toyokuni Shrine, cf. Hiraoka 1991: 195-221. 
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kami and Buddhas (hotoke) as ultimately being identical, regardless of their dif-
ferent names. 
This view was shared by Ryôbu Shintô as well as its counterpart, Yoshida 
Shintô, which viewed Buddhist figures as being of secondary importance (see 
chapter II: 2. 1. 2. 3), and it was additionally supported by the fact that Buddhist 
priests often also performed tasks in shrine rituals. Thus, it could no longer be 
seen as especially unusual that a prominent figure was more likely to become a 
kami than a hotoke after death. 
The teachings and rituals of Yoshida Shintô, which will be examined in the 
following, doubtlessly contributed to the fact that an only recently deceased per-
son could be considered a kami. On the other hand, according to Bitô (l.c.), there 
are also convincing reasons from Hideyoshi’s perspective why he should prefer 
to become a kami rather than a hotoke after his death. As the founder of a new 
house, it was crucially important to Hideyoshi to create his own house ujigami, 
comparable to Hachiman, who protected the Minamoto/Genji and the Ashikaga. 
Furthermore, he could more directly protect his new house, which was constantly 
under threat, as a kami than as a hotoke, whose power in this world would be very 
limited. According to Bitô, these circumstances led to the construction of a new 
shrine dedicated to the house of Toyotomi. 
Ooms (1985: 45ff.) also points out the fact that Hideyoshi wanted to ensure 
that his power was secured through religious authority; he called Japan the »land 
of the gods« and institutionalized Shintô for the sake of elevating his power to a 
spiritual level. Shintô became an equivalent for what Nobunaga had found in the 
term tenka (Ooms 1985: 46). Hideyoshi accorded a high importance to visiting the 
shrines at Ise and gave the shrines financial support, making it possible to resume 
the traditional renovations of the shrine buildings every 20 years, which had not 
been able to be carried out for a period of 120 years due to wartime distur-
bances.37 He also had a shrine built for himself posthumously in the vicinity of 
the Hôkôji, which was to serve as a symbol of his divine power. 
According to Bitô (l.c.), the general religious attitudes of the time had ad-
vanced so much that the practice of deifying people could be accepted. The en-
shrining of Tokugawa Ieyasu at the Tôshôgû in Nikkô38, which will be discussed 
in the following, represented a high point of this religious trend, although since 
the 17th century not only important political figures, but also people of more 
                                                 
37 On the cyclical renovations at Ise Shrine, cf. Bock 1974; Tokoro 1973, among others; cf. Ooms 
1985: 49. 
38 For an introduction to the Tôshôgû in Nikkô and the deification of Tokugawa Ieyasu, cf. Boot 
1987; Schurhammer 1923: 117-194, among others. 
                                             CHAPTER II: THE EDO PERIOD  n  65 
 
modest station were worshipped as kami. Daimyô, Shintô theologians such as 
Yamazaki Ansai (see below), and people who had performed a noble deed were 
often deified after death, and even during their lifetime. In this area, links be-
tween religious and general social developments in the 17th century are apparent. 
For example, the practice of following one’s master into death by committing sui-
cide (junshi) became prevalent, and the wave of double-suicides (shinjû) among 
the bourgeoisie in the late 17th century are also relevant in this context. Both phe-
nomena were based on the assumption that one could attain after death what one 
had been denied in life, a concept that also formed the basis of the practice of en-
shrining people as kami. 
As was previously noted, the Tokugawa masterfully used the religious situa-
tion of the time to secure and legitimize their newly acquired power. The worship 
of the founder of the house, Tokugawa Ieyasu, is especially significant in this con-
text. This practice was strongly influenced by Ieyasu’s grandson Iemitsu. 
Iemitsu had previously expanded the basis of his power by a significant 
measure: he bound the Daimyô even more tightly to himself through the sankin-
kôtai system, and thus effectively gained control over them. Finally, he also ef-
fected the break with Kyôto and made the bakufu the sole autonomous center of 
power in Japan. He introduced the policy of isolation (sakoku) and ruled Japan 
like a king. As his most important measure, he forced the deification of Ieyasu as 
the »holy founder of Japan,« and thus justified his own authority as a direct de-
scendant of this »holy founder.« In 1634 Iemitsu initiated the alteration of the 
shrine to Ieyasu in Nikkô into a grandiose mausoleum, the result of which was 
»that he converted his political mandate into a sacred one, linking his rule to that 
of an ancestral divine lord. It was from this time on that Ieyasu came to be re-
ferred to officially as shinkun, divine ruler,« (Ooms 1985: 57).39 
As Sugiyama Rinkei writes (Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994: 16; cf. Antoni 1997b: 
179ff.), Ieyasu was first buried at Kunô-zan after his death in the year Genna 2 
(1616), and a mausoleum was built in front of his grave. The burial ceremonies 
are said to have been arranged by the influential monk Bonshun (1553-1631) ac-
cording to Yuiitsu-Shintô of the Yoshida School. Bonshun was also responsible 
for altering Ieyasu’s genealogy while he was still alive, connecting his house to 
that of the Minamoto and thus genealogically qualifying him for the position of 
the Shôgun (cf. Kracht 1986: 143). Although Bonshun was a Buddhist monk, as 
the son of Yoshida Kanemigi and brother of Kanemi, then head of the Yoshida 
house as well as the tradition of Yuiitsu or Yoshida Shintô (see discussion below), 
                                                 
39 See also Boot 1987 and 1991; Hiraoka 1991. 
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he was also well versed in the matters of Shintô.40 Most of the editorial works of 
Bonshun can be found today in the collection of the Yoshida house, Yoshida-
bunkô, Tenri Library (cf. Inoue 1994: 530). Together with Kanemi, he had previ-
ously built the shrine for the deceased Toyotomi Hideyoshi (Hôkoku-sha, or 
Tôyôkuni-jinja), which was designed in the tradition of Yoshida Shintô, and car-
ried out his funeral according to the Yoshida Shintô ceremony. 
Due to internal power struggles, however, a mausoleum for Ieyasu was built 
in Nikkô and his coffin was finally transferred there, with the Tendai monk Jigen 
Daishi Tenkai (1536-1643)41, who belonged to the Sannô (Ichijitsu) School of 
Shintô42, responsible for the burial rituals. As Seckel (1943: 66) writes, however, 
there were also »close personal connections between Yoshida and Nikkô,« de-
spite the dominant position of the Tendai/Sannô priest Tenkai. This mausoleum 
to Ieyasu was ultimately given the »divine name« (shingô) of Tôshô-dai-gongen 
by the imperial household, and an imperial envoy was present at the solemn 
ceremony of the shôsengû, the ceremonial enshrining of the main shrine, in the 
fourth month of the year Genna 3 (1617). 
Tenkai had reinterpreted the teachings of Buddhist Sannô Shintô into a doc-
trine that reversed the original relationship between Buddhist original reality 
(honji) and the manifested traces (suijaku; cf. Ooms 1985: 175). This axiomatic ap-
proach had already been taken by Yoshida Shintô since the beginning of the late 
Kamakura period. Tenkai, who had previously been an advisor to Ieyasu (cf. 
Kracht 1986: 121), now implemented this approach in the Sannô School and made 
Amaterasu a honji. Ieyasu was thus elevated to a reincarnation (gongen) of the an-
cestral deity of the imperial household. Ieyasu’s posthumous divine name, Tôshô, 
meaning »(Ama) terasu of the East,« was also an indication of this. 
 
2. 1. 1. 1. Sannô-Ichijitsu Shintô and Miwa (-ryû) Shintô 
 
According to Sugahara Shinkai’s research (1996), there is a clear distinction 
between the medieval school of Sannô Shintô and the school of Sannô Ichijitsu 
Shintô founded by Tenkai. As Bernhard Scheid remarks in his introduction to 
Sugahara’s work (1996: 61f.),  
                                                 
40 Cf. Taira 1972: 519-522; Itô Akira: »Bonshun« in: Inoue 1994: 530-531. On Yoshida Shintô in gen-
eral cf. Scheid 2001. 
41 On Tenkai, cf. Sugahara 1996: 64, note 2, among others. 
42 On Sannô (Ichijitsu-) Shintô, cf. Naumann 1994: 10, 76, 99; Ômori 1992: 164-167. For a thorough 
discussion of the topic, cf. Sonehara 1991; see also Grapard 1983-86. 
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»Sannô Shinto developed out of the Tendai sect’s efforts to integrate the 
Japanese kami into Buddhist worldview; [...] Sannô Ichijitsu Shinto, in con-
trast, was formulated in the early Edo period and was centered at Tôshôgû. 
[...] Although based on the same Tendai thought as Sannô Shinto, Sannô Ichi-
jitsu Shinto was, Sugahara argues, a highly political religious system de-
signed to legitimize and stabilize the rule of the Tokugawa house.«  
In his writings, Sugahara traces the teachings of Sannô Ichijitsu Shintô par-
ticularly to the main work of Tenkai, Tôshô daigongen engi (mana), or Mana engi, 
which was compiled around the year 163543 and formulates this Shintô doctrine 
based on the teachings of Tendai. The goal of these teachings is clearly the relig-
ious legitimation of the power of the Tokugawa house (cf. Sugahara 1996: 74ff.). 
Like the worship of Fujiwara no Kamatari (614-669), the progenitor of the Fuji-
wara house who is worshipped at Tônomine Shrine, Ieyasu also became a divine 
protector of his house. Tenkai writes in the first section of his Mana engi: 
»Tôshô Daigongen, [a deity] of the Proper First Court rank, reveals himself. 
He knows the way of peace and tranquility in this world and of enlighten-
ment in the life to come. For the prosperity of the Tokugawa house and the 
eternal benefit of the people, you must by all means guard Sannô Shintô and 
not combine it with any other doctrine. Instead you must imitate the etiquette 
of Tô-no-mine, then your descendants will prosper.« (Sugahara 1996: 75; JDZ 
1: 12). 
Furthermore, a close analysis of the burial ceremonies for Ieyasu reveals a 
surprising reference to other forms of medieval Shintô-Buddhist syncretism, 
which would hardly be expected to appear in this context. Sugahara shows that 
the deceased Ieyasu was directly compared by ceremonial means to the figure of 
the emperor in order to religiously legitimate the rule of the Tokugawa house. 
Ritual elements play a central role in this context. Although there is no evidence 
of such elements within the Tendai Buddhist ritual tradition, they do exist within 
the Mikkyô School of Shingon Buddhism. Within syncretistic Shingon Ryôbu 
Shintô, Sugahara (1996: 81) sees the closest parallels in Miwa(ryû) Shintô, a school 
that dates back to ancient Japan. According to him, the arrangements for Ieyasu’s 
burial thus show »a great familiarity on Tenkai’s part with the Miwa-Ryû ritual. 
[...] That Sannô Shinto took an interest in the Miwa-ryû Shinto transmitted at the 
shrine of Ômiwa is certain.« This echos medieval Shintô-Buddhist syncretism, ex-
tending beyond the narrow denominational borders of the Tendai and Shingon 
teachings. The syncretistic tradition of Mount Miwa in Yamato provides the best 
proof of this. 
                                                 
43 For a discussion of the exact date of writing, cf. Sugahara 1996: 69f.  
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2. 1. 1. 2. Excursus: on the history of the jingûji of Miwa44 
 
Mount Miwa is up to the very day one of the holiest places all over Japan. At 
the spot where the Yamato plain suddenly turns into a gently rounded mountain 
range, a single, thickly forested mountain rises above the rest, standing out due to 
its nearly perfectly conical shape. This is Mount Miwa, also called Mimoro or 
Mimuro,45 today part of the city of Sakurai in Nara Prefecture. Centers of worship 
have existed here since ancient times, as archeological studies have shown, al-
though the details of their origins are lost in the darkness of prehistory (cf. Antoni 
1993a, 1995c).46 In the Japanese Middle Ages, this was the religious and theologi-
cal center of the syncretistic teachings of Miwa, or Miwa(-ryû) Shintô. As a vari-
ant of Ryôbu Shintô, which is based on the Mikkyô School, i.e. Shingon Bud-
dhism, Miwa theology identified the mountain and its deity with the sun goddess 
Amaterasu, calling the two »one body« (ittai). Together they represent manifesta-
tions of the Great Buddha of Light, Dainichinyorai (sk. Mahâvairocana), who is 
regarded as the main Buddha (honzon) according to Mikkyô doctrine. This idea is 
closely related to the teachings of Ise Shintô. Its dual aspects, the Diamond World 
(kongôkai) and the Womb Realm (taizôkai), were thus manifest in Mount Miwa as 
the shintai (-yama) of the Dainichinyorai: the kongôkai in the south side, and the 
taizôkai in the north side, while the geographic characteristics of the mountain 
were said to embody tantric ritual objects.47 
However, the history of Buddhism and the jingûji of Miwa does not begin 
with medieval Miwa Shintô, but rather stretches back to the early days of the 
Japanese state. As the history of the shrine published by Ômiwa-jinja states, the 
existence of the first »shrine temple«, jingûji, of Miwa, Ômiwa-dera, can be con-
firmed by first-hand accounts as well as archaeological finds dating back to the 
early Nara period (cf. OJ 1975: 223f.). This temple still existed during the Heian 
period, but it appears to have declined in the early Kamakura period. The re-
founding of the temple is accredited to the famous monk Eison (1201-1290), post-
humously called Kôshô-bosatsu, who is said to have been responsible for many 
(re-) foundings of temples in Yamato. In the year Kôan 8 (1285), he renamed the 
                                                 
44 For this section see also Antoni 1993a and 1995c. 
45 Cf. OJ 1975: 75-80, 650, with analysis of the Manyôshû verses 2472 (Mimuro) and 2512 (Mimoro); 
see also the article by Kanda Hideo: »‘Mimuro’ to ‘Mimoro’« in OJ 1968-91, Volume 3: 852-855; 
Antoni 1988: 79. 
46 Cf. OJ 1975, chapter 1: 3-30; OJ 1968-91, Volume 3, chapter 3: 727-923, with a total of 23 articles 
on Miwa archaeology. 
47 Sources on Miwa Shintô in OJ 1968-91, Volumes 2, 5, 6, 10 (cf. OJ 1968-91, bekkan 2: 131-144); 
Ueda 1989: 93-134 (Chapter II: »Miwa-ryû Shintô ki«). See also OJ 1968-91, Volume 3, chapter 4 (p. 
925-1026); Abe 1984-85; Kubota 1968-91; OJ 1975: 232-244 and chapters 7 and 8 passim. 
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temple Daigorinji. Accounts of the founding of the temple can be found in the 
Kamakura-period work Miwa daimyôjin engi from the year Bumpô 2 (1318).48 
However, such legends were still based on Buddhist teachings at the time. 
According to this tradition, the crown prince Shôtoku once found the statue of the 
eleven-headed Kannon in the main building, which has been the temple’s honzon 
ever since (cf. OJ 1975: 225). Although this legend has no claim to historic factual-
ity, it provides a religious explanation of the origin of the first jingûji of Miwa. 
The same Eison who is said to be responsible for the re-founding of the tem-
ple studied at the temples of Kôya-san, Tôdaiji (Nara), Daigoji (Kyôto), and fi-
nally Saidaiji (Nara).49 Eison spent long periods of his later life in Miwa, which 
explains his deep connection to the place.50 According to the legend of the shrine, 
he finally came to the realization of the unity of Amaterasu ômikami and the de-
ity of Miwa while on a pilgrimage to Ise-jingû.51 Eison is said to be the founder of 
the Ritsu school of Shingon (Shingon Risshû), and he re-founded the Saidaiji, 
which was once one of the »seven temples of Nara« (cf. Kaneko 1987: passim), as 
its main temple. As a result of this, the Daigorinji was also incorporated into this 
school and remained a branch temple (matsuji) of the Saidaiji until the Meiji Res-
toration. 
The history of the jingûji of Miwa is made considerably more complicated by 
the fact that nearly simultaneously to Eison, a further important Buddhist teacher 
was active who had a lasting influence on the syncretistic development of Miwa: 
Kyôen (?-1223), the »Saint of Miwa,« Miwa shônin.52 The earliest accounts of 
Kyôen are found in a work compiled by one of his students in the year Kenchô 7 
(1255), the Miwa shônin gyôjô, shortly after Kyôen’s death (cf. OJ 1975: 226f.). All 
later accounts of Kyôen are based on this source.53 
                                                 
48 See the text in OJ 1968-91, Volume 2: 1133-1138; Ueda 1989: 95-103; OJ 1928: 12-21. Cf. Kubota 
1968-91: 974, 980. 
49 On the life and work of Eison, cf. Kaneko 1987: 75-192. 
50 Cf. OJ 1975: 225; Kubota 1968-91: 975f. In the biography of Eison by Kaneko (1987), however, 
which reflects the current view of the Saidaiji, this fact is astonishingly nowhere to be found. 
51 Cf. Miwa-Daimyôjin engi (Ueda et al. 1989: 95ff.); OJ 1975: 230. 
52 On Kyôen, cf. Kubota 1968-91: 972ff.; OJ 1975: 226ff. OJ 1968-91, bekkan 2: 10. The fact that Pon-
soby-Fane mixes up the mythologies of Eison and Kyôen and accredits them entirely to Eison and 
the Daigorinji, for example, shows how confusing the situation can be even to those familiar with 
the material. This may have merely been a mistake, but due to the reasons outlined below, it can-
not be ruled out that the author, an eminent expert on both historical and contemporary Shintô, 
intentionally combined the two branches of the mythology in order to wipe out all memory of the 
Byôdôji. 
53 Cf. the work Miwa-san Byôdôji chûkôso Kyôen-shônin betsuden (OJ 1968-91, Volume 6: 652-666) 
from the year Genroku 15 (1702).  
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Kyôen is said to have come from Chinzei (i.e. Kyûshû). His date of birth is 
unknown, but it is estimated to lie between 1140 and 1150, based on various 
sources. After traveling through Yamato for many years, during which time he 
studied the Daihannyakyô, he arrived at Iwashimizu Hachiman Shrine and fi-
nally in Miwa, where he found enlightenment (reikô) and developed his own 
teachings. Kyôen is considered by many specialists to be the true founder of 
Miwa Shintô.54 He built a Buddhist seminary and monastery (dôjô) in order to 
spread his syncretistic teachings, which were based on Mikkyô-Shingon. The 
monastery was given the name Miwa-besshô, which was recorded in 1233, but 
was soon also known by the name Byôdôji, first mentioned in 1236. The temple 
flourished and surpassed the Daigorinji around the end of the Kamakura period. 
In the Muromachi period the temple fell under the control of the Kôfukuji in 
Nara, but also maintained close ties to the Daigoji in Kyôto (cf. OJ 1975: 229-229; 
Yoshida 1991: 36.).  
This double alignment finally led to a split among the temple’s priests into 
two groups, one aligned with the Kôfukuji (gakushû), and the other (zenshû) with 
the Daigoji, or, more precisely the Sampôin, a sub-temple of the Daigoji. Begin-
ning in the middle of the Muromachi period, the zenshû side became increasingly 
influential. This fact is of great importance in the present discussion, since the 
Daigoji, the main temple of the Shingon-Daigo School and the eleventh station on 
the pilgrimage route of western Japan (Kami Daigoji)55, was a religious center for 
the movement that was later subjected to intense persecution during the Meiji pe-
riod, namely the religion of the mountain ascetics, or shugendô. For this reason, 
aside from its connection to the Kôfukuji, the Byodôji of Miwa has also been 
known primarily as the center of shugendô. It was here, on the holy Mount Miwa, 
that the Yamabushi performed their rituals on their way to the mountain regions 
in the south (Ômine, Kimpusen).56 
                                                 
54 Cf. Abe 1984-85; OJ 1968-91, Volume 3: 1000. Kubota (1968-91: 975f.) argues more cautiously. 
55 Cf. the remarks to this temple in Hirakata 1992: 82-87. 
56 Cf. OJ 1975: 229; Maruko (undated); Yoshida 1991: 36. The Byôdôji, a Sôtô Zen temple that was 
re-founded in 1977, emphasizes this aspect in the history of the historical Byôdôji above all others. 
The former honzon of the Byôdôji, an impressive Fudô myôô statue, is especially significant in this 
context in order to understand this once largest jingûji of Miwa that, however, seems to have 
fallen completely out of favor over the course of history. In no other religious group is the tradi-
tion of the Fudô myôô of greater importance than in shugendô. The first Christian missionaries saw 
the Yamabushi as »followers of the devil,« an expression that was likely inspired by their fear-
some Fudô statues. En no Gyôja, the legendary father of shugendô, was considered by his follow-
ers to be an incarnation of the Fudô myôô. Since the Kamakura period, two schools have existed: 
one group close to the Tendai sect (konzanryû), and the other close to the Shingon sect (tôzanryû), 
which worshipped in the mountains of Yamato and Kii. The Yamabushi, who dealt with healing 
the sick, exorcism and other magical practices, suffered greatly under the religious policy of the 
Meiji period, since their syncretistic beliefs and practices, which were largely based on Shingon, 
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As the »History of Ômiwa-jinja« (OJ 1975) states in a single sentence, the 
Byôdôji separated from the Kôfukuji in Nara during the Edo period, turned to the 
teachings of Shingon and practiced the way of shugendô (OJ 1975: 229). This 
statement, which could not be more succinct, tells us that the temple was from 
then on no less than a center of shugendô. 
This appears to be the true key to understanding the question of why the 
Byôdôji, which was once the largest jinguji of Miwa, was so completely wiped out 
in the course of the destruction wrought during the shinbutsu-bunri period of the 
early Meiji era (see discussion below). While the philosophical Miwa Shintô of the 
Japanese Middle Ages, which is symbolized in the statue of the eleven-headed 
Kannon at the Daigorinji, is a focus of great interest even in current studies, there 
is hardly any mention of the other side of the syncretism of Miwa, namely, moun-
tain worship, Yamabushi and organized shugendô, as can be seen in the terrifying 
figure of Fudô myôô. 
A study published in 1984 by Allan G. Grapard shows the far-reaching effects 
that the shinbutsu-bunri decree of the Meiji Restoration had on this former center 
of shugendô in the case of Tônomine (Tanzan Shrine; see chapter III: 2. 2). Since 
close historical and intellectual ties between Miwa and Tônomine existed, this as-
pect is of great importance in the present context of the deification of Tokugawa 
Ieyasu. As became evident in the previously discussed writings of Tenkai, the re-
lationship to Tônomine played an important role already in his thoughts on the 
deification of Tokugawa Ieyasu, just as important as the equating of Ieyasu with 
Amaterasu, the ancestor and patron saint of the imperial house. These Shintô-
Buddhist speculations, which can be traced back to the religious thought of the 
Japanese Middle Ages, can hardly be forced into dogmatic categories of religious 
denomination. All too often, such religious speculations served the greater pur-
pose of legitimating the right to rule, as was the case of the deification of To-
kugawa Ieyasu postulated by Tenkai. Nikkô, as the site of the deified ancestor of 
the Tokugawa shoguns, served a similar purpose to that of Ise, the resting place 
of the divine ancestors of the imperial family. The gradual replacement of Ise by 
Nikkô took place in the mid-1640s, and in 1645 the highest rank of gû was 
awarded to the shrine by the emperor, which placed it on the same level as the 
shrines at Ise, and imperial visits to Nikkô became a regular occasion. Thus a new 
center of religious authority emerged that was seen as a visible sign of the legiti-
                                                                                                                                                  
Taoism and folk religion, did not coincide with organized state worship. In 1870 shugendô was le-
gally classified under Buddhism, and on October 17 (Gregorian calendar: September 15), 1872, it 
was finally forbidden as an independent religious group by state decree. According to the decree, 
the schools of shugendô were »returned to the two main sects of Tendai and Shingon by the high-
est orders,« (cf. Lokowandt 1978: 297-298, Document 59). Cf. Antoni 1993 a: 37f. 
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mation of the Tokugawa. Ritual was the most important means by which the To-
kugawa sought to legitimize their rule.57 
Thus, two of the most important Shintô schools of medieval syncretism, 
Sannô Ichijitsu Shintô and Yoshida (or Yuiitsu) Shintô (see discussion below), 
stood at the beginning of the formation of the system of rule that was specific to 
the Edo period. And despite the fact that Shintô at the time was deeply rooted in 
the world of Buddhist syncretism, the various schools of Shintô now also turned 
toward the doctrine that later became part of the religious and ideological foun-
dation of the Tokugawa system: Neo-Confucianism. Before further examining the 
content and theology of this connection, however, we will first discuss a few im-
portant points about the political, social and organizational reality of Shintô in the 
early Edo period. 
 
2. 1. 2. The system of shrines and priests 
 
In the early Edo period, a general shift from Buddhist to Confucian principles 
and education took place in Japan, though not to the exclusion of Buddhism and 
Shintô (cf. Hall 1968: 180f.; Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994). While Shintô supported 
local connections among the people, the state found Buddhism to be an ideal 
means for monitoring the people. At new temples in Edo (e.g. the Kan’ei-ji in 
Ueno) and in the castle towns of the Daimyô, Buddhism was mainly responsible 
for carrying out the rites of passage associated with births, marriages and burials. 
This exclusive support was a result of the bakufu’s anti-Christian policy, the cen-
tral point of which was the universal duty to register (terauke) at a temple (dan-
naji). In 1640 an edict was issued that made registration at a temple as well as an 
annual test of belief (shûmon-aratame) mandatory, ensuring the formal depend-
ence of the Japanese people on Buddhist rituals. Shintô fit seamlessly into this 
system. The connections between individuals and the community were strength-
ened by a hierarchical network of shrines, headed by the emperor, who, as the 
highest Shintô priest, carried out the worship of the ancestral deity of the imperial 
house in Ise. Similarly, the Samurai worshipped their ancestors at their local 
shrines, and the lower classes worshipped at their own local tutelary shrines. 
Bitô Masahide (1991: 387) illuminates some basic characteristics of the relig-
ious development of the shrine system in the late Japanese Middle Ages. He sees 
the rise of the local tutelary deities (ujigami) as the focus of religious life in small 
                                                 
57 »The ritual and religious devices the Tokugawa manipulated exacted a religious awe, an experi-
ence of the sublime,« (Ooms 1985: 185). 
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regional communities, such as agricultural towns, as the most important feature 
of this development. Ujigami protected the members of these communities. 
The local ujigami, which emerged in the 15th and 16th centuries, thus differed 
from those of ancient times in the fact that they were independent of specific fa-
milial groups and functioned solely as the tutelary deities of territorial groups 
(Bitô 1991: 388). However, according to Bitô, it is still unclear why a term that 
originally referred to the deity of a blood-related group could now be used for a 
locally or regionally worshipped deity.58 The ujigami’s community was made up 
of various ujiko (Bitô 1991: 390), a connection that is strongly reminiscent of the 
parent-child relationship and lays the foundation for the concept of the exclusive 
connection between ujigami and ujiko. 
Ujigami were enshrined in a yashiro, a word that originally meant a place with 
a temporary altar for the worship of the kami, since the deities’ permanent place 
of residence was not in the town, but rather usually in the mountains, and they 
were only occasionally summoned into the town. 
According to Bitô, it is difficult to determine when the towns began to build 
shrines as permanent residences for the kami. It is possible that this occurred dur-
ing times of economic hardship. Permanent shrines were built on a large scale 
probably over the course of the 16th century, and even earlier in the Kinki region. 
Large communities called sôsho existed there, which often encompassed an entire 
shôen and emerged as early as the 13th century. 
Permanent shrines were built at an early date for the sôsho-ujigami (Bitô 1991: 
391). Furthermore, groups of bushi and small landowners who worshipped at the 
shrine, called miyaza, were connected to these shrines.59 
Although the sôsho disappeared in the 16th century as a result of the end of the 
shôen system, the town remained the fundamental unit of social organization. 
This political development influenced the area of religion by shifting the sphere 
of the ujigami and the miyaza from the sôsho communities to the villages.  
This same development also occurred in the major urban areas. Instead of a 
communal structure that encompassed the entire city, neighborhoods (chô or ma-
chi) emerged as the centers of social life, and several of these chô worshipped a 
common ujigami. 
In many ways, the development of the ujigami resembled that of Buddhist 
temples. However, each temple required a head priest, while it was the miyaza 
who organized ceremonies at the shrines. Even the position of the kannushi often 
                                                 
58 See also the discussion on ujigami in Naumann 1994: 161f., 172f. 
59 Cf. Naumann (1994: 155f., 161, 206f., 231) on the medieval miyaza.  
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rotated among members of the community, and only in the case of shrines of a 
certain size and complexity were head priests employed. 
However, the emergence of head priests across Japan brought with it the need 
for a superior authority to control them (cf. Bitô 1991: 392). The Yoshida family, 
whose main stronghold was Yoshida Shrine in Kyôto, provided a convenient doc-
trine in this context, namely Yoshida or Yuiitsu Shintô (see chapter II: 2. 1. 2. 3), 
and thus achieved a significant measure of influence over the administration of 
shrines throughout the country. Founded by Yoshida Kanetomo (1453-1511), Yo-
shida Shintô functioned as an authority in questions of the correct execution of 
shrine ceremonies as well as the appointment of priests. The Yoshida awarded ti-
tles and ranks to shrines, and were thus able to bring the majority of shrine 
authorities throughout the country under their control between the 16th and 17th 
centuries. 
Though they originally lacked any special characteristics, beginning in the 
18th century it became common for the local ujigami shrines to be seen as branch 
shrines of a few large, national shrines, for example, the Hachiman, Inari and 
Tenjin shrines. In most cases, however, this connection had little effect on the ac-
tual worship of ujigami. 
 
2. 1. 2. 1. The administration of shrines under the baku-han system 
 
The Kanbun era (1661-73) during the rule of the fourth Shôgun, Ietsuna, is 
particularly remarkable in regard to the administration of the shrines (cf. Sugi-
yama, Sakamoto 1994: 15). The »Decree on Shrines and Priests« (Shosha negi kan-
nushi hatto)60, which was issued in July of the year Kanbun 5 (1665), is especially 
relevant in this context, and states: 
 »1. The priests (negi and kannushi) of the various shrines are to study (ma-
nabu) exclusively the way of the gods of heaven and earth (jingidô) and gain 
true knowledge of their honorable heavenly being (»divine body,« shintai). 
They are to carry out the traditional holy ceremonies (shinji) and festival ritu-
als (sairai). Whoever shows himself to be neglectful of these regulations will 
be divested of his position as priest. 
 2. Hereditary families of priests of noble rank, that is, those families who 
have served as densô [also: tensô61] since ancient times, are to be promoted in 
rank and are responsible for carrying out [these rules]. 
                                                 
60 Text in Ishii 1959: 6-7 (= Tokugawa kinrei kô, Volume 5, chapter 40/44, Number 2545); Itô Akira 
provides an annotated transcription in modern Japanese (in: Inoue 1994: 116-117); cf. Sugiyama, 
Sakamoto 1994: 15. 
61 Noblemen who, among other things, maintained relations between the court and the shrines; cf. 
Meyer 1998. 
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 3. Shrine priests (shajin) without rank are to wear white robes. All others 
may wear the official robes only with the written permission of the Yoshida.62  
 4. Shrine estates may neither be sold nor purchased. Furthermore, they 
also may not be mortgaged. 
 5. In the case of minor damage to the shrines, the appropriate repairs are 
always to be carried out according to custom. Furthermore, the shrines are to 
always be kept clean. 
The above paragraphs are to be strictly followed. Violations are to be re-
ported according to the severity of the case.« 
This directive was sent to every shrine in the country as well as the individual 
domains (han). It was also given to the Yoshida family, to whom the bakufu had 
awarded the position of governor of shrine affairs (jingi kanrei shiki).63 
On the other hand, there were also significant movements against these 
measures in several domains (han).64 In 1666 (Kanbun 6) Tokugawa Mitsukuni 
subsequently called for the destruction of all newly built Buddhist temples – 997 
in all – in his territories, but ordered the older temples to be renovated. Long be-
fore the Meiji government took similar measures in 1868, he enforced the separa-
tion of shrines and temples (shinbutsu-bunri) in his domain and decreed that only 
one tutelary shrine per town be allowed (ichigô issha system). In Aizu-han a Jisha 
engi totaling 24 volumes was compiled in the year Kanbun 4 (1664), four volumes 
of which were devoted to the shrines. The reorganization of the temples and 
shrines in this domain was carried out based on this registry (jisha-seiri). As was 
the case in Mito, here too temples built in the previous twenty years were torn 
down in 1666. The influential feudal lord Hoshina Masayuki (1611-1672) was a 
central figure in these measures. In Okayama-han (domain) too, Ikeda Mitsumasa 
decreed that shrines and temples with »questionable beliefs« (inshi) be destroyed 
in the fifth month of the same year. In the year Kanbun 7 (1667), more than 10,000 
shrines were reportedly torn down in the entire region in the wake of the »one 
town, one shrine« (ichigô-issha) rule, with only 601 shrines remaining. By enforc-
ing the ichigô-issha system and thus revoking the custom of Buddhist temple reg-
istration (terauke) in his domain, he also allowed the mandatory »confirmations of 
                                                 
62 This means that the Yoshida themselves awarded the rank, since the robe was a symbol of this 
rank. 
63 This so-called »shrine regulation« (jinja no jômoku) was first given to the Yoshida Family by the 
bakufu as a »written confirmation with the red seal of the shôgun« (shuinjô) together with the »con-
firmation of the bakufu regarding the estates (fiefs) of the Yoshida family« (Yoshida-ke ryôchi 
shuinjô) in the year Jôkyô 2 (1685) and again in the years Kyôhô 4 (1719), Enkyô 4 (1747), Hôreki 12 
(1762), Temmei 8 (1788), Tempô 10 (1839) and Ansei 2 (1855). Cf. Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994: 15.  
64 In Mito-han, for example, a »Registry of temple foundings in Mito« (Mito-kaiki-chô) in 15 vol-
umes was compiled, two volumes of which were dedicated to the local tutelary deities (chinju-
kaiki-chô). 
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belief,« which were otherwise administered by Buddhist priests, to be given by 
Shintô priests. Furthermore, he recommended Shintô burials. In the year Kanbun 
9 (1669), for example, a total of 97.5% of the deceased in this han were reportedly 
buried according to the Shintô tradition. However, these movements only had a 
temporary influence on the neighboring domains. Hoshina Masayuki died in 
1672, and Mito (Tokugawa) Mitsukuni as well as Mitsumasa stepped down. This 
meant that the terauke system once again applied as required by the bakufu. 
However, the shinbutsu-bunri policy of the Kanbun era (1661-1673) also con-
tinued to be upheld at some shrines, such as Kitsuki Shrine in Izumo (today: 
Izumo-taisha), as well as Sata Shrine and Miho Shrine in the domain of Matsue, 
among others. The number of shrines and temples also declined due to the finan-
cial state of the han. 
While the terauke system in several influential han, such as Okayama, was 
temporarily suspended, as described above, over the course of the Genroku pe-
riod (1688-1704), the bakufu generally strengthened its support of the Buddhist 
temples (cf. Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994). 
 
2. 1. 2. 2. The control of the shrine priests by the Yoshida family 
 
The Yoshida family, which was responsible for administering Yuiitsu (Yo-
shida) Shintô, had issued confirmations and appointments to the regional shrine 
priests (shinshoku) since the Japanese Middle Ages (cf. Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994: 
16). During the Edo period, the Yoshida strove to form this rule into a monopoly 
by virtue of the authority of the bakufu, but was always rebuffed by the family’s 
opponents, such as the Shirakawa family and other families of the court nobility 
(kuge).65 
The means used by the Yoshida for maintaining control over the individual 
regions included, for example, periodic visits (kaison, »traveling through the vil-
lages«) to the local shrines (kunikakari-yaku) of the provinces by a representative of 
the Yoshida house. Additionally, priests underwent practical training under the 
direction of the Yoshida during their stays in Kyôto regarding their duties at the 
shrines. Finally, in the year Kansei 3 (1792), the Yoshida family also established a 
                                                 
65 As Naumann (1994: 71 and 72) points out, Yoshida Kanetomo had strengthened his family’s 
power and prestige »primarily at the expense of the Shirakawa family, who were still responsible 
for the actual administration of the Office of Shintô Worship (jingikan). Therefore, Kanetomo be-
gan to appoint regional shrine officials, award the shrines ranks, and to allow certain robes to be 
worn. [...] Ultimately, in 1596 the Yoshida succeeded in gaining permission – in competition with 
the Shirakawa – to build the hasshinden, the hall for the eight gods of the Office of Shintô Worship, 
on the grounds of their shrine.« On Yoshida Kanetomo cf. Scheid 2001: 108ff. 
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branch of their office in Edo in order to process applications for the appointment 
of priests from the eastern provinces. Additionally, the »Office of Theology« 
(shingaku-shitsu) was also opened in Edo, which employed a total of 40 officials at 
the time of the Tempô reform in 1842. Among others, there was another such of-
fice in Ôsaka. 
Unlike the Yoshida family, the Shirakawa family, which belonged to the no-
bility, appears not to have dealt intensively with the regional shrines and priests 
at the beginning of the Tokugawa period. Rather, the Shirakawa appear to have 
maintained contact with the priests associated with the jingikan, the focus of 
which were the »twenty-two shrines« (nijûni-sha)66, and played their role as no-
blemen with close ties to the emperor. However, the Shirakawa also attempted, 
through the practice of kaison, to gain control at least of the priests in Yamato 
Province, thus expanding their area of rule compared to the Yoshida. 
Furthermore, there was yet another family, the Tsuchimikado, who awarded 
licenses to local priests, and some large regional shrines also awarded letters of 
appointment to their priests. Shrines such as the two Ise shrines, Kashima Shrine 
and Katori Shrine, among others, were governed by a total of nearly 100 heredi-
tary priest families (shake), and these shrines regulated their own systems over 
many generations. 
 
2. 1. 2. 3. The further development of Yoshida Shintô 
 
As the above discussion has shown, Yuiitsu Shintô of the Yoshida house 
played the dominant role among Shintô schools in the 17th century in Japan. This 
was the starting point of most syncretistic doctrines. Since the teachings of Yo-
shida Kanetomo (1435-1511) have already been discussed in detail by Nelly 
Naumann (1994) and Bernhard Scheid (2001)67, only a brief overview will be 
given in the present context. Kanetomo, the most important thinker of this school, 
was particularly strongly influenced by Buddhism. For this reason, his esoteric 
teachings included various rituals that were originally borrowed from Shingon 
Buddhism (cf. Naumann 1994: 71). 
                                                 
66 On the system of the »twenty-two shrines,« cf. Naumann 1988: 230f.; on the position of the 
Ômiwa-jinja within this system, cf. OJ 1975: 145ff. 
67 Medieval Yoshida (Yuiitsi) Shintô as well as Yoshida Kanetomo and his teachings have been ex-
tensively covered both in Japanese and in Western languages (in particular, cf. Ishibashi and 
Dumoulin 1940; Seckel 1943). For an introduction, cf. Scheid 2001; Naumann 1994: 57-74; Picken 
1994: 302-305; Kishimoto 1972 (1993): 37-44; Ômori 1992: 156-159, among others. Allan Grapard 
provides translations and studies on this topic in the journal MN (MN 47, 1992), which, however, 
hardly extend beyond the earlier work by Ishibashi and Dumoulin (1940) and Seckel (1943) in the 
same journal, and furthermore, does not contain any mention of these previous studies. 
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The Yoshida achieved their influence over Shintô during the Edo period due 
to their position of power in the system of Shintô shrines at the time as well as 
their ability to gain the favor of the rulers of the new system, the Tokugawa 
house. The previously discussed »Decree on Shrines and Priests« (Shosha negi 
kannushi hatto) from the year Kanbun 5 (1665) is especially important in this con-
text. This law, which consists of a total of five paragraphs, also explicitly institu-
tionalized the dominant position of the Yoshida house in this context. As is stated 
in the third paragraph of the decree quoted above, »Shrine priests (shajin) without 
rank are to wear white robes. All others may wear the official robes only with the 
written permission of the Yoshida.« Thus, the Yoshida were responsible for 
awarding ranks, since the robes functioned as a symbol of rank. Despite the fact 
that other institutions during the Edo period, such as the Shirakawa and Tsu-
chimikado houses, as well as some of the most important shrines, also came to 
appoint local shrine priests, this law provided the legal basis for continuing the 
practice that had been in place since the Japanese Middle Ages, in which the Yo-
shida house issued formal letters of appointment for shrine priests. 
In addition to these bureaucratic functions performed for the bakufu, the Yo-
shida also had a critical influence on the worship of the imperial house. Already 
Yoshida Kanetomo won, as Naumann (1994: 71) writes, »great influence at the 
court, where he gave lectures on the Nihongi.« As Seckel (1943: 62) writes, »in the 
turmoil of the Sengoku period, [...] the jingikan also became sympathetic, and the 
responsibility for these especially important shrines, and thus the cultic, magical 
protection of the emperor was entrusted to the Yoshida house, which appeared to 
be the most qualified for this responsibility due to its dominant position in Shintô 
matters.« Under Kanetomo’s successor Kanemi, the saijôsho, the most important 
place of worship of the Yoshida house in Kyôto, finally took with the newly es-
tablished »deputy jingikan« (jingikandai) on the basic ritual functions of the Impe-
rial Office of Shintô Worship, the jingikan.68 
Thus, in the early Edo period, the Yoshida had acquired an incomparable 
measure of power in the area of Shintô, both on the level of the Shôgun as well as 
                                                 
68 Since the year 1590, or 1596 (Naumann 1994: 72), the tutelary deities of the hasshinden of the Of-
fice of Shintô Worship (jingikan) in the main shrine of the Yoshida in Kyôto (Yoshida Saijôsho) 
were ritually worshipped. It was Kanetomo who founded this highest of sacred places for the 
gods of heaven and earth, according to the teachings of Yoshida, at Kaguraoka in Kyôto (cf. Seckel 
1943; Grapard 1992). In his detailed study on this topic, Seckel (1943: 62f. ) points out that, con-
trary to the generally accepted opinion, the eight small shrines for the worship of the imperial tu-
telary deities (hasshinden) of the jingikan were not moved from the jingikan to the Yoshida Saijôsho 
around the end of the 16th century. He writes decidedly: »[...] that Kanetomo also knew to ensure 
the priority of his place of worship in this important regard above all other jinja by taking on the 
responsibility for the personal tutelary deities of the emperor and the strong clerical position of 
power this provided in relation to the emperor and the court.« Cf. Scheid 2001: passim. 
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with the emperor. And this superior position applied not only to the area of the 
newly won control of the Shintô priests or of official rituals. 
The Yoshida’s influence on the development of Shintô of the early Edo period 
was closely dependent on the new social and political structures, and conse-
quently, the doctrine of Yoshida Shintô underwent an extensive development, the 
result of which was modern Shintô, influenced by Neo-Confucianism, which 
hardly bore any resemblance to the original ideas of Yoshida Kanetomo. 
Among the previously discussed Confucians of the time, the Shintô teachings 
of Hayashi Razan in particular were influenced to a large extent by the Yoshida 
doctrine, regardless of his criticism of Yuiitsu Shintô of the Yoshida house (cf. 
Naumann 1994: 72; see chapter II: 2. 2. 2). However, before Hayashi’s teachings 
can be examined in detail, a few general points about Confucian Shintô in the Edo 
period must be established. 
 
2. 2. Shintô and Confucianism in the early Edo period 
 
The following sections will attempt to illuminate the theological and ideologi-
cal spheres of religious thought that formed the basis for religious practice in the 
early Edo period (cf. Antoni 1997b). As discussed above, the widespread interpre-
tation of the sole dominance of pure Neo-Confucian thought during the Edo pe-
riod cannot be supported in light of recent studies. Besides Buddhism, which, due 
to the aforementioned terauke system, expanded its influence into all areas of 
Japanese society, Shintô is especially relevant in this context. The contribution of 
Shintô thought to the Neo-Confucian, metaphysical legitimation of the bakufu’s 
rule, as well as that of the imperial household in the later phases of the Edo pe-
riod, has only recently been fully recognized. This is where the present discussion 
will begin. Shintô-Confucian discourse laid the ground for the success of the Ko-
kugaku, and it is here that the roots of the Japanese debate on modernization can 
be found, which continued into the Meiji Restoration and the Japanese modern 
era. 
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2. 2. 1. Basic characteristics of Japanese Confucianism 
 
Confucianism has always been viewed as a central element of the originally 
foreign cultural heritage that was adapted to Japan to a large extent over the 
course of history, and is comparable only with Buddhism in terms of its impact. 
Already the first written documents, which according to the legendary tradi-
tion came to Japan from China by way of Korea, were copies of Confucian clas-
sics. In ancient Japan, so-called state or Han Confucianism influenced all matters 
of the Japanese state, which was formed according to the example of Tang-period 
China. Unlike the idealized Chinese meritocracy, however, which formed the ba-
sis of Confucianism in China, in Japan Confucianism was always influenced by 
the tribal structures of an aristocracy oriented toward clan interests. The basic 
Confucian, egalitarian primacy of individual virtue over aristocratic descent was 
never able to establish itself in Japan. This represents a crucial difference between 
Japanese and Chinese Confucianism, both varieties nonetheless being part of a 
common system of thought and values. The principle of a government based on 
its own moral quality was never able to gain acceptance within the genealogically 
oriented thought in Japan, whose most important criterion is the question of de-
scent. The emperor as well as the Shôgun ruled based on their own genealogical 
legitimation, the emperor due to his immanently divine ancestry, and the Shôgun 
due to his membership in the house of the Minamoto – specifically, Seiwa-Genji, a 
former secondary line of the imperial family. However, the organization of the 
state, both in ancient Japan and under the feudal system of the Edo period, 
largely followed the maxims of contemporary Confucian thought on government. 
After the centuries of government disorganization and disintegration during 
the late Muromachi period, the Tokugawa house, which was able to gain hegem-
ony over all of Japan, created a strict system of domestic organization and con-
trol. The Confucian values and relationships played a major role in this system. 
The Five Relationships (gorin) and Five Virtues (gojô) determined all aspects of 
state and social life (see chapter I: 3. 2. 2). Even the paths of individual professions 
and social classes strictly followed these moral laws. The basis for this was Neo-
Confucianism, as interpreted by the Sung-period Chinese scholar Chu Hsi (1120-
1200; Zhu Xi, Japanese: Shushi), whose commentaries on the Confucian classics 
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had previously been studied and spread during the Japanese Middle Ages – in-
terestingly, by Zen Buddhist monks.69 
The circles of originally Buddhist clerics were also the source of the school 
that later went on to influence religious and state life in the Edo period: shushi-
gaku according to the interpretation of the Hayashi family. The founder of this 
school and personal advisor to the first Tokugawa Shôgun Ieyasu, Hayashi Razan 
(1583-1657), formed a state ideology out of the social and ethical aspects of Chu 
Hsi Confucianism that was perfectly suited to the needs of the Tokugawa and of-
ficially remained in effect until the middle of the 19th century, but that, in a differ-
ent form, also continued to influence modern Japan after 1868. 
The syncretistic union of Confucianism and Shintô was already, as previously 
discussed, the focus of this most important Tokugawa scholar and ideologue. In 
his view, the three sacred treasures of Shintô, the imperial regalia (sanshû no 
jingi), were in their true meaning the manifestations of cardinal Confucian vir-
tues: 
»The mirror is knowledge, the jewels are humanity and the sword is courage. 
It is justice that preserves the virtues of knowledge, humanity and courage in 
the heart. If these virtues are alive in the heart, they are knowledge, humanity 
and courage. If they appear as symbols, they become jewels, mirror and 
sword. They are necessary for governing and protecting the state. [...] The 
way of kings and the way of the gods is but one.« 
This is how Razan describes the relationship between Confucianism and 
Shintô in his work Shintô denju (1644-48).70 It is especially apparent that, accord-
ing to this Confucian thinker, the Confucian system of values play the primary 
role, while the sacred treasures are brought into a subordinate, symbolic position. 
Shintô-Confucian syncretism, or Confucian Shintô (juka shintô)71, largely re-
placed Buddhist-influenced Shintô in theoretical and theological discourse, and 
thus also syncretistic shinbutsu-shûgô thought, during the early Edo period.72 
Nonetheless, the Shintô-Buddhist »shrine-temple complexes« (jingûji)73 remained 
                                                 
69 On Chu Hsi Confucianism, cf. Chan 1973: 588-653; texts from the Japanese Shushi school in: 
Tsunoda 1964, Volume I: 335-368; de Bary, Volume 2, 2005: 29ff. Smith 1973 provides a historical 
overview. 
70 Quoted and translated from Benl, Hammitzsch 1956: 218, Document no. 121. 
71 Cf. Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994; Abe 1972; Boot 1992; Kishimoto 1972 (1993): 47-69 and Kracht 
1986. Collected source materials: Taira, Abe (ed.) 1972: 9-262; Kojiruien (1977), Jingi-bu II/44, 
Shintô 2: 1359-1455.  
72 On Shintô-Buddhist syncretism (shinbutsu-shûgô) cf. Kawane 1986, chapter 1; Kubota 1989; Ma-
tsunaga 1969; Naumann 1988: 221-237; Naumann 1994; Ono 1985; Ômori 1992, among others.  
73 On the jingûji of the Edo period, cf. Seckel 1985: 29f., 74-77, among others. 
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in existence at the ceremonial level and at local shrines throughout the Edo pe-
riod until they were officially separated (shinbutsu-bunri) during the Meiji Resto-
ration. 
Confucian interpretations of Shintô can be found already in the medieval doc-
trines of Ise or Yoshida Shintô, although they continued to be largely influenced 
by Buddhism. On the other hand, the Confucian Shintô of the modern era – that 
is, the concept of a unity of Shintô and Confucianism (shinju-itchi)74 – was based 
on (Neo-) Confucianism at its spiritual core and a hostile attitude toward Bud-
dhism (haibutsu). Thus, Shintô was reinterpreted from the point of view of the 
philosophy that came to dominate official thought, shushigaku – a classic case of 
ideologically motivated traditionalism. 
The new, Confucian-oriented Shintô philosophers included the most influen-
tial shushigakusha of the time, such as Fujiwara Seika (1561-1619), Hayashi Razan 
(1583-1657) and Yamazaki Ansai (1619-1682). The doctrines of Watarai (Ise) 
Shintô and Yoshida Shintô were also reinterpreted according to Confucianism 
during the Edo period and thus developed in accordance with the new balance of 
power, especially by the influential scholars Watarai Nobuyoshi (1615-1690) and 
Yoshikawa Koretari (Koretaru; 1616-1694). 
 
2. 2. 2. Hayashi Razan’s Confucian Shintô 
 
As was discussed above, the work of Hayashi Razan is especially influential 
in this context. In his most important work on the relationship between Shintô 
and Confucianism, Shintô denju, Razan illustrates the common basic principles of 
the two belief systems.75 Among others, Klaus Kracht (1986) has focussed in 
depth on the work of Hayashi Razan, and his study also examines general aspects 
of Shintô-Confucian discourse at the time. 
Kracht’s study attempts, as he states, »to more closely understand Neo-
Confucian thought in Japan from the 17th to the 19th centuries by examining one 
aspect of its concept of gods, the Neo-Confucian concept of the spirit according to 
the tradition of Chu Hsi.« One remarkable characteristic of this study is Kracht’s 
translation of the native Japanese word kami with the term Geist (»spirit«) in 
German. He also refers to shintô as the Geist-Weg (»spirit way«) and shinkoku, tra-
                                                 
74 Cf. Kishimoto 1972 (1993): 49-58; Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994: 16. 
75 On the Shintô-Confucian synthesis of Hayashi Razan and especially his work Shintô denju (ca. 
1644-1648, on date cf. Kracht 1986: 116) cf. Kracht 1986: passim; Boot 1992: passim; vgl. Taira 1972: 
507-518; Abe 1972: 502-503; Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994: 17; Taira, Abe (ed.) 1972: 11-57; Yamamoto 
1993 (1911): 14-46.  
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ditionally »land of the gods«76, is rendered as »land of the spirits.« In my view, 
this represents an indifference for the religious element, which fails to compre-
hend the numinous character of a term such as kami (»god, deity«). On the other 
hand, Kracht’s study represents a well founded introduction to the field of 
Shintô-Confucian discourse in the early Edo period, and for this reason its main 
conclusions will be discussed in the following. 
First the author outlines the term »spirit discourse,« which is of central impor-
tance to his study, as »a reproduction of the Chinese kuei-shen lun, or the Japanese 
kishinron. In Confucianism, talking about spirits and the spirit means pursuing 
the basic questions of the cosmos and the order of nature, man and society. Spirit 
discourses open the possibility [...] of asking concretely: What are spirits? What is 
the spirit?« (Kracht 1986: 1). According to Kracht, such an investigation is espe-
cially important in Japan, a country that, »according to its traditional understand-
ing of itself, is the ‘land of the spirits’ (shinkoku, kami no kuni) and the ‘spirit way’ 
(shintô, kami no michi),« (Kracht 1986: 2). 
The study focuses on three Confucian scholars of the Tokugawa period. Be-
sides Hayashi Razan, these include the philosophers Arai Hakuseki (1657-1725) 
and Yamagata Bantô (1748-1821). Kracht justifies his choice of these three thinkers 
in particular with the fact that they 1) all emerged from the same Confucian 
background, and thus are comparable; 2) each belonged to a different era within 
the Tokugawa period; and 3) all three wrote extensively about the »spirit.« Fi-
nally, Kracht writes, all three had »something very basic in common: their spirit 
discourses were written as the products of private or secret speculation not in-
tended for publication,« even though all three were prominent public figures. 
Although Chu Hsi (1130-1200), whose discourses form the foundation of 
Kracht’s study, did not organize his own thoughts on the subject of the »spirit,« 
his thought reveals an understanding of the canonical spirits shen, kuei and ch’i as 
three kinds of what is actually »one spirit« (shen). However, Kracht writes, the 
use of the term »spirit« is to be understood both concretely and abstractly, refer-
ring to the »spirit« as well as »spirits« (Kracht 1986: 83). One of Chu Hsi’s main 
goals was to »oppose ‘common superstitions.’« He saw the popular practice of 
worshipping spirits as being wrong. Later in his study, Kracht discusses this es-
sential aspect of his argumentation, which is rooted in the vagueness of the word 
»spirit.« The German word Geist (»spirit«) is understood as a »translated word« 
(Hartmut Buchner, cf. Kracht 1986: 109) that is accordingly inconsistent in its 
                                                 
76 The designation shinkoku (»land of the gods«) for Japan can be found already in the Nihonshoki 
(Jingû-kôgô, Chûai-tennô 9/10/3 = NKBT 67: 338). For the shinkoku ideology in Japanese intellec-
tual history cf. Nawrocki 1998: 21-86. 
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meaning. »It can encompass all the basic meanings of kuei-shen in its variants 
without imposing its own linguistic complexities.«  
Kracht’s discussion of the three Japanese Chu Hsi Confucian scholars men-
tioned above begins with Hayashi Razan’s Neo-Confucian Shintô, based on the 
text of the Shintô denju, which was compiled between 1644 and 1648. Confucian 
Shintô (juka shintô), Kracht writes, represents an »attempt to reconcile the beliefs 
of the native mythology with Chinese Confucianism. It brings two heterogeneous 
written traditions into harmony with one another as different expressions of the 
same truth.« (Kracht 1986: 117) Razan’s Shintô is rooted in Yuiitsu Shintô (»the 
way of the one and only Shintô«) in the tradition of Yoshida Kanetomo (1435-
1511). Thus, it is not surprising that even the Shintô denju was based on Kane-
tomo’s main work, Yuiitsu shintô myôbô yôshû (»Outline of the notable law of the 
Solitary Shintô«).77 Similarly, W. J. Boot (1992: 148) remarks: 
»The kind of Shintô Razan propagates in his Shintô writings is the so-called 
Ritôshinchi shintô. He developed it himself, under the influence of the me-
dieval Shintô of the Yoshida and of Neo-Confucianism.« 
Hayashi Razan’s teachings themselves are a conglomeration of Japanese my-
thology as well as Buddhist, Confucianist and Taoist elements. In this context, the 
equation of the Confucian kishin with the native mythological kami is of »funda-
mental importance to Hayashi Razan’s thought.« In his teachings, the deity (or as 
Kracht writes, the »spirit«) Kuninotokotachi no Mikoto of Japanese mythology is 
particularly important: this deity is understood to be the »original spirit,« or the 
»entire body« of all kami, »symbolically equal to the t’ai-chi of Sung Confucian-
ism.«78 
According to this conception, Buddhism takes the rank of a subordinate doc-
trine whose roots lie in Shintô (which marks the absolute opposite to the position 
of Kuroda Toshio, see below). The emphasis on Shintô implies that the problem 
of legitimating rule in the Tokugawa state was of particular importance. Based on 
the genealogical speculations of a priest of the Yoshida School, Bonshun (1553-
1632), the supposed proof was provided that the Tokugawa belonged to the 
house of the Seiwa Genji and therefore were descendants of the imperial line. 
Thus, Hayashi Razan also included the Tokugawa in Amaterasu’s divine man-
date to rule (shinchoku).79 
                                                 
77 On Kanetomo’s Yuiitsu shintô myôbô yôshû cf. Scheid 2001. 
78 See also Boot 1992: 151. 
79 Cf. note 21. The divine mandate to rule (shinchoku) is recorded in the Nihonshoki (NKBT 67: 147; 
Aston 1956: 76f.), the Kojiki (NKBT 1: 126/127; Antoni 2012a: 77) and in the Kogoshûi (Gunsho ruijû 
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While Hayashi Razan propagated an ethnocentric form of Shintô Confucian-
ism whose basic material was found in the native Japanese traditions, the think-
ing of the second of the theoreticians under discussion was of a completely differ-
ent intention. In Arai Hakuseki’s (1657-1725) »Neo-Confucian demonology,« 
Japanese mythology is not accorded any importance of its own. His work Kishin-
ron80 draws its material entirely from Chinese sources. Arai Hakuseki subscribes 
to the maxim that »the traditional [i.e. Chinese] texts are the basis for Confucian 
discourse on spirits.« 
Hakuseki distinguishes between the spheres of the »ordinary« and the »ex-
traordinary.« While the »ordinary« state means the balance of »powers« (rei) and 
the orderliness of »material« (ki), the »strange« and »extraordinary« is defined as 
the »result of a loss of this balance and order.« Among the causes of this state are 
the actions of free-floating ghosts of the deceased (onryô), free-floating »life en-
ergy,« and expanding »powder energy« (cf. Kracht 1986: 179ff.). According to this 
doctrine, Buddha belongs to the sphere of the »extraordinary« and is considered 
an extremely dangerous demon from the region of the ghosts of the deceased. 
The third of the Confucian philosophers discussed by Kracht (1986: 200ff.), 
Yamagata Bantô (1748-1821), finally exceeds the limits of purely Confucian 
thought, and Kracht characterizes his thought as »trans-Confucian speculation.« 
The core elements of the teachings of Yamagata Bantô, expressed in his pri-
vate work Yume no shiro (»Instead of Dreams«)81, which was written between 1802 
and 1820, are based on modern Western astronomy, which offered an alternative 
to the traditional cosmologies of Japan, China and India. He views the concept of 
the shinkoku/kami no kuni in particular, as professed by the school of National 
Learning (Kokugaku), as an »expression of the greatest stupidity and ignorance.« 
In Bantô’s view, the nonexistence of spirits is an incontrovertible fact. However, 
he reveals his Confucian foundations by stating that one must serve the spirits of 
the ancestors as if they existed, as an act of piety toward one’s deceased parents. 
Finally, Kracht (1986: 256, 265) states that there was a historical shift in Japa-
nese thought between the 17th and 19th centuries, along with »elements of conti-
nuity.« He sees two circumstances as contributing to the »indigenization of aca-
demic discourse«: the integration of the native Japanese mythology into academic 
discourse, and the expansion of discourse on Japanese spoken language. This 
                                                                                                                                                  
25: 5; Florenz 1919: 246). However, an essential detail of this myth is not mentioned in the com-
mentaries; only one version, which appears in just one variant of the Nihonshoki, tells of a mandate 
for the eternal rule of the imperial line. All other variants only mention the direct mandate of 
Amaterasu to her grandson Ninigi. Cf. Antoni 2012a: 558.  
80 Arai Hakuseki: Kishinron, ed. NST 35. 
81 Yamagata Bantô: Yume no shiro, ed. NST 43; cf. Kracht 1986: 201ff. 
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leads to an »expansion of the academic concept of experience through the integra-
tion of mythology and everyday life, indigenous scholarship and Western sci-
ence, into the Chu Hsi Confucian debate.« 
Among the reactions to this development, besides that of Ishida Baigan, the 
main representative of the shingaku (»mind and heart learning«), Kracht draws 
particular attention to the arguments of Aizawa Seishisai in his programmatic 
work of the late Mito School, Shinron (»New Discourse«). Regarding the term 
»spirit« in the late Mito School – in the tradition of Yamazaki Ansai – Kracht 
(1986: 268) remarks in summary that this is »a unification of native mythology 
and Confucian canon, by way of the Chu Hsi exegesis, that is distinguished from 
Razan’s Confucian Shintô particularly by its stronger abstinence from obviously 
Buddhist speculation.« 
At the same time, this school, which had become so important to scholars in 
the Japanese modern age, was inspired by National Learning, with its »exaggera-
tion of the national concept of the ‘spirit country’ [shinkoku: ‘land of the gods’],« 
which is apparent in Aizawa Seishisai’s statement: »Our country has the rank of 
head of the earth« (see chapter II: 5. 2. 2). 
According to Kracht, the general teachings of Chu Hsi Confucianism were 
»provincialized« in Japanese thought, meaning »a certain form of appropriation.« 
In conclusion, he states that the causes of this »provincialization« of Japanese 
thought lie »in the latency of the disregarded, not historically analyzed native 
mythology.« Boot (1992: 173) reaches a similar conclusion in his concise state-
ment: 
»In regard to Shintô Razan’s position is that Shintô is of autochthonic Japa-
nese origin, that it is been denatured by Buddhism which obliterated certain 
of its essential features, and that in final analysis it is identical with Confu-
cianism.« 
Just as there is no doubt about Hayashi Razan’s importance for the »Confu-
cianization« of Shintô in the early Edo period, the shift to the final adaptation to 
the new system was carried out most effectively in the thought of a scholar who 
made an important impact on Yoshida Shintô during this period: Yoshikawa Ko-
retari, also known as Koretaru (cf. Antoni 1997c). 
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2. 2. 3. Yoshikawa Shintô 
 
Yoshikawa Koretari (1616-1694)82, also known as Yoshikawa Koretaru or Kik-
kawa Koretari, entered the service of the head of the Yoshida house, Hagiwara 
Kaneyori, the first son of Yoshida Kaneharu, in 1653 as a student, and was intro-
duced to the teachings of Yoshida Shintô by him. Later, Koretari even became a 
shintô-dôtô, or a keeper of the teachings of the Yoshida, and was made head of the 
Yoshida house itself.83 
Under the rule of Shôgun Tokugawa Tsunayoshi (1646-1709), Koretari also at-
tained the position of shintôkata (»director of Shintô affairs«) for the bakufu,84 
meaning that he was a civil servant of the Tokugawa. This influential administra-
tive division of the Edo bakufu belonged to the office of the jisha-bugyô (»commis-
sioners of temples and shrines«).85 The office of the shintôkata was established af-
ter the issuing of the aforementioned decree on the appointment of shrine priests 
(Shosha negi kannushi hatto) in 1665 (Kanbun 5), but it was not until Tenna 2 (1682) 
that Yoshikawa Koretari became the first person to assume this position. After his 
death, the position was given to his son Tsugunaga, and it remained within the 
Yoshikawa family until the Meiji Restoration.86 
Koretari, and later his son Tsugunaga, developed Yoshida Shintô into the 
»new Yoshida Shintô« (shin Yoshida shintô, cf. Ômori 1992: 170), also known as 
Yoshikawa Shintô. Particularly the virtues represented by the imperial regalia 
                                                 
82 On Yoshikawa Koretari, also known as Koretaru, cf. Taira 1972: 519-528; Sugiyama, Sakamoto 
1994: 17; Ômori 1992: 170-171; Kojiruien (1977), Jingi-bu II/44, Shintô 2: 1405-1414; Taira, Abe (ed.) 
1972: 59-75 and 77-83 (Yoshikawa Tsugunaga); Yamamoto 1993 (1911): 141-147. 
83 As Taira (1972: 520f.) writes, the doctrine of Yoshida Shintô was passed on from generation to 
generation within a hierarchy of four levels of secrecy. The bearer of the highest level of secrecy 
(himorogi iwasaka den) was appointed shintô dôtô and thus bestowed not only with the highest 
authority as a scholar, but also within the world of Edo period Shintô. On this topic, see also the 
most important work of Yoshikawa Shintô, written by Yoshikawa Tsugunaga, Himorogi iwasaka no 
daiji (Taira, Abe (ed.) 1972: 77-83). Taira sees the reasons for Kaneyori’s choice of Koretari as his 
successor, who was not a descendant of the Yoshida family, as being his outstanding scholarship 
as well as the fact that there was no appropriate successor in the Yoshida family itself. According 
to Ômori (1992: 171), after this time, the right of succession to this highest rank remained within 
the Yoshikawa family. Only in the year Meiji 21 (1888) was it returned to the Yoshida family – 
long after Yoshida Shintô had lost its dominant position.  
84 Cf., among others, Itô Akira’s article »Shintôkata« in Inoue 1994: 118. 
85 On the office of the jisha-bugyô, cf. Totman 1988: 40ff., 174-176, 181f., 195-197, among others. 
86 On the role of Yoshikawa Tsugunaga, cf. Inoue 1994: 444f. 
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(sanshû no jingi) were of fundamental importance to Koretari, as well as for other 
leading figures of Shintô-Confucian juka shintô.87 
Koretari’s doctrine was based on complicated speculations on the derivation 
of morality from the Chinese Confucian doctrine of the elements,88 in which the 
relationship of the elements »earth« (tsuchi, do) and »metal/gold« (kane, kon) were 
of central importance as the basis of morality. In this context, dokon is considered 
the root of the central ethical category of »reverence, obedience« (tsutsushimi). 
The remaining core points of Yoshikawa Koretari’s teachings can be summa-
rized as follows (cf. Taira 1972: 522-528): The world in its entirety was created by 
the gods of Japan. The laws are made according to the way of Shintô. Both Con-
fucianism and Buddhism are teachings that were derived from Shintô and devel-
oped differently according to location and human factors. The Shintô of the 
»original source« (sôgen shintô89), i.e. Yoshida Shintô, on the other hand, is the 
successor of the true way and thus is supreme over all other religions. Neo-
Confucianism (sôgaku, Sung Confucianism) is used in order to rationalize the 
teachings of Shintô, and therefore it is a rigaku shintô,90 or »scientific Shintô« 
(Naumann 1994: 73), or »Shintô of the study of the principle [of reason].«91 
The deity Kuninotokotachi no mikoto, god of the creation of the world, is also 
a central figure in this context, and he existed as an original deity before the crea-
tion of heaven and earth, and of yin and yang.92 This god, which is without form 
or name, is identical to the formless chaos that is called the »nothingness« (kyomu) 
in Taoism and »peaklessness and highest peak« (mukyoku-ji-taikyoku; Chinese: wu-
chi-t’ai-chi) in Confucianism.93 Regarding the relationship between god and man, 
Koretari holds that all creatures were formed out of the movement of chaos of the 
taikyoku (Chinese: t’ai-chi). People also originated from the combination of the 
»principle« (ri) of taikyoku (taikyoku no ri) and the »spirit« (ki) of yin and yang (on-
myô no ki) – a core principle of Neo-Confucian cosmology. Thus, the original 
                                                 
87 Cf., among others, the chapter »Shintô to sanshû-jingi-kan« in Kishimoto 1972 (1993): 185-191, 
especially 189f. 
88 Cf. Taira 1972: 522-525; Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994: 17; Kishimoto 1972 (1993): 58-60; text sources: 
Kojiruien (1977), Jingi-bu II/44, Shintô 2: 1405-1414; Taira, Abe (ed.) 1972: 59-83. 
89 Cf. Kracht 1986: 125; Naumann 1994: 66, 68ff. 
90 Cf., among others, the chapter »Rigaku shintô« in Kishimoto 1972 (1993): 58-60. 
91 Picken 1994: 32: »Rigaku (the Study of Rational Principles)«, Kracht 1986: 120: »Geist-Weg des 
Studiums des [Vernunft]prinzips.« 
92 Just one variant in the report of the Nihonshoki forms the basis for this statement; cf. Nihonshoki, 
Jindaiki I, var. 5 = NKBT 67: 78/79; Florenz 1919: 125. 
93 Mukyoku »germ. Gipfellosigkeit« (cf. Kracht 1986: 122, 123, Chin. wu-chi); taikyoku »highest 
peak« (also: 122, 123, Chin. t’ai-chi). 
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»principle« (kongen no ri) is always manifest in mankind. This is the justification 
for the »unity of god and man« (shinjin-gôitsu). 
If human beings call the divine light back into their hearts, they can return to 
the original state of the cosmos. On the path to the »unity of god and man,« di-
vine work is manifested in the virtues of »straightforwardness« (shôjiki)94 and 
»truth« (makoto).95 Man reaches this goal by way of »modesty« (tsutsushimi, also 
»seriousness«) and »reverence« (uyamai). Tsutsushimi96 is attained through »inner 
and outer« – that is, bodily and spiritual – purification (harae). Man attains his 
unity with the gods through prayer (kitô) and worship. 
Man’s way is defined by the Five Relationships and the Five Virtues (gorin-
gojô). The ethical relationship between lord and vassal (kunshin) is particularly 
important in this context. Once again, Koretari’s Confucian principles are appar-
ent, and in this point he shows the highest degree of agreement with Razan. 
Koretari introduced important Daimyô to his Shintô teachings, especially the 
influential ruler of Aizu-han, Hoshina Masayuki, who was previously discussed 
in regard to the regional shrine reforms. Masayuki was among the elite leader-
ship of the Tokugawa state. He was the younger brother of Tokugawa Iemitsu 
and guardian of Ietsuna, and he made essential contributions to the establishment 
of the baku-han system.97 In his Shintô studies with Koretari, he reached the fourth 
and highest level of secrecy and was buried in the Shintô tradition after his death 
(Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994: 17; Taira 1972: 521), for which he received the explicit 
approval of the bakufu (Taira 1972: 521). It was Koretari who had made the 
strongest attempts to raise Shintô to the status of a religious doctrine (kyôgaku), 
and he thus contributed much to the modern development of Shintô-Confuciain 
syncretism as the head of the Yoshida house and successor of Yoshida Shintô. 
 
                                                 
94 On shôjiki (Chin. cheng-chih) cf. the chapter »Shintô to shôjiki no toku« in Kishimoto 1972 (1993): 
181-185; Kracht 1986: 137, 295, 313, (see cheng-chih); Ooms 1985: 66, 68, 92, 98, 100-101, 103 (shôjiki, 
»straightforwardness«), among others. Shôjiki is an ethical form of harae in Ise Shintô: cf. Kishi-
moto 1972, chapter 3. 
95 Cf. Kracht 1986: 56, 205, 258. 
96 The meaning of the term tsutsushimi (cf. Morohashi 1989: nr. 13303) in the context of Shintô-
Confucian syncretism is unclear. Ooms (1985: 225f.) remarks on the use of this important term by 
Yamazaki Ansai that the way, the teachings and nature are the three fundamental categories 
within the Confucian tradition. Human nature, which is characterized by the Five Relationships 
and Virtues, is based primarily on kei, »reverence, respect« (tsutsushimi). Pörtner, Heise (1995: 
422): »kei, ching, germ. (konf.) Reverenz, Ehrerbietung«; Chan (1973: 606f.): »Holding Fast to Seri-
ousness (ching)«; Kracht, Leinss (1988: 374): germ. kei »Achtung,« »Aufmerksamkeit« (Chinese: 
ching). 
97 Cf. Ômori 1992: 171; Taira 1972: 521; Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994: 17. 
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2. 2. 4. Yamazaki Ansai’s Suika Shintô 
 
In this context, it is also helpful to outline the further development of Confu-
cian-influenced Shintô in the early Edo period, which in various ways connects 
Yoshida Shintô with the world of Neo-Confucianism.98 
Yamazaki Ansai (1618-1682) 99 is especially noteworthy in this development, 
since he marks a high point of Confucian Shintô in the Edo period as a prominent 
shushigakusha as well as a Shintô scholar. Ansai had attended lectures by Koretari 
on Shintô with the aforementioned Hoshina Masayuki, the Daimyô of Aizu-han, 
and it was Koretari who awarded him the title of »Suika« in the year Kanbun 11 
(1671), i.e. during his lifetime (Taira 1972: 544). 
On the other hand, Ansai was influenced to a large extent by Watarai Nobu-
yoshi’s (1615-1690) reinterpretation of Ise Shintô, which emphasizes the Shintô 
taught in Japan, with Confucianism serving merely a supporting, explanatory 
role. It was Watarai Nobuyoshi who lent medieval Ise Shintô its Confucian char-
acter. According to Nobuyoshi’s beliefs on the relationship between Shintô and 
Confucianism, both belief systems emerged independently of each other, but still 
exist in harmony together, since they are both based on the same rational princi-
ple of the cosmos and nature (tenchi shizen no ri; Taira 1972: 540). 
Yamazaki Ansai took his own path, relative to many Neo-Confucians of his 
time. Originally an ordained Buddhist monk at the Myôshinji, one of the leading 
Zen monasteries, he returned to life as a layman in 1646 in order to study the 
Confucian teachings of Chu Hsi. Finally, he lived as a teacher in the house of Ho-
shina Masayuki, the influential Daimyô of Aizu. Already at the age of twenty, he 
had developed a serious interest in Shintô.100 
Yamazaki Ansai’s theories became what is known as Suika (also Suiga) 
Shintô. The term suika, which according to Yamazaki represents the essence of 
                                                 
98 »A century after Kanetomo, Yuiitsu Shintô, [...] which he helped spread, prevailed over other 
Shintô schools,« remarks Klaus Kracht (1986: 120). He continues: »As an ‘academic Shintô’ (kyôha 
shintô) it takes on new forms in developments such as … Razan’s Ritô shinchi shintô, [...] Yama-
zaki Ansai’s Suika shintô, or … Yoshikawa Koretaru’s Rigaku shintô. They all stem from Yoshida 
Kanetomo.« (l.c.) 
99 There is a comprehensive body of research on Yamazaki Ansai and Suika Shintô; for an intro-
duction, cf. Taira 1972: 541-550; Sujiyama, Sakamoto 1994: 17; Ômori 1992: 172-173; Earl 1964: 52-
65; Kishimoto 1972 (1993): 64-67; Picken 1994: 311; Okada 1979; Ooms 1985: 194-286. Source mate-
rials: Kojiruien (1977), Jingi-bu II/44, Shintô 2: 1414-1424; Taira, Abe (ed.) 1972: 119-188; cf. Biallas 
1989, Weinstein 1983-86c; Tsunoda et al. 1964, Volume 1: 354-362. 
100 Cf. Biallas 1989; Weinstein 1983-86c. 
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Shintô, is taken from a passage of the Yamatohime no mikoto seiki (one of the five 
works of Watarai Shintô101, Shintô gobusho), which states:  
»Divine mercy (shin-sui) requires prayer. Divine protection (myô-ga) is rooted 
in honesty.«102  
Thus, the term suika is a combination of the words »mercy« (sui) and »protec-
tion« (ga, or ka). At its most basic level, Suika Shintô is a combination of Neo-
Confucian metaphysics and the cosmology and ethical ideas of the classic schools 
of Shintô. 
Yamazaki Ansai justified the basic unity of gods and man, and thus also of 
the emperor and his subjects, with the »principle« (ri). Thus, Suika Shintô also 
sought to secure Shintô’s place among the religions of Japan. Besides shintô (»way 
of the gods«), terms such as shinnô (»divine ruler«) and shinkoku (»land of the 
gods«) also gained importance. 
From Neo-Confucianism Yamazaki borrowed the Chinese idea of ching (Japa-
nese: kei; »reverence«), which in his view represented the basis for all human ac-
tivity. He also adopted the Neo-Confucian concept of li, the »all-encompassing 
and unifying principle« (Japanese: ri), in order to justify the fundamental unity of 
the gods of Shintô and man as well as that of the emperor and his subjects. Yama-
zaki emphasized the uniqueness and divinity of the imperial line, which he be-
lieved must be preserved and protected above all else, despite his references to 
Chinese ideas in his interpretation of the Japanese creation myths. It is worth not-
ing that Yamazaki Ansai was deeply involved with Shintô, as befits his reputa-
tion as a thorough scholar. He visited Ise Shrine no fewer than six times (in 1657, 
1658, 1659, 1663, 1668 and 1669) for his studies. In Ansai’s view, Shintô and Con-
fucianism were fundamentally of the same origin. He held that the original god 
was a deity in human form. This deity was the progenitor of the imperial family. 
Thus, kami and man were one. Although this approach is purely based on Shintô, 
Yamazaki Ansai saw a parallel to Confucianism, which also states that heaven 
and man are one. On this basis, he concluded that both belief systems were based 
on the same principle. For this reason, Okada Takehiko supposes that Yamazaki 
Ansai came to Shintô while he was searching for the origins of the Shushi doc-
trine, which led him to Shintô as the only possible approach (Okada 1979: 249). 
                                                 
101 On Watarai Shintô generally cf. Teeuwen 1996. 
102 Cf. Yamato-hime no mikoto seiki, Section: »Yûryaku-tennô«, 23rd year, 2nd month (NST 19: 30). In 
his work Suika-shagyo, Yamazaki Ansai draws this connection himself; cf. NST 39 (Kinsei-shintô-
ron; Zenki-kokugaku. Taira Shigemichi (ed.) 1972: 120); see also Shimonaka 1937-40 (repr.): 816; 
Hammitzsch 1937: 39. 
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Yamazaki Ansai’s Suika Shintô is also based on the theory of earth (tsuchi) 
and metal (kane). He sees these elements as signifying the virtues of devotion and 
honesty, which govern everything. Ansai traced this doctrine back to the Nihon-
shoki, which describes how Izanagi split Kagutsuchi, the god of fire, into five 
pieces. Thus, fire is the origin of all existence. From fire comes earth, although fire 
is associated with the spirit, or heart (kokoro), which is a manifestation of the 
kami.103 
Yamazaki Ansai’s frequent use of etymological wordplay is striking. One ex-
ample of this is his analysis of the name of the god Omoikane. According to An-
sai, the name contains two parts: omoi (»thought,« but also »heavy«) and kane 
(»metal«), thus meaning »thinking or heavy metal.« Yamazaki Ansai associated 
the word kami (神, »god,« »deity«) with kami (上, »over,« »above«), kagami (»mir-
ror«), kangamiru (»to consider,« but also »to take an example«) and kami miru (»to 
look down from above«). 
Suika Shintô was especially concerned with practical ethics. At its most basic 
level, this meant the unity of heaven and man (tenjin-yuiitsu) and the inseparable 
connection between ethics and the existence of the universe. This resulted in two 
fundamental principles of metaphysics and ethics. 
The term of reverence from Confucian theory, which Yamazaki Ansai empha-
sizes time and again, forms the basis of the ethical principle. Yamazaki explains 
this by stating that the position of the emperor is derived from the metaphysical 
and ethical principle. The »three divine instruments« (sanshû no jingi) of sword, 
mirror and jewel, which function as the imperial regalia, also possess spiritual 
powers according to Suika Shintô. The jewels represent the divine spirit, the mir-
ror represents the wisdom of this spirit, and the sword represents its power. The 
jewels, which symbolize the heart of Amaterasu ômikami, the ancestral deity of 
the imperial household, are of the highest importance. They contain all the other 
symbols. From them came the power to create all life, and after the creation of the 
world, the divine virtues of Amaterasu were given to the people. Thus, deity and 
man are one.104 
According to the Suika theory, the power lies not in the person of the em-
peror, but in the divine instruments. Not the person of the greatest virtue be-
                                                 
103 Ansai refers to the tale of Dokon no den (also: Tsuchigane no tsutae; cf. NST 39: 143, 458). Cf. 
Ooms 1985: 238f.; deBary 1964: 358f. See also Tsunoda et al. 1964, Volume 1: 358-360. 
104 In his work Sahshû shinpô gokuhiden, Yamazaki Ansai refers to Amaterasu ômikami as the vir-
tuous goddess of nature and also of the sun. The ruler of Japan was called to rule by her divine 
mandate. Virtue as the responsibility of the ruler is symbolized in the three sacred treasures of the 
imperial regalia (sanshû no jingi). Amaterasu is thus understood to be the founder of ethics in Ja-
pan (cf. Taira 1972: 547). 
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comes emperor, as is the case in the Chinese theory, but rather, the emperor is 
destined to possess these absolute virtues conveyed by the instruments, even if he 
was not virtuous before ascending to the throne. Thus, the »three divine instru-
ments« do not symbolize the virtue of the emperor – they are virtue. 
Thus, the emperor is the highest expression of the unity of heaven and man. 
While according to Chinese thought, the emperor is the son of and receiver of or-
ders from heaven, in Suika Shintô, he himself is heaven and all other people are 
the receivers of his orders. This is how Yamazaki Ansai differentiates China from 
Japan. 
As a Confucian, Ansai teaches that one must show the emperor the utmost 
obedience (taigi). As a believer in Shintô, he also emphasizes the worship of the 
gods. In other words, obedience to the emperor and worship of the gods are two 
aspects of the same thing. In this way, Suika Shintô solidified and awakened Ya-
mazaki Ansai’s loyalty to Japan and his patriotism. He taught that trust in divine 
mercy (sui) and protection (ka), and thus also trust in the mercy and protection of 
the emperor, were the requirements of his philosophy (Earl 1964 (1981): 54f.). 
Despite his efforts, Yamazaki Ansai never achieved a full synthesis of Confu-
cianism and Shintô. Disregarding the question of whether such a synthesis is 
even possible, it must be noted that this interpretation and his attempt to inte-
grate Shintô appear strained. Ooms writes: 
»Ansai had achieved a highly personal synthesis of Shinto and Neo-
Confucianism; a synthesis based on unshakable belief in the degree to which 
the Way is embedded in man as inborn norms and relationships, which 
rested on a pervasive, non-objectified, fearful reverence as a basic human 
disposition. The single truth enunciated in this synthesis, however, was 
reached in quite different ways in Shinto and Neo-Confucianism. Although 
faith and certainty gained Ansai’s exploration of that truth in both traditions, 
two different epistemologies were involved.« (Ooms 1985: 263) 
The fundamental problem lay in bringing the true way of Japan into agree-
ment with the way of China. Not least due to this, he also had heated arguments 
with other scholars of the Tokugawa period, such as Fujiwara Seika, Hayashi 
Razan, Hayashi Gahô (1618-1680), and even with Yamazaki Ansai’s own teachers, 
Nonaka Kenzan, Watarai Nobuyoshi and Yoshikawa Koretari. Even some of his 
best students, Satô Naokata (1650-1719) and Asami Keisai, criticized Yamazaki 
Ansai (Ooms 1985: 264f.). 
Specifically, these arguments stemmed from Ansai’s interpretation of various 
terms in the classical Japanese sources, which were an essential part of his Shintô 
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teachings. Furthermore, many scholars accused him of being too uncritical, re-
spectful and even naïve in his research on the origins of Shintô. 
A further point of criticism was the fact that Yamazaki Ansai’s reverence for 
his own school of Shintô was so extreme that, from 1673 on, he had his students 
pray to him in front of a shrine that he himself had consecrated. In the last ten 
years of his life, he saw himself as a »living god,« and his students either wor-
shipped him, or left. Satô Naokata and Asami Keisai both did the latter around 
1680. It must be noted, however, that the criticism of Yamazaki Ansai was limited 
to the Shintô area of his teachings. He continued to be highly regarded as a mas-
ter of Confucianism. 
After Yamazaki’s death, his followers, who numbered in the thousands, 
spread these teachings throughout Japan. Although Motoori Norinaga (1730-
1801), the most important National Learning (Kokugaku) scholar, criticized Suika 
Shintô due to its philological unreliability, Ansai’s ideas still had a great influence 
on the later Mito School, as well as on Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843), the foremost 
representative of Restoration (Fukko) Shintô. In turn, the Mito School and Atsu-
tane played a large part in the movement that later led to the deification of the 
emperor and the fall of the shogunate, as will be discussed in the following 
(Ooms 1985: 195). 
 
 
2. 2. 5. The further development of Ise Shintô by Watarai Nobuyoshi 
 
Like Yamazaki Ansai’s Suika Shintô, Watarai Nobuyoshi’s (1615-1690)105 Ise 
Shintô also attempted to harmonize the worldviews of Neo-Confucianism and 
Shintô (cf. Nosco 1984: 174f., among others). 
Nobuyoshi attempted, through lectures and commentaries on the five »clas-
sics« of Shintô (Shintô gobusho; cf. Naumann 1994: 30, 32, 37, 46), to draw interest 
to this system of religious beliefs. In his main work, Yôfukuki (»The Return to [the 
Principle of] Yang«) of 1650106, which also contains elements of the cosmology of 
Chu Hsi, he formulates an extract from the »battery of traditional and native 
Japanese virtues« (Nosco 1984: 175). In regard to the inborn virtues, however, he 
does not focus on the concept of makoto, as Koretari does, but rather concentrates 
on the concept of shôjiki (see above). 
                                                 
105 For an introduction to the teachings of Watarai Nobuyoshi, cf. Taira 1972: 528-541; Taira, Abe 
(ed.) 1972: 85-117; Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994: 17; Picken 1994: 310; Ooms 1985: 237. Source materi-
als: Kojiruien (1977), Jingi-bu II/44, Shintô 2: 1434-1438; Yamamoto 1993 (1911): 126-138 (Deguchi 
Nobuyoshi). 
106 Cf. Yôfukuki, ed. NST 39: 85-117; cf. Taira 1972: 537ff. 
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In his works, Watarai (also known as Deguchi) Nobuyoshi thus carried for-
ward one of the most important medieval schools of theological Shintô: Ise or 
Gekû Shintô.107 This school of Shintô was founded and spread by the Watarai 
family, which maintained the hereditary priesthood of the Outer Shrine (Gekû). 
The imbalance between the two shrines at Ise came to be questioned due to the 
influence of Ryôbu Shintô, and already Watarai Yukitada (1236-1305), the first 
significant representative of this school, postulated that both shrines were equal 
and dependent upon each other, and even that the Outer Shrine was superior, 
comparing it to the relationship between the sun and the moon or heaven and 
earth. By the 13th century, Watarai Shintô had produced a body of sacred books, 
the Shintô gobusho (»The Five Books of Shintô«), and it was the Watarai scholars 
who finally developed a complex theology that proclaimed the ultimate superior-
ity of the goddess of the Gekû, Toyouke, over all other deities, including 
Amaterasu ômikami. Scholars of the Watarai School also dismissed the widely 
held belief that the gods of Shintô were essentially Japanese manifestations of 
Buddhist deities. Rather, they claimed that the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas were 
merely manifestations of the original Shintô deities. Although Watarai Shintô 
strongly influenced other schools of Shintô, such as Yoshida and Suika Shintô, it 
relied heavily on Buddhist concepts in formulating its own doctrine, and for this 
reason it was strongly criticized during the Edo period. 
In the Muromachi period, Ise Shintô continued to spread, but it was the Yo-
shida family that determined Shintô thought as the main school during this pe-
riod. Thus, Watarai Nobuyoshi had the responsibility of modernizing Ise Shintô 
(Taira 1972: 528ff.).108 
The Yôfukuki can be seen as an introduction to Nobuyoshi’s Shintô. This work 
represented an approach to modernizing Ise Shintô by turning away from me-
dieval, Buddhist Shintô and toward the Confucian-oriented Shintô of the modern 
era. Shintô was now seen as the common way of the universe, that is, as a mani-
festation of the same principle (or the way) of the cosmos and nature (tenchi shizen 
no michi), thus showing strong similarities to Confucianism. 
In this context, Inoue (1994: 17) states that Watarai Nobuyoshi criticized the 
widespread theory supported by scholars of Ise Shintô of a concurrence of Shintô 
and Confucianism (shinju-shûgô) to the effect that, although the two areas show 
                                                 
107 For an introduction to medieval Watarai Shintô, cf., among others, Teeuwen 1993, 1996, Nau-
mann 1994: 29-56; Picken 1994: 306-310; Kishimoto 1972 (1993): 31-37. 
108 The founding of the Toyomiyazaki bunko library is traced back to him. It contains among other 
things secret revelations of Shintô; it was here that the priests of Ise jingû studied and debated, as 
well as other Shintô scholars, and thus contributed to the further development of Ise Shintô. Cf. 
Taira 1972: 538.  
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similarities in their basic teachings, they were shaped differently according to 
human institutions, opinions and deeds in Japan and other countries (ikoku to wa-
gakuni no seidobun’i; cf. Taira 1972: 539). This new interpretation of Ise Shintô by 
Nobuyoshi (cf. Picken 1994: 310, among others), which focuses on Shintô as prac-
ticed in Japan, while Confucianism serves only to explain Shintô, also influenced 
Yamazaki Ansai and began a new era for the development of Confucian Shintô. 
In this way, Hayashi Razan, Yoshikawa Koretari, Watarai Nobuyoshi and 
others finally set aside the syncretistic concept of the unity of Shintô and Bud-
dhism (shinbutsu-shûgô) and developed modern Shintô using the concept of a 
harmony of Shintô and Confucianism. 
Although the fundamental relationship between Shintô and Buddhism was 
still recognized at the time, far more similarities were believed to exist between 
Shintô and Confucianism. This is apparent, for example, in Nobuyoshi’s reference 
to the three Confucian virtues of »wisdom, benevolence, righteousness« (chi-jin-
yû) as expressed by the imperial regalia (sanshû no jingi), a subject that was a part 
of Confucian Shintô (or Shintôist Confucianism) throughout the early Edo period, 
as was previously shown (cf. Taira 1972: 526). 
However, Nobuyoshi rejects the traditional view, which uses the similarities 
between Shintô and Confucianism to claim that Shintô emerged only through the 
influence of Confucianism. Nobuyoshi’s theory states that both areas emerged 
independently of each other, but corresponded because they are based on the 
principle of cosmos and nature (tenchi shizen no ri). Therefore, certain shortcom-
ings in Shintô theory should be filled in using Confucian theories.  
Another significant work by Nobuyoshi is the Daijingû shintô wakumon (1666), 
in which he differentiates between the Shintô of the people and the Shintô of the 
priests (negi and kannushi; cf. Taira 1972: 532f.). According to Nobuyoshi, the for-
mer is the natural path for daily practice among the people and can be followed 
without religious instruction by the clergy. This work also contains a general cri-
tique of syncretism (shûgô) that, however, does not represent a rejection of Bud-
dhism or Confucianism, but rather states that Shintô is the foundation of all other 
religions. According to this theory, Buddhism and Confucianism function as 
branches of Shintô. Overall, however, the theology of this school recognizes Con-
fucianism as showing the greatest similarities to Shintô. 
As for the laws governing the state, this work aims to provide religious and 
genealogical legitimation for rule, according to which the emperor and the 
Shôgun are the descendants of the deities Kuninotokotachi no mikoto and 
Amaterasu ômikami. According to this view, there is no other state in which the 
blood of the ruler is so pure and the relationship between lord and vassal (kun-
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shin) remains as stable as in Japan. Special attention is given to defending the holy 
ceremonies and institutions of Ise Shintô, such as the daijôsai, the institution of the 
shrine princess (Ise-saigû), the regular renovations of the shrine buildings (sengû) 
etc. On the relationship between the Naikû and the Gekû, Nobuyoshi remarks 
both carefully and clearly that the view that the deity of the Naikû (Amaterasu 
ômikami) is nobler than the deity of the Gekû, and thus that the Naikû is superior 
to the Gekû, is merely a common assumption (Taira 1972: 535). In his view, Shintô 
is ultimately also a system of ethics for everyday use. Thus, man studies Shintô 
not only through the traditional customs and practices (kojitsu) or names and ti-
tles (meimoku), but by practicing the path of moderation (chûdô), straightforward-
ness (shôjiki), purity (seiketsu) and a heart as pure as a mirror. Every social class 
has its own duty (shokubun), as evident in the gorin no michi of the people. In this 
way, man returns to the ancient customs of the land of the gods (shinkoku 
toyoashihara nakatsukuni). 
A further important work is the Jingû hiden mondô, written in 1660 (cf. Taira 
1972: 532f.). In this work, Nobuyoshi expands upon his discussion of the relation-
ship between the Outer and Inner Shrines. He proposes that the Gekû is the fa-
ther and the Naikû is the mother. Shôjiki is the most important virtue for the 
common man (bonbu) in order to enter the realm of heavenly light. 
 
2. 2. 6. Conclusion 
 
To return to the original question of the relationship between religion and 
politics in the constantly changing sociocultural environment of Japan during the 
early Edo period, the development of Shintô during this period appears to closely 
reflect the political, social and cultural changes of the time. 
In all major areas of religious life – ritual, administrative, philosophical and 
theological – Shintô was shaped by the new conditions. While this is often charac-
terized as a Confucianization of Shintô, perhaps it were the Confucians who dis-
covered and utilized elements of Shintô for political reasons in order to legitimate 
the new power structures. Which is more accurate: Confucian Shintô or Shintô 
Confucianism? Klaus Kracht (1986: 117) calls this question the »problem of the iden-
tity of Confucian Shintô.« Without pursuing a definitive answer to this question, 
which in some ways is reminiscent of the numerous Japanese theories of honji-
suijaku, it seems more likely that Shintô accepted and integrated the challenge of 
Confucianism, rather than that Confucianism merely made use of elements of 
Shintô. It was the Yuiitsu, Watarai and other schools of Shintô, which had existed 
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since the Japanese Middle Ages, that integrated current schools of thought and 
thus gave Shintô access to the new power structures. 
The Yoshida School in particular offers a clear picture of this development. 
Originally deeply rooted in the syncretistic thought of the Japanese Middle Ages, 
and above all in Shingon Buddhism, this school and its immediate followers – es-
pecially Yoshikawa Koretari – turned with astonishing speed toward the new 
structures and the ruling elite of the emerging baku-han system. 
This is a remarkable example of traditionalism as an intellectual and religious 
system of legitimation for new social and political structures. Just as in the Meiji-
period State Shintô combined the basic beliefs of the Kokugaku with modern na-
tionalism into a religiously tinged ideology, 250 years earlier medieval Shintô 
used Neo-Confucianism as a means for claiming its part of the ruling power at 
the time. Thus, it can be concluded that the rituals and doctrine of Shintô-
Confucian syncretism in the early Edo period offer a nearly perfect example of 
the emergence of a religious and ideological traditionalism that served the new 
power structures as an ideal system of legitimation. 
Thus, I can only agree with Herman Ooms’s emphasis on the importance of 
the development of Shintô for the genesis of early Edo period thought. Research 
in this area is only beginning to recognize the Shintô schools of the Edo period as 
independent intellectual, religious and ideological powers that cannot be under-
stood merely as mythological and historical appendages of Japanese Neo-
Confucianism. This perspective also offers an explanation for further develop-
ments in the course of the late Edo period, leading up to the ethnocentric dis-
course of the Kokugaku. Without the concept of the shinkoku and the position of 
the emperor as established by the Shintô-Confucian schools of the 17th century, 
the teachings of Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) would not have been the same. 
However, before this area, which belongs to the late Edo period, can be cov-
ered in detail, it is first necessary to examine some important aspects of popular 
religious practice at the time. 
 
                                             CHAPTER II: THE EDO PERIOD  n  99 
 
 
3. THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THE PEOPLE 
 
It is remarkable that the peasants who participated in pilgrimages to Ise, 
which were immensely popular at the time, primarily worshipped the deity of 
the Outer Shrine (Gekû), the goddess of agriculture called Toyouke no kami. This 
circumstance was strongly criticized by no less than the great Kokugaku scholar 
Motoori Norinaga109 in the late Edo period. The fierce conflicts between the 
priests of the Inner and Outer Shrines over superiority in the popular Ise School 
clearly show that a deep divide existed within the supposedly homogenous theo-
logical concept of the Daijingû of Ise. Mark Teeuwen (1995: 6) writes that pilgrims 
were even deterred by blockades on roads to the Inner Shrine. Since the Outer 
Shrine was not only dedicated to the worship of Toyouke no kami, but also repre-
sented the theological center of syncretistic Watarai or Ise Shintô as the headquar-
ters of the Watarai family of priests, general religious practice and theological and 
philosophical Shintô came into close contact there. Especially through the influ-
ence of the teachings of Watarai Nobuyoshi, this school underwent a remarkable 
renewal and was repositioned toward Confucianism, which, as discussed above, 
marked a clear break with the medieval, syncretistic tradition of conventional Ise 
Shintô. Norinaga’s vehement polemical work against the dominance of the Outer 
Shrine in the popular Ise school of his time includes clear references to the theo-
logical and ideological content of pilgrimages to Ise, for example, in his evalua-
tion of the main written works of Watarai Shintô, the Shintô gobusho (cf. Teeuwen 
1995: 38, note 117). This represents a clear point of connection between theory and 
practice in Edo period Shintô. 
 
3. 1. Pilgrimages to Ise in the Edo period 
 
There is no doubt that shrines in the Edo period primarily served to 
strengthen local and regional social connections between individuals, but in this 
context it is important not to overlook the few large nationally worshipped 
shrines that did not serve this purpose. These shrines played a central role in the 
extraordinarily popular pilgrimages during the Tokugawa period. 
For the common people during the Edo period, nearly the only way to go be-
yond the borders of one’s own locality, though only for a short time, was to par-
                                                 
109 Cf. Norinaga’s work Ise Naikû sakitake no ben (Teeuwen 1995). 
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ticipate in pilgrimages to holy places worshiped on the national level. These pil-
grimages, which were organized at the community level, functioned as an outlet 
for the administrative pressure of the strict social rules of the Tokugawa state. Re-
ligious as well as the most »worldly« of motives played a role in this practice. 
Furthermore, pilgrimages to the large, nationally worshipped shrines, of which 
Ise was the most prominent, strengthened the general consciousness of cultural 
similarities among the Japanese people that were not otherwise apparent due to 
the political, social and cultural restrictions of the time. 
Pilgrimages to Ise were part of a larger tradition of pilgrimages in Edo period 
society that extended beyond the borders of individual territories and ultimately 
connected them with one another.110 However, the innovation of the Tokugawa 
period was not the pilgrimage routes themselves, but their general populariza-
tion; pilgrimages became popular among social classes that previously did not of-
ten taken part in them. »Edo pilgrimage was the modification and adaption of the 
pilgrimage of the ascetic holy men to commoners’ needs, goals and aspirations,« 
(Shanti 1986: 260). Among the many pilgrimage routes111, the following four were 
the most important (cf. Shanti 1986: 256ff.): Kumano,112 Saikoku,113 Shikoku,114 
and Ise. Pilgrimages to Ise became a part of the originally Buddhist tradition of 
pilgrimages in the Muromachi period; Deva Shanti (1986: 256) considers this an 
example »of the way Shintô gradually attained its own definition and doctrine in 
imitation of and competition with Buddhism.« The practice of worshipping at Ise 
became popular toward the end of the 16th century among the lower bushi and fi-
nally among the general population, due to the intensive missionary work by the 
»religious messengers« (Naumann 1994: 164), the oshi or onshi.115 
These pilgrimages, of which the pilgrimage to Ise was the most popular from 
the end of the 17th century on, usually took the form of so-called »circular tours« 
                                                 
110 Cf. Antoni 1997c. 
111 Besides the places of pilgrimage mentioned in the text, Kompira Shrine (cf. Shanti 1986: pas-
sim), Zenkôji Temple in Nagano, Mount Ôyama, and Enoshima, home of the god of fortune, were 
especially popular among the people of Edo (cf. »Historical Sketches – Processions and Pilgrim-
ages. On the Road in Tokugawa Japan« in: The East, 23/1, March 1987: 15-19; Ehmcke 1994: 63ff., 
among others). 
112 On the relationship between the destinations of Kumano and Ise, cf. Nishigaki 1983: 53-68 
(»Kumano to Ise«); Ehmcke (1994: 57) calls the popularity of Kumano »a classic example of suc-
cessful marketing, to put it in modern terms,« since the oshi priests of Kumano were successful in 
drawing large numbers of pilgrims to their distant village thanks to their outstanding organiza-
tion. 
113 Cf. James H Foard’s (1982) excellent study on the 33 stations of the Saikoku pilgrimage route 
(Saikoku sanjûsan reijô.  
114 On the Shikoku pilgrimage route, cf. Pye 1987, Reader 2006. 
115 Cf. Nishigaki 1983: 149-164 (»Kinsei no mura to oshi«). 
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(junrei), whose participants were chosen by their communities and were only al-
lowed to take part in the trip with the express permission of the local officials. 
This official permission allowed them to cross territorial borders. The allowed 
length of travel was also regulated by the officials and could not be exceeded, in 
the interest of maintaining agricultural production and work-force availability. 
Thus, in Saga-han (Kyûshû) there were detailed lists for the allowed duration of 
each trip. The following restrictions existed for Ise, which was usually part of a 
circular tour involving several places of worship (cf. Shanti 1986: 267): 
   
Destinations Allowed duration of 
travel 
Only Ise 100-120 days 
Ise and Mount Kôya 120 days 
Ise and Saikoku 120-150 days 
Ise and Shikoku 180 days 
Ise, Mount Kôya and Sai-
koku 
150-180 days 
Ise, Saikoku and Kompira 150-180 days 
Ise, Saikoku, Mount Kôya 
and Kompira 
150-180 days 
Ise and Zenkôji 150 days 
Ise, Saikoku and Zenkôji 150 days 
Ise, Saikoku, Zenkôji, Shi-
koku, Nikkô and Enoshima 
280 days 
 
Such lists do not reveal to what extent the regulations were actually enforced, 
but they at least give us an idea of how long these long-distance pilgrimages ac-
tually took. 
 
3. 1. 1. The »confraternities« (kô) 
 
The organization of the trips fell to the so-called »confraternities« (kô), which 
spread mostly in villages, rather than in larger cities. Unlike the medieval miyaza 
or tôya, the »shrine guilds« controlled by the wealthy members of individual 
towns, »confraternities were voluntary associations to which peasants of all levels 
of village society could belong.« (Shanti 1986: 263) The town confraternities, 
which resulted from the missionary work of the oshi religious messengers, were 
responsible for organizing and especially financing the pilgrimage for one or sev-
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eral members. Like community savings organizations – Franziska Ehmcke aptly 
calls them »organizations for financing travel« (Ehmcke 1994: 62) – money was 
collected from members over a long period of time and finally (usually in the 
form of a lottery) paid to the lucky few who were allowed to take part in the pil-
grimage on behalf of the community. The possibility of winning was offered only 
once, in order to ensure that every member had an opportunity to travel. The 
purpose of the trip was to collect amulets from places along the pilgrimage route 
and bring them back to the village, where they were incorporated into the local 
shrine or temple. The amulets were seen as the property of the divinity of their 
respective holy places, thus ensuring the transfer of numinous power to the 
community. 
Among the confraternities, the Ise confraternity (Ise-kô) was the most wide-
spread. Bitô (1991) states in this context that the spread of the practice of wor-
shipping at Ise among the population had far-reaching effects on local religious 
life. The missionary work of the oshi of Ise was originally only aimed at the upper 
classes, but starting in the late 16th century, they began to enlist common people 
as danna (danka, »supporter,« »community member«), and subsequently the num-
bers of both groups – the oshi as well as the danna – increased sharply. The num-
ber of oshi of the Outer Shrine grew, according to Bitô (1991: 392), from a total of 
150 at the end of the 16th century to approximately 550 at the end of the 18th cen-
tury, plus around 140 oshi of the Inner Shrine.116 According to a document from 
1777, the oshi of the Outer Shrine alone had registered 4,961,370 households as 
danna, a number that would have been nearly the same as the entire population of 
Japan at the time. This fact shows that the Outer Shrine had a remarkably strong 
position117, which will be discussed in the following. Helen Hardacre (1989: 15) 
remarks that the network organized by the oshi extended across Japan: 
»Between 80 and 90 percent of the nation maintained a confraternity mem-
bership, and thus powerful oshi might have as many as four to ten thousand 
households in their control.« 
                                                 
116 The numbers cited by Naumann (1994: 164), some of which differ from the above, offer a com-
parison: »At the end of the 16th century there were 145 o-shi families just at the Outer Shrine, but 
their numbers grew rapidly along with the growing enthusiasm for pilgrimages to Ise during the 
Edo period: between 1711 and 1716, there were already 504 o-shi families at the Outer Shrine, and 
at the Inner Shrine there were 241.« 
117 On the relationship between Naikû and Gekû in the context of pilgrimages to Ise see also Ni-
shigaki 1983: 69ff. 
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The oshi visited their confraternities one to two times a year in order to sell 
amulets, almanacs and other devotional objects. They were paid in kind, based on 
the price of rice. 
 
3. 1. 2. The Ise shrines during the Edo period 
 
The practice of worshipping at the Great Shrine of Ise (daijingû) gained impor-
tance during the Tokugawa period in several ways. First of all, the bakufu chose 
the arrangement and function of the two shrines as a pattern for the design of the 
Tôshôgû in Nikkô, the new »ancestral shrine« of the Tokugawa house. Just as Ise 
guaranteed the spiritual protection of the imperial household and the imperial 
capital of Kyôto, the new mausoleum for the founder of the Tokugawa dynasty, 
located to the northeast of Edo, was to become responsible for protecting the rul-
ing house and city. This shows that the shrine was clearly based on the example 
of the imperial ancestral shrine – the intention of which was to elevate the To-
kugawa house through spiritual legitimation. This gradual replacement of the Ise 
shrines by Nikkô was completed in the 1640s; in 1645 the emperor awarded the 
highest rank of gû to the Tôshôgû, placing it on the same level as Ise, and visits by 
the imperial family became a regular occurrence (cf. Ooms 1985: 182ff.). 
But this was not the only way in which Ise gained significance within the re-
ligious policy of the bakufu. With the reinstatement of rituals relating to the impe-
rial house that had mostly been forgotten since the Ônin War, which the bakufu 
carried out clearly for political reasons, the Great Shrine and the related ceremo-
nial duties again became a matter of political interest. 
As Seckel (1943: 62) writes, the central place of worship of the Yoshida house 
in Kyôto (saijôsho), took on the essential ceremonial functions of the Imperial Of-
fice of Divinities (jingikan), along with the newly established »deputy jingikan« 
(jingikandai).118 In 1609 (Keichô 14) an imperial ritual that was also important at 
Ise (Ise issha hôbei) was performed there for the first time (cf. Sugiyama, Sakamoto 
1994: 14). 
Similar to the daijôsai, the ceremonial rebuilding (shikinen sengû) of the two Ise 
shrines had not taken place since the rebuilding of the Toyouke-daijingû (Gekû) 
in 1434 (Eikyô 6) and of the Kôtai-jingû (Naikû) in 1462 (Kansei 3), a period of 
more than 120 years. In 1563 (Eiroku 6) the ceremonial rebuilding of the Outer 
Shrine was once again able to be carried out due to a collection of offerings car-
ried out by the Buddhist clergy. In the year 1609 (Keichô 14) the ceremonial re-
                                                 
118 Cf. Naumann 1994: 72; Antoni 1997b: 184. 
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building of both Ise shrines was completed, a practice that continued every 20 
years (13 times in all) until 1869. 
Thus, the policy of the bakufu, which sought to ceremonially strengthen the 
imperial household while at the same time disempowering it politically, mark-
edly raised the position of the Ise shrines – a change that also appears to have oc-
curred among the common people. Along with the institutional reinstatement of 
the ceremonial position of Ise, the sect experienced an unprecedented rise in 
popularity and spread among very diverse sections of the population. This is the 
third important aspect regarding the position of Ise in the Edo period. 
Bitô writes that, as opposed to the communal worship of the ujigami, the prac-
tice of worshipping at Ise was based on the individual belief of each person or 
household. This, he states, represents a new development in the popular religion 
of the kami, and the parallels between two kinds of kami worship – at the commu-
nity level and at the level of individuals or households – came to define the pe-
riod (Bitô 1991: 393). According to Bitô, worship at Ise is the most representative 
case of this latter group. 
This assertion cannot remain uncontested. Although especially various out-
growths of the pilgrimages to Ise, such as the so-called nuke-mairi (»pilgrimage by 
slipping away,« cf. Ehmcke 1994: 62), solitary pilgrimages to Ise by individuals 
undertaken without permission, show signs of an expressive individualism, the 
phenomenon of popular pilgrimages to Ise exhibit strongly community-centered 
aspects. Deva Shanti (1986: 262) states as much in her impressive study on pil-
grimages in the Edo period: 
»Pilgrimage by the masses in the Edo period was both a result of their in-
creased standard of living and of the typical social organization of the rural 
village. Like most other practices, rituals and ceremonies of popular religion, 
pilgrimage was not an individual or solitary practice. The function of pil-
grimage was to benefit the social group as a whole.« 
Disregarding mass-pilgrimages, such as the one that took place in 1830, which 
were an unusual occurrence, pilgrimages by the common people from the coun-
tryside generally followed a uniform pattern. 
 
3. 1. 3. The procedure of pilgrimages to Ise 
 
The monks Zôga and Kokan Shiren (1278-1347) are two examples of Buddhist 
clergymen who sought to establish a Buddhist interpretation of the most impor-
tant place of worship in the country, Ise Shrine, especially pertaining to the rela-
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tionship between the sun goddess and the Buddha of Light. This is reminiscent of 
Ryôbu Shintô, which postulates a unity of the two belief systems within Shingon 
Buddhist thought and theology. According to the core beliefs of this syncretistic 
religion, Amaterasu ômikami (the sun goddess worshipped at the Inner Shrine of 
Ise) is the Japanese manifestation of Dainichinyorai (Mahâvairocana), the »Great 
Sun« or »Light Buddha« in Shingon Buddhism. The pilgrimage to Ise is of great 
importance in this context; »from the beginning of the 12th century on, the pil-
grimage to Ise became nearly a fashion« (Naumann 1994: 21). 
Aside from the clearly Buddhist background of medieval pilgrimages, it is 
also significant that most of these pilgrimages were undertaken by individuals.119 
For example, the monk Zôga set out alone for Ise, and the atmospheric descrip-
tion of Ise by Kokan Shiren as a place of complete silence and utter simplicity co-
incides with the image of the lone pilgrim: 
»I visited the shrine of the gods in the province of Ise. High mountains loom 
all around. A small stream winds along the way, through a dense forest of 
high cedars. Many of the trees have a circumference of ten fathoms. They are 
more then one hundred feet high. Not a bird sings. All is dark and silent. The 
hall is ancient and simple in design, decorated with reed and bramble and is 
without any carvings. The people standing before it hold their breath. They 
enter with cautious steps. Their hearts are already full of awe.« (Genkô shaku-
sho XVIII = Naumann, Wolfram 1989b: 331) 
Reading this description by a contemplative pilgrim to Ise from the Japanese 
Middle Ages, the report of another pilgrimage provided by Winston Davis (1983) 
and vividly described according to a contemporary source, appears almost unbe-
lievable. Only a few excerpts of note from the entire account are presented here: 
»So many pilgrims were on the road that many, unable to find lodging at the 
end of the day, were forced to sleep in the fields. Others trudged along 
through the dark only to fall into the clutches of thieves. Those lucky enough 
to find a place in an inn were forced to share their mat with three or four oth-
ers. [...] Some pilgrims (especially those who had taken French leave) starved 
to death after the almsgivers lost their initial enthusiasm. [...] Pregnant 
women sometimes gave birth in tea shops or inns along the way. [...] Some 
went mad when they lost their children in the crowds. With the roads so 
crowded, mothers who could not find a place to change their children were 
                                                 
119 There appears to be a wide selection of sources on medieval and modern pilgrimages to Ise. 
The catalogue Kokusho sômokuroku (1963-1976) alone lists more than 50 titles on the topic of Ise-
sangû (Volume 1: 202f.); the categorized collection of texts Kojiruien dedicates an entire section to 
this topic (sangû; cf. Kojiruien, Volume Jingi-bu 3: 631-680). The collection Gunsho ruijû contains 
several relevant medieval sources (cf. Gunsho kaidai, Volume 3 (p. 324, 363, 391, 392), Volume 6 (p. 
322, 324), Volume 8 (pp. 326, 457). 
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forced to walk on and on while the infants on their backs stank and 
squalled.« (Davis 1983: 107) 
A different account tells of a quite special procession to the Great Shrine of 
Ise: 
»[...] led by the aged but apparently successful master of a brothel in Shizu-
oka. [...] At each side marched an entourage of about twenty prostitutes all in 
the same costume. Following them came more than thirty porters and coolies, 
also in livery, with the bags. Over their heads fluttered an enormous banner 
with the words, ‘Our Second Pilgrimage.’« (Davis 1983: 102-103) 
It is difficult to believe that this account and the one by the medieval monk re-
fer to the same basic subject, pilgrimages to Ise. Apparently there are almost uni-
maginably stark contrasts in the coordination and atmosphere of the pilgrimages. 
A difference of no less than 500 years separates Kokan Shiren’s account and the 
descriptions from the source interpreted by Davis, a written work from the late 
1840s called Ukiyo no arisama.120 The chaotic conditions of pilgrimages in the early 
19th century have nothing in common with the contemplative quiet pilgrimages in 
earlier centuries. They are the result of a long, continual historical process that 
brought about a drastic change in religious practice in the wake of changes in the 
country’s social, cultural, political and economic conditions.  
»The place of pilgrimage, of mercy, is a kind of second home,« the religious 
historian Gerardus van der Leeuw remarks in his study of the phenomenol-
ogy of religion. He continues: »It is said to provide wealth, offspring, the ful-
fillment of wishes, redemption from sin, admittance to the world of the gods 
and eternal happiness – nearly every power one could wish for.« (van der 
Leeuw 1997: 456) 
Allowing for certain cultural limitations, this general statement can also be 
applied to pilgrimages in Japan. However, in this case, unlike Bitô, the collective 
aspect of the pilgrimage experience must be emphasized. An instructive example 
of this collective mentality of pilgrimages can be found, for example, in a Japa-
nese folk tale that begins with a call for a collective pilgrimage to Ise. The story, 
»The Father in the Mirror,« which originated in Hanamaki in Iwate Prefecture, is 
told by a man who is mourning the death of his father. In order to cheer him up, 
the others invite him to take part in a collective pilgrimage to Ise: 
                                                 
120 Davis (1983: 105, note 26) refers to the printed editions of the source in the series Kokushi sôsho 
(1917-20) and Nihon shômin seikatsu shiryô shûsei, Volume 11, (Tôkyô: San’ichi shobô), 1971 (com-
plete edition). A partial edition can be found in the series Nihon shisô taikei (cf. Shôji 1985: 307-371). 
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»Then, finally, a neighbor came to him and said that all the inhabitants of the 
village planned to make a pilgrimage to the shrine of Ise (Ise-mairi), and that 
rather than sit in his house and cry, he too should go along on the pilgrimage 
to Ise, for this would surely improve his mood. And so the man decided to 
make the pilgrimage, in memory of his father.« (Antoni 1989: 5) 
This portrayal shows rural pilgrimages as a collective undertaking by the en-
tire village in which everyone could (and should) take part. However, aside from 
the times when mass pilgrimages were common, this was not the usual form of 
pilgrimage undertaken by the rural population. Primarily due to financial rea-
sons, only chosen members of such rural communities were sent on the journey, 
with the express purpose of carrying out the religious ceremonies as a representa-
tive of the entire community and to bring the amulet of the place of pilgrimage 
back home to ensure the entire community’s protection. 
 
3. 1. 4. Ise-mairi and the beginnings of mass tourism 
 
Clearly the pilgrims, especially the »representatives« chosen by communities, 
also had worldly motives for traveling on pilgrimages beyond purely religious 
reasons. Under the baku-han system, with its enforced immobility, clearly defined 
roles for the individual within society and strict control over the people, pilgrim-
ages were the only possibility for commoners to escape the limitations and social 
controls of their local environment, even if only for a short time. Aside from the 
ecstatic mass pilgrimages, in which case the usual rules appear not to have ap-
plied, pilgrimages in general also appear to have been strictly organized and their 
success supervised. Even so, the journey offered a degree of freedom that would 
be unthinkable under normal circumstances. Thus, the concept of religious pil-
grimages and early forms of mass tourism came together in a fascinating, specifi-
cally Japanese way. 
Many of the aspects of Japanese travel customs that many non-Japanese find 
to be peculiar to the country, such as the duty of the individual to bring back 
»souvenirs« (miyage) for members of their family or organization, originated in 
the pilgrimages of the Edo period. In this context, Franziska Ehmcke (1994: 65) 
remarks that at the time, 
»miyage meant ‘something brought from the shrine,’ an amulet or some other 
holy object. Thus, the pilgrims brought back a concrete piece of the religious 
experience undertaken as a representative of the entire community. The ‘part-
ing gift,’ or sembetsu, allowed those who stayed behind to participate in the 
pilgrimage both in symbolic and real terms, and they were included in the re-
sult in the same way through the miyage, the ‘gift from the shrine.’« 
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Pilgrimages showed similar characteristics to modern mass tourism in other 
ways as well. Vast entertainment districts offering every kind of diversion and 
amusement were established around the places of pilgrimage. In Ise, the enter-
tainment district of Furuichi between the Inner and Outer Shrines became nation-
ally famous. At its peak, this district supposedly housed no less than 70 brothels. 
Whether the following disillusioned remark on the motives of pilgrims to Ise is 
true can hardly be proven: »In actuality, the pleasures of the Furuichi were the 
principal motive for the pilgrimages of many men.«121 However, Davis (1983: 108) 
offers some perspective in his reference to the significance of prostitution in Japa-
nese tradition. 
 
3. 1. 4. 1. Travel guidebooks 
 
As travel became increasingly popular during the course of the Edo period 
(not only in the religious context), travel guidebooks were published in great 
numbers.122 Among these, the illustrated guidebooks to famous places, the so-
called Meisho zue published beginning in 1780, are also of great cultural-historical 
value.123 The illustrated travel guidebook for pilgrims to Ise, the Ise-sangû meisho 
zue, published in 1797,124 is especially significant in this context. This was the 
sixth volume in the series of illustrated guidebooks,125 a visual representation of 
famous places on the pilgrimage route from Kyôto to Ise, which also included 
commentaries. Illustrated and written by Shitomi Kangetsu (1747-1797) and pub-
lished in eight maki, the illustrations in this work are its most striking feature, as 
Rose Hempel (1963: 114) points out. Rolls 1 to 5 describe famous places on the 
road from Kyôto to Ise, as well as the Ise shrines themselves and the surrounding 
area. The sixth volume focuses on the region around Lake Biwa. Toda (1931: 333) 
distinguishes between three kinds of illustrations in the work: historical pictures, 
landscapes, and illustrations of daily life. The compilation on the Meisho zue of the 
Edo period edited by Dufey and Laube (1995) reprints a genre picture of a pil-
                                                 
121 »Historical Sketches – Processions and Pilgrimages. On the Road in Tokugawa Japan.« In: The 
East, 23/1, March 1987: 18. 
122 Cf. Nishigaki 1983: 165-190 (»Ise he no michi«); Foard 1982: 241ff., Ehmcke 1994: 66ff.; »Histori-
cal Sketches [...]« (cf. note 119) 1987: 18. 
123 Cf. Toda 1931; Dufey, Laube (ed.) 1995; Hempel 1963. 
124 For information on dates, cf. Toda 1931: 333; Dufey, Laube (ed.) 1995: 323. Some commentators 
hold that the work was published in 1796; cf. Ehmcke 1994: 67; Hempel 1963: 113. 
125 Cf. Hampel 1963: 113; for a list of important Meisho zue, cf. Dufey, Laube (ed.) 1995: 323-324. 
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grimage to Ise that corresponds to the third category of Toda’s classification.126 
Kanji Kurumizawa writes: 
»The picture shows pilgrims on way to Ise spending the night in the guest-
house district of Nakagawahara. On the lefthand side of the picture, oshi are 
shown picking up pilgrims from the journey. In the guest house (ryôkan), 
there is a sign from a group of pilgrims from the area with the inscription kô 
(pilgrimage savings organization, or confraternity).« 
Thus, many of the elements that characterized pilgrimages to Ise can be found 
in this single illustration.127 
This makes the Ise-sangû meisho zue one of the most important sources for un-
derstanding the reality of pilgrimages to Ise. Its landscapes and genre pictures, 
together with commentaries and accounts of historical events, offer insight into 
the procedure and atmosphere of the most popular pilgrimage route of the time. 
However, it should be taken into account that this is a relatively late work per-
taining to the situation in the late Edo period. For instance, the festival aspect of 
large-scale pilgrimages only developed after the mass pilgrimage of 1771 (Davis 
1983: 102), and it did not take long for the chaotic events of 1830 to come about. 
This means that one must be cautious when applying the impressions contained 
in the Ise-sangû meisho zue from 1797 to the Ise-mairi of the early Edo period, 
which had not yet developed into the mass okage-mairi (»thanksgiving pilgrim-
ages«) of later years. 
These okage-mairi, mass pilgrimages to the shrines at Ise, formed the peak of 
the general popularization of worship at Ise during the time of national seclu-
sion.128 Although mass pilgrimages to Ise »broke out« in a roughly sixty-year cy-
                                                 
126 Dufey, Laube 1995: 256, illustration 128 »Wallfahrt nach Ise« (»Pilgrimage to Ise«) 
127 The rest of Kurumizawa’s commentary is also worth quoting here, since he gives a concise 
overview of the basic characteristics of Ise-mairi: »In Japan, pilgrimages have been made to certain 
temples and shrines since ancient times. In the Edo period, they became even more popular. Espe-
cially the journey with a group of pilgrims to Ise Shrine, called Ise-mairi, was to be taken at least 
once in one’s lifetime. Perhaps this place of Shintô worship was thought to offer the most divine 
mercy because the clan deity of the emperor and the god of agriculture are worshipped there. At 
Ise Shrine, priests called oshi (»honorable teacher«) took care of the travelers. Each was responsi-
ble for a certain region. They visited the worshipers at home, sold them ofuda, talismans for wor-
ship at home altars, and invited them to take part in pilgrimages. They were paid for these activi-
ties. Their job was seen as a privilege and soon became subject to inheritance and could be bought 
and sold.« (l.c.) 
128 On the phenomenon of okage-mairi, cf. Nishigaki 1983: 191-206 (»Okage-mairi no hitobito«); Ni-
shigaki 1984: 145-242. Davis 1983: passim. Franziska Ehmcke (1994: 62f.) remarks in this context: 
»All pilgrims wore white pilgrim robes, had a ladle (hishaku) for drawing the ritual purifying wa-
ter at the shrines and sang: ‘Okage de sa, sururi to na, nuketa to sa’ (‘Thanks to your help, I se-
cretly slipped away.’). For this reason, pilgrimages to Ise were called ‘Thanks-to-your-help pil-
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cle, the pilgrimages of 1705, 1771 and 1830 corresponded most closely to this idea. 
The source cited by Davis comments critically on the most famous (perhaps also 
the most infamous) pilgrimage among these three, which took place in the third 
month of the year Bunsei 13 (1830) and began in Shikoku.129 Even though the 
mass pilgrimage had not yet become a phenomenon in all regions of Japan 
(Kantô, Tôhoku and Kyûshû were apparently not affected; cf. Davis 1983: 101), in 
this year nearly five million people made the journey to Ise, compared to the av-
erage of 300,000 to 400,000 pilgrims in »normal« years. The reason for this pil-
grimage, which bordered on mass hysteria, was the supposed raining of amulets 
from Ise, which, beginning in Shikoku, spread across the entire country and in-
spired large numbers of people to make the pilgrimage. Raining amulets, along 
with the ecstatic dance cults (odori) of the time, are a fascinating example of Japa-
nese folk religion in the Edo and bakumatsu periods; their genesis and populariza-
tion are the subject of extensive studies by Reinhard Zöllner (2003). In 1830 the 
Ise-odori or okage-odori, which had broken out in various parts of the country, were 
among the most obligatory events of the mass pilgrimage.130 
However, the »pilgrimages of thanks« (okage-mairi) represented only the peak 
of a development brought about by the practice of worshipping at Ise131 and the 
related popularization of the pilgrimages (Ise-mairi) over the course of the Edo 
period.132 
 
3. 1. 5. Engelbert Kaempfer as a chronicler of the pilgrimage to Ise 
 
In order to understand pilgrimages in earlier times, it is worth considering a 
source that has hardly received any attention until now, but offers an extremely 
valuable account of this phenomenon: the report from Japan by the doctor and 
researcher Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716), who served the Dutch. His travel ac-
counts from Japan during the Genroku period (1688-1703), which tell of his voy-
ages to Edo with the Dutch mission (Feb. 13, 1691 to May 8, 1691 and Mar. 2, 1692 
to May 25, 1692; cf. Beck 1966: 10), are doubtlessly well known. They also contain 
                                                                                                                                                  
grimages,’ okage-mairi, since the pilgrims could travel on ships and ferries and cross bridges for 
free, received free straw sandals and were sometimes even given money.« 
129 Yano Yoshiko’s (1984) thorough study gives a detailed account of this mass pilgrimage. 
130 Davis (1983: 101, note 11) points to the fact that the Ise dances were documented throughout 
the Tokugawa period, especially in the years 1614, 1621, 1624, 1653, 1678 and 1714. 
131 On the development of worship (or religion) at Ise in the Edo period, cf. the collection by Ni-
shigaki 1984; especially the section »Kinsei-Ise-shinkô to minzoku,« which contains various arti-
cles (p. 245-332); see also Fukuya 1988: 109f.; Tokoro 1973. 
132 Niiki 1984 offers a thorough statistical analysis of the number and size of pilgrimages to Ise 
during the Edo period, as well as the geographical origin of their participants. 
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vivid accounts of the travelers’ encounters with pilgrims to Ise on the long road 
from Nagasaki to Edo.133 
And yet, however vivid each of these accounts may be, they provide only 
momentary glimpses and fleeting impressions of the journey. Kaempfer’s sys-
tematic treatise on the pilgrimages to Ise, on the other hand, which is part of the 
third book of his main work (cf. Kaempfer 1727) History of Japan (HoJ) is of great 
academic interest. 134  Despite the discussions of Kaempfer’s work that have 
emerged in recent years, it can be said that this work represents a historically 
authentic, generally well-founded and systematic discussion of the religions of 
Japan during the Genroku period. As will be discussed in the following, this 
work represents an important source for our knowledge of the culture of this pe-
riod, and it is regrettable that his systematic remarks on contemporary religions 
have received far too little attention in the past. 
In the context of the change in the function of the Ise-mairi, one of Kaempfer’s 
remarks is particularly important. He writes: 
»Orthodox Sintoists go in Pilgrimage to Isje once a year, or at least once in 
their life. Nay ‘tis thought a duty incumbent on every true Patriot, whatever 
sect or religion he otherwise adheres to, and a publick mark of respect and 
gratitude, which every one ought to pay to Tensio Dai Sin, if not, as to the God 
and Protector of the Nation, at least, as to its founder and first parent.«(HoJ 
III/4 = Kaempfer 1727: 226) 
This account clearly highlights the »overall Japanese« intentions that were al-
ready associated with pilgrimages to Ise at the end of the 17th century. As is evi-
dent from other parts of the work, »orthodox Sintoists« means the disciples of 
Yuiitsu Shintô of the house of Yoshida. One can see how far the ideas of this 
school, which anticipated the national-political concepts of the Kokugaku, had 
apparently already spread among the people at this early time, since »every true 
Patriot, whatever sect or religion he otherwise adheres to« was expected to un-
dertake a pilgrimage for this reason. This indirectly confirms a theory by James 
H. Foard, which states that pilgrimages in the Edo period (even purely Buddhist 
ones) particularly served to form communities across the nation: 
»As Japan became both a cognitive and functional region for more and more 
Japanese, pilgrimage contributed its vision of national communitas.« (Foard 
1982: 247) 
                                                 
133 Cf. Scurla (ed.) 1969: 103-105, 165-166, 168, 172, 226. 
134 For a historical critical edition of Kaempfer’s original manuscripts cf. Kaempfer 2001. 
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This suggests certain aspects of the subject that will be discussed later. The re-
lationship between the two Ise shrines is particularly significant in this context. 
This is evident, for example, in the previously mentioned warning by the Ko-
kugaku scholar Motoori Norinaga, who, at the turn of the 19th century, ultimately 
demanded a turning away from the worship of the Gekû in favor of the Inner 
Shrine – that is, to the ancestral deity of the imperial house. The era described by 
Kaempfer also apparently represents a transitional period for the increasingly na-
tionwide importance of the practice of worshipping at Ise. 
In his account of pilgrimages to Ise, Kaempfer offers great insights into relig-
ious life in the early Edo period. Kaempfer’s descriptions and analyses are far 
more important than mere travel reports. He was the first to demonstrate a »Ja-
panological« view by relating the religious, cultural, social and political condi-
tions of his time to one another. For this reason, our investigation of religious life 
in the early Edo period will continue with a closer examination of Kaempfer’s 
work (see also Antoni 1997d). 
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4. ENGELBERT KAEMPFER’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF 
EDO PERIOD SHINTÔ 
 
With few exceptions, European observers of Japan in the 16th and 17th centu-
ries paint a picture of the country’s religions that is deeply influenced by their 
own basic concept of religion. Even when they attempt to provide an objective 
account of Japanese culture overall, they generally lack this intercultural generos-
ity when it comes to the area of religion. Even Luis Frois (1532-1597), who other-
wise strives for a balanced representation of Japanese culture, cannot escape his 
own shadow on this subject. Frois’s basic attitude is apparent in his outraged re-
mark: 
»In our society, a man who changes religions is said to be a renegade and an 
apostate; in Japan one can switch sects as often as one likes without the 
slightest scandal.«135  
As Peter Kapitza justly remarks, only when it comes to religious institutions 
does Frois fall into overly simplistic categories, »because he abandons the princi-
ple of the objective, critical view in favor of Christianity and its contemporary 
view of non-Christian religions.« (Kapitza 1990: 133) 
If even such an intelligent and prudent observer left the path of objectivity in 
the area of religion, then it is not surprising that less well-educated Europeans 
took an even more ignorant position. One example, cited here pars pro toto, is a 
certain Eberhard Werner Happel, who compiled his Thesaurus Exoticorum in 1688 
in Hamburg, which contained »foreign rarities and stories.« His bizarre writings 
on »the Japanese religion« reach their peak in his remark: 
»Their outward worship is very brutish / and consists of satanic images / 
their highest idols are Xaca / with three heads under one hat / Canon, 
Amida’s son, with seven heads on his chest.«136 
Still further testimonies by European reporters could be cited, which vary in 
their assessment of the Japanese religions, yet are largely negative, such as those 
of Jorge Alvarez (1547), Francisco de Xavier (1549), Cosme de Torres (1557), Bal-
                                                 
135 Quoted from Kapitza 1990: 136; on Luis Frois, cf. Jorissen 1988; Schurhammer, Voretzsch 1926. 
136 Kapitza (1990: 883) cites Happel’s depiction »as an example of this kind of fashion and enter-
tainment writing.« Original: »Ihr eusserlicher Gottesdienst ist sehr Viehisch / und bestehet in ei-
nem teuffelschen Bilder=Dienst / ihre vornehmbste Abgötter seind Xaca / mit 3 Köpffen unter 
einer Mütze / Canon des Amida Sohn mit 7 Köpffen auf der Brust.« 
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tasar Gago (1562), Gaspar Vilela (1571), François Caron (1645), Arnold Montanus 
(1669), Pierre Bayle (1702/1742), Johann Christoph Gottsched (1725)137 and others, 
but this would not change the general fact that the European view of the foreign 
Japanese religion, was deeply distorted by its own perspective. 
4. 1. The academic reception of the work 
 
As Detlef Haberland (1990 b: 27) justly remarks, Kaempfer was »the first to 
give a detailed account of Shintô.« However, his account has left behind no ap-
parent traces in the field. The criticism and disdain expressed by such authorities 
as Aston (1902) and Schurhammer (1923) have led to the fact that, up until now, 
Kaempfer’s description and analysis of Shintô have not been paid enough atten-
tion in historical Shintô studies.138 I do not know of a single work that has done 
justice to Kaempfer’s writings as a serious, historically valuable, ethnographic 
and ethnological source on Shintô during the Edo period. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to take a fresh look at this otherwise well-known source.139 
 
4. 1. 1. Religions in Kaempfer’s History of Japan 
 
The third book of the first volume of Kaempfer’s main work, History of Japan 
(HoJ), contains a description and systematic analysis of the Japanese religions, 
and of Shintô in particular. The whole work, being based on notes from the years 
1690 to 1692, was published in 1727 as Kaempfer’s masterwork on Japan, which 
had been completed in German but not yet published during Kaempfer’s lifetime. 
                                                 
137 Cf. Kapitza (1990) in this context on Jorge Alvarez (p. 65f.), Francisco de Xavier (p. 80-84), 
Cosme de Torres (p. 103-104), Baltasar Gago (p. 117), Gaspar Vilela (p. 129-130), François Caron 
(p. 546-558, 559), Arnold Montanus (p. 690, 701, 708), Pierre Bayle (p. 47), Johann Christoph 
Gottsched (p. 172); see also the notes on Japanese religions in Th. Salomon and M. van Goch (1729, 
Kapitza 1990: 298-300), as well as Johann Jacob Brucker (1744), who, as Kapitza remarks (1990: 
412), »refuses to admit that there is any kind of philosophical meaning in Shintô mythologies,« 
which is to be seen as »a sign of the limits of the Enlightenment.« (l.c.) 
138 An example in this regard may be seen in an essay by J. A. G. Roberts (1989), which discusses 
contemporary European reports on the intellectual development of the Edo period. In this context, 
it is remarkable that the author devotes a section to »Shintô« (p. 157-161) in which positions and 
definitions are cited that clearly can be traced back to Kaempfer, without citing their true source. 
Kaempfer is only mentioned in summary (p. 151f.). 
139 The general »rediscovery« of Kaempfer in academic research has been documented in a whole 
series of conferences and symposiums on the subject of his life and work; cf. Bodart-Bailey, Ma-
sarella 1995; Haberland 1993; Kreiner 1992; already in 1966, a memorial work on Kaempfer and 
Siebold was published by the OAG (cf. OAG-Tokyo 1966). Besides geographical and historical de-
tails, Kaempfer also provides information on the botany (cf. Muntschik 1993b, 1995; Werger-Klein 
1993), cartography, (Sternstein 1993; also Schmeißer 1995) and the Japanese language (cf. Michel 
1993). For recent research cf. Kaempfer 2001. 
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The English translation was done by J. Caspar Scheuchzer and finally published 
under the title The History of Japan. Only in 1777 and 1779 was a German edition 
published by Christian Wilhelm Dohm in two volumes, which was comparable to 
the English edition and was reprinted in its original form in 1964 (Kaempfer 
1964). In 2001 a complete edition of his original version in German was published 
for the first time under the original title Heutiges Japan (»Today’s Japan«). (Cf. 
Kaempfer 2001) 
The third book, »Of the state of Religion in Japan,« is found in the first of the 
two volumes of the 1727 print, and contains a total of seven chapters (HoJ III/1-7 
= Kaempfer 1727: 203-252): 
Chap. I. Of the Religions of this Empire in general, and of the Sintos-Religion 
in particular (203) 
Chap. II Of the Sintos Temples, belief and worship (208) 
Chap. III Of the Sintos Rebi, that is, their fortunate and holidays, and the cele-
bration thereof (215) 
Chap. IV. Of the Sanga, or Pilgimage to Isje (225) 
Chap. V. Of the Jammabos, or Mountain-priests, and other religious orders 
(232) 
Chap. VI. Of the Budsdo, or foreign Pagan Worship, and its founder (241) 
Chap. VII. Of the Siuto, that is, the doctrine and way of life of their Moralists 
and Philosophers. 
In the first four chapters of this book, Kaempfer provides a systematic discus-
sion of Shintô. Although references and comments with valuable information on 
this topic are also scattered throughout the entire work, the author’s systematic 
discussion on this subject is mainly concentrated in these sections. 
 
4. 1. 1. 1. »Of the Religions of this Empire in general, and of the Sintos-Religion in par-
ticular« 
 
The first chapter (HoJ III/1 = Kaempfer 1727: 203-208) begins with a remark-
able, programmatic statement on religious freedom, which Kaempfer – on the eve 
of the European Enlightenment140 – surely placed at the beginning of his discus-
sion of the religions of Japan not without further intentions: 
»Liberty of Conscience, so far as it doth not interfere with the Interest of the 
secular Government, or affect the peace and tranquility of the Empire, hath 
been at all times allow'd in Japan, as it is in most other Countries of Asia. Hence it is, 
                                                 
140 Kaempfer’s relationship to the Enlightenment is discussed in Kapitza 1980 and Klueting 1993. 
Of note in this context is the high esteem for Kaempfer’s work held by none other than Voltaire, 
who called Kaempfer a »freedom-loving and well educated traveler« (cf. Kapitza 1990: 466). 
116  n  KOKUTAI - POLITICAL SHINTÔ FROM EARLY-MODERN TO CONTEMPORARY JAPAN   
 
that foreign Religions were introduc'd with ease, and propagated with success, 
to the great prejudice of that, which was establish'd in the country from remotest 
antiquity.« (HoJ III/1 = Kaempfer 1727: 203) 
Directly after this general statement, the author lists the most important reli-
gious schools of thought in Japan: 
»In this last hundred years there were chiefly four Religions, considerable for 
the number of their adherents, to wit.  
1. Sinto, the old Religion, or Idol-worship, of the Japanese.  
2. Budsdo, The worship of foreign Idols, which were brought over into Japan, 
from the Kingdom of Siam, and the Empire of China.  
3. Siuto, The Doctrine of their Moralists and Philosophers.  
4. Deivus, or Kiristando, is as much as to say, the way of God and Christ, 
whereby must be understood the Christian Religion.« (HoJ III/1 = Kaempfer 
1727: 203) 
Kaempfer also examines Christianity and its downfall in Japan, which, as the 
author asserts, was the fault of the Jesuit mission.141 Among contemporary relig-
ions, it is Shintô that, according to Kaempfer, is the most important: 
»Of the three chief Religions, which now flourish and are tolerated in Japan, 
the SINTOS. must be considered in the first place, more for its antiquity and long 
standing, than for the number of its adherents.« (HoJ III/1 = Kaempfer 1727: 204) 
After a detailed explanation of the word Sinto (shintô), the author discusses in 
detail various aspects of the history, theology and metaphysics of this religion, 
about whose independence as a religion he does not raise the slightest doubt, 
given that he was a contemporary of the Genroku period (1688-1704). As is typi-
cal for the time he lived in, Kaempfer consistently makes more or less serious fac-
tual errors, a fact that Aston (1902) rightly criticizes. For example, Kaempfer’s at-
tempts to trace »This Religion [which] seems to be nearly as ancient as the nation 
itself« (HoJ III/1 = Kaempfer 1727: 205) back to biblical and Babylonian roots ap-
pear rather obscure to present-day readers. But in this context, it is at least worth 
noting that Kaempfer constructs a kind of evolutionary model for religion(s) that 
                                                 
141 It is Kaempfer who blames the missionaries themselves for the persecution of Christians during 
the Edo period, as evidenced by this statement: »Considering what a vast progress it had made till 
then, even amidst the many storms and difficulties it had been exposed to, there was very good 
reason to hope, that within a short compass of time the whole Empire would have been converted 
to the faith of our Saviour, had not the ambitious views, and impatient endeavours of, these Fa-
thers, to reap the temporal, as well as the spiritual fruits of their care and labour, so provoked the 
supreme Majesty of the Empire as to raise, against themselves and their converts, a persecution, 
which hath not its parallel in History, whereby the Religion, they preach’d, and all those that pro-
fess’d it, were in a few years time entirely exterminated.« (HoJ III/1 = Kaempfer 1727: 204) 
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includes Japanese Shintô. Furthermore, especially the most recent research points 
to close cultural-historical contacts between Mesopotamia and ancient Japanese 
religion.142 
The position of the Japanese emperor is especially important in this context, 
whom Kaempfer, who regards him as a kind of pope, characterizes as a living 
god: 
»This Japanese Pope assumes also to himself, the sole power and authority of 
deifying and canonizing others.« (HoJ III / 1 = Kaempfer 1727: 206) 
The author also appears to be surprisingly well informed about the mytho-
logical background of the imperial genealogy in detail: 
»[…] The Tensin Sitzi Dai, or seven great Celestial Spirits, who are said to have 
existed in the most antient times of the Sun, long before the existence of men 
and heaven, and to have inhabited the Japanese world (the only country in 
their opinion then existing) many millions of years.« (HoJ III/1 = Kaempfer 
1727: 206) 
Finally, as a further important criterion, Kaempfer states that »this religion 
[...] is so closely connected with the political life that it exists almost exclusively in 
the outward customs of the people.«143 This is reminiscent of much later, so-called 
State Shintô concepts from the modern era, which officially define Shintô as a 
kind of conglomeration of Japanese folklore and ritual. However, Kaempfer 
clearly states that this is not the whole picture; rather, a theology that was passed 
down by priests does indeed exist, but it is not generally accessible: »They will 
teach their system of divinity to others for a proper consideration, and under an 
obligation of secrecy;« (HoJ III/1 = Kaempfer 1727: 207). Following a loose quota-
tion on the creation of the world apparently taken from the Nihonshoki, Kaempfer 
continues in the German version of the text with an astonishingly learned excur-
sus on the term ki, the »anima universi,« in the context of Shintô theology.144 But 
                                                 
142 For further details, cf. Antoni 1988: 206-209, among others. 
143 This quotation follows Dohm’s German translation of Kaempfer’s/Scheuchzer’s text (GBJ III/1 
= Kaempfer 1777-79 repr. 1964: 255), which reads: »Diese Religion hängt mit dem politischen Le-
ben dadurch genau zusammen, daß sie fast nur in äußern bürgerlichen Gebräuchen besteht«. 
Scheuchzer’s English version is slightly different (HoJ III/1 = Kaempfer 1727: 207); but since the 
original text is in accordance with the German version version and reads: »Es ist diese Religion 
mit der Policeij also verbunden, ...« (Kaempfer 2001, vol. I: 175) it is correct to use the prase »po-
litical life« here. 
144 English translation of the passage in Kaempfer (1777-79 repr. 1964: 256): »This ki, however, 
means: 1) the highest essence of the gods, 2) the souls of humans, and 3) the souls of the animals. 
No specific place is given to the most subtle light-essence of the gods, besides the tensho dai shin, 
which should be in the heart of any well-meaning, pure soul. The pure beings or souls, however, 
are strictly separated and differentiated from the impure beings or souls.« 
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it remains unclear if this is an additional note by the translator Dohm, dating 
from 1777, since the topic is missing also in the recently discovered original ver-
sion of the text (Kaempfer 2001) 
 
4. 1. 1. 2. »Of the Sintos Temples, belief and worship« 
 
After discussing the basic foundations of Japanese religions and establishing 
the prominent position of Shintô in the first chapter, the following sections focus 
on various aspects and topics relevant in this context. The second chapter (HoJ 
III/2 = Kaempfer 1727: 208-215) is entitled »Of the Sintos Temples, belief and 
worship.« The first sentences of this chapter demonstrate that Kaempfer was also 
knowledgable about the linguistic aspects of his subject: 
»The Sinsju, that is, the adherents of the Sintos Religion, call their Temples, or 
Churches, Mia, which word, as I have observ'd, signifies dwelling places of 
immortal Souls. They come nearest to the Fana of the ancient Romans, as they 
are generally speaking so many lasting monuments erected to the memory of 
great men. They call them also Jasijro, and Sia, or Sinsja, which last takes in 
the whole Court of the Mia, with all other buildings and dependencies be-
longing to the same. The Gods, who are the subject of their worship, they call 
Sin and Cami, which signifies Souls or Spirits. Sometimes also they honour 
them with the epithet of Miosin, sublime, illustrious, holy; and Gongen, just, 
severe, jealous. The adherents of other religions call the convents of their re-
ligious men, and the places of their worship, Sisia Tira, that is, temples, and 
the Gods themselves, which they adore, Fotoge. All other foreign Idols, the 
worship of whom was brought into Japan from beyond Sea, are compre-
hended under one general name of Bosatz, or Budz.« (HoJ III /2 = Kaempfer 
1727: 208) 
Following these introductory words, the author turns to a detailed descrip-
tion of a typical Shintô shrine. The general layout and structure are discussed, as 
well as the significance of various details, such as torii and bells. Once again, 
Kaempfer’s critical view is apparent in his remark on the bells: 
»Over the Temple-door hangs sometimes a wide flat bell, and a strong, long, 
knotted rope, wherewith those that come to worship, strike the bell, as it 
were, to give notice to the Gods of their presence. This custom however is not 
very ancient, nor did it origjnally belong to the Sintos Religion, for it was bor-
row'd from the Budsdo, or foreign Idol-worship.« (HoJ III /2 = Kaempfer 
1727: 209) 
Kaempfer describes further aspects of shrine architecture and of the most im-
portant objects in great detail. He discusses the special aspects of the hongû 
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(Fongu) as well as the function of various relics. The author also proves to be 
knowledgeable about the ranks of the priesthood, the differences between negi, 
kannushi and shanin, and their clothing. Finally, Kaempfer shows a deep under-
standing of the administrative structures of contemporary religious policy in a 
paragraph in which he discusses the position of the jisha-bugyô (cf. chapter II: 2. 2. 
3), the highest position in the bakufu for regulating the country’s religious institu-
tions.145 
Kaempfer remarks that the Shintô priests are »haughty and proud, beyond 
expression, fancying themselves to be of a far better make, and nobler extraction 
than other people.« (HoJ III/2 = Kaempfer 1727: 211) Their behavior contrasts 
with what he sees as their rather simple theology (»the whole Sintos Religion is so 
mean and simple«, (l.c.). In his view, the simplicity of Shintô is also the reason 
why Shintô and Buddhism entered into such a close relationship with one an-
other. Kaempfer proceeds to give a thorough discussion of theology and syncre-
tism, in which he differentiates between the two main schools, which he calls the 
»Juitz« (yuiitsu) or »Orthodox Adherents«, and the »Riobu« (ryôbu), or »Syncre-
tists.« Clearly this means Yuiitsu Shintô and Ryôbu Shintô. 
»The first of these Sects is call’d Juitz. The Orthodox Adherents of this, con-
tinued so firm and constant in the religion and customs of their ancestors, 
that they would not yield in any the least point, how insignificant soever. But 
they are so very inconsiderable in number, that the Canusi’s, or Priests them-
selves make up the best part. The other Sect is that of the Riobu’s : These are a 
sort of Syncretists, who for their own satisfaction and for the sake of a more 
extensive knowledge in religious matters, particularly with regard to the fu-
ture state of our Souls, endeavour’d to reconcile, if possible' the foreign Pagan 
Religion, with that of their ancestors. In order to this they suppose, that the 
Soul of Amida whom the Budsdoists adore as their Saviour, dwelt by transmi-
gration in the greatest of their Gods Ten Sio Dai Sin, the essence, as they call 
him, of light and sun. Most Sintoists confess themselves to this Sect.« (HoJ 
III/2 = Kaempfer 1727: 212) 
Kaempfer then moves on to an excursus on the Shintô teachings on the soul, 
which he finds unusual, since they do not include the »transmigration of Souls,« 
nor any kind of hell. Here, too, he divides the basic teachings of Shintô theology 
into five points, each of which he then discusses: 
                                                 
145  »In Spiritual Affairs, they are under the absolute jurisdiction of the Mikaddo, but in Temporali-
ties, they, and all other Ecclesiastical Persons in the Empire, stand under the command of two Dsi 
Sin Bugios, as they call them, or Imperial Temple-Judges, appointed by the Secular Monarch.« (HoJ 
III/2 = Kaempfer 1727: 211) For an introduction to this office, cf. Totman 1988: 181-182, 195-196; 
Steenstrup 1991: 115f. 
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»The chief points of the Sintos Religion (and those, the observation whereof 
its adherents believe, makes them agreeable to the Gods, and worthy to ob-
tain from their divine mercy an immediate admission into the stations of 
happiness after their death, or what is more commonly aim’d at, a train of 
temporal blessings in this life) are, 1. The inward purity of the heart. 2. A re-
ligious abstinence from whatever makes a man impure. 3. A diligent observa-
tion of the solemn festival and holy days. 4. Pilgrimages to the holy places at 
Isie. Of these, to which by some very religious people is added, 5. Chastizing 
and mortifying their bodies, I proceed now to treat severally.« (HoJ III/2 = 
Kaempfer 1727: 213) 
Kaempfer then proceeds to discuss the prime importance of external purity in 
Shintô doctrine, as well as the related rules requiring the avoidance of impure 
things, especially blood: 
»[…] external purity, the observance whereof tho’ less material in it self, hath 
yet been more strictly commanded, it consists in abstaining from blood, from 
eating of flesh, and from dead bodies.« (HoJ III/2 = Kaempfer 1727: 214) 
The author ends the second chapter with an illustration of the religious 
overzealousness and hypocrisy that also exist in Japan, in which he discusses one 
of his acquaintances: 
»An acquaintance of mine at Nagasaki was so exceedingly nice and scrupu-
lous on this head, that when he received but a visit of one, whom he had rea-
son to suspect of being a Fusio, he caused his house to be wash’d and cleaned 
with water and salt from top to bottom, and yet, all this superstitious care 
notwithstanding the wiser of his Countrymen look upon him as a downright 
Hypocrite.« (HoJ III/2 = Kaempfer 1727: 215)  
 
4. 1. 1. 3. »Of the Sintos Rebi, that is, their fortunate and holidays, and the  
celebration thereof«  
 
Following his systematization of the five main points of Shintô, Kaempfer 
then turns to Shintô rituals (HoJ III/3 = Kaempfer 1727: 215-225): »The Celebra-
tion of solemn Festivals and Holidays, which is the third essential point of the 
Sintos Religion, consists in what they call Majiru, that is, in going to the Mias and 
Temples of the Gods and deceased great Men.« (HoJ III/3 = Kaempfer 1727: 215). 
The author first discusses the general rules for private visits to shrines, followed 
by a discussion of the most important national and local festivals. To recount all 
of these would go beyond the scope of the present discussion, but these descrip-
tions offer valuable authentic material for understanding Japanese festivals of the 
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Genroku period. Once again, Kaempfer’s assessment of the festivals as a kind of 
national folklore is worth noting. He remarks: 
»It is observable in general, that their Festivals and Holidays are days sacred 
rather to mutual compliments and civilities, than to acts of holiness and devo-
tion, for which reason also they call them Rebi’s, which implies as much as 
Visiting-days. Tis true indeed, that they think it a duty incumbent on them on 
those days, to go to the Temple of Tensio Daisin, the first and principal object 
of their worship, and the Temples of their other Gods and deceased great 
men.« (HoJ III/3 = Kaempfer 1727: 217) 
Once again, the argument that Shintô festivals are a kind of (national) custom 
makes an appearance – something that was actually far more common in much 
later times. His subsequent extensive descriptions of the nationwide monthly and 
annual festivals show that Kaempfer is indeed describing a pan-Japanese custom. 
Fully six pages of this chapter focus on the five annual festivals, which are dis-
cussed in great detail. The author focuses especially on New Year (shôgatsu), 
when writing: »Songuatz [sic!]146, or New-years-day, which is celebrated in Japan 
with the utmost solemnity, preferably to all other Holidays« (HoJ III/3 = 
Kaempfer 1727: 218). 
However, as Kaempfer (HoJ III / 3 = Kaempfer 1727: 222) goes on to state, 
there are »many more Holidays observ’d in Japan, of less note indeed, and sacred 
to particular Gods and Idols, in whose honour they are celebrated.« Kaempfer 
names no fewer than sixteen of these festivals and offers descriptions of some of 
them, starting with the festival of »Tensio Dai Sin […] the supreme of all the Gods 
of the Japanese, and acknowledg’d as Patron and Protector of the whole Empire.« 
(l.c.), dedicated to Amaterasu ômikami, the high god of Ise, whom Kaempfer mis-
takenly assumes to be male. 
Even Izumo is mentioned in his account, where Kaempfer states: 
»Idsumo no O Jasijro, that is, O Jasijro of the Province Idsumo, is another God, 
for whom they have a great respect. Amongst several glorious exploits, he 
kill’d a mischievous terrible Dragon. He is call’d also Osjuwo ni no Mikotto.« 
(HoJ III / 3 = Kaempfer 1727: 223)  
But Kaempfer’s analysis of the Japanese festival calendar does not end here. 
At the end of this section, he mentions further deities that are worshipped 
throughout the country: 
                                                 
146 Songuatz is a misspelling; some lines above Kaempfer uses the more correct term Soguatz. 
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»There are many more saints and great men, whose memory is celebrated on 
particular days, because of their noble actions, and great services done to 
their country. But as they are confined to particular places, being call’d the 
Saints of such or such a place, and besides, as they were never canoniz’d by 
the Mikaddo, who alone can make Saints, nor honour’d with an Okurina, as 
they call it, or illustrious title, which is usually given to new Gods and Saints, 
I did not think it worth while to make any Enquiries about them.« (HoJ III/3 
= Kaempfer 1727: 224f.) 
Kaempfer ends the chapter with references to related Japanese sources.147 
Once again, it is apparent that the author, despite his modesty, is not merely a 
travel writer, but rather a true forerunner of philological and ethnological Japa-
nese studies: 
»Thus far, what an attentive traveller can learn in the Country, concerning the 
Sintos Religion, and the Gods, who are the objects of its worship. A more ex-
tensive and accurate account of both is contain’d in two Japanese Books, one 
of which is call’d Nippon Odaiki, being an Historical and Chronological ac-
count of their Kintsju, or great men, and their memorable actions ; the other 
Sin Dai Ki,148 that is, the History and Actions of their great Gods.« (HoJ III/3 = 
Kaempfer 1727: 225) 
 
4. 1. 1. 4. »Of the Sanga or Pilgrimage to Isje« 
 
Despite his concluding remarks at the end of the previous chapter, which ap-
pears to bring the topic to a close, in the fourth section (HoJ III/4 = Kaempfer 
1727: 225-231) of the third book, Kaempfer turns to a further fundamental aspect 
of Japanese religiosity, and thus also of Shintô according to Kaempfer’s account: 
the custom of pilgrimages, especially to Ise. 
»The Japanese are very much addicted to Pilgrimages. They make several, 
and to different places. The first and chief goes to lsje, the second to the 33 
chief Quanwon Temples of the Empire, the third to some of the most eminent 
Sin, or Cami, and Fotoge or Buds Temples, famous for the great miracles 
wrought there, and the help and benefit, Pilgrims found by going to worship 
there.« (HoJ III / 4 = Kaempfer 1727: 225)« 
Fortunately for the historiography of Edo-period Shintô, Kaempfer devotes 
this chapter, after an introduction, to a detailed discussion of pilgrimages to Ise. 
Together with his comments about pilgrims to Ise interspersed with his travel ac-
                                                 
147 For a discussion of these and other Japanese sources consulted by Kaempfer, cf. Imai 1980: 
102ff., chapter III; cf. Imai 1973. 
148 By this the first sections (Jindaiki) of the Nihonshoki were meant. 
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counts on the court of the Shôgun in Edo, this discussion offers what is probably 
the earliest coherent account of pilgrimages to Ise in the Edo period. 
This account of pilgrimages to Ise marks the conclusion of the author’s re-
marks on contemporary Shintô. Although the subsequent chapters of this third 
book on religions (HoJ III / 5-7 = Kaempfer 1727: 232-252) focus on topics that are 
closely related to the system of Shintô discussed in the present study – namely, 
the yamabushi, contemporary Buddhism, Confucianism and ethics – to cover these 
topics would go beyond the scope of the present study. 
 
4. 2. Conclusion 
 
Obviously Kaempfer’s account does not merely offer a cursory, sensationalist 
picture of pagan cults intended for the amusement of a Christian audience in 
Europe. On the contrary, Kaempfer was the first European author to attempt an 
academically serious, systematic and analytical investigation of Japanese relig-
ions. The factual errors it contains are perhaps bearable in light of this intellectu-
ally pioneering achievement. It is the responsibility of Japanese studies to clarify 
these misinterpretations using an exact historical and philological analysis. To 
condemn the work outright for these errors, as Aston has done, or to ignore it, as 
Schurhammer chose to do, means putting pettiness and ideological aversion 
above the goal of understanding. Only today does acceptance appear to be grow-
ing for the academic value of Kaempfer’s work as a source for our understanding 
of the religions in Japan during the 17th century. 
Furthermore, this source contains other astonishing insights on this topic. In 
light of research from Japan and Japanese studies, it appears that the topic of a 
single Edo-period Shintô must be handled with extreme care. Is it even possible 
to speak of one form of Shintô for this period, due to the clearly documented and 
apparently dominant syncretism of the Edo period in the context of Confucianism 
as well as Buddhism? The more intense the intellectual-historical discussion of 
this topic becomes, the more scrupulous the prudent observer must be when 
dealing with the term »Shintô« in the context of the Edo period. And in the midst 
of all this restraint and historiographic care, Kaempfer represents a contemporary 
source which states: »Of the three chief Religions, which now flourish and are 
tolerated in Japan, the SINTOS. must be considered in the first place [...].« (HoJ 
III/1 = Kaempfer 1727: 204)  
For Kaempfer as a contemporary witness, and thus implicitly also his Japa-
nese informants who supplied him with the necessary material, there was appar-
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ently no question that Shintô was not only an independent religion, but that it 
was even the most important one in Japan. Although Kaempfer’s discussion also 
shows that he did not conceive of Shintô as a monolithic block in terms of theol-
ogy or ritual, this does not change the fact that, despite all syncretism and hetero-
geneity, the author himself chooses »Shintô« as an overarching term. 
In his discussion of the schools of Shintô, Kaempfer contrasts the dominant 
school of Ryôbu syncretism with a school that was influential among the priest-
hood, the so-called »orthodox,« which he calls »Juitz« (yuiitsu). Clearly this refers 
to Yuiitsu Shintô, the Yoshida School, which was widely influential among Shintô 
priests at the time. As the name indicates, this school was based on the idea of a 
supposedly pure Shintô, long before Motoori Norinaga and others developed 
their ideas of the Shintô school of National Learning. It appears that Kaempfer’s 
work was strongly influenced by these ideas, which he himself described as »or-
thodox.« His idea of Shintô as the ancient Japanese religion appears to support 
this interpretation, as well as the fact that Kaempfer refers specifically to a written 
Japanese source in this context, which he calls »Shindai ki.« This of course refers to 
the introductory chapter of the Nihonshoki from the year 720 on the »Age of the 
Gods« (Jindaiki), which covers Japanese mythology and the ruling dates of the 
earliest Japanese emperors (cf. Imai 1980: 103, among others). The Nihonshoki, 
however, was also the main written work of Yuiitsu Shintô,149 which was often 
referred to as Nihongi Shintô for this same reason. Only after the emergence of 
the Kokugaku was the supposedly more authentically Japanese Kojiki (712) em-
phasized, while the Nihonshoki was rejected as a source. 
 
 
 
                                                 
149 Yoshida Kanetomo already achieved, as Naumann (1994: 71) explains, »great influence at the 
court, where he gave lectures on the Nihongi.« On the importance of the Nihonshoki (Nihongi) in the 
teachings of Yoshida Shintô, see also Ooms 1985, Scheid 2001: passim. 
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5. THE KOKUGAKU AND MITOGAKU: FUKKO SHINTÔ  
AND THE RESTORATION 
 
The examples from the previous discussion of pilgrimages to Ise and 
Kaempfer’s writings on pan-Japanese patriotism have shown that, aside from re-
gional variations during the Edo period, Shintô of the time was already deter-
mined by a nationwide perspective. While this is true for the aforementioned 
visible areas, it applies even more so to the theological and ideological develop-
ment of Shintô during this period, which finally led to the pugnacious concept of 
»Restoration Shintô,« which provided the spiritual basis for the Meiji Restoration. 
The center of this complex area is the so-called Kokugaku, the Japanese school of 
National Learning, which will be the focus of the following discussion. 
5. 1. The Kokugaku 
 
On the one hand, Confucian Shintô, the main school of which was Suika-
Shintô, and which rose to prominence together with modern Confucianism, be-
came the main branch of Shintô during the Edo period (cf. Sugiyama, Sakamoto 
1994: 17). On the other hand, a new interpretation of Shintô in the context of the 
Kokugaku gradually took shape in the middle of the Edo period. The Kokugaku 
primarily took the indigenous, classical literatures of Japan as its area of study. 
Studies on ancient Japanese literature, especially on the Kojiki, by Motoori Nori-
naga, a student of Kamo Mabuchi, had the effect that both of the previous syncre-
tistic interpretations and belief systems of Shintô – the syntheses of Shintô and 
Buddhism and Shintô and Confucianism – were designated as not authentically 
Japanese and thus pushed aside. Thus emerged an interpretation of Shintô that 
was supposedly independent of Buddhism and Confucianism (in reality, this was 
much more complicated) that later competed with Confucian Shintô as the nativ-
ist school of National Learning. 
This novel interpretation of Shintô was the result of studies on ancient Japan, 
and it reached its intellectual and philological peak with Motoori Norinaga and 
his studies on the Kojiki. In these studies, Norinaga differentiated Shintô not only 
from Buddhism and Confucianism, but also from Taoism (i.e. the teachings of 
Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu), which his teacher Mabuchi still considered approxi-
mately congruent with Shintô. Norinaga defined Shintô as the process of devel-
opment of all beings that was begun by Izanagi and Izanami with the mitama of 
the deity Takamimusubi, and which was then taken over and passed down by 
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Amaterasu (cf. his programmatical essay Naobi no mitama, see below). Based on 
this idea, he theorized that everything on earth was based on the accomplish-
ments of the Japanese gods, and that no human being could judge or understand 
the nature of these gods by way of knowledge and an understanding. According 
to his teachings, Shintô is different from Confucianism and Buddhism in that man 
is unable to convey or learn its teachings by intellectual means, but rather, he can 
set his life on the right path with the help of the gods. Thus, Norinaga taught that 
man can only intuitively understand Shintô if he rules out those interpretations of 
the gods that are based on human knowledge and understanding, and in their 
place – without relying on the false »Chinese rationalism« (karagokoro, see below) 
– studies the authentic works of ancient Japan. 
While Norinaga swept aside all interpretations of Shintô that were influenced 
by »foreign« religions and belief systems, such as Buddhism and Confucianism, 
he considered the accounts of the gods found in the Kojiki to be the absolute his-
torical truth. According to Sakamoto Koremaru (cf. Sugiyama, Sakamoto 1994: 
18), this was directly responsible for the »shallowness« of the Shintô religion. 
Norinaga offered a new perspective for understanding Shintô by rejecting the 
Confucian and Buddhist interpretations of Shintô as far-fetched. 
Based on their philological and theological studies, from the late 18th century 
on, the Kokugaku also strove to implement their theories in the political sphere 
by increasingly emphasizing a renaissance of the Japanese emperorship in accor-
dance with the Shintô beliefs on the genealogical origins of the imperial family. 
Ultimately, the Kokugaku played a large spiritual part in the abolition of the sho-
gunate as a form of government in the middle of the 19th century. As befitted 
their high regard for the myths and legends of the Kojiki, the social ideals of the 
Kokugaku were firmly rooted in the distant past and were epitomized in ancient 
Japan, which, according to their view of history, was an era of ethical, religious 
and political rule by the emperor. 
In the view of the Kokugaku, which is based on the interpretation of ancient 
written sources – especially the Kojiki (»Record of Ancient Matters«) from the year 
712 A.D. and the Nihonshoki (»Chronicle of Japan«) from the year 720 – Japan was 
a »land of the gods,« or shinkoku. This formed the spiritual basis for the meta-
physical elevation of the entire Japanese nation. 
The theoretical axiom of the Kokugaku was their belief in the historical truth 
and reality of the ancient historical annals, including the chapter on the »Age of 
the Gods« in the Kojiki. The annals were literally understood to be facts (jijitsu); 
their accounts of the creation of the world, the divine and human spheres, the be-
ginnings of the emperorship, the origins of the powerful clans – all these mythical 
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and legendary events from the earliest times were declared by the scholars of Na-
tional Learning to be accounts of a historically accurate reality. When, for exam-
ple, an extremely influential theoretician and ideologue of the late Kokugaku 
such as Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843) refers to Japan as the »land of the gods,« he is 
following the literal interpretation (whether calculatingly or naïvely) of the an-
cient written works according to a fundamentalist view of Shintô. In Atsutane’s 
case, this view led to a fanatical nationalism and his belief in the fundamental su-
periority of Japan over all other nations. In his view, the gods are »the very be-
ginning of all humanity, and just as the gods created the world, at the same time 
they also created man.« To Atsutane, the path of the »decent man in reality is the 
way of the gods.« In another place he writes of the nature of the Japanese people 
that »we all are without a doubt the descendants of the gods.«150 
These examples give a vivid picture of the developments in intellectual his-
tory that ultimately, in the Meiji period, led to the formation of an ideologically 
influenced conception of man in which the Japanese subjects were given divine 
status, regardless of their inferior position in the state. But these events occurred 
only after the developments of the middle of the Edo period, when the theologi-
cal and ideological worldview of pan-Japanese, nationalist Shintô was first 
formed. 
Thus, before the Kokugaku can be discussed, it is first necessary to examine 
Japanese ideas about the founding of the empire and the related concept of the 
emperor. As a descendant of the gods, the emperor secures the identity and the 
continued existence of the empire, and as a descendant of the sun goddess 
Amaterasu, he rules over an empire that is protected by the gods. 
Aside from the aforementioned ancient historical annals, works from the 
early Japanese Middle Ages also functioned as sources for this view. An impor-
tant work in this context is the Jinnô shôtôki (»Chronicles of the Authentic Linea-
ges of the Divine Emperors,« from 1339, expanded in 1343151) written by Kita-
batake Chikafusa. This work dealt with the uniqueness of Japan as the land of the 
gods (shinkoku) and the divine descent of the emperor.152 
Criticizing the mistakes of the old imperial state, Kitabatake advocated the 
creation of a new, better government under which civil and military power 
would again be united in the hands of one ruler, the emperor. At first this work 
had little influence, but it later became a »work of fundamental importance for 
                                                 
150 Hirata Atsutane: Kodô taii, edition: KGS; 10: 1; Hammitzsch 1936: 20ff.; cf. Antoni 1991a: 66. 
151 Jinnô shôtôki, editions: KGS 6.; NKBT 87; cf. Naumann 1994: 47-58; Göbel 1987.  
152 Jinnô shôtôki = KGS 6: 1; Benl, Hammitzsch 1956: 133f., 206, 216, 231, 234ff. 
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the conception of the Japanese nation and for modern nationalism,« (Goch 1981: 
399). 
The Kokugaku emerged as a countermovement to the increasing influence of 
China in Japan. As Peter Nosco (1984) remarks in his study on Masuho Zankô 
(1655-1742), the question of how the Kokugaku emerged as an alternative to Con-
fucianism in the Tokugawa period remains unanswered. Some of the similarities 
between the two schools include an emphasis on classical texts based on the idea 
that they provide a more exact understanding of the values and customs of an-
cient times, and the interpretation of the Japanese classics as a means to finding 
the ancient Japanese way (kodô). Other theories on the emergence of the Ko-
kugaku emphasize a certain »emotionalism« and point to the social climate of the 
late 17th century as the reason for the school’s development, in which emotional-
ity and sensuality sought a different, »Japanese« release rather than puritan, or-
thodox Neo-Confucianism. According to yet another explanation, National 
Learning formed as a countermovement to the then dominant school of intellec-
tual rationalism, celebrating the irrational and placing itself in opposition to the 
idea of a totally rational understanding of the world, which Neo-Confucianism 
claimed to offer. Finally, Nosco offers an explanation that is closely related to the 
previously mentioned theories, and which emphasizes the existence of an ideo-
logical nativism that is deeply rooted in Japanese tradition and developed in 
various ways since the 17th century. 
Represented by its main figures, Kada Azumamaro (1668-1736)153, Kamo Ma-
buchi (1697-1769), Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) and finally Hirata Atsutane 
(1776-1843), over the course of the Edo period, this school developed from a pri-
marily philological and literary school of thought into a conscious, politically an-
tagonistic, ultranationalistic and xenophobic ideology. Buddhism and Confucian-
ism were not only rejected as »non-Japanese« but were actually seen as the very 
cause of Japan’s decline. 
Among the first leaders of the movement, besides Motoori Norinaga, were 
especially his teacher Kamo Mabuchi, as well as his successor Hirata Atsutane, an 
extreme ultranationalist and xenophobe whose writings found a large audience 
in the late Edo period. The following discussion will examine these three figures 
in order to understand, at least in broad terms, the development of the Kokugaku 
from a philological school to the Shintô school of National Learning. 
 
 
                                                 
153 On Kada Azumamaro, cf. Dumoulin (translation) 1940; Nakamura 1984. 
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5. 1. 1. Kamo Mabuchi 
 
Kamo Mabuchi154 came from an established family of Shintô priests that 
served at Kamo Shrine near Kyôto.155 His father served as a priest at Okabe 
Shrine in Hamamatsu. This is especially worthy of note, since the place was home 
to an active intellectual scene at the time. This group focussed on Chinese and 
Japanese literature, and in contrast to the richly decorated temples, around the 
shrines there lived men who held similar views to the Kokugaku scholars of later 
times (cf. Dumoulin 1943 b. 52). Kamo Mabuchi grew up in an environment that 
offered him a comprehensive education in Chinese as well as Japanese thought. 
He was first introduced to Kada Azumamaro, whose student he later became, by 
the shrine priest Sugiura Kuniakira. 
In 1733 he left his second wife and their family, who ran a guest house on the 
Tôkaidô, to pursue his studies in Kyôto. He stayed for three years, during which 
time Mabuchi became a favorite student of Azumamaro (cf. Dumoulin 1943 b: 
63). In 1736 his teacher died, and one year later Mabuchi left for Edo. 
Upon arriving in Edo, he met old friends from his Kokugaku days in Kyôto 
and attempted to analyze difficult passages of Japanese literature with them in 
literary circles. In 1746 he entered the service of Tayasu Munetaka (the son of To-
kugawa Yoshimune), a great admirer of the Manyôshû and a talented poet himself 
(cf. Dumoulin 1943 b: 63). 
During his service he began to study in detail and write a commentary on the 
Manyôshû, partly within his capacity under his employer, but largely due to his 
own interest. He saw this work as the embodiment of the pure Japanese spirit 
that was free of foreign influences and represented the purest expression of an-
cient Japan. In his view, in ancient times the yamato-gokoro, the Japanese spirit, 
still existed. Later eras came under the influence of the karagokoro, meaning Tao-
ism, Confucianism and Buddhism. He blamed these schools in particular for the 
supposed decline of Japan. 
Mabuchi reserved special criticism for Confucianism, the »way of ju.« In his 
work Kokuikô, he examines individual Chinese emperors and dismisses their rule, 
with only a few exceptions. He continually criticizes the change of dynasties, dis-
cussing it on seven occasions in this work alone.156 He sees the lack of a continu-
                                                 
154 On the life and work of Kamo Mabuchi, cf. the works of Heinrich Dumoulin 1939, 1941a and b, 
1943 a and b, 1953, 1955, 1956a and b; see also Suzuki 1986/87. 
155 Cf. Dumoulin 1943b: 41; Dumoulin 1939b; Göbel 1987. 
156 Cf. Kamo Mabuchi: Kokuikô, edition NST 39; Dumoulin 1943b: 118. 
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ally ruling dynasty as the main cause of social unrest and all other turmoil in 
China. The fact that upstarts, and even »barbarians,« came to power and were 
then worshipped as emperors was incomprehensible to him: 
»Then the upstarts of lower standing came, killed the ruler, and when they 
called themselves the emperor, every subject in the land bowed their head, 
obeyed and served him. What’s more, even those who are called barbarians, 
who come from the lands of the four points of the compass, lower people, 
came from their barbaric countries, and when they became emperor of the 
Chinese nation, once again everyone bowed down and obeyed them. Should 
one therefore not call barbarians low and coarse?«157 
Since in Confucianism all non-Chinese were called »barbarians,« this also ap-
plied to the Japanese. And despite this, according to Mabuchi, the Japanese Con-
fucians lowered themselves so far as to call themselves »barbarians,« thus prov-
ing the »disgracefulness« of the Japanese ju scholars. 
Mabuchi generally criticizes the rationalist position of the Chinese scholars, 
who could no longer recognize the clear, simple path due to their obedience to 
reason. One example Mabuchi gives is the use of Chinese characters (he also calls 
China the land of many thousands of characters), which he calls a manifestation 
of complicated Chinese thought. This he contrasts with an intuitive form of un-
derstanding: 
»When, for example, a doctor also knows the Chinese writings well, he can 
only seldom heal his patients. On the other hand, the uncontrived, non-
theoretical medicines of this country, which have been passed down on their 
own (onozukara), are certain to heal sickness, without the need to understand 
any theoretical explanations. It is enough to understand things with one’s 
own heart.«158 
Mabuchi contrasts the supposed complicatedness of the Chinese with the ide-
alized simplicity of the Japanese. This applies to the example of written charac-
ters159 as well as to systems of rule. In China, Mabuchi writes, there is a need to 
separate power from authority. The virtues that are so expressly invoked in 
China already existed in Japan, without needing to be named specifically. The 
naming of virtues and the tendency toward theory can only lead to extremes and 
imbalance. 
                                                 
157 Dumoulin 1943b: 274; cf. 1939b: 170-171; NST 39: 376. 
158 Dumoulin 1943b: 278; cf. 1939b: 173; NST 39: 378. 
159 Dumoulin 1939b: 176f.; NST 39: 380ff. 
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In Mabuchi’s view, Chinese scholarliness was something constructed by hu-
mans, thus making it artificial and foreign to mankind at its core:  
»It forces the heart of heaven and earth and makes it small. It is made by 
man.«160 
Kamo Mabuchi’s attempts to characterize all things Chinese in this way re-
veal an almost missionary quality. They are meant to convert the Japanese away 
from the culture that is foreign and unfitting to them and back toward the origi-
nal Japanese sources. To whomever cannot or will not follow his arguments, he 
proposes the following treatment: 
»The incorrigible should be sent to China so that they can see the country. 
They would feel the same as Urashima no Ko upon returning home.«161 
 
5. 1. 2. Motoori Norinaga 
 
Motoori Norinaga162 was one of the leading figures in National Learning dur-
ing the Edo period. The Kokugaku and the doctrine of Restauration Shintô 
(Fukko Shintô) that resulted from it attempted to illuminate an original form of 
Shintô in ancient Japan – a time when the foreign teachings of Buddhism, Confu-
cianism and Taoism had not yet been introduced to the country. The scholars of 
this deeply nativist school believed that foreign ideologies distorted and cor-
rupted the true meaning of Shintô. Especially in its later phase, the movement of 
Fukko Shintô turned violently against Buddhism and Chinese thought and advo-
cated a return to the kodô (»the ancient way«) – an idealistically exaggerated, pre-
Buddhist Japan that was seen as a golden age. Norinaga in particular attempted, 
through his philologically exact, source-critical research, not only to clarify the 
literary tradition, but also the political institutions and the ancient Japanese relig-
ion, and thus to reach an understanding of what he regarded to be the true spirit 
of ancient Japan. 
Norinaga, who was born near Ise Shrine, emphasized the absolute superiority 
of the sun goddess Amaterasu ômikami, the main deity of the Inner Shrine of Ise 
(Naikû), over all other indigenous gods, as the core of his programmatic writings. 
                                                 
160 Dumoulin 1943b: 128; 1939b: 165f.; NST 39: 374. 
161 Dumoulin 1943b: 275; 1939b: 171; NST 39: 374. 
162 On Motoori Norinaga, cf. Brownlee 1988; Allessandro 1964; Dumoulin 1939a; Hino 1983; Ma-
tsumoto 1970; Motoori Norinaga: Kojikiden, (MNZ), Tôkyô, 1919-27; Nishimura 1987 and 1991; 
Satô-Diesner 1977; Stolte 1939, Wehmeyer 1997, among others.  
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Since the emperor was believed to be a direct descendant of the sun goddess 
Amaterasu, Motoori claimed that the emperor shared her divinity and was thus 
worthy of being worshipped by the entire nation as the highest religious symbol. 
Motoori Norinaga was born in 1730 in Matsuzaka, in the province of Ise. His 
family ran a cotton business there, but he was not interested in entering this pro-
fession. For this reason, he went to Kyôto in 1752 to continue his education. After 
studying Chu Hsi Confucianism (shushigaku), which was the dominant school of 
the time, as well as medicine, he began to work as a doctor in his home town. His 
interest in the Japanese classics finally led him to the works of Kamo Mabuchi, 
and two years after meeting him, Motoori Norinaga became his student. With 
Mabuchi’s help he began his enormous commentary on the Kojiki (Kojikiden) in 
1764, comprising 48 volumes in all, which he completed three years before his 
death, and later became famous. Norinaga spent the following ten years of his life 
as a personal physician to Tokugawa Harusada, the Daimyô of Kii. However, this 
position did not prevent him from continuing his studies and teaching. 
One detail in particular is worth mentioning here: although Motoori belonged 
to the lowest class in Tokugawa society, he was able to overcome this hurdle. To 
a certain extent, this fact explains the unusual mix of his students in his later life. 
They were a varied group of merchants, farmers, noblemen, as well as Buddhist 
and Shintô priests, thus representing many different classes of society. Further-
more, representatives of nearly every religion in Japan were included (cf. Earl 
1964 (1981): 69). These two aspects surely offer an explanation for the wide appeal 
and spread of Motoori Norinaga’s teachings. 
 
5. 1. 2. 1. Naobi no mitama 
 
One significant work in Motoori Norinaga’s large oeuvre is a text from 1771, 
Naobi no mitama (»The spirit of Renewal«), which the »universally educated early 
nationalist and reviver of Japanese antiquity« (W. Naumann 1997: 204) wrote as 
the conclusion to the first book of the Kojikiden.163 Despite its brevity, it is consid-
ered one of the main works of political and theological theory in the late To-
kugawa period and is perhaps the clearest example of Norinaga’s thought (cf. 
Earl 1964 (1981): 73). 
This work of commentary is based on the Kojiki. The events described in the 
Kojiki are seen as historical facts and are not subjected to any critical examination, 
but rather, Norinaga offers his own commentary. It is clear that his arguments are 
                                                 
163 Cf. Naobi no mitama, MNZ 9-12; for translations and commentaries cf. Stolte 1939; Nishimura 
1991; Wehmeyer 1997; Antoni 2012a: 426-429. 
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intended as a legitimation of the uniqueness of Japan and the Japanese. Based on 
the special role of the emperor as a successor and representative of the sun god-
dess Amaterasu, the author regards the age of the kami as a concrete model for 
reorganizing Japan. At that time, he writes, the empire was in an ideal condition. 
The evil in this world is solely due to the negative influence of China and Korea 
in Japan. 
The first chapters of Naobi no mitama deal with the myth of the creation of Ja-
pan, the emperor and the kannagara no michi, the »way of the gods« (Shintô), as 
portrayed in the Kojiki. Norinaga makes the categorical argument that »The Impe-
rial Country [Japan] is the land of the birth of the awesome goddess Ama-terasu-
ô-mi-kami, ancestor of the gods (kamu mi-oya).«164 Following this, Norinaga 
claims that it was Amaterasu’s intention that the throne of the successor of the 
heavenly sun should be as unshakable as heaven and earth (l.c.). He writes that 
the unbroken lineage of the ruling house is the defining characteristic elevating 
Japan above all other countries, and that especially in comparison to China, Ja-
pan’s special characteristics shine. These theories made a lasting impression on 
the core theological and ideological tenets of the Kokugaku. 
In foreign countries (adashi kuni), which means in particular China, Motoori 
writes, there is no one ruling family, since China is not the country of Amaterasu 
ômikami.165 Anyone who is powerful enough to take over the government can 
rule the country. Since these rulers would even violate their own way of the 
»sages« (shen-jen) in order to rule, their teachings are nothing more than »a 
stratagem to draw and pacify the people«.166 These rulers can by no means be 
compared to the Japanese emperors or kami of the «Age of the Gods«, since these 
are legitimated for all time by their direct descent from the sun goddess 
Amaterasu. In China, such a line of descent does not exist. Therefore, there can be 
no direct path comparable to the kamunagara (kannagara) in Japan, which the Ni-
honshoki described as »to follow the Way of the Gods, or again to possess in one-
self the Way of the Gods.«167 Motoori Norinaga sees the Chinese emphasis on the 
existence of a way as merely an illusion aimed at winning over the people and 
gaining power. By contrast, Japan has a true way that, due to its evidence, does 
not need to be constantly emphasized. In earlier times, he writes, there were no 
normative rules of behavior, since they were not needed. Virtues existed a priori. 
Only in later times were they overlaid and replaced by foreign influences. 
                                                 
164 Naobi no mitama (MNZ 9): 49; Wehmeyer 1997: 213 (cf. Stolte 1939: 193) 
165 Naobi no mitama (MNZ 9): 50; Wehmeyer 1997:  216 (cf. Stolte 1939: 195). 
166 Naobi no mitama (MNZ 9): 52; Wehmeyer 1997:  218 (cf. Stolte 1939: 197). 
167 Naobi no mitama (MNZ 9): 53; Wehmeyer 1997:  229 (cf. Stolte 1939: 204). 
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Motoori Norinaga continually refers to the lineage of the emperor, whose 
right to divine rule was granted directly by the heavenly ancestors who created 
the empire.168 This is the first time he makes the conclusion that the emperor him-
self is a god, due to his direct lineage. Therefore, the true way is to worship him 
as a god (cf. Beasley 1972: 144). 
The fact that the Naobi no mitama was a part of Norinaga’s masterwork Koji-
kiden, shows the central role that fell to the Kojiki in his thinking. Of particular 
importance in this context was the Japanese language, in contrast to Chinese and 
the Kanji writing system. Therfore it seems appropriate to focus on Norniaga’s 
Kojiki studies in the following sections of this study. 
 
5. 1. 2. 2. Norinaga’s Kojiki studies 
 
The importance of reconstructing the allegedly archaic kun-reading of the Ko-
jiki text in Motoori Norinaga’s monumental work Kojikiden, in which he declared 
the Chinese characters constituting the text as actually being absolutely unimpor-
tant for its real meaning, became a topic for recent academic research.169 As Nori-
naga stated, the Chinese »characters themselves are makeshift items which were 
simply attached to the text; what possible sort of deep reality could they repre-
sent?«170 Ann Wehmeyer (1997: 10) points out in this context that in Norinaga’s 
understanding, the Chinese characters were nothing more than »ornamentation,« 
attached to the text by its compiler, Ô no Yasumaro. 
With this statement we reach a pivotal problem, in philological as well as 
ideological terms. At its center stands the question, if there really existed an ar-
chaic narrative, which we can call the Kojiki, or if this narrative was a mere (re-) 
construction of later times, created by philologists following in the legacy of Mo-
toori Norinaga. Norinaga’s work stands in accordance with a beginning anti-
Chinese ideological paradigm. Creating a purely »Japanese« text of the Kojiki, 
without any hint to its Chinese implications, would fit exactly into such a matrix, 
which itself exists since the works of Motoori Norinaga and his fundamental cri-
tique of the »Chinese way of thinking,« karagokoro. 
 
                                                 
168 Naobi no mitama (MNZ 9): 56; Wehmeyer 1997:  225 (cf. Stolte 1939: 202). 
169 Cf. Wehmeyer 1997: passim; Antoni 2011, 2012b. 
170 Kojikiden 1 (MNZ 9, 1976), cf. Wehmeyer 1997: 145. Wehmeyer (1997: 14, n. 29) points to a study 
of Kobayashi Yoshinori (»The Kun Readings of the Kojiki« (in: Acta Asiatica, vol. 46, 1983)) in the 
context of kun reading of the Kojiki. 
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5. 1. 2. 2. 1. Excursus: on the textuality of the Kojiki 
 
In contrast to the Nihonshoki, the Kojiki itself provides material on the forma-
tion of the text, being absolutely invaluable for historical research.171 This infor-
mation is given in the »Foreword« by the Kojiki’s compiler, Ô no Yasumaro. His 
personal existence was finally proven by the accidental discovery of his grave on 
January 20th, 1979, which verified the Shoku Nihongi’s record on his death in the 
year 723.172 We may therefore regard Ô no Yasumaro as a historical figure and 
thus his »Foreword« as a trustworthy source173  as well. 
In his Foreword, the author, or compiler of the text, informs the reader about 
his difficulties in writing down the narrative. As is well known, Tenmu-tennô 
(631-686 A.D.) had already ordered a certain person, whether male or female is 
still debated, of the Hieda-uji clan, with the personal name of Are, to »learn,« or 
»memorize« the old traditions, because they were in danger of getting lost or in-
terpreted »wrongly« (cf. NKBT 1: 46/47). The text states (following Chamber-
lain’s translation):  
»He was twenty-eight years old, and of so intelligent a disposition that he 
could repeat with his mouth whatever met his eyes, and record in his heart 
whatever struck his ears. Forthwith Are was commanded to learn by heart 
the genealogies of the emperors, and likewise the words of former ages.«  
But it was not before the days of Empress Genmei (661-721 A.D.) that Hieda 
no Are’s record was actually written down. Yasumaro states that the Empress 
»commanded me Yasumaro to select and record the old words learnt by heart by 
Hiyeda no Are according to the Imperial Decree, and dutifully to lift them up to 
Her.« 
Since Hirata Atsutane’s (see below), and later Yanagita Kunio’s speculations, 
the gender of Hieda no Are had been a matter of dispute. In his essay on »Kojiki 
as Literature,« Donald Keene (1983: 104ff.) discusses this point at length, giving 
some arguments that regard Hieda no Are as a woman, probably an early sha-
man in the tradition of the sarume ancestress. Keene mentions Saigô Nobutsuna’s 
interpretation that »Are’s learning did not consist of reading the manuscripts but 
                                                 
171 The Nihonshoki just mentions under the date of Tenmu 29/3/16 a command to »writing a 
chronicle of the Emperors, and also of matters of high antiquity.« But Aston (1975: 350, n. 2) inter-
prets this as the command which »led ultimately to the compilation of the Kojiki,« not the Nihon-
shoki. 
172 Cf. the report on »O no Yasumaro« in: MN, vol. 34/2, Summer 1979: 257. 
173 For a discussion of this topic cf. Lurie 2011: 406, n. 5.15. 
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of reciting them with the proper intonation so as to retain their magical proper-
ties.« 174 Although there is no final proof for the question of Hieda no Are’s gen-
der, we arrive at the problem of Are’s »learning« at a crucial point in understand-
ing the textuality of the Kojiki itself. As Keene (1983: 107) again mentions in this 
context, »the preface to the Kojiki by Ô no Yasumaro is almost ostentatious in its 
fluent use of Chinese rhetoric.« We know, for example, that even parts of the 
command by Emperor Tenmu, cited in the Foreword, were literally taken from a 
Tang document, dating from the year 653 and citing originally a command of the 
Chinese emperor Tai Zong.175 Rendering such a wholly Chinese text in an alleg-
edly archaic »pure Japanese« form comes close to the absurd. As Keene (1983: 
107, n. 25) points out, this is proof »(if proof were needed) that it is possible to 
translate almost any Chinese text into ancient Japanese.« 
So, the main question remains: what did Hieda no Are actually »learn«? As 
Yasumaro cites the command of emperor Tenmu,176 there obviously did exist 
written documents as sources, which are described as teiki (»Imperial Chroni-
cles«), and honji (»Fundamental Dicta«), apparently interchangeable with kuji 
(»Old Matters«), which were also mentioned.177 Robert Ellwood (1973: 498) leaves 
this question open when declaring: »These chronicles of the imperial line and na-
tional events are lost, or were never other than oral tradition.« If we look at the 
actual text of the Foreword, it remains unclear whether Hieda no Are has simply 
learned and memorized those texts, which of course must have been written in 
Chinese characters too, or if he/she, as the female shaman theory says, chanted 
magical words coming from the oral tradition of the remote past. Yasumaro de-
scribes the enormous problems he faced when writing down Hieda no Are’s re-
cital,178 and decided not to produce an ordinary text in Chinese, despite being 
                                                 
174 Keene 1983: 105. 
175 Brownlee 1991:10. 
176 »Hereupon the Heavenly Sovereign commanded, saying: ‘I hear that the chronicles of the em-
perors and likewise the original words in the possession of the various families deviate from exact 
truth, and are mostly amplified by empty falsehoods. If at the present time these imperfections be 
not amended, ere many years shall have elapsed, the purport of this, the great basis of the coun-
try, the grand foundation of the monarchy, will be destroyed. So now I desire to have the chroni-
cles of the emperors selected and recorded, and the old words examined and ascertained, false-
hoods being erased and the truth determined, in order to transmit [the latter] to after 
ages.’« (Chamberlain 1883 (1982): 3, 4). 
177 Philippi 1968: 41, cf. Keene 1983: 103, n. 9. 
178 »In reverent obedience to the contents of the Decree, I have made a careful choice. But in high 
antiquity both speech and thought were so simple, that it would be difficult to arrange phrases 
and compose periods in the characters. To relate everything in an ideographic transcription 
would entail an inadequate expression of the meaning; to write altogether according to the pho-
netic method would make the story of events unduly lengthy. For this reason have I sometimes in 
the same sentence used the phonetic and ideographic systems conjointly, and have sometimes in 
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very well versed in this style of writing, as his Foreword proves, but to instead 
use a mixed form of phonetic and semantic usage of Chinese characters.179 So, fi-
nally it remains unclear up to this very day if the Kojiki text is mainly based on 
earlier written sources, which would have been previously laid down in Chinese, 
and were »learned« by Hieda no Are, or based on oral tradition, simply having 
been »memorized« by him or her, probably with the aid of those sources. On the 
basis of available source material this question can no longer be solved. But we 
can realize that this very problem marks the starting point for the controversy in 
modern times around the Kojiki as the allegedly first Japanese holy scripture. 
 
5. 1. 2. 2. 2. Reading the Kojiki: Motoori Norinaga 
 
As is very well known, the question of language marks Motoori Norinaga’s 
intellectual focus interpreting the Kojiki more than a thousand years after it was 
written down. During the Heian and medieval periods, it was the Nihonshoki that 
had served as the authoritative source for the Japanese past. This work matched 
the expectations of the times much better by presenting an imperial history of an 
adequate standard by comparison to official Chinese sources. The Nihonshoki was 
completely written in Chinese, in contrast to the Kojiki’s mixed style, which had 
become quite unreadable even shortly after its compilation. It was the Edo period 
nativists, starting with Kada no Azumamaro (1706-1751) and Kamo no Mabuchi 
(1697-1769),180 who (re-) discovered the forgotten predecessor of the Nihonshoki in 
accordance with their project of founding a genuinely national philology. It was 
Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) who finally devoted himself to this work, the Ko-
jiki. At the center of his scholarship stands his monumental work on the Kojiki, the 
Kojikiden. As already pointed out, Norinaga had adopted philological methods 
from Confucianism in spite of his fundamental critique of Chinese thinking 
(karagokoro). Therefore, Confucianism may bear indirect responsibility for the ap-
pearance of the nativist national learning schools, since the concept of an ideal-
ized past is common to all schools of Confucianism. The Confucian philosopher 
Ogyû Sorai (1666-1728) and the »Classical School« (kogaku) of Edo Confucianism 
in particular had a deep impact on nativist thinking. Referring to the works of 
                                                                                                                                                  
one matter used the ideographic record exclusively. Moreover where the drift of the words was 
obscure, I have by comments elucidated their signification; but need it be said that I have nowhere 
commented on what was easy?« (Chamberlain 1883 (1982): 5). 
179 For a discussion of the language of the Kojiki cf. Lurie 2011: 225-250. 
180 Years before Motoori Norinaga’s work Kojikiden, Kamo Mabuchi had presented studies on the 
Kojiki, for example his Kojiki kashiragaki (1757; cf. Nosco 1990: 122). Philippi in the introduction to 
his translation discusses the history of manuscripts and textual criticism of the Kojiki (Philippi 
1968: 30- 33).  
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Maruyama Masao, J. Victor Koschmann points out that »Ogyû Sorai’s rejection of 
Sung neo-Confucianism in favor of a fundamentalist insistence on direct readings 
of the Chinese classics was extended by the eighteenth-century nativists like Mo-
toori Norinaga to a renewed interest in Japanese mythohistories, particularly the 
Kojiki (Record of ancient matters)«.181 Ann Wehmeyer states in regard to Nori-
naga’s borrowing from Ogyû Sorai:  
»Motoori appears to have written down Ogyû’s theories and studied them… 
In his view, the ‘words’ represented the actual ‘facts’ of the way of the Sages. 
The same notion that facts or events (kotogara) may be revealed through lan-
guage (kotoba) is stated.«182  
In general, nativist thinking was highly motivated by the conviction that »his-
torical ‘fact’ may be revealed through the archaic ‘word,’«183 as Norinaga’s axio-
matic conviction of the Chinese characters of the Kojiki as nothing more than »or-
namentations« to archaic words definitely states. Only the Japanese words con-
tain truth, not the Chinese characters. And only by declaring the Kojiki as a whole 
to be a purely Japanese narrative can this truth of the words may be revealed. 
Norinaga mentions in the first book of his Kojikiden that »… in the Kojiki 
meaning, event, and word are in accord with one another, and what is repre-
sented there is the true nature of ancient age.«184 So he comes to the only conse-
quent solution in his eyes when declaring: »I have determined, therefore, that in 
the Kojiki, we have the best work among the ancient works, and that the Nihon-
shoki should be placed secondary in importance after the Kojiki.«185 From his 
comments it becomes apparent that his kun-readings of the Kojiki script should 
not be taken too literally, since Norinaga does not try to find a correct »reading« 
for the Chinese characters of the text, but more or less intuitively seeks an archaic 
wording adequate to the script: 
»…Therefore, if one is to read the text in ancient Japanese which is true to 
form and meaning, the only choice is not to stick too literally to the style and 
the characters, but rather to assign a reading based on the language of the Ko-
                                                 
181 Koschmann 1987: 39. 
182 Wehmeyer 1997: 3; unfortunately there are many misprints in Wehmeyer’s text, so on p. 3, 
where she confuses the year 1751 with 1851 three times. 
183 Wehmeyer 1997: 8. 
184 Kojikiden 1 (MNZ 9, 1976), cf. Wehmeyer 1997: 22. 
185 Kojikiden 1 (MNZ 9, 1976), cf. Wehmeyer 1997: 24. 
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jiki and the Manyôshû after one has thought carefully about the general sense 
of the passage as a whole.«186 
But even Norinaga cannot manipulate the textual facts completely and has to 
admit that »all of the sentences of the Kojiki are written in the style of classical 
Chinese.«187 His solution for this obvious problem seems quite an elegant and 
lofty one. He simply declares that »the compiler [Ô no Yasumaro] did not direct 
much attention to classical Chinese,«188 which is a remarkable argument when 
taking into account the fact that Ô no Yasumaro’s foreword was coined after Chi-
nese models, as we have seen above. Norinaga speculates about Yasumaro’s in-
tentions, remarking »… we can see that his true desire must have been to write it 
all down in syllabic script.«189 On Hieda no Are’s memory, Norinaga declares: 
»The Emperor [then] commanded directly a person named Hieda no Are to recite 
the Sumera-mikoto no hitsugi [The Imperial Sun Lineage] and the Saki no yo no 
furukoto and commit them to memory…«190 Consequently, Norinaga states on 
the textual body written down by Yasumaro: »… the reason why he is to record 
the Kuji which Are recited by imperial command is because the language of an-
tiquity was viewed as essential.«191 
Here we have found the link between Norinaga the ideologist and Norinaga 
the philologist. He nearly shouts out when giving advice to the reader of the Ko-
jiki: »… read the text seeking the pure language of antiquity, without any con-
tamination by the Chinese style«!192 This is the Norinaga we know from his 
karagokoro pamphlets, and here lies his motivation to declare the Kojiki a text of 
purely Japanese origin and language. Norinaga elsewhere elucidates his concept 
of mono no aware and the intuitive character of Japanese understanding of the 
world. So we are not astonished when finally reading his advice for a correct un-
derstanding of the Kojiki’s language - in the sense of an archaic Japanese narrative 
- when he declares: »… one must determine the teniwoha through intuition.«193 
This is the very core and main essence of Norinaga’s teaching about the Kojiki: 
the real facts are hidden in the words, and the ancient words can in the last con-
sequence only be grasped by intuition. This clearly reveals that the kun-readings 
                                                 
186 Kojikiden 1 (MNZ 9, 1976), cf. Wehmeyer 1997: 48. 
187 Kojikiden 1 (MNZ 9, 1976), cf. Wehmeyer 1997: 75. 
188 Kojikiden 1 (MNZ 9, 1976), cf. Wehmeyer 1997: 79. 
189 Kojikiden 1 (MNZ 9, 1976), cf. Wehmeyer 1997: 80. 
190 Kojikiden 1 (MNZ 9, 1976), cf. Wehmeyer 1997: 141. 
191 Kojikiden 1 (MNZ 9, 1976), cf. Wehmeyer 1997: 141, 142. 
192 Kojikiden 1 (MNZ 9, 1976), cf. Wehmeyer 1997: 145. 
193 Kojikiden 1 (MNZ 9, 1976), cf. Wehmeyer 1997: 156. 
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of the Kojiki are not meant as philologically and historically correct readings of 
the eighth century Kanji text corpus, but more as a kind of separate, nearly inde-
pendent narrative, running parallel to the existing body of the text. And this 
separate kun-narrative rests mainly on the intuitive speculations of philologists 
who pretend to know the ancient words. The historian Kônoshi Takamitsu (2000) 
too sees the core of Motoori Norinaga’s thinking in »what he saw as the exclusive 
purity of primeval Japan, most particularly in the ‘ancient words’ (furukoto) that 
had been spoken by the Japanese. This position required the expunging of all 
elements of the Chinese language, including the obfuscating veil of written char-
acters and literary conventions.«194 »Language becomes the basis for canonizing 
the Kojiki…« The world Norinaga envisions is the world of sumera mikuni (»land 
of the emperor«), »it is a world identified by allegiance to the emperor and by op-
posing to outside lands, most specifically China.«195 
 
5. 1. 2. 2. 3. Motoori Norinaga and the Kojiki as kotodama 
 
In Norinaga’s view the reconstruction of the spoken language of antiquity in 
its last consequence represents the most important, even the only means of access 
to the thought of the days of archaic, i.e. »authentic«, Japan, which could serve 
also as a model for the future. In the Kojiki, which in his view had originally been 
based on the oral report of the mentioned Hieda no Are, he saw a means for di-
rect access to the authentic language of antiquity. This also included the hope of 
bringing back to life the spirit of ancient times itself through the words of the old 
language. This is a concept that influenced the entire movement of romanticism 
in Europe too, although no connection between the Japanese and European 
spheres has been proven. 
To Norinaga the story of creation and the myths of the Kojiki were the expres-
sion of an inner connection between the ancient Japanese people and the deities 
of indigenous mythology, of which they could intuitively become aware with a 
»pure« and »true heart« (magokoro), and which still resonated deeply. In the lan-
guage of antiquity he saw the direct and concrete expression of this specifically 
Japanese spirit. For him, as well as for other leaders of the Kokugaku, the recon-
struction of the old Japanese language of the ancient sources, including especially 
the Man’yôshû in addition to the Kojiki, offered a direct means to accessing the 
                                                 
194 Kônoshi 2000: 62. 
195 Kônoshi 2000: 64.  
                                             CHAPTER II: THE EDO PERIOD  n  141 
 
language and »soul« of ancient times, that is the Age of the Gods itself. Here a 
very ancient concept, that of the »word soul« (kotodama), becomes visible.196  
Norinaga’s understanding of the ancient Japanese language expresses all as-
pects of the concept of kotodama, even if the term itself seems to be rarely men-
tioned in his writings. But like his teacher Kamo Mabuchi, Norinaga, too, refers 
directly to the kotodama or kotoage verses of the Man’yôshû in his work, namely in 
his introductory essay to the Kojikiden, the already discussed Naobi no Mitama (cf. 
Stolte 1939: 195, note 8). Thereby the importance of this aspect for Norinaga’s un-
derstanding of the Kojiki is shown. David Pollack (1986: 49) emphasizes the gen-
eral importance of the concept of kotodama in Motoori Norinaga’s work. And 
Mark Morris197 remarks:  
»Hence the centrality of kotodama, ‘word power’, to Norinaga’s utopic rewrit-
ing-in-unwriting of the Kojiki: ‘because there was no separation between the 
words (koto) and the things (koto) they named, to utter the word was to give 
rise to the reality itself’«. 
In Norinaga’s Kojikiden, the language of the Age of the Gods itself appears as 
the mystical core of Japanese identity. Without going into detail on this topic 
here, the following thought is worth considering: In light of Norinaga’s linguistic 
and mystical tendencies, which are evident throughout the Kojikiden, is it possible 
to state that his obsessive involvement with the Kojiki and its language could be 
understood and explained by the concept of kotodama itself? Norinaga’s stated 
goal was to use the linguistic reconstruction of the Kojiki to reawaken the ancient 
divine spirit contained in it. Thus, it does not appear out of line to see this as the 
actual motivation of his work. After Norinaga’s philological work had stripped 
the Kojiki of its »foreign«, i.e. Chinese aspects, contained in the Kanji, the original, 
that is Japanese, words could be »set free«. These words of the Age of the Gods 
however were thought to contain magical powers, as we now know from the 
teachings of kotodama, based on an ontological and semiotic identity of the signi-
                                                 
196 The idea of the »word soul« is considered an important mental and spiritual concept of Japa-
nese antiquity. It is based on a concept originating in sympathetic magic, according to which no 
essential difference exists between a thing and its naming. Semiotically spoken there is an identity 
of signifier and signified. In Japan this idea expresses itself in the compound term of kotodama, 
consisting of the two words koto and tama. Tama means »soul«, while koto has the dual meaning of 
»word« and »thing«. Usually this term is translated as »word soul«. Historically the earliest refer-
ence to this concept is found in songs of the lyric collection Manyôshû from the eighth century in 
which Japan is called a country of kotodama. Almost forgotten in the Japanese Middle Ages, this 
idea became a sort of conceptual general key to the national philology of the Edo period (1600-
1868) and the kokutai-nationalism of the modern age to postulate basic specific features of Japan 
and its language, seemingly originating in high antiquity and the Age of the Gods. See also An-
toni 2012b.  
197 Mark Morris in his review of Pollack 1986 (JJS, vol 15/1: 283).  
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fier and signified. With the ancient language the corresponding reality could also 
be brought back into being. 
Against this background Norinaga’s academic duality as philologist and 
Shintô theologian, which is otherwise often puzzling, becomes surprisingly un-
derstandable in my view: the reconstruction of the ancient »words« (koto) would 
lead to an evocation of the corresponding identical »thing« (koto), that is the con-
ditions of antiquity. This means that a historical text such as the Kojiki could be-
come a religious »holy text« through the linguistic ‚archeological’ work of phi-
lologists. The qualitative transformation of the text from a profane document into 
a sacred, even magical, reality would be perfect. These interpretations cannot yet 
be proven beyond doubt, since clear textual references remain to be found in 
Norinaga’s work. But the kotodama approach appears to offer a plausible hy-
pothesis as to why Norinaga sought to reconstruct the authentic Japanese lan-
guage of the work with such obsession through decades of work. In this way the 
ancient deities would directly come back into the world, as the word and the 
thing are identical. And this was without a doubt the intention of Norinaga’s 
theological – and political! - program. The Kojiki, as the supposedly authentic his-
tory of the gods and ancient emperors, would be a medium for the evocation of 
these higher beings of antiquity, and thus truly a »holy work« for the new con-
cept of Shintô as a national religion propagated by Norinaga. In this way the lin-
guistic reconstruction of the Kojiki could truly be understood as a kind of magical 
act, which could be used to transfer not only the words, but also the entire reality 
of ancient times to the present. 
 
 
5. 1. 2. 2. 4. Patterns of ideology 
 
The already mentioned scholar Kônoshi Takamitsu stresses the importance of 
Motoori Norinaga’s Kojiki studies for the emergence of the modern nation state in 
Japan. »But it would be a mistake,« he points out, »to see Norinaga’s opinions as 
the basis for the canonization of the Kojiki in the modern period. Instead, it was 
the modern’s state’s need for a national canon that caused it to discover Nori-
naga.«198 
As is well known in the history of the modern world, the idea of the nation 
state puts high value on the question of a particular national language. In this 
context, Kônoshi quotes Ueda Kazutoshi’s famous lecture dating from 1894, Ko-
                                                 
198 Kônoshi 2000: 64. 
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kugo to Kokka to (»National Language and the Nation«), »which stated that the na-
tion-state needs to be founded on a common language.«199 This, by the way, is a 
position very well known from the writings of the Romantic School, especially in 
Germany. 
Let us quote Kônoshi again, who puts this whole process in a nutshell: 
»It was in this context that the wabun (vernacular)-centered corpus of Japa-
nese ‘classics’ was constructed and that the Kojiki assumed a privileged status 
over the Nihonshoki as a national classic and as the repository of the oldest 
and most ancient folk tradition«.200 
In a parallel process, the Manyôshû was canonized as a »national poetry an-
thology.«201 Kônoshi elucidates the idea of the kokutai (see below) and the impor-
tance of Amaterasu’s »Divine Mandate« (shinchoku)202 in this context, but cannot 
provide the answer to an intriguing detail problem: why is the crucial decree for 
eternal rule over the land of Japan to be found in the Nihonshoki only, and not in 
the Kojiki? Both texts together build up the modern Japanese canon of idealized 
antiquity. But it was the Kojiki that, since the historic »decision« of Motoori Nori-
naga, was regarded first in rank among these twins.203 
 
5. 1. 2. 2. 5. Kojiki – the Holy Book of (modern) Shintô? 
 
Let us finally turn to the most difficult problem within this context: Must the 
Kojiki be regarded as a, or even the, »Holy Book of Shintô«? This question de-
serves a full-scale study on its own, so only a few arguments can be discussed 
here. 
Marco Frenschkowski (2007: 33) states that holy texts frequently are the oldest 
written sources we know from a certain culture. And in the preface to another 
study on understanding »texts as sources« in comparative religious history, its 
author, Kurt Rudolph (1988), discusses at length the methodology of research on 
holy texts of world religions. He points out that in many cases holy scriptures are 
based on earlier, orally transmitted narratives.204 A central point in his argumen-
                                                 
199 Kônoshi 2000: 64. 
200 Kônoshi 2000: 65. 
201 Cf. in this context the highly valuable study of Shinada Yoshikazu in the same volume (Shirane 
2000) as Kônoshi’s essay: »Man’yôshû: The Invention of a National Poetry Anthology« (Shinada 
2000).  
202 Kônoshi 2000: 66. 
203 On reading the Kojiki see alsoKônoshi Takamitsu’s more recent book on this subject (Kônoshi 
2007).  
204 Rudolph 1988: 44. 
144  n  KOKUTAI - POLITICAL SHINTÔ FROM EARLY-MODERN TO CONTEMPORARY JAPAN   
 
tation is, as he says, the »old struggle« between the two antagonistic methods, 
that of literary studies and that of religious histories studies’ approaches has dia-
lectally faded away, giving room to work done in concert.205 This is true for Kojiki 
studies as well. In his essay on »The Kojiki as Literature,« Donald Keene (1983) 
makes some extraordinary remarks on the religious functions of the Kojiki in 
modern times: 
»The Kojiki is of great importance in the history of Japanese culture not only 
because of its antiquity but because it has served, especially since the eight-
eenth century, as the sacred book of the Shinto religion, and because it is our 
best source of information about the beliefs of the Japanese at the dawn of 
their civilization.«206 
Isomae Jun’ichi, in his study on Motoori Norinaga and the creation myths of 
the Kojiki and the Nihonshoki, points to the progress of publishing technology dur-
ing the early Edo period in this respect207 and adds a new and fascinating aspect 
to the discussion, arguing that the Nihonshoki had articulated the world views of 
the ruling classes, whilst Motoori Norinaga’s Kojiki stood in accordance with the 
ordinary folk’s view of the world. 
The Chinese style of the Nihonshoki was the symbol of the Chinese education-
lism of the ruling classes represented by Confucian studies. Moreover, classi-
cal Chinese was not conducive to the emotional expression that Norinaga de-
sired. By designating the Kojiki as the essential tradition of Japan, Norinaga 
denied the cultural traditions of the ruling classes who comprised the con-
stituency of the Nihonshoki as historically extraneous. In doing so, he suc-
ceeded in asserting the legitimacy of his own worldview.208 
With this argumentation, the Kojiki becomes a mere product of an individual, 
Motoori Norinaga’s, interpretation of the »original past,« based on his concept of 
mono no aware and the culture of the non-ruling classes.209 Isomae, by pointing out 
                                                 
205 Rudolph 1988: 50. 
206 Keene 1983: 99. 
207 »It was the publishing technology created in the Kan’ei period (1624-1644) that effectively 
linked the myths and the people of the non-ruling classes. [...] Together with the establishment of 
book lenders (kashihon’ya 貸本屋), the large-scale production of written texts made it possible for 
anyone to take the Kojiki or Nihonshoki in his own hands and read it. [...] Even if an individual did 
not belong to a particular group such as the court or a Shinto religious association, he could freely 
read the Kojiki or Nihonshoki and their commentaries.« (Isomae 2000: 29). 
208 Isomae 2000: 33. 
209 Isomae 2000: 32. 
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»the contemporaneity« of interpretation of texts, therefore questions the inter-
preter’s general »search for an original past.« 210 
In any case, we may conclude that there would be no Kojiki as a sacred book 
for Shintô in general or for the non-ruling classes since the Edo period in particu-
lar, without the philological, and religiously motivated ideological work of Mo-
toori Norinaga. His main motivation clearly can be seen in his rejection of every-
thing Chinese, his fundamental and more and more fanatic hatred of the 
karagokoro. As it was true for the German Romanticists of the same age, astonish-
ingly without any visible relationship between the two intellectual worlds, in the 
center of this nativist project stood the concept of the national language. Motoori 
found his archaic and »pure« Japanese in the narrative of the Kojiki, and he made 
this the base of a whole worldview. State Shintô of the Meiji and early Shôwa pe-
riods as well as Imperial Shintô up to this very day could never have existed if 
Norinaga had not declaared the Kojiki the central text and narrative of the Japa-
nese canon.  
Later critical research since the end of the nineteenth century, i.e. the days of 
Chamberlain, Aston and Florenz, as well as Tsuda Sôkichi,211 had already and 
unmistakably pointed to the historical facts. So the story of the Kojiki as a holy 
text is not just the story of religious content, as our best »source of information 
about the beliefs of the Japanese at the dawn of their civilization,« as Donald 
Keene holds it, but is much more the story of a text, its construction, interpreta-
tion, reception and translation. Textual critique has to stand at the beginning of 
our research, and without such a critical approach, we are condemned just to be-
lieve, what others have written down. Whether the Kojiki should be regarded 
from this point of view as a kind of »invented tradition« or a product of »tradi-
tionalims« (see below) is an extremely complicated topic, since the text itself is, 
without any question, a very old one.  
But it is also true that the Kojiki’s impact on the Japanese society is limited to 
the epochs since the early modern era; and it was none other than Motoori Nori-
naga who opened this way and therefore made the »modern Shintô« of Meiji 
times and later thinkable and historically possible. 
 
                                                 
210 Isomae 2000: 34. 
211 Cf. Tsuda 1967. On the general importance of early translators and Tsuda Sôkichi cf. Naumann 
1996: 18ff. 
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5. 1. 3. Hirata Atsutane 
 
These were the core tenets of the Kokugaku, or Fukko Shintô, which were 
later applied in practical political terms during the Meiji period, and which had a 
lasting influence on the ideological development of Japan up until its defeat in 
1945. But our analysis would not be complete without mentioning a further 
scholar and ideologue in the context, whose school became exteremly important 
in implementing the nativist thought in modern Shintô: Hirata Atsutane (1776-
1843). 
Hirata Atsutane,212 the last of the great kokugakusha of the Edo period, was 
born on October 7, 1776, under the name Owada Masakichi as the fourth son of a 
low-ranking Samurai from Satake-han in the castle town of Kubota in the prov-
ince of Dewa (cf. Odronic 1967; Göbel 1987; Miki 1990). At the age of seven, he 
began to study the Chinese classics in kanbun as a student of the Confucian 
scholar and Daimyô of Akita Nakayama Seiga (1728-1805). As Miki Shôtarô 
writes in his comprehensive study on Hirata Atsutane from 1990, as a boy he was 
already influenced by the Yamazaki Ansai School of Chinese studies, which he 
later also praised for its patriotic spirit (cf. Miki 1990: 12, 102), while he strongly 
criticized the Sorai School and its leader, Dazai Shundai. At the age of ten he was 
also taught basic principles of medicine by his uncle. At the same time, he also 
developed an interest in Japanese literature. At the age of 19, he returned to Edo 
as a ronin in order to continue his studies. In his first years in Edo, he worked 
various jobs (cf. Odronic 1967: 23) and had only limited opportunities to pursue 
his studies. But in 1800 his life took a crucial turn: he was adopted by Hirata To-
bei Atsuyasu, a Samurai from Matsuyama in Bichû and a teacher of the Yamaga 
Sokô School of bushidô, and changed his name to Hirata Atsutane. 
In 1801 he first encountered the writings of Motoori Norinaga, which influ-
enced him so strongly that he immediately applied to join the Matsuzaka School 
(cf. Earl 1964 (1981): 77). This happened shortly after Norinaga’s death, and so he 
never had the opportunity to be taught by Norinaga directly. Nonetheless, this 
contact with Norinaga’s teachings became a crucial point in Atsutane’s intellec-
tual development. From then on, he dedicated himself to the study of Norinaga’s 
writings and gradually developed into one of the school’s leading students. 
                                                 
212 On the life, work and political influence of Hirata Atsutane, cf. Miki 1990; Tahara 1990 (1963); 
Watanabe 1978; Keene 1953 and 1978; Schiffer 1939; Hammitzsch 1936; Devine 1981; Odronic 
1967, among others. For more recent studies on Hirata Atsutane cf. McNally 1998, 2002. 
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Around 1808 he was appointed as a teacher, and he was even invited to read 
before the priests of the Hakke School of the Shirakawa family. Atsutane then be-
came an instructor to the priests of Shirakawa Shintô, a position that until then 
had been hereditary (cf. Odronic 1967: 27). This led to the final loss of influence 
for Ryôbu or Hakke Shintô (cf. Earl 1964 (1981): 77). In the following productive 
years, which reflect Hirata’s wide array of interests, his life was shaken by the 
death of his wife and two sons. 
In 1823, in what was probably his greatest triumph, the Yoshida family ac-
cepted his theories, and Atsutane became responsible for the education of the 
priests of Yuiitsu Shintô. This meant that the responsibility for educating the 
priests was from then on solely under the control of the jingikan, which resulted 
in a simplification of the teachings of Shintô. At the same time, it brought about a 
reconciliation between the Shirakawa and Yoshida families, which had feuded 
since the 15th century. Also, in 1823 Hirata’s writings were presented to Emperor 
Kôkaku (cf. Odronic 1967: 28), and Hirata’s attempt to free the teachings of Shintô 
of Shingon elements (Hakke Shintô), as well as Buddhist, Confucian and Chinese 
influences (Yuiitsu Shintô), marks the true turning point from syncretistic Shintô 
to the »pure« Shintô of the modern age. 
In 1824 Hirata adopted Hekizen Atsutane, who was later known as Hirata 
Kanetane, and who carried on his teachings into the early Meiji period (cf. 
Odronic 1967: 29). Through his activities in the name of Shintô, he increasingly 
became a thorn in the side of the supporters of the orthodoxy, who placed him 
under surveillance and submitted a report to the Shôgun in 1834. Hirata was first 
censored when the Shôgun removed his work Daifusokoku kô (written in 1828 and 
published in 1836) from circulation. After a further incident, Hirata was exiled to 
his birthplace in 1841. 
By this point the number of followers of Atsutane’s Kokugaku had grown 
enormously throughout the country (cf. Odronic 1967: 30). At the time of his 
death in 1843, his own students numbered 553; a further 1330 registered as stu-
dents after his death. His posthumous title of kamu tama no mi-hashira, »illustrious 
pillar of the divine soul,« which was given to him by the Shirakawa, was a tribute 
to his life’s work in studying the kodô (»way of antiquity«). 
 
5. 1. 3. 1. Hirata Atsutane’s Kokugaku 
 
Hirata Atsutane continued for the most part on the path of his predecessors, 
although he was less interested in the interpretation of ancient literary works, fo-
cusing instead on the study of the kodô, the ancient way, and proving the superi-
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ority of Japan and the inferiority of other nations (cf. Blacker 1988: 72). According 
to this view, Japan was the ruling country that other nations were obliged to fol-
low as subjects. 
He strongly criticized the Neo-Confucians and generally opposed Chinese in-
fluences. Although he often defended Lao Tzu and Confucius, he accused the 
Confucians of not correctly studying the written works. He shared Motoori’s 
view that China was morally inferior due to the change of dynasties there. For 
example, in his work Taidô Wakumon, he criticized China for the fact that one 
could not only turn away from the ruler, but it was even deemed possible to as-
sassinate him.213 Furthermore, he found fault with the lack of academic methods 
in Chinese writings, which – remarkably – he saw evidenced in Dutch works 
(Odronic 1967: 24). Due to his comprehensive education and his knowledge of 
Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism, as well as Western thought and Christian-
ity, which he cited as complementary examples in his lectures and commentaries, 
his written works were better founded and more detailed, from the perspective of 
comparative education, than those of Motoori Norinaga (cf. Earl 1964 (1981): 78). 
Hirata Atsutane’s influence lay in the further development, and especially the 
politicization of, the ideas of the Kokugaku, as well as the emphasis on Shintô as 
a national religion. Hirata saw the Japanese kokutai as the embodiment of the 
»true way of the kami« (makoto no shintô; Schiffer 1939: 227): 
»There are also several different ways of the kami. The first is the true way of 
the kami. As previously mentioned, knowledge of the illustrious kokutai of the 
land of the kami, the study of the deeds of the kami and the practice of the way 
of righteous men are the true way of the kami. [...] The way of the kami that is 
commonly referred to alongside the way of the ju and the Buddha, however, 
is something very vile: the kami are usually portrayed as capable of simply 
being bought off. Such people covet gold and silver and know nothing of the 
illustrious kokutai.«214 
The more Atsutane pursues the question of the essence of what is truly Japa-
nese, the more important the emperor became in his thinking, and thus also the 
concept of absolute loyalty to the emperor, based on the genealogy of the impe-
rial family extending back to the sun goddess Amaterasu ômikami. These ideas 
resulted in a chauvinistic worldview that placed the old concept of Japan as the 
»land of the gods« in the middle of the world and also made claims on surround-
ing countries. On the basis of the ancient Japanese sources, Atsutane expressed 
                                                 
213 This theme represents one of the main arguments of the Hirata school against China see al-
soSchiffer 1939: 233ff.; cf. Braun 1989: passim. 
214 Hirata Atsutane: Taidô wakumon, III = Schiffer 1939: 227. 
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his position on the Korean peninsula, for example, in which he writes about the 
war against the »three great Han« (i.e. Korea) in the context of Jingû Kôgô’s »ex-
pedition« to Korea: 
»But I believe, most respectfully, the great kami hated them in their illustrious 
hearts, the actual subjects of Sumera mi Kuni, who, rather than serve as sub-
jects, acted proud and insolent. And for this reason, they were punished by 
the gods with the illustrious punitive expedition.«215 
He continues: 
»Thus, there is among all the nations of the world not a single one that is not 
the emperor’s own, and no people that are not the emperor’s own.« (l.c.) 
The above quotations demonstrate the potential for aggression contained in 
Hirata Atsutane’s religious nationalism. It is not difficult to arrive at a justifica-
tion for rights over neighboring countries and acts of war using Atsutane’s argu-
ments. 
Atustane also criticized Confucianism, thereby aggravating the Samurai class, 
since this belief system was particularly important to them. Although he himself 
was not a revolutionary figure, he provided the theoretical ammunition for oppo-
sition groups. Accordingly, the followers of his teachings included rich farmers 
and merchants who were close to these groups and saw more personal gain in 
supporting the advocates of the emperor than the weakened bakufu. This prom-
ised the chance of reaching a higher social position without belonging to the 
Samurai class. 
But Hirata Atsutane’s elevation of the position of the emperor was not only 
met with support. Statements such as the following brought about increasing re-
sistance from the bakufu: 
»And, most respectfully, whether it is called a sesshô, kampaku or daijukô, 
the emperor gave him this right and transferred his office to him, and there-
fore it is quite naturally the case that he is the emperor’s illustrious sub-
ject.«216 
The consequences of such statements can be seen, as previously mentioned, in 
Hirata’s exile from Edo and the banning of his writings by the shogunate. 
As Odronic (1967) writes, however, Hirata’s position on Western learning was 
not clear. On the one hand, he showed true admiration – for example, in his ac-
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216 Hirata Atsutane: Taidô wakumon, I = Schiffer 1939: 219. 
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ceptance of Copernican theory – while on the other hand, he discounted the »in-
significant« achievements of Western science in comparison with the study of the 
ancient way of Japan. His knowledge of Christianity (cf. Odronic 1967: 33) was 
evident in his work of 1806, Honkyô gaihen (»An Introduction to the Teachings of 
Our Country«), among others. 217  Hirata adopted some aspects of Christian 
thought and adapted them to Shintô, for example, by citing passages while sim-
ply adding the word »Shintô« (cf. Odronic 1967: 34). Thus, he saw Adam and Eve 
as an equivalent to Izanagi and Izanami, and it was possibly also Christian writ-
ings that brought about his visions of life after death, the counterpart to the visi-
ble world,218 ruled over by the Izumo deity Okuninushi. Hirata declared Shintô 
the religion that is superior to all others and the deity Musubi no kami (i.e. Ta-
kamimusubi) the creator of all things. In his view, the main deities of other relig-
ions were nothing more than local manifestations of this Japanese god of creation 
(Odronic 1967: 35). This deity was responsible for the creation of all things and 
was the source of all existence, both human and divine. Furthermore, he ex-
panded his worldview to include the concept of the salvation of souls after death; 
eternal happiness awaited those who achieved merits in this world. 
In his attempt to enrich Shintô, Hirata elevated the position of the creator god 
Takamimusubi in particular to that of the central deity of the world. According to 
the written tradition, especially the Nihonshoki, his divine sons Omoikane and 
Sukuna-bikona, as well as his daughters, played important roles in mythology. 
His grandchild Ninigi no mikoto descended to earth in order to rule over Japan, 
and his great grandson, Jinmu-tennô, became the first emperor of Japan. Atsutane 
considered this elevation of Takamimusubi not to be an arbitrary choice, but justi-
fied by his role in Japanese mythology. This choice is striking, because the central 
figure of Shintô thought at the time was the sun goddess Amaterasu. Before this 
reassessment of Musubi no kami, Amaterasu was seen as the most important de-
ity, especially due to the theological ideas of Motoori Norinaga. One reason for 
Norinaga’s high regard for a female deity could perhaps be the fact that he felt 
especially close to the female sensitivity of the magokoro. 
In this context, Sigmara Sato-Dienser quotes from Motoori Norinaga’s work 
Shibun yôryô: 
»[...] man’s true feeling is gentle and simple, like that of children and women. 
To be male, composed and intelligent is not this true feeling. It is merely ex-
                                                 
217 Written in the year Bunka 3 (1806); edition: Hirata Atsutane zenshû (Hirata-gakkai), Volume 2; 
cf. KSSMR 7: 374. 
218 On Hirata Atsutane’s attitude toward Christianity, see alsoRichard Devine’s study »Hirata At-
sutane and Christian Sources« (Devine 1981). 
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ternal and unimportant. If one searches for the true nature of the heart, how-
ever, one finds that intelligent men are all like women and children. The only 
difference is that some hide it out of shame, while others do not.«219 
However, Hirata Atsutane not only exaggerated the position of the god 
Musubi no kami, but also the position of Japan in general by calling it a nation 
above all others that was created before all other nations and was also the birth-
place of the sun goddess. Therefore, he saw Japan as superior to all other nations. 
As a radical proponent of the Kokugaku, he believed that the Japanese were dif-
ferent from other nations especially in their spirit, their politeness and their cour-
age, and that therefore these qualities must be promoted (l.c.). 
Hirata Atsutane was also responsible for the idea of the extension of the di-
vinity of the empire and its ruling family to the Japanese people as a whole. In his 
work Kodô taii (»Fundamental Ideas of the Ancient Way«) from 1824, he clearly 
states: 
»Our illustrious country is truly the land of the gods, from the simple man up 
to us, we are all certainly descendants of the gods.«220 
Not only the character traits of the Japanese are exceptional, according to 
Hirata, but also the Japanese themselves are a very special race, superior to all 
others in stature and health. The only reason the Japanese people at the time did 
not correspond to this ideal, according to Atsutane, was that they had endured 
lasting damages through their contact with China! (Cf. Blacker 1988: 72-73.) 
Hirata’s further dogmatic claims also sought to prove the superiority of the 
Japanese people, who were the first to come about at the creation of the world. 
However, Odronic (1967: 38) suspects that Hirata Atsune’s emphasis on the supe-
riority of the Japanese is probably best understood as a spurious response to the 
apparent inferiority and slow national development of Japan at the time. In his 
emphasis of the greatness of Japan, Hirata attempted to compensate for the cul-
tural and material dependency on foreign nations by postulating the spiritual su-
periority of Japan, or by demonstrating that the Japanese spirit, yamato-gokoro, 
was the defining characteristic that distinguishes Japan from other nations (cf. 
Odronic 1967: 39). 
 
                                                 
219 Sato-Diesner 1977: 85; cf. Motoori Norinaga: Shibun yôryô, edition MNZ 10, 1927: 305. 
220 Hirata Atsutane: Kodô taii, edition: KGS 10: 1. 
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5. 1. 3. 2. The Hirata School and Fukko Shintô 
 
In Inoue Nobutaka’s work (1994: 442f.) on Fukko Shintô – also called jun-
shintô, (»pure Shintô«), kodô-shintô (»Shintô of the ancient way«), Kokugaku-
shintô, shintô-fukkoha (»Shintô restoration school«) – the author writes that this 
school epitomized Edo period Kokugaku thought. This school was based on the 
ideal of a »pure« Shintô that was not influenced by Buddhism or Confucianism. 
More specifically, however, the term Fukko Shintô usually refers to the school of 
Shintô that emerged from Hirata Atsutane’s theories. As was previously men-
tioned, Hirata emphasized the religious character of Shintô particularly through 
his systematization of his concept of the afterlife, which was centered around the 
deity Ôkuninushi. Ultimately, the movement for the restoration of the emperor-
ship (ôseifukko) during the bakumatsu period emerged from this theological and 
political body of thought. However, the word »Fukko Shintô« only came into of-
ficial use in March of 1868 (Keiô 4). 
Over the course of this movement, the Shirakawa family adopted the inter-
pretation of the Kokugaku in the interpretation of the Hirata School and was thus 
able to expand the reach of its power. In light of this situation, the Yoshida family 
saw it necessary, in order to win the support of the shrine priests, to appoint the 
Hirata student Yano Harumichi and thus show that the Yoshida had also re-
turned (fukko) to the »ancient, pure way« (junsui-kodô). In this case, fukko does not 
refer to the way before the introduction of Buddhism and Confucianism in an-
cient times, but rather, the »ancient, pure way« before the establishment of me-
dieval syncretism by the Yoshida and Shirakawa Schools. One of the main goals 
of this movement was the restoration of the powerful position of the ritsuryô-
jingikan system by Kokugaku scholars of the Hirata School. As for its theology, 
this school propagated especially the unity of religion and rule, or politics, (saisei-
itchi), which was centered around the concept of Jinmu-tennô as the founder of 
the Japanese state. In the Meiji period, these Kokugaku scholars of the Hirata 
School were seen as followers of the Fukko School. 
Hirata Atsutane’s successors, including Yano Harumichi (1823-87)221, put the 
concepts of this school into practice as practical ideology during the bakumatsu 
period (cf. Inoue 1994: 537). Born as the first son of a Samurai from Ôzu-han in the 
province of Iyô, Yano first studied philology under Ban Nobutomo, before joining 
                                                 
221 Kishimoto (1956: 46) cites Yano Gendô, whom he calls a »great leader of the Hirata School.« For 
Yano Harumichi cf. Wachutka 2013: passim. 
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the Hirata School. In 1862 he became a teacher of Shintô priests in the Shirakawa 
family, and in 1867 he became the head of the Yoshida School. He wrote the pro-
grammatic work Kenkin sengo222 as a theoretical basis for the restoration of the an-
cient imperial political system and thus provided the most comprehensive and 
systematic plan for the state from the perspective of the Hirata Kokugaku schol-
ars. After the Meiji Restoration, Yano Harumichi attempted to organize the edu-
cation system around the principles of the Kokugaku, but was arrested in March 
of 1871 (Meiji 4), along with Tsunoda Tadayuki, Gonda Naosuke and others, on 
accusations of treason. After completing his sentence, he dedicated his life pri-
marily to editorial work up until his death in 1887. 
 
5. 1. 4. Conclusion: criticism of Confucianism in the Kokugaku 
and the image of China 
 
To summarize, it can be said that criticism of Confucianism and the resulting 
rejection of China came to play a critical role in Kokugaku thought. Paradoxically, 
however, Confucianism itself can also be credited for the rise of the Kokugaku, 
since this school, whose goal was the restoration of a romanticized version of an-
cient Japan, was formed as a countermovement to the organizing principle of 
government in the Tokugawa period, shushi Confucianism. It is especially inter-
esting that the academic methods of the Kokugaku, who argued emphatically 
against Confucianism, ironically operated based on the categories and axioms of 
Confucian thought. Just as in classical Confucianism the idea of historical pro-
gress is negated and instead a picture of idealized antiquity is painted that is to 
serve as a model for the present, so too did the kokugakusha (»national scholars«) 
formulate a similarly idealized version of antiquity for Japan that was meant to 
serve as a model for a better future.223 
But the Kokugaku’s interpretation of this past golden age is dwarfed by the 
works of Japanese Confucianism that accumulated over the previous centuries. 
The scholars of National Learning saw their own culture as being rooted in the 
distant past, before Japan came into contact with Chinese culture and thus had 
not yet been influenced by Confucianism and Buddhism. The early kokugakusha, 
especially Kamo Mabuchi and his successor Motoori Norinaga, dedicated them-
selves to the goal of bringing to light the facts (jijitsu) about their own ancient cul-
                                                 
222 Cf. KSSMR 3: 103. A first edition of this work from 1867 can be found in the library of Kyûshû 
University (publisher and place of publication not indicated). 
223 The role of the Kokugaku for the formation of a modern Japanese identity is also emphasized 
by Nelly Naumann (1987: 182ff.). 
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tural heritage before Japan’s contact with China and its supposed contamination 
through foreign influences. Finally adopting the methods of Confucianism as 
well as its goals, the kokugakusha thus turned to their own past and strove for a 
philological reconstruction of the ancient written works of the Japanese tradition, 
which were no longer easily readable. The verses of the Manyôshû, the »Collection 
of Ten Thousand Leaves« from the eighth century, played an especially impor-
tant role in these efforts. Kamo Mabuchi dedicated a significant part of his life’s 
work to the interpretation of this work of lyric verse written in Old Japanese us-
ing phonetic Chinese characters. Mabuchi saw this work as the pure expression of 
Japanese poetry, which was not yet clouded by Chinese influence, and was thus a 
reflection of the golden age at the beginning of Japanese history. For the philolo-
gists of National Learning, philology was not only the means, but also the object 
of academic study, since a pure language that is free of Chinese influence, as was 
believed to be evident in the Manyôshû and other ancient works, like the Kojiki,224 
represented the only means for achieving the idealized conditions of antiquity.225 
Under Motoori Norinaga, Mabuchi’s successor, the ideological reach of the 
Kokugaku was strengthened, but it had not yet taken on the fanatical character of 
Hirata Atsutane’s ideas in the 19th century. Motoori considered not the Manyôshû, 
but the Kojiki of 712 to be the most important ancient written work. (Cf. Antoni 
2012a: 412ff.) This work, the oldest history of the Japanese empire, which was 
compiled in the late seventh century at the imperial court, completed the link be-
tween religion and literature, mythology and history. Norinaga saw the myths of 
the Kojiki, which he analyzed over the course of decades of philological studies, as 
accounts of the true beginning, the most ancient times, long before any outside in-
fluence. Based on this idea, Norinaga developed not only the conept of a Japan-
centered religious »original revelation,« but also traced the concept of Japan’s su-
periority over China back to the myths of the Kojiki. 
Confucianism forms the focus of his fundamental criticism of China. He saw 
its teachings as the expression of a presumptuous rationalism that blatantly dis-
regards the fundamental truths of human existence with its purely meritocratic 
teachings of virtue. In Norinaga’s view, the truth is found in the Kojiki and its 
mythical accounts of the «Age of the Gods«. He sees the story of creation as an 
expression of the deep connection of the ancient Japanese to the indigenous dei-
ties – a connection that the inhabitants of the outside world, especially the Chi-
nese, lack. And Norinaga leaves no doubt that the Japanese deities are universal, 
                                                 
224 For the importance of language for the ideology of the Kokugaku cf. Antoni 2012b. 
225 Incidentally, one can easily draw some striking comparisons between this field and European 
romanticism of that era – a subject that deserves further study. 
                                             CHAPTER II: THE EDO PERIOD  n  155 
 
since there can be no two truths. This construction, which is typical of religious 
ethnocentrism226, finally leads him, by deduction, to an outright condemnation of 
China. 
Only in China, which in his view had fallen from the truth of the gods, was 
there any necessity for the creation of a philosophy of human making such as 
Confucianism. Since the »godless« Chinese no longer intuitively carried within 
themselves the way of virtue, Norinaga writes, they needed an elaborate system 
of moral standards in order to control negative human powers. In this way, Nori-
naga’s criticism of Confucianism, which began with the limits of a rationalist 
worldview, suddenly becomes an intensely xenophobic reckoning with China. 
The overarching term in this context is karagokoro, the »Chinese spirit« or »Chi-
nese heart.«227 In his view, karagokoro is the matrix of negative development and 
corruption.228 While Mabuchi’s rejection of Confucianism was still largely free of 
such chauvinistic overtones (he merely rejected Confucianism as a belief system, 
while at the same time praising Taoism229, which is also of Chinese origin), Nori-
naga represents the transition from a purely political and ideological criticism of 
Confucianism to the political and ideological rejection of China in the late Ko-
kugaku. 
The school’s main proponent, Hirata Atsutane, preached a glowing reverence 
for the emperor and the idea of the religiously justified superiority of Japan over 
all other nations. In his view, China in particular was the seat of corruption, since 
Chinese history was marked by treason and usurpation, the opposite of the Con-
fucian ideal of holiness. 
In this context, it is pertinent to mention the importance of the legitimation of 
rule in Kokugaku thought. According to the beliefs of all kokugakusha, the Japa-
nese imperial family took the highest rank among all the rulers of the world, since 
they alone were directly descended from the deities of (Japanese) mythology ac-
cording to the Kojiki. The apparent importance of tribal or genealogical thinking 
forms the basis for this belief. According to the beliefs of the Kokugaku, because 
the imperial family is directly descended from the gods, it has been called upon 
to rule eternally. The importance of this concept in the Kokugaku and, after the 
                                                 
226 On ethnocentrism, cf. the collection edited by Manfred Brocker and Heino Nau (1997). 
227 Cf. the sections on karagokoro in Norinaga’s work Tamakatsuma (MNZ 1, Tôkyô 1976: 48-50). On 
Norinaga’s view of karagokoro see also Antoni 2004. 
228 Cf. Naobi no mitama (Motoori (1922): 4 = Stolte 1939: 195). Here Norinaga describes China as a 
country in which »the people’s hearts are corrupted and their customs are savage.« Cf. Wehmeyer 
1997: passim. 
229 In his work Kokuikô Kamo Mabuchi refers to the teachings of Lao-tsu, and thus Taoism, as the 
oldest belief system in China and states that only with Confucianism did the moral decline of 
China begin (cf. Dumoulin 1939: 180, among others). 
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Meiji Restoration, in the state doctrine of modern Japan up to the end of World 
War II, cannot be emphasized enough. For the kokugakusha, and especially the 
proponents of the later school of Hirata Atsutane, the value of a country was de-
cided almost exclusively on the basis of this question. 
In 1861, at a time of great political upheaval, a student of the Hirata School by 
the name of Takeo Masatane wrote a comprehensive work on the situation in 
world politics at the time.230 As discussed in a study by Kim Braun, Masatane, 
displaying an astonishing knowledge of history and geography, critically com-
pares the histories of the major powers at the time recognized by him as »em-
pires« and discusses in great detail the »German empire« (this, however, does not 
refer to the unification of 1871), the Ottoman empire, Russia, France, early civili-
zations and China. The author recounts page after page of examples of usurpa-
tions, assassinations and illegitimate rule in all of these empires in astonishing de-
tail, while always arriving at the same conclusion, namely that only the Japanese 
ruling house, due to its direct line of divine descent, can claim to rule legiti-
mately. This is almost a caricature of the standard Kokugaku argument against 
China, now expanded to the entire world, that only the Japanese dynasty is justi-
fied to rule due to its legitimation in ancient times. He regards China in particu-
lar, with its history of constant dynastic change and especially the centuries-long 
rule by the foreign Qing (Manchu), as a perfect example of »worthless« rule. (Cf. 
Braun 1989) 
Thus, at the beginning of modern Japan during the Meiji period, a self-
contained worldview was established that, based on the beliefs of the Kokugaku, 
combined an extremely negative view of Confucianism with a related antagonism 
toward China. The hated rationalism of Confucian thought was, to the kokugaku-
sha, merely a sign that China had fallen from the teachings of the gods as con-
tained in the Kojiki. According to this extremely ethnocentric view, China’s »god-
lessness« was the original cause of the apparently presumptuous rationalism of 
Confucian thought. While in China virtue and morality by way of philosophical 
justification had to be created for this reason, the kokugakusha believed, such a 
supporting construction was unnecessary in Japan, since that country once again 
recognized its own numinous roots. According to this view, Japan possessed an 
indigenous, metaphysically justified morality, and the virtues that Confucianism 
propagated through philosophy were already present in Japan. Therefore, the 
true origin of the virtues of Confucianism was also in Japan, since the necessity of 
                                                 
230 Takeo Masatane: Dai teikoku-ron (NST 20); cf. Braun 1989 and 1992. 
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their philosophical formulation in Chinese intellectual history was merely a sign 
of China’s moral decline. 
The fact that the early enthusiasm for the Kokugaku’s glorification of ancient 
Shintô was followed by a countermovement of liberal, Western-oriented intellec-
tuals like Fukuzawa Yukichi actually brought about an intensification of the anti-
Chinese aspects of the new government.231 While the liberals considered China 
and Confucianism a cautionary example of social underdevelopment, and thus a 
motivation to orient the country increasingly toward Western progress, Meiji-
period Shintô conservatism reached its negative position on China based on the 
beliefs of the Kokugaku. The enormous importance of the Kokugaku view of Ja-
pan and the world, and of China in particular, which ultimately grew in the 1930s 
and ‘40s, is well known. Without this deep belief in Japan’s cultural mission and 
the implied inferiority of the rest of Asia, supported by the previously discussed 
intellectual and religious sources, the military expansionism of that time would 
have been unthinkable. But before this is discussed in greater detail, it is neces-
sary to turn back to the late Edo period. 
 
5. 2. The Mito School 
 
In his work on the culture and intellectual history of the late Edo period, 
Harry D. Harootunian (1995) demonstrates that the culture of this period began 
not in the bakumatsu period, but around the year 1800: »The special culture of late 
Tokugawa culture did not begin in the 1830s, or even later, but probably in the 
late eighteenth century or the early 1800s,« (Harootunian 1995: 53). He sees the 
period as being characterized by a sense of decline and the search for solutions to 
the social, political and economic crisis. »Virtually all of the new discourses of the 
late Tokugawa period – Mitogaku (Mito learning), national learning, Western 
learning, and the new religions – tried to unite a concept of culture with politics.« 
All these groups saw their suggestions as ways to reform the whole, and »all of 
these new discourses were formulated in the early nineteenth century,« (Haroo-
tunian 1995: 67). 
The Mito School, which saw reforms in the han as a model for the reorganiza-
tion of the entire Japanese system of government, is especially important in this 
context.232 Generations of Samurai intellectuals from Mito-han, such as Fujita 
                                                 
231 On Fukuzawa cf. among others Craig 2009. 
232 On the Mito school cf. Bellah 1985; Brüll 1989; Earl 1981 (1964); Hammitzsch 1939 (repr. New 
York, 1965); Hammitzsch 1940; Harootunian 1988; Imai 1972; Ishida Ichirô 1991 (1963); 
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Yûkoku (1774-1826), his son Tôko (1806-1855), Aizawa Seishisai (1781-1863), the 
Daimyô Tokugawa Nariaki (1800-1861) and others, contributed to the develop-
ment of this specific body of thought of Mito (Harootunian 1995: 67). In particu-
lar, they strove for a synthesis of (Neo-) Confucian ethics and the religious beliefs 
of the indigenous tradition, thus, in a way, continuing the Shintô-Confucian dis-
course of the early Edo period, but with with different emphases. 
 
5. 2. 1. The development of the Mito School 
 
In strict opposition to the dominant shushigaku, this Confucian school of 
thought – which at first was purely philosophical and historiographical and later 
became intensely political and revolutionary – increasingly gained ground 
around the end of the Edo period and ultimately worked toward eliminating the 
bakufu. In its place, this school advocated the reinstatement of an idealized an-
cient system of rule, headed by the divine emperor as an autocratic monarch. The 
Mito School, which was named after the territory of Mito (located in what is to-
day Ibaraki Prefecture), which developed over the course of the Edo period into a 
center of opposition to the bakufu, postulated the combination of Shintô and Con-
fucianism (shinju-itchi) as the basis for a new Japanese empire. The central point 
of Mito discourse was the concept of the (Japanese) »national polity« (kokutai), 
which became the basis for a powerful religious and political ideology. In Mito 
School thought at the end of the Edo period, the relationship between Shintô and 
Confucianism went through a remarkable transformation. According to the con-
cept of shinju-itchi, the »unity of Shintô and Confucianism« as formulated by the 
influential scholar of the late Mito School, Fujita Tôko (1806-1855), among others, 
the relationship between and significance of the two sides were reversed. Accord-
ing to a specialist in this area (Kracht 1975: 51) it is apparent »how consistently 
the Mito School unites Confucian and Shintô elements in its teachings,« whereas 
henceforth Confucianism only played a secondary role in supporting the »divine 
mandate« of Shintô.233 The spiritual principles of the Meiji Restoration, and thus 
of the modern, Meiji-period nation-state of Japan, were developed and shaped 
into a powerful political ideology by the scholars of this important national 
school at the end of the Edo period. The syncretistic reversal of the relationship 
                                                                                                                                                  
Koschmann 1987; Kracht 1975; Kracht, Leinss 1988; Minamoto 1992 (1973); Nosco 1990; Stanzel 
1982; Suzuki 1987; Wakabayashi 1986; Webb 1958, among others. See also Antoni 1987: 266-282. 
233 Already a successor to Yamazaki Ansai, Atobe Yoshiakira (1658-1729), remarked on the rela-
tionship between Confucianism and Shintô: »Shintô is the only Way in the universe. Confucian-
ism assists Shintô when its principles are consistent with Shintô.« (Okada 1979: 248) 
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between Confucianism and Shintô in the Mito School represented the crucial step 
toward a final acculturation of Confucianism. 
The over two hundred-year-long history of the Mito School can be divided 
into three periods, each of which are closely connected to one of the Daimyô of 
Mito: Tokugawa Mitsukuni in the founding era, Tokugawa Harumori (1751-1823; 
ruled 1766-1805) during the middle period, and Tokugawa Nariaki during the fi-
nal period of the Mito School before the Meiji Restoration. 
The Mito School234 was created along with the establishment of the Office of 
Historiography (shikyoku)235, and consisted of a council of historians of varied 
academic and geographic backgrounds. Among them were the Chinese Confu-
cian Scholar Chu Shun-shui (Chu Chih-yu; known in Japan as Shu Shunsui; 1600-
1682); the Chinese Zen master Xin Yue (1639-1695); the Taoist scholar Hitomi Bo-
kuyûken (1598-1670); the Buddhist monk Sassa Jitchiku (1640-1698); the propo-
nent of a synthesis of Confucianism and Buddhism, Mori Genjuku (1653-1721); 
Ukai Shinshô (1647-1693), a student of Yamazaki Ansai; Kuriyama Sempô (1671-
1706), also a student of the Kimon School; Miyake Kanran (1673-1718); and Asaka 
Tanpaku (1656-1737), who had been educated as a student of Shu Shunsui in Mito 
(cf. Hammitzsch 1939: 17-22; Kracht 1975: 84). 
It was Tokugawa Mitsukuni’s intention to compile a historical work based on 
the Chinese model (Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s Shi Chi), the Dainihonshi, which was finally 
completed only at the beginning of the 20th century (cf. Earl 1964 (1981): 83). One 
of the main responsibilities of this work was to provide historiographical proof of 
the legitimacy of the Southern Court during the imperial schism of the Namboku 
period (1336-1392). The criteria for determining a line of rule were established by 
Kuriyama Sempô. According to him, the only legitimate court was the one in 
possession of the imperial regalia (sanshû no jingi) – the symbols of divine rule as 
descendants of Amaterasu ômikami – which in this case was the Southern Court. 
This concept of the imperial regalia representing a direct line of legitimate rule 
resulted in a fusion with the religious beliefs of Shintô that became typical of the 
Mito School. 
In this context, it is worth noting that the ideas of the Mito School in this early 
phase were not intended as an opposition to the bakufu. According to their theo-
ries, the Shôgun should act as a loyal minister under the emperor. They propa-
gated the idea of sonnô (»reverence for the emperor«) as well as sonnô-keifu (»Re-
                                                 
234 In Mitsukuni’s time, this cannot yet be called a »school«; cf. Hammitzsch 1939: 8-13, and Kracht 
1975: 6. 
235 After moving from the ancillary residence in Mito to the main residence in Edo in 1672 and the 
corresponding enlargement, the Office of Historiography was called Shôkôkan (»Institute for En-
lightenment [of the Past] and Study [of the Future]«); cf. Kracht 1975: 153. 
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vere the emperor, respect the bakufu«; cf. Benl, Hammitzsch 1956: 355). Thus, this 
was not a contradiction of the ruling system of the Tokugawa. The crucial factors 
for the school’s political power were its place in the historical constellation and its 
emphasis on legitimacy through an unbroken line of rule. 
In the period from 1740 to 1800, the Mitogaku more or less reached a point of 
stasis. Only after the country’s intellectual and political structures changed did 
the school also experience a renewal. Japan’s feudal society had slipped into an 
increasingly serious crisis, and pressure from the West was growing. This situa-
tion caused the syncretism of the Mito scholars to spread at a breathtaking pace. 
The idea of the kokutai, which will be examined in more detail below, emerged 
and remained the key concept of the Japanese national consciousness on into the 
1940s. 
After decades of inactivity, work on the Dainihonshi was continued under To-
kugawa Harumori. Only after the previous dean of the Office of Historiography 
(which was located at Mitsukuni’s residence in Edo under the name Shôkôkan 
since 1672, and was later moved to Mito236), Tachihara Suiken (1744-1823), was 
disgraced by a legal affair in 1800, was his most gifted student, Fujita Yûkoku, 
appointed by Harumori to continue compiling the work (cf. Kracht 1975: 91). 
Under his leadership, the Mito School was transformed from a purely histori-
ographical school into a political one. This is also apparent in the establishment of 
the Kôdôkan237 by Tokugawa Nariaki in 1841, the territorial academy in Mito that 
became the center of the late Mito School. 
Besides Yûkoku, his son Fujita Tôko (1806-1855) and his student Aizawa 
Seishisai also played a large part in shaping the thought of the late Mitogaku. The 
basis for their theories was their definition of the term »way« (michi, dô). Accord-
ing to the Mito School, this term refers to a principle of virtue laid down by the 
gods that requires man to act in a manner that is virtuous and appropriate to his 
station. This principle is based on the »Five Relationships« (gorin) of Confucian-
ism and the »obligation to behave in accordance with one’s social status« (taigi-
meibun; cf. Kracht 1976). 
In practice, this means that the basic principles of the school’s teachings were 
the following: returning to the old values of the land of the gods (shinshû in the 
Sino-Japanese reading), the unity of Shintô and Confucianism (shinju-itchi), pen 
and sword (bunbu-fugi), loyalty and piety (chûkô-muni) and the inseparability of 
science, or study, and practical application (gakumon jigyô fusho). 
                                                 
236 Cf. »Shôkôkan« in KEJ 7: 164, among others. 
237 »Institute for the Propagation of the Way,« founded in 1841 by Tokugawa Nariaki. Its purpose 
and goals are described in its manifesto and the corresponding commentary; cf. Kracht 1975. 
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Following the principle of the unity of study and practical application, the Mi-
togaku scholars applied their ideas in practice, participated in current political 
events and saw it as their duty to point out the mistakes of the bakufu. In their 
writings they demanded the reinstatement of the emperor, the removal of the ba-
kufu and the expulsion of foreigners, resulting in difficulties with the bakufu. 
Fujita Tôko’s »Kôdôkan manifesto« (1838) outlined the goals and intentions of 
the school (cf. Kracht 1975). The return to the past and the corresponding stabili-
zation of domestic affairs were to protect against being subordinated by the 
Western »barbarians.« The motto sonnô-joi (»Revere the emperor, expel the bar-
barians«) epitomizes this combative phase of the Mitogaku. The ideas of the Mito 
School formed the basis for the later spiritual conflict with the bakufu in the baku-
matsu period, which led to the Meiji Restoration (cf. Hammitzsch 1939: 29). A 
break with the bakufu could no longer be avoided, and ultimately the regime col-
lapsed in 1867. 
 
5. 2. 2. Aizawa Seishisai’s »New Discourse« (Shinron) 
 
Aizawa Seishisai, the author of the Shinron (»New Discourse«) from 1825, was 
one of the most prominent thinkers of the Mito School, and his ideas directly in-
fluenced the later Meiji Restoration. 
 
5. 2. 2. 1. Aizawa’s biography 
 
Aizawa Seishisai was born on July 5, 1782, in Mito.238 At the age of nine, his 
father sent him (cf. Stanzel 1982: 60)239 to the private school of Fujita Yûkoku, who 
himself was only 17 years old at the time but had already been a member of the 
Shôkôkan for two years and was relatively well known. Fujita had the greatest in-
fluence on Aizawa’s thought, and many of Aizawa’s theories appear to be a con-
tinuation of his teacher’s thought. 
In 1799 he was appointed as a writer at the Shôkôkan, and in 1803 he went 
with Yûkoku to the Shôkôkan department at the Mito residence in Edo in order to 
work on the compilation of the Dainihonshi. In 1804 he was appointed as teacher 
                                                 
238 Hammitzsch indicates the town of Morosawa as Aizawa’s birthplace in his essay. Stanzel, on 
the other hand, mentions the quarter of Shitaya in Mito; cf. Hammitzsch 1940: 63; Stanzel 1982: 61. 
239 His ancestors worked as ezashi, catchers of live food for the falcons belonging to the territorial 
ruler of Mito. His father Yasutaka (1746-1804) was entrusted with various smaller positions and 
was finally elevated to the position of a low-ranking samurai. Therefore, Aizawa, who became a 
high-ranking samurai, was a »social climber.« This is an interesting biographical detail, since Edo 
period society was generally rigid and it was relatively unusual to rise to a higher social class. 
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to the children of the Daimyô Harumori, in which position he taught Nariaki, 
who later became Daimyô himself, and whose thought he crucially influenced. In 
1820 he returned to the Shôkôkan and opened a private school at his home. Be-
ginning in 1826, the year of Fujita Yûkoku’s death, he also served as vice-dean, 
and from 1831 to 1839 as dean, of the Shôkôkan and continued to work on the 
Dainihonshi (cf. Kracht 1979: 353). 
The good relations between Aizawa and Nariaki remained intact, even after 
Nariaki became Daimyô of Mito in 1830 (cf. Harootunian 1970: 90). Many of the 
reforms that were carried out by Nariaki in Mito can be traced back to the initia-
tive of his advisor Aizawa. The goals of these reforms, which later also became 
the model for the Tempô reforms of the bakufu, were the economic security of the 
people, effective administration of the territory, improvement of military equip-
ment, abatement of luxury, replacing the Buddhist festivals with Shintô festivals, 
and the reform of the education system (cf. Stanzel 1982: 66). The reform of the 
education system led to, among other things, the establishment of the territorial 
academy of the Kôdôkan, in whose planning Aizawa played a significant role. 
The Kôdôkan was opened in 1841, and Aizawa was appointed dean along with 
Aoyama Sessai (1776-1843).240 
At that time, Nariaki increasingly came into conflict with the bakufu, and he 
was ultimately forced to abdicate in 1844. The opponents of the reform policies 
now gained power in Mito, and in 1845 Aizawa left his position as dean of the 
Kôdôkan. He spent the following years in seclusion, but returned as dean of the 
Kôdôkan in 1855 and retained the position until his death in 1863. 
Aizawa Seishisai was honored posthumously, documenting his importance to 
the Meiji Restoration, as Meiji-tennô accepted a hand-written edition of the Shin-
ron on the occasion of his visit to Mito in 1890, and Aizawa was even awarded a 
rank of nobility (cf. Stanzel 1982: 70ff.). 
The basic topics of his works can be divided into the following groups: 
»1. The idea of »unity of loyalty and piety« (chûkô-muni), from which the con-
cept of the »great duty to act according to one’s station« (taigi-meibun) is de-
rived 
2. The study of the »way« (dô) in order to establish the necessity of returning 
to the ideal society of the past 
3. The study of history in order to establish the theory of the »national polity« 
(kokutai) 
4. The concept of the »unity of religion and government« (saisei-itchi) as the 
basic requirement for correctness in politics 
                                                 
240 Student of Tachihara Suiken, who was dean of the Shôkôkan from 1823 to 1830, and dean of the 
Kôdôkan from 1840 until his death. Cf. Kracht 1979a: 388. 
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5. The study of world politics in order to understand Japan’s position in an 
international context 
6. The idea of practical application in all areas of study« (gakumon-jigyô; cf. 
Stanzel 1982: 64) 
 
5. 2. 2. 2. Aizawa’s Shinron 
 
The Shinron (»New Theses«), written in 1825, is Aizawa Seisisai’s most impor-
tant and well-known work. He wrote it in 1825, probably in reaction to the ba-
kufu’s edict to »drive away foreign ships.« Aizawa believed that Japan could only 
allow contact with the outside world if the country was prepared for foreign in-
fluences (cf. Hammitzsch 1940: 67). He describes the political measures necessary 
for achieving this in the Shinron. 
This work, which is written in kanbun, was not originally indended for a pub-
lic readership, but rather as a kind of memorandum for the territorial ruler To-
kugawa Narinobu (1800-1829, ruled 1816-1829). Narinobu prohibited it from be-
ing published, however, in fear of the reaction from the bakufu. Only under the 
rule of Nariaki (1800-1860, ruled 1829-1844) were copies of the work dissemi-
nated. In the 1850s a Japanese (wabun) edition was published, and the work was 
widely distributed. It became well known, especially under the imperial loyalists 
(shishi), but it was only allowed to be published after 1857 (cf. Wakabayashi 1986: 
9). 
The work is made up of two volumes containing a total of seven chapters241: 
Volume 1: »The National Polity« (kokutai), containing chapters I-III, »The State 
of the World« (keisei), »On Barbarians« (ryojô); and Volume 2, »Protection and De-
fense« (shugyô), »A Far-Reaching Plan« (chôkei). The first three chapters, which are 
devoted to the kokutai, are the core of the Shinron (Hammitzsch 1940: 69). The first 
chapter establishes the lineage of the emperor and his divine status. It states that 
his position as a worldly ruler is justified by his possession of the imperial regalia. 
Aizawa particularly emphasizes the importance of the divine justification of 
the order through the deeds of Amaterasu ômikami, the ancestral deity of the 
imperial household. Time and again the author refers to this point. Already in the 
beginning of his remarks on the Japanese kokutai, he points out programmatically: 
»In antiquity, the Heavenly Progenitress, [Amaterasu]242, set down the pre-
cepts on which to base this nation. Her Imperial Throne was divinely or-
                                                 
241 NST 53: 49-159; cf. Hammitzsch 1940: 67; Stanzel 1982; Wakabayashi 1986.  
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dained, Her virtue was divinely bestowed, and through these, She carried out 
the Processes of Heaven. All of Her achievements were the work of Heaven 
itself. She incorporated Her virtue in the Jewel, Her wisdom in the Mirror, 
and her Majesty in the Sword. Being the embodiment of Heavenly Benefi-
cence and possessed of Heavenly Majesty, She ruled over all nations accord-
ing to the dictates of Heavenly Wisdom.« (Wakabayashi 1986: 152; NST 53: 
52) 
In the past, he states, an ideal condition of society was reached through the 
divine position of the emperor, which, due to changes over time and various false 
doctrines, however, was destroyed. The virtues of piety (kô) and loyalty (chû) are 
the basis of human relationships and thus also of the state. Their absolute bind-
ingness was stripped by Buddhism and Christianity. It is especially the release of 
the individual from his duties to the state that Aizawa abhors in Christianity and 
Buddhism.243 
The second of the three chapters on the »national polity« deals with the reor-
ganization of the military, or the reestablishment of military strength in accor-
dance with the ideal condition of the past. He claims that this is the will of the 
gods, since such a restoration of the military would make it possible to expand 
the area that is ruled by »divine virtue.« According to Aizawa, however, military 
strength slipped out of the realm of the emperor’s power – that is, divine influ-
ence. The warriors became weak and no longer offered the country protection, 
and the country was even threatened by an invasion from abroad. In order to 
protect against this danger, Aizawa wrote, the ideal condition of military strength 
must be reestablished.244 
The third chapter on the kokutai deals with a problem that at first appears to 
be a very practical matter, the unequal distribution of rice. Aizawa states that rice 
is a gift from the gods, and therefore, the original owner of the entire country is 
the emperor as a representative of the gods. The ideal condition of the past was 
destroyed because the owners of great amounts of rice wallowed in luxury while 
the other classes lived in poverty. The right to possession of the rice must there-
fore be reformed.245 
In the chapter on the state of the world, Aizawa takes position on the general 
political topics of the time. He argues that even in Japan it is important to know 
                                                                                                                                                  
242 The original text does not name the goddess directly, but instead refers to the »heavenly ances-
tor« (tenso). Nonetheless, it is clear from the context that this means Amaterasu; cf. commentary 
NST 53: 52. 
243 NST 53: 52-70; Wakabayashi 1986: 152-171; cf. Stanzel 1982: 77.  
244 NST 53: 70-80; Wakabayashi 1986: 172-183; cf. Hammitzsch 1940: 71f.  
245 NST 53: 81-88; Wakabayashi 1986: 184-192; cf. Stanzel 1982: 78. 
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about world events in order to defend the country against possible attacks. In his 
view, China is the only possible ally of Japan, since only there do the people 
know about the will of the heavens. The Islamic countries are not aggressive and 
do not represent a threat. Only the Christian countries are dangerous, since they 
seek to expand their rule.246 
In the following chapter, »On Barbarians,« Aizawa argues that it is Christian-
ity that makes the West so dangerous. He alleges that spies disguised as mer-
chants enter the countries that are to be conquered and convert their people to 
Christianity in order to weaken them from the inside. In his view, Christianity is 
especially dangerous because most people are too easily swayed by it. Therefore, 
clear measures must be taken in this area.247 
In the chapter »Protection and Defense,« Aizawa makes detailed suggestions 
for domestic reforms. He states that the military must be revived, luxury must be 
avoided, and the social discrepancies between the classes must be leveled. He 
proposes a reorganization of the country’s defenses by settling farmer-warriors in 
remote areas, establishing surveillance posts on the coasts, as well as a navy and a 
modern, powerful artillery. Furthermore, the obligation of the Daimyô to regu-
larly reside in Edo should be abolished, since this results in excess costs.248 
In the last chapter, »A Far-Reaching Plan,« Aizawa summarizes the core 
points of his program: strengthening general welfare and the military, winning 
the trust of the people, establishing loyalty and piety as virtues for all people, 
uniting heaven and earth in the worship of the emperor, and civilizing the bar-
barians once and for all. This plan, Aizawa states, must extend from the time of 
the creation of Japan to the saving of all nations of the earth by Japan.249 
 
5. 2. 3. The concept of the kokutai 
 
The fundamental concept of the late Mito School therefore is the idea of the 
»national polity« (kokutai; cf. Antoni 1987, 1991, among others)250. The national 
polity of a country refers to the essential characteristics that differentiate it from 
all other nations, giving it its special position among these countries. In the case 
of Japan, the national polity justifies its unique position relative to other nations, 
                                                 
246 NST 53: 88-94; Wakabayashi 1986: 193-199; cf. Stanzel 1982: 79. 
247 NST 53: 94-106; Wakabayashi 1986: 200-213; cf. Hammitzsch 1940: 73. 
248 NST 53: 107-134; Wakabayashi 1986: 214-244; cf. Stanzel 1982: 80. 
249 NST 53: 134-158; Wakabayashi 1986: 245-277; cf. Stanzel 1982: 81. 
250 Material on certain periods of the kokutai concept can be found in, among others, Bellah 1985; 
Lokowandt 1978; Benl, Hammitzsch 1956; Earl 1981 (1964); Kracht 1975; Maruyama 1971 and 
1988; see also Worm 1981. 
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since Japan is the »land of the gods,« having been founded by the sun goddess 
Amaterasu and ruled over by her descendants. This made the emperor the em-
bodiment of the Japanese kokutai (cf. Stanzel 1982: 53-55). 
However, the term kokutai itself is extremely vague and difficult to translate 
directly. An etymological analysis (cf. Antoni 1991a: 32ff.) shows that the original 
Chinese term kuo-t’i, or kokutai in Japanese, can have many different meanings 
when translated directly, but becomes increasingly difficult to define. In China at 
the end of the 19th century – the time when the concept of the kokutai experienced 
its final blossoming in Japan – the pair of opposing terms t’i and yung, or »essen-
tial body [of China]« (i.e. Confucianism) and »practice« (i.e. Western technology), 
was known (cf. Bauer 1974: 383, 413, 465, 468, 470-72), but kokutai as a term of 
state philosophy in the sense of a »national polity« and »national identity« origi-
nated in the Japanese tradition of thought. 
The term kokutai appears not to have played a major role in Japan until the 
late Tokugawa period. In 1856 the scholar Yamagata Taika remarked that the 
term kokutai was totally unknown in Japan and was probably first used by schol-
ars of the Mito School.251 However, this generally held opinion is contradicted by 
the remarkable fact that the term kokutai most likely played a prominent role in 
the intense entanglements with foreign nations in the bakumatsu period. Accord-
ing to Meyer (1998), in December of 1853, Kômei-tennô explicitly stated to the ba-
kufu that the question of the written exchange with the American president on the 
opening of the country »is an extraordinary circumstance for the land of the gods, 
and he, Kômei-tennô, does not wish to cause chaos in the country through such a 
provocation and to dishonor the kokutai,« (Meyer 1998: 127). Past research has as-
sumed that the term kokutai had until that time been exclusive to the speculations 
of the national philosophers. This point must now be reconsidered (cf. Meyer 
1998: 126, note 17). At least at the court, the term kokutai was apparently used as a 
synonym for Japan itself at the time, and the reader will recall that already Hirata 
Atsutane saw the »true way of the kami« as being embodied by the kokutai (see 
chapter II: 5. 1. 3. 1). However, the spread of this concept to further sections of the 
population did not occur until the Meiji Restoration. 
It was the mentioned Mito scholar Aizawa Seishisai who established the term 
kokutai in discourse on the theory of government and determined its essential 
meaning, thus determining the foundation for kokutai thought (kokutai-shisô) in 
later times. 
                                                 
251 Yamagata Taika (1781-1866) was one of the leading theoreticians of the Meiji Restoration and a 
comrade of Yoshida Shôin; cf. Earl 1981 (1964): 236 and passim. 
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In this context, the term ceased to mean the »body, essence« or the »condi-
tion« of any nation252, but rather specifically and exclusively the inner being, the 
essence, the defining, immutable and eternal characteristics and values of the 
Japanese nation – everything that supposedly distinguished Japan from other na-
tions and made it superior to them. These meanings, whose origins are heteroge-
neous, had long been known to nationally oriented thinkers, but specifically their 
summarization and subsumption into a concise, overarching term appears to 
have been a new development. 
Upon examining the development of this term’s meaning in later times, three 
distinct phases of kokutai thought seem evident evident: the formative phase 
(around 1825-1890), the classical phase (1890-1937) and the hubristic phase (1937-
1945). 
The formative phase began in the early 19th century, as documented in the 
previously discussed work Shinron by Aizawa Seishisai of 1825. This period ends 
in 1890, the year the Imperial Rescript on Education was issued, which influenced 
the later development of the concept and marked the beginning of the second, 
classical phase (see chapter III: 3. 1.). 
As is evident from the dates of these periods, the classical phase took place 
during the greatest upheaval in Japanese history: the fall of the Tokugawa state, 
the opening of the country, and the establishment of the modern empire of Japan, 
with the emperor as its sacred head of state, who was above the Constitution and 
who was seen as an incarnation of the state. 
The thinkers of the Mito School played a significant role in this development, 
both in intellectual and political terms. Beginning with their originally purely his-
torical studies on the imperial family of Japan, this school developed increasingly 
practical and political as well as religious and ideological intentions that, in oppo-
sition to the so-called representative regime of the feudal state in Edo, fought for 
the reinstatement of a direct imperial government. 
Their theoretical foundation was formed by two originally independent sys-
tems of thought that were synthesized by the Mito scholars. The first of these was 
the centuries-old nationalist Shintô concept of Japan as a nation superior to all 
others and a sacred land of the gods whose divine emperors were called to rule in 
a single, eternal dynasty. 
The Mito School differed from the Kokugaku, which also emphasized this as-
pect at its central tenet, essentially only in the conscious addition of a further 
                                                 
252 The term kokutai is used in this sense by the Kokugaku scholar Ôkuni (Nonoguchi) Takamasa 
(1792-1874): »There are, however, nations whose state essence (kokutai) is inferior, whose customs 
are bad and where disloyalty is common,« (Hongaku koyô, NST 50, 1973: 407; Brüll 1966: 61). 
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spiritual element, the ethical maxims of the Edo period shushigaku. Interestingly, 
the Mito School considered these Confucian rules for organizing public life and 
managing vertical relationships of dependency to be the second immutable char-
acteristic of the essence of Japan. And the more this spiritual synthesis was ad-
vanced, the more the consciousness of the actually foreign – that is, Chinese – ori-
gin of this ethical system was lost, until it was finally understood to be Japanese 
around the end of the 19th century. 
As will be shown in the following discussion, State Shintô in the Meiji period 
postulated that the virtues were not of Confucian origin, but »introduced by the 
imperial ancestors« before the arrival of Confucianism and Buddhism in Japan 
(Lokowandt 1978: 240). Kokugaku scholars such as Ôkuni Takamasa claimed that 
»a true relationship to the ruler, to one’s parents, to one’s spouse, to society, to the 
people etc. only exists in Shintô, even though the names of the virtues that corre-
spond to these relationships – loyalty among vassals, obedience, benevolence, 
lawfulness etc. – are written in the books of Confucianism,« (Stolte 1939: 196f. 
note 12). 
This spiritual amalgam of Shintô in the sense of National Learning – based on 
the concept of the divine ruler – and Confucianism, which was understood as a 
catalog of moral norms, was considered by the Mito scholars to be the core of the 
kokutai, the defining and unique essence of the Japanese nation. 
The Mito scholars expanded the Shintô ideology of the land of the gods in the 
interpretation of National Learning to encompass the canon of Confucian ethical 
maxims that were dominant in Japan at the time. This is the actual difference be-
tween the Mito School and the puristic National Learning, which strictly rejected 
all things Chinese (cf. Antoni 1991a: 41, note 39). The doctrine of the »Five Vir-
tues« of the individual (go-jo, Chinese: wu-ch’ang) and the »Five Relationships« 
(gorin, Chinese: wu-lun) in society represented – independent of the nascent idea 
of direct rule by the emperor – the ethical foundation of feudal Japan in the Edo 
period (see above). 
The first two of these relationships were especially important: the relationship 
between vassal/official and master, and the relationship of filial piety (kô, Chi-
nese: hsiao) between father and son, or children and parents. Two aspects proved 
unique to the Japanese interpretation of these teachings: the concept of the origi-
nal unity of these two ideal relationships in the term chûkô-itchi, (»unity of loyalty 
and filial piety«), and the requirement that »loyalty,« defined as »filial piety,« was 
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no longer to be paid to the feudal ruler, but to the only legitimate ruler of Japan, 
the divine emperor.253 
Later, after the Meiji Restoration, this equating of »filial piety« and »loyalty« 
inevitably led to the concept of the state as a family, and loyalty toward the one 
true ruler was compared to a child’s love for its father. Combined with the Na-
tional Learning ideology of the land of the gods, this led to a familistic conception 
of the kokutai, which viewed the Japanese nation as an actual family of common, 
divine ancestry, with the emperor as its natural ruler.254 Mito School thought thus 
did not remain merely a theoretical exercise, but went on to become the true spiri-
tual basis of the new Japanese empire after the Meiji Restoration and the final vic-
tory of the conservative powers in the late 1880s. 
 
5. 2. 4. Further developments 
 
The Shintô aspects of this doctrine were also of central importance to a later 
Mito scholar and activist, Maki Izumi (1813-64), »an enthusiastic follower of the 
Mito discourse,« (Harootunian 1995: 77). He became politically active in the early 
1860s and was imprisoned due to his political activism in Kurume-han. A letter to 
the emperor from 1861 describes the goals of the Restoration. He considered the 
emperorship in ancient times to be ideal, and stated that it was none other than 
Jinmu-tennô himself who established the teachings of Shintô (Harootunian 1995: 
82): 
»[...] For Maki the whole purpose of the imperial campaign was to destroy the 
bakufu, he recommended a return to an antiquity before the Shôgun and mili-
tary estates had appeared as a model for the present.« (Harootunian 1995: 83) 
A failed attempt at a restoration in 1864 later served as a model for the events 
of 1868. Harootunian remarks in summary (l.c.): 
»In Maki, the Mito discourse, which had begun with Confucian statecraft for 
domain reform, had gone on to provide the validations of Shinto mythology 
for the organization of efforts for nationwide reforms and emperor-central 
revolution.« 
                                                 
253 The importance of this concept for the kokutai ideology of the Shôwa period can be seen in the 
commentary by Fujii (Tôkyô 2600 (1940): 54; cf. Antoni 1991: 42, note 40.) 
254 A comparison of the relationship between lord and vassal, father and child can be found al-
ready in the Nihonshoki (Yûryaku 23/8/7). The actual equating of the two relationships, however, 
first took place in the 19th century in the ideology of the kokutai; cf. Lokowandt 1978: 60ff.; Tsu-
rumi 1970: 103-109; Fridell 1970: 828-833; Bellah 1985: 104; van Straelen 1952: 83. 
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Between 1860 and 1863, there was widespread unrest throughout the country, 
including acts of terror by extremist groups (Göbel 1987). These groups were 
composed primarily of relatively young men (shishi, »men of high ideals«) from 
throughout the country who had received a military education at home or were 
involved with National Learning. Many of them, especially the most talented, 
went to Edo in order to complete further studies. There they often came into con-
tact with the Mito scholar Fujita Tôko, one of the men who had gathered around 
Tokugawa Nariaki and supported a philosophy of national unity and military 
preparedness (cf. Hall 1968: 253). Besides being politicized, they were also taught 
that the emperor was the symbol of all that Japan should represent. The fact that 
the West aggressively sought to impose its influence on Japan at that time was a 
source of resentment for these men, whose views were both sympathetic to the 
emperor and xenophobic (sonnô-jôi). Their political power reached its greatest 
peak after they returned to their home territories. There they occupied newly cre-
ated positions, became advisors to the Daimyô, and attempted to influence poli-
tics through direct initiatives. Later, the assassins of Ii Naosuke and Townsend 
Harris’s translator also came from their ranks. 
The Western reaction to these terrorist attacks consisted of acts of violence 
that further destabilized the bakufu. Conflicts within the bakufu also did not help 
promote any new trust in the regime. A request for help from Tokugawa Nariaki 
to the emperor in order to put an end to the dispute over the successor to the de-
ceased Shôgun Iesada resulted in increased prestige for the emperor. In 1864, 
when even the new Shôgun Yoshinobu personally travelled to Kyôto at the re-
quest of the emperor, he also implicitly underlined the new importance of the 
imperial court (cf. Meyer 1998). The Western powers realized this and ceased 
sending their delegations to Edo in favor of the imperial court in Kyôto. 
Upon Emperor Kômei’s death in 1867, his 14-year-old son took office as his 
successor, and the struggle for political dominance continued. Shôgun Yoshinobu 
was still attempting to reinstate the old system of power with the help of reforms. 
But this proved unsuccessful, and he was also unable to form a coalition of the 
Daimyô. In turn, the so-called »Tosa Memorandum« was issued, in which he was 
asked to step down in favor of a council of Daimyô under the authority of the 
emperor. He finally accepted in November 1867, thus »returning« power to the 
emperor 
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As Japan was finally forced by the United States and the European powers to 
open its ports in the middle of the 19th century, a pessimistic prognosis for the 
country’s future would have been logical, considering the realities of the time. 
Other Asian countries had been too weak to resist the imperial onslaught of the 
West, and it seemed that Japan’s fate was similarly sealed. 
But Japan did not become a colony, or even a dependent territory, but instead 
strove, after a short time, to become an imperial hegemon itself in the East-Asian 
hemisphere. There are many interpretations, explanations and analyses of the 
reasons that allowed Japan to undergo this incredible development. It would be 
beside the point to discuss them in detail here. However, there is consensus on 
the fact that one of the primary requirements for Japan to exist within the global 
framework of power was not just technological transformation, but also a trans-
formation of ideas – a revolution in the country’s intellectual foundation. 
The new government saw the solution to these problems not in the mere 
adoption of Western technologies and instruments of power, but rather in their 
intellectual foundations. The key terms in this context were »unity« and »nation.« 
The United States and the nations of Europe had already demonstrated the in-
struments of power of modern nation-states, and this was Japan’s only chance to 
catch up with these nations in this area quickly and without compromise. 
Finally, the fruits of a more or less hidden development that had taken place 
during the era of national seclusion came to bear. Although Japan was still far 
from being a unified nation at the time of the Meiji Restoration, the most impor-
tant members of the country’s intellectual leadership already envisioned, and 
possessed the means for, establishing a modern Japanese nation and nation-state. 
Thus, the country was also surprisingly well prepared for its encounter with the 
West on an intellectual level. 
The institution of the emperor was chosen as the unifying factor that was to 
overcome the historical differences of geography and class in Tokugawa-period 
society. Statesmen such as Itô Hirobumi openly declared that only the emperor 
was capable of providing spiritual guidance as a replacement for religion for the 
not yet unified Japanese nation. This view referred back to the Edo period schools 
of National Learning (Kokugaku) and Mitogaku. These schools had already de-
manded the reinstatement of the emperor’s supposedly ancient rights during the 
18th and early 19th centuries – the Kokugaku arguing on the basis of nationalistic 
Shintô and the Mito School with the addition of the ethical maxims of Neo-
Confucian social ethics to this foundation. 
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The image of Japan that was propagated under this state ideology reached its 
peak in the postulation of a single, unique Japanese »national polity,« or kokutai, 
that supposedly distinguished Japan from all other nations. 
As for domestic policy, the kokutai ideology, which was created, as we have 
seen, around the end of the Edo period by scholars of the Mito School, provided a 
guideline at the beginning of the Meiji period for the spiritual maxims of an eth-
nically and socially homogenous nation, with the goal of transforming the frag-
mented population into a united people loyal to the state. It was hoped that this 
unified nation-state would scare off potential enemies from the outside and create 
the basis for expanding the new Japanese empire. The ideological means for these 
aspirations to unity were the creation of a Japanese »family state,« in which all 
citizens or subjects were united by their common lineage, and which oriented this 
mythically founded nation toward the emperor as the father of the entire national 
family. 
The Meiji Restoration of 1868, in which the shogunate as a form of govern-
ment came to an end, can thus only partially be attributed to the influence of the 
West that is so often emphasized in theories of modernization. Without the deep 
intellectual opposition that developed within the country during the years of na-
tional seclusion, as well as this opposition’s preparations for change – that is to 
say, without the efforts of the imperial loyalists of the Kokugaku and Mitogaku 
already during the Tokugawa period – Japan would not have been able to trans-
form itself into a modern nation state in the sense of the 19th-century concept of 
government. 
Therefore, it was only natural that the spiritual beliefs and goals of these early 
national schools in Japan during the Meiji period should be translated into practi-
cal policies. Over the course of this development, Shintô became a »supra-
religious« state religion to which every citizen was required to adhere, regardless 
of his personal religious beliefs.255 The central role in this process of national uni-
fication was played by the imperial household, whose position was now officially 
– no longer only among the small numbers of Shintô and imperial loyalists – des-
ignated as unique and unequaled, since its origins were documented in the an-
cient myths. 
Thus, an extraordinary wave of national self-glorification swept through Ja-
pan during the beginning of the modern era, while Western learning and tech-
nology flowed into the country. Modern Japan saw its chance to stake its claim on 
the world stage in the combination of two opposing principles: the adoption of 
Western technology and the simultaneous emphasis of the »Japanese spirit.« 
                                                 
255 For highly valuable recent research on this topic cf. Isomae 2104, Josephson 2012, Maxey 2014. 
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1. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION 
 
Tokugawa Yoshinobu (also known as Tokugawa Keiki; 1837-1913), the 15th 
and last Shôgun of the Tokugawa house, yielding to both internal and external 
pressures, officially declared his resignation on November 9, 1867, (Keiô 3/10/14) 
and thus »returned« the power of government to the emperor (cf. KEJ 5: 159 b), 
though he at first claimed the post of prime minister as well as the extensive land 
holdings of the Tokugawa house. The ensuing doubts about the seriousness of his 
resignation caused the domains of Chôshû, Satsuma and others to mobilize forces 
against the Tokugawa. The bakufu as a political institution was abolished and a 
»restoration« of imperial rule was declared. On April 6, 1868, (4/3/14) Sanjô 
Sanetomi read the »Charter Oath in Five Articles« (gokajô no goseimon) that later 
became the basis for the national program of renewal.256 The charter secured not 
only the rule of the emperor, but was also written so that a majority within the 
imperial movement would support it. Its vague phrasing permitted a wide array 
of interpretations and allowed the government great flexibility in its actions (cf. 
Weber-Schäfer 1971: 637). 
After the clear victory of the revolutionary forces from the tozama-han 
Satsuma and Chôshû in the civil war, which lasted until July of 1869, the new 
government acted decisively to transform Japan into a modern state. The young 
leaders of the Meiji Restoration, some of whom had already spent time abroad, 
believed that a government that was determined by the interests of hundreds of 
rulers could hardly compete with the leading European powers and the United 
States. With the awkward position of China in mind, they sought to save their 
country from a similar fate. Furthermore, they recognized that the policy of na-
tional seclusion could not be continued. Thus, they advocated emulating the lead-
ing world powers of the time: the United States, Great Britain, Germany (Prussia) 
and France. Knowledge brought back from throughout the world was to form the 
basis for imperial rule. The goal of fukoku-kyôhei (»enrich the country, strengthen 
the military«) was modeled after Western imperialism, and in order to achieve 
this goal, it was necessary to eliminate the last vestiges of feudalism. 
For this reason, the government forced all Daimyô to »return« their territorial 
lands to the emperor. Prefectures (ken) based on the French model replaced the 
approximately 200 han. The imperial residence was moved from Kyôto to Edo, 
which was renamed Tôkyô, and a fully centralized government was created. As 
                                                 
256 Text in: Fujii Jintarô and Moriya Hidesuke: Meiji jidai shi. (SNT 12). Tôkyô 1939: 216; cf. Weber-
Schäfer 1971: 635. 
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especially revolutionary changes, mandatory military service and compulsory 
education were introduced. Despite difficulties at first, mandatory military serv-
ice was established relatively quickly. The former Samurai were given the ranks 
of officers based on the Prussian model, and the generals came mostly from 
Satsuma and Chôshû. However, many lower-class families protested against 
compulsory education at first, since they could not afford to pay for schooling. It 
was also difficult for them to understand why girls should be taken from their 
duties at home to go to school. Only in 1910 did the four-year system of compul-
sory education achieve widespread acceptance. 
The adoption of Western culture and lifestyles was not greeted exclusively 
with enthusiasm; there were also numerous disturbances. In 1877 Saigô Takamori 
(1828-1877) – a politician from Satsuma who played a significant role in the Meiji 
Restoration, but who later became dissatisfied with the scope of the reforms, and 
particularly with the impoverishment of the Samurai – attempted to carry out a 
coup. However, after an intense battle, the government forces prevailed. In 1889 
the minister of education, Mori Arinori (1847-1889), who was seen as a strong 
proponent of westernization, was assassinated by a discontented nationalist. 
When it became apparent, in the years following the Meiji Restoration, that 
only a few politicians from Satsuma and Chôshû were capable of ruling over their 
territories and would not tolerate a weakening of their position, bitterness spread 
among the remaining anti-bakufu forces who failed to gain influence after the Res-
toration. In January of 1874, some politicians from Tosa submitted a petition to 
the government demanding the creation of a parliament. This group’s activities 
eventually led to the later human rights movement (minken-undô). European 
thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill provided the ideo-
logical basis for the movement, which was led by Itagaki Taisuke (1836-1919). Al-
though most people in Japan had no concept of the terms »liberalism« and »de-
mocracy,« the movement spread quickly throughout the entire country. The gov-
ernment’s attempts to suppress this movement, including limiting the freedom of 
assembly, proved unsuccessful. Originally made up of former Samurai, the 
movement increasingly caught on among the upper classes – that is, wealthy 
farmers and merchants. In 1880 more than 240,000 people signed a petition for the 
establishment of a representative legislative body. And in the wake of a corrup-
tion scandal, the government saw no other option than to promise to work out a 
Constitution by 1890. A delegation led by Itô Hirobumi (1841-1909), one of the 
leading politicians of the Meiji period, was sent to Europe to study the various 
constitutional models there. Influenced by conservative scholars of constitutional 
law such as Rudolf von Gneist and Lorenz von Stein, they decided on a Constitu-
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tion based on the Prussian model. On February 11, 1889, the Meiji Constitution 
was promulgated by the emperor. This meant that the emperor’s position of 
power was now also guaranteed by law. 
In foreign affairs, a peaceful course was taken at first, since the country was 
still weak in comparison to the Western powers. In 1855 an agreement was 
reached with Russia stating that the southern Kuril Islands up to Etorofu (Iturup) 
belonged to Japan and that the Island of Sakhalin was an area of influence for 
both powers, without determining the exact borders. Then, in 1875 a treaty was 
reached stating that Sakhalin belonged to Russia and the thirty mostly unsettled 
Kuril Islands up to the Kamchatka Peninsula belonged to Japan. In the same year, 
claims on the Bônin Islands were made against Britain and the United States. In 
the south and on the continent, where the adversary was believed to be weaker, it 
was decided to use military force. After some Ryûkyû fishermen were captured 
and killed by inhabitants of the island of Taiwan, which belonged to China, Japan 
sent a punitive expedition to Taiwan. The Chinese government then agreed to 
compensatory payments for the affected families, thus indirectly recognizing Ja-
pan’s rights to the Ryûkyû or Okinawa Islands, which were claimed by both gov-
ernments. 
But Japan was especially interested in Korea. Already in 1873 the idea of con-
quering Korea discussed openly for the first time, though it ultimately did not 
have enough support in the government. Just three years later, a Japanese puni-
tive expedition was successful in »opening« the country. Korea was recognized 
by Japan as an independent kingdom, resulting in access for Japan to a number of 
harbors and an agreement on diplomatic trade relations. Since Korea had been a 
vassal state of China for centuries, the Korean people were split into two groups: 
the pro-Chinese, oriented toward the conservative politics of China, and the pro-
Japanese, who wanted to modernize Korea based on the Japanese model. After 
incidents in 1882 and 1884, which nearly led to conflicts between Chinese and 
Japanese troops, both governments decided to remove their troops from Korea. In 
1894, against treaty agreements with Japan, Chinese soldiers arrived in Korea in 
order to help suppress an anti-government movement. For Japan, which was con-
fident in its military power, this was a welcome opportunity to declare war on 
China. Japan won the war within six months. According to the peace accords of 
Shimonoseki in April of 1895, China was required to surrender Taiwan to Japan, 
give up control of Liadong Peninsula, recognize Korea’s independence and pay 
heavy reparations. Throughout the world, Japan’s influence now came to be 
feared. 
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2. SHINTÔ AS A »STATE RELIGION« IN THE EARLY MEIJI PERIOD? 
 
The Meiji Restoration marked not only the change of the ruling power from 
the Shôgun to the emperor, but also brought about important changes particu-
larly in the areas of religion and philosophy. Buddhism, which had previously 
been supported by the bakufu, lost its favored position to Shintô.257 The jisha-
bugyô, the highest office of the bakufu for controlling the country’s religious insti-
tutions, which had monitored relations between the government and religious in-
stitutions since the reign of Tokugawa Iemitsu (1623-1650), was abolished. Bud-
dhism was divested of its state recognition and large parts of its property were 
confiscated by the government (cf. Holtom 1922: 11). 
The central ideological and intellectual tenet of the restoration movement was 
the so-called »pure« Shintô (Fukko Shintô) of the Hirata School. Atsutane’s fol-
lowers advocated returning to an idealized form of government: the imperial rule 
by the supposed first emperor, Jinmu-tennô, according to the mythological tradi-
tion. The core tenets of this ideology were the direct descent of the imperial 
household from the sun goddess Amaterasu and the uniqueness and supremacy 
of the Japanese kokutai. The first four years of the Meiji period (1868-1872) were 
marked by the attempt of the Meiji oligarchy to integrate a form of Shintô into the 
state that had been radically cleansed of Buddhist influences. 
Thus, the Meiji government drew its legitimation from the existence of an 
early, historically undocumented emperor whose rule was nonetheless to serve as 
the model for the modern state. The cult of Jinmu in the Meiji period reveals the 
deep irrationality underlying the early state structures of modern Japan. Various 
edicts issued by the emperor and the government document this intention. 
Already in 1868, the Meiji government proclaimed as its next goal not the 
separation, but the unity of religion and state (saisei-itchi). According to this con-
cept, the details of which are relatively vague, the business of government is to be 
conducted in the same spirit in which the gods of the land are worshipped. How-
ever, the concept’s actual significance lies in the religiously based legitimation of 
rule. Ernst Lokowandt (1989: 14) writes on the meaning of the concept of saisei-
itchi: 
                                                 
257 This subject is covered in a wide range of literature, a selection of which includes Murakami 
1986 and 1990; in Western languages: Gluck 1985; Hardacre 1989; Hori, Toda 1956; Lokowandt 
1978; Antoni 1991; more recently Maxey 2014, Isomae 2014. 
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»This concept is based on the belief in the divinity of Japan and of the impe-
rial household and on the belief in the eternal influence of the gods, whose 
protection and aid must be secured. It demonstrates the basis for the state in 
the religious context.«258 
In order to propagate and enforce this ideology, in February of 1868 the 
Shintô Worship Bureau (jingi jimukyoku) was established as one of eight bureaus 
of the Grand Council of State (dajôkan). Only a short time later, the dajôkan gave 
the order to separate Shintô and Buddhism (Shinbutsu-bunri no rei). Objects of 
Shintô worship were to be removed from Buddhist temples, and Buddhist stat-
ues, images and other materials removed from Shintô shrines. Shrines with Bud-
dhist names were renamed. 
Thus, with the proclamation of the return to imperial rule in January 1868, the 
new emperor, Mutsuhito, designated himself a direct descendant of Jinmu-tennô. 
In a Shintô ritual on April 6, 1868, the emperor declared on behalf of the govern-
ment that, from that point on, governance and religion would be one, as specified 
in the »Charter Oath in Five Articles« (Gokajô no goseimon), which enumerates the 
fundamental principles of the future empire (cf. Lokowandt 1989: 11ff.). 
The Charter Oath did indeed contain some constitutionally applicable princi-
ples, and the first four clauses were apparently strongly influenced by liberal 
thinking, which still existed alongside kokutai thought at the beginning of the 
Meiji period. However, the fifth and now most famous clause specifies what later 
became the official program of the new era. This section states: 
»Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the 
foundation of imperial rule.« 
This passage is strongly reminiscent of the view – widely held at the time – 
described by the term wakon-yôsai (see chapter III: 4.), a concept being based on 
the premise that the technological achievements from the outside world – that is, 
the West – could be used to benefit the spiritual core of Japan, its imperial house-
hold and the state. 
In practice, principles of Shintô were introduced into politics through the es-
tablishment of government offices responsible for this task. In direct analogy to 
the Taihô Code, as contained in the Yôro Code of the 8th century, the jingikan was 
once again to occupy the highest position in the hierarchy of government. No-
where else are the idealistic and nativistic characteristics of the Meiji Restoration 
                                                 
258 »Dieses Konzept beruht auf dem Glauben an die Göttlichkeit Japans und des Kaiserhauses und 
auf dem Glauben an das fortwährende Wirken der Götter, deren Schutz und Hilfe man sich ver-
gewissern muß. Es demonstriert die Grundlagen des Staates im Religiösen.« 
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more apparent than here (cf. Lokowandt 1989: 12). Thus, in April 1868, the Shintô 
Worship Bureau (jingi jimukyoku) was transformed into the Office of Divinities 
(jingikan). At first, this office was given the highest rank of any state institution, 
according to the ancient system – higher even than the Grand Council of State. 
However, in the beginning its responsibilities were purely of a ritual nature: the 
performing of ceremonies for the souls of the imperial ancestors, harvest and 
New Year’s rituals, maintenance of the imperial burial places, as well as the wor-
ship of the deities of heaven and earth and the eight protective deities of the im-
perial household. 
Further measures were aimed at strengthening the new system. For example, 
the establishment of numerous imperial shrines was intended to strengthen the 
emperor’s popularity. A new Shintô calendar of festivals replaced the traditional 
Buddhist festivals of the Edo period. Mutsuhito’s birthday, the mythological en-
thronement of Jinmu-tennô, and other festivals related to the imperial household 
strengthened the support among the people for the national imperial dynasty. 
With the help of a hierarchical organization of the shrines, at the peak of which 
was Ise Shrine, the »Mecca« of imperial Shintô, and the base of which was made 
up of the innumerable village shrines, the religion of Shintô was centralized and 
oriented toward the imperial household. Religious rites, priests’ clothing and the 
gods to be worshipped were standardized based on the model of the Ise. 
After reforming the shrines, the focus turned to the people, who were to be 
organized as parishioners (ujiko) of individual shrines. Instead of the system of 
mandatory registration at Buddhist temples, which had been common policy un-
til then, registration at shrines (ujiko-shirabe) was introduced. Every Japanese be-
came a »shrine parishioner« by receiving a talisman from the local shrine. Upon 
changing residence, parishioners were obliged to register at the new place of 
residence, and when an ujiko died, the talisman was finally returned to the 
shrine.259 
A third measure was aimed at the priesthood. In 1871 the Grand Council of 
State declared that shrine ceremonies were to be considered state rites (kokka no 
sôshi). Thus, the heritable nature of the priesthood came to an end. From then on, 
all priests were appointed by the state.260 Shintô priests were thus elevated to the 
position of government officials and were subject to the authority of the jingikan. 
                                                 
259 This early form of census, however, which was the responsibility of the Buddhist temples dur-
ing the Tokugawa period, was not systematically applied and quickly lost its importance; cf. Har-
dacre 1989: 29. 
260 In 1875 this framework was expanded by the government’s designation of rituals and ceremo-
nies for use in officially recognized shrines. They were given precise instructions, even regarding 
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The shrines also took over the function of registration and census offices from 
the Buddhist temples (Hardacre 1989: 83f.). Newborn babies were given a talis-
man from Ise, and private households were required to worship statuettes of the 
main deities of Ise Shrine (Hardacre 1989: 86ff.). Even the Imperial Palace was 
»cleansed« of Buddhist influence: Buddhist altars were brought into temples, 
Buddhist court ceremonies relating to the seasons were discontinued, and mem-
bers of the imperial family who were Buddhist monks were required to give up 
this function. The cleansing of Shintô from Buddhist influence proceeded without 
control or direction. First, the Meiji government issued a decree in April of 1868 
dismissing all Buddhist priests who served at shrines, which was common prac-
tice in the time of Ryôbu Shintô. The removal of Buddhist symbols from Shintô 
shrines and the prohibition against Buddhist burials were intended to bring 
about a »gentle separation« of Buddhism and Shintô. 
However, the execution of the government decision fell under the responsibil-
ity of the regional authorities, which worked to the disadvantage of Buddhism. 
Buddhist temples were burned down, images, sutras and objects of worship were 
destroyed or sold, bells were melted down, and valuable art and cultural objects 
were lost (Hardacre 1989: 27f. Lokowandt 1989: 13ff.). 
However, the jingikan only retained its special status for a short time. In 
August of 1871, the office was incorporated into the government apparatus as a 
normal ministry under the title of jingishô. Like the other ministries, it was now 
subject to the authority of the Council of the State (dajôkan). 
According to Holtom (1922: 17ff.), the time between 1871 and 1872 marked 
the beginning of a new era for Japan. He states that the unusually close relation-
ship between Shintô and the state was especially apparent in the government’s ef-
forts to gain full control over the shrines (Holtom 1922: 18). It was thought that 
the main reason for the confusion at the time was the heritable nature of the 
priesthood, which had the effect of making the shrines practically the property of 
the priests and their income private. The law abolishing the heritability of the 
priesthood261 was followed by a similar decree requiring the separation of public 
and private worship in Shintô (Holtom 1922: 20). 
Simultaneously with these reforms of the priesthood, a new system of classi-
fying all shrines according to specific ranks was implemented – yet another 
measure revealing the government’s desire to expand its control over the shrines. 
According to this new classification, there were now various official ranks such as 
                                                                                                                                                  
the pronunciation of words. Exceptions were only allowed through special permission; cf. 
Creemers 1968: 214, Appendix B. 
261 Fukoku no. 234 of the dajôkan of May 14, 1871, cf. Lokowandt 1978: 270 doc. 29. 
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kanpei-taisha (»first-class imperial shrine«), kanpei-chûsha, kanpei-shôsha etc.262 As 
Lokowandt writes, the »entire policy on Shintô [served] to religiously ensure the 
divine honor of the emperor,« (Lokowandt 1978: 43). The new classification of the 
shrines, with Ise at its peak, followed by the shrines for the worship of the em-
peror (chokusaisha263), state shrines (kansha), and the special imperial shrines (bek-
kaku-kanpeisha), strengthened the people’s connection to Shintô and the imperial 
household (cf. Lokowandt 1978: 44ff.). Especially Ise, which had been closely 
connected with the imperial household since ancient times (the Naikû housed the 
mirror as one of the three imperial regalia), was able to benefit from its great 
popularity during the Edo period, when practice of Ise-mairi was highly fashion-
able (see chapter II: 3. 1.). This religious belief was now transferred onto the im-
perial household. 
Furthermore, on April 13, 1871, standardized rituals and ceremonies for all 
Shintô shrines were specified by decree, as well as for all the important Shintô 
festivals (Holtom 1922: 21/22).  
The government, which aimed to use religion for political purposes, strove to 
bring order and clarity to religious practice. At the same time, an aggressive pol-
icy of repression was undertaken, which was first directed against Buddhism. But 
Christians throughout the country were also subject to severe measures. The pro-
hibition against Christianity from the Edo period was extended on April 7, 1868 
(Lokowandt 1978: 24; cf. Maull 1993). The Urakami Christians who were discov-
ered near Nagasaki in 1867 were forced under threat of torture and deportation to 
renounce their religion, and some of their leaders were beheaded. On the »three 
permanent display panels« in Tôkyô, Christianity was branded as an »evil relig-
ion« (Lokowandt 1978: 24f.).264 The Christians’ situation improved after the return 
of the Iwakura mission in 1873. The delegation had left for Europe and the United 
States in 1872 to revise the Unequal Treaties of 1853 (cf. Hall 1968: 238ff.). The 
members of the delegation were constantly confronted by diplomats and the pub-
lic abroad regarding the persecution of Christians in Japan. After their return, the 
members of this mission had the text of the Tôkyô display panels changed and of-
ficially brought an end to the persecution of Christians (Lokowandt 1978: 26f.). 
Although in the beginning of the Meiji period Shintô was spread by radical 
and – as can be seen in the example of Buddhism and Christianity – intolerant 
means, it lacked the theological force of Buddhism, which, due to its simple tenets 
                                                 
262 Cf. Holtom 1922: 20; Lokowandt 1978: passim. 
263 Originally these were the so-called »22 shrines« (cf. Naumann 1988). »The old system was re-
newed by a visit by Meiji-tennô to the Hikawa shrine of Omiya at Tôkyô« (Lokowandt 1978: 44). 
264 On the topic of Christianity as an evil religion cf. the new study by Maxey 2014: passim. 
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and well-educated theologians, remained very popular among the Japanese peo-
ple. In 1872 the government acknowledged this fact as well as the demands from 
abroad for religious freedom. In April of that year the government transformed 
the jingikan into the Ministry of Religion (kyôbushô), which was also responsible 
for Buddhism. Buddhism was once again recognized by the state, although this 
recognition also included a comprehensive regimentation of Buddhist doctrine. 
Buddhism was given a position that was clearly subordinate to Shintô. Ernst 
Lokowandt (1978: 24) pointedly remarks on the kyôbushô that »the attempt was 
made to integrate Buddhism into Shintô.« 
 
2. 1. The spiritual upheaval: Meiji Restoratiom and haibutsu-kishaku 
 
Already during the Edo period, criticisms of the degenerate and privileged 
life of the Buddhist priesthood and Buddhism’s orientation toward the afterlife 
were leveled by Confucians and Kokugaku scholars.265 The latter primarily advo-
cated a restoration of Shintô, studied Japan’s past and demanded the reinstate-
ment of the emperor as the country’s ruler and highest priest. Even before the 
Meiji government decreed the separation of Buddhism and Shintô in 1868, thus 
beginning the campaign against Buddhism (haibutsu-kishaku, »abolish the Bud-
dha, destroy Sakyamuni«), anti-Buddhist measures had already surfaced in iso-
lated areas such as Satsuma and Oki. There were plans to dissolve Buddhist tem-
ples, defrock monks and use the taxes paid to the temples for military expenses. 
However, these precursors were overlooked. 
Originally, it was not the intention of the Meiji government to abolish Bud-
dhism, but the edict of 1868 mandating its separation from Shintô included 
measures that came very close to abolition. The early Meiji period was marked by 
destructive attacks against Buddhism and a subsequent »Buddhist awakening.« 
Shintô and Buddhism had existed in parallel for centuries. Shintô deities were 
viewed as incarnations of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and were worshipped with 
statues of the Buddha; likewise, Buddhist priests appointed by the Tokugawa 
government (bettô, shasô) were responsible for managing shrines. Therefore, ac-
cording to the Kokugaku, it was necessary to cleanse Shintô, the new state relig-
ion, of all elements that were believed to be »non-Japanese,« meaning Buddhist 
and also Confucian influences. The Mito School, which argued for the instate-
                                                 
265 On the following cf. Alles 1979; Fischer (ed.): passim 1979; Kishimoto 1956; Kitagawa 1966; 
Chantepie de la Saussaye 1925; Yasumaru 1979 and 1984-85b, among others. In his recent study 
Michael Wachutka (2013) explicitly explores the role of Kokugaku in Meji-period Japan. 
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ment of the emperor as a political ruler, also urged at least a reduction in the 
number of Buddhist temples. With the government’s decrees in 1868 to separate 
»gods and Buddhas« and the defrocking of Buddhist priests serving at shrines 
(this meant removing all priests, rituals and religious objects from the shrines), a 
five-year period of suppression of Buddhism began throughout Japan. This 
movement was widely supported in some han, such as Satsuma and Oki,266 since 
Buddhism had not earned much sympathy during the Tokugawa period due to 
high taxes, the privileged life led by its priests, and its role in surveillance. 
The result was the destruction of Buddhist temples and religious objects, as 
well as the dissolution of the temples’ land holdings. Demands by the govern-
ment to quell the violence were unsuccessful. Anti-Buddhist sentiment from the 
Tokugawa period as well as the desire for the reinstatement of the unity of relig-
ion and government created a climate in which the destruction of Buddhism 
quickly gathered momentum. 
This development was neither exclusively motivated by ideology nor by relig-
ion, but rather contained elements of both areas, amplified by the characteristic 
desire of the early Meiji period to destroy everything that was old. Thus, haibutsu-
kishaku became a national movement. In the fall of 1870, Toyama-han without 
warning issued a call to abolish Buddhist temples, resulting in a dramatic reduc-
tion in their numbers. Contact between religious believers and the sect leaders 
was forbidden under threat of the death penalty. Toyama’s harsh policy resulted 
in widespread criticism, but not all of the han that still existed at the time inter-
preted the decree for separation so radically. 
However, one element shared by all of these movements was the strong in-
fluence of the Hirata and Mito Schools, which provided the ideology for the per-
secution of Buddhism. The Hirata School advocated the complete abolition of 
Buddhism, the »return« to Shintô and the complete destruction and abolition of 
all Buddhist elements and influences (cf. chapter II: 5. 1. 3. 2.). These were to be 
replaced with Shintô. The Hirata School was most influential in Satsuma, Oki, 
Mino and Tosa. The Mito School, on the other hand, did not support a direct re-
jection of Buddhism, but rather advocated closing »unnecessary« temples and 
dismissing any priests not strictly needed. In Toyama, for example, »the number 
of temples was reduced from 1,630 to 7,« (Lokowandt 1978: 19). On the island of 
Oki, Buddhism was subjected to extreme persecution. This tense situation was 
gradually defused by the reorganization of the han into prefectures in 1871 and 
the influx of modern Western thought in Japan, and the persecution of Buddhism 
                                                 
266 Cf. Tamamuro 1977: 228f.; Alles 1979: 2. 
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subsided. At this time, a few conscientious priests began to explore the traditional 
spirit of Buddhism. 
 
2. 2. Shinbutsu-bunri, the »separation of gods and Buddhas« 
 
The true beginning of the state’s propagation of Shintô after 1868 was her-
alded by the decree of March 28, 1868, in which the new government called for 
the »separation of gods and Buddhas« at Shintô shrines. This decree (Shinbutsu-
bunrei no rei, or Shinbutsu-hanzen rei267), which was based on the maxims of the 
Hirata and Mito Schools of Fukko Shintô268, was immediately made known 
throughout the country by the government bureaucracy and implemented at the 
local level, sometimes involving terrifying outbreaks of violence against Buddhist 
institutions. Thus, over one thousand years of shared traditions between »gods 
and Buddhas« (shinbutsu-shûgô) abruptly came to an end. 
As Allan Grapard writes in his 1984 study, which introduced the topic of 
shinbutsu-bunri to the West, these measures by the Japanese government began a 
series of events that were not limited to the suppression of Buddhism (haibutsu-
kishaku). However, this topic has so far only seldom been mentioned in discus-
sions of Japan’s religious history, despite its importance for the country’s relig-
ious, political and social development in the modern era. Only a small number of 
Japanese scholars (Grapard 1984: 241)269 have covered this area in recent years, 
and their findings have not widely influenced the general view of the situation. 
According to Grapard, the view held by the overwhelming majority of schol-
ars is clearly based on their total ignorance of the degree of interaction between 
Shintô and Buddhism over the centuries. In his view, if this interaction had been 
taken into account, they would not have seen the events of the years surrounding 
the Meiji Restoration as a »restoration,« but rather as a cultural »revolution« with 
far-reaching consequences for the development of modern Japan. He states that 
most scholars, and especially those in the West, were or still are under the influ-
                                                 
267 The text of the decree can be found in Kumagaya 1902: 1, no. I/1; German translation in Lok-
owandt 1978: 250, document 7. My use of the term »separation of gods and Buddhas« follows 
Grapard’s (1984: 241) example. 
268 Hori and Toda (1956: 39-41) in particular emphasize the influence of the Kokugaku (Hirata 
Shintô), while Tamamuro (1977) sees the Mito school as the most influential group. On the rela-
tionship between the Kokugaku and the Mitogaku, see also Antoni 1991. 
269 For an introduction to this topic, cf. Coville 1948: 7ff.; Grapard 1984; Hardacre 1989: 27f.; Hori, 
Toda 1956: 47- 52; Iwai 1984; Lokowandt 1978: 13-22 and doc. 7, 8, 10, 15-17; Murakami 1990: 59ff.; 
Nara-kenritsu Nara-toshokan 1992; Ômori 1992: 184-186; Ono 1985: 63f.; Tamamuro 1977; Tsuji, 
Murakami 1926; Yasumaru 1984-85a. 
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ence of the Meiji ideology (Grapard 1984: 242) and continue to view Shintô as in-
dependent from Buddhism.270 Scholars have continued to uphold this separation 
by specializing in either Shintô or Buddhism, thus marginalizing the culture of 
Japanese syncretism. 
If any doubt remains about the connection between the gods of Shintô and 
Buddhism, Grapard continues, the texts on the origins, symbols and myths of the 
shrine-temple complexes (jisha engi) provide exhaustive details, and it only makes 
sense to recognize the emergence, development and history of these cultural cen-
ters as a fundamental aspect of Japanese religiosity and culture. For this reason, 
he states, the separation of Shintô and Buddhism by the Meiji government was a 
destructive act that appeared to be aimed at these centers, but in fact primarily 
sought to change the country’s religious consciousness. In his view, this would 
not have been possible without an ideology based on the total disregard of his-
tory (Grapard 1984: 245). 
The decrees of 1868 allowed the Meiji ideologues to sever all connections be-
tween the deities of Shintô and Buddhism, and in their place to create numerous 
gods of their own, either by renaming old ones or inventing new ones, that were 
to become part of the new state religion. Thousands of monks and nuns were 
forced to live as laymen, and innumerable Buddhist works of art were destroyed, 
sold, stolen, burned or covered with excrement. The degree of the destruction of 
syncretistic writings and works of art was beyond all imagination, but no one 
recognized the fact that, in reality, this represented a denial of the country’s true 
cultural history. By bringing about the separation and allowing such destruction, 
the new government claimed to return to the true source of Japanese identity and 
religious consciousness. In truth, however, these measures constituted the falsifi-
cation of their own culture and the rewriting of Japan’s history (Grapard 1984: 
245). 
For this reason, the early Meiji period is a prime example of Hobsbawm and 
Rothermund’s theories on »invented traditions« and religiously justified »tradi-
tionalism.« (see below) The ideologues in the tradition of the Hirata and Mito 
Schools created supposedly ancient institutions and rituals,271 used popular piety 
whenever this served their aims, and shifted the main object of worship in Ise 
from the god of agriculture enshrined at the Outer Shrine (i.e. Watarai Shintô) to 
                                                 
270 This interpretation by Grapard is worth considering, since it points to one of the main prob-
lems in intellectual-historical Japanese studies: the question of whether its findings generally only 
reflect the theories of the Japanese Kokugaku and present them as objective facts. 
271 Among other things, the establishment of »Shintô weddings«; cf. Ôbayashi 1997. 
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the sun goddess of the Inner Shrine (i.e. the Kokugaku) as a symbol of the state 
(Grapard 1984: 246). 
 
2. 2. 1. A case study: shinbutsu-bunri at Ômiwa Shrine 
 
One ancient center of religion in Japan is particularly instructive in illuminat-
ing the details and the dramatic development of this separation of Buddhism and 
Shintô at the beginning of the Meiji period: Ômiwa Shrine, located at the base of 
Mount Miwa, which was previously discussed in the context of Miwa (-ryû) 
Shintô (see also Antoni 1993a, 1995c). 
Mount Miwa played a significant role already in the tradition of Shintô my-
thology. The Kojiki and Nihonshoki tell of the fate of the deity of this mountain, 
Ômononushi no mikoto, a manifestation of the Great Deity of Izumo, Ôkuninushi 
no kami (cf. Antoni 1988: passim; Naumann 1988: 122f.). This main deity of the 
Izumo tradition of Japanese mythology is worshipped at one of the most impor-
tant Shintô shrines in the country, Ômiwa-jinja. This »Shrine of the Great Deity« 
claims to be the oldest shrine in all of Japan, according to ancient Japanese 
myths.272 Although the historical truth of such claims is disputed – and in actual-
ity, they are doubtful – Ômiwa-jinja (henceforth referred to as »OJ«) demonstrates 
a number of qualities that make it unusual as a Shintô place of worship. For ex-
ample, the main shrine of the precinct has no honden, the central shrine building 
that houses the shintai (»divine body«) of the enshrined deity, but only a haiden, 
the »hall of worship« in which religious services are performed. Since Miwa-yama 
is considered to be a divine mountain, and thus is holy and inviolable as the body 
of the deity, the mountain itself is worshipped as the shintai of the god 
Ômononushi. This demonstrates the extraordinary importance of this mountain 
in the religious thinking of Miwa. 
Around the central shrine building, there is a group of various so-called sessha 
and massha, branch shrines whose deities have a special, traditional relationship 
to the main deity of Ômiwa-jinja. 
These include smaller compounds such as Himuka-jinja273 and Kuebiko-
jinja274, but also larger ones such as Sai-jinja275 and Hiraba-jinja.276 The last of 
                                                 
272 This assumption, which is based on the assumed veracity of the mythical chronology, can be 
found in the form of a concrete statement in the shrine’s own publications (OJ 1977: preface, 
among others). Even the only English-language discussion of the shrine to date (Ponsonby-Fane 
1968-91: 57 [original: 1939]) which, however, contains serious errors, supports this claim. 
273 On Himuka-jinja, cf. Shiga 1968-91: 157-158. 
274 On Kuebiko-jinja, cf. OJ 1975: 396; 1977: 18; 1968-91, vol. 4: 551 
188  n  KOKUTAI - POLITICAL SHINTÔ FROM EARLY-MODERN TO CONTEMPORARY JAPAN   
 
these shrines is particularly important. Hibara-jinja is also known by the name of 
Yamato no Kasanui no mura. According to the Nihonshoki, it was here that Toyo-
sukiiri-hime worshipped the sun goddess and ancestral deity of the imperial 
household during the reign of the legendary emperor Sujin, before the mirror was 
finally transferred to Ise as her »divine body« or shintai (Nihonshoki, Sujin 6 (no 
month, no day) = Shinten 1982: 291). Therefore, this shrine is also called Moto-Ise 
(»the original Ise«).277 
This legend, whose historical veracity will not be examined here, illuminates 
an aspect that was of central importance to the history of Ômiwa-jinja: the 
shrine’s extremely close connection to the imperial household. The shrine at 
Miwa has always been one of the greatest shrines in the country, whose national 
importance stemmed from their proximity to the religious and political position 
of the imperial household. Thus, in times when the emperorship was strong, the 
shrine’s influence and prestige grew, while in eras of imperial decline, its position 
was similarly affected. Accordingly, since the Ritsuryô period, Ômiwa-jinja has 
been among the most important shrines in the empire and was also included in 
the list of the »twenty-two shrines« that have been famous on a national scale 
since the Heian period. 
Only in the modern era (i.e. after the Meiji Restoration) did Ômiwa-jinja once 
again attain a similarly elevated position. As a consequence of the »reinstate-
ment« of imperial rule after 1868 and the consequent efforts to make Shintô the 
state religion of the new Japan, Miwa also regained its importance. Already in 
May of 1871, Ômiwa-jinja was elevated to the highest of the newly created cate-
gories for Shintô shrines: kanpei-taisha, »first-class imperial shrine.«278 The shrine 
lost this position only upon the official abolition of State Shintô through the 
»Shintô Directive« of December 15, 1945, issued by the American occupation 
authorities.279 
                                                                                                                                                  
275 On Sai-jinja [Sainimasu Ômiwa Aramitama Jinja], the largest branch shrine at the Miwa com-
plex, cf. OJ 1975: 149, 157, 257, 619; Shiga 1968-91: 153; Yoshida 1989: 19, among others. 
276 On Hibara-jinja, cf. Higuchi Kiyoshi: »Hibara-jinja fukugen no igi« in: OJ 1968-91, Vol. 3: 648-652. 
Cf. OJ 1977: 20; Yoshida 1989: 30. Since November 5, 1987, Hibara-jinja has been expanded to in-
clude a further small shrine, Toyosuki-iri-hime no miya. 
277 Several articles in OJ 1968-91, Vol. 3: 614-652 deal with the question of the identity of Yamato 
no Kasanui no mura and Hibara-jinja. The term Moto-Ise is also used in connection with other 
shrines in the country. 
278 On the history of Ômiwa-jinja since the Meiji period, cf. Inui 1968-91; Miyachi 1968-91; Mori 
1992; OJ 1977; Umeda 1975. See also Hardacre 1989: 81f.; cf. Antoni 1995c. 
279 Even to this day, Miwa claims and documents its close connection to the imperial household 
and the state order, especially that of State Shintô, of pre-1945 Japan. The influence of this relig-
ious order even today can be seen in the fact that regular celebrations in honor of the most impor-
tant document of Meiji-period state ideology, the »Imperial Rescript on Education« (Kyôiku (ni 
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It is apparent that the Meiji period was especially important for the concep-
tion of Ômiwa-jinja. But to the interested observer, the significance of the events 
of the time – particularly the religious policy of the Meiji Restoration – is difficult 
to unearth. This is not surprising, since it reveals a dark – and even tragic – chap-
ter in the shrine’s history, which concluded with the elevation of Ômiwa-jinja to 
the rank of a »first-class imperial shrine.« 
 
2. 2. 1. 1. The implementation of the shinbutsu-bunri decree 
at Ômiwa Shrine 
 
The so-called jingûji, Buddhist temples that operated in symbiosis with Shintô 
shrines, whose teachings were based on syncretistic models that identified kami 
with Buddhas and Bodhisattvas of the Buddhist pantheon, had existed through-
out the land since ancient times. It was the two great Buddhist schools of the He-
ian period in particular that provided the foundation for this practice: Tendai 
Buddhism with its concept of honji-suijaku, and Shingon Buddhism with Ryôbu 
Shintô, which was based on the tradition of Mikkyô. Both assumed that there was 
an original unity of the kami and Buddhist higher beings, but both schools also 
saw the deities of Shintô as being inferior, since they were only the »local« mani-
festations of their respective universal beings of Buddhism, whether in the form 
of the »original reality« and »manifested traces« of the Tendai doctrine or as 
manifestations of the Dainichinyorai in parallel Shintô deities according to the 
Shingon Mikkyô tradition. This syncretistic thinking had been prevalent in Japan 
since ancient times, and particularly since the end of the Heian period.280 Only in 
the Edo period, when the Tokugawa bakufu designated Buddhism as a state relig-
ion, and with the (resulting?) rise of the Kokugaku, were forces from within 
Shintô circles able to gain power and push for a separation and »cleansing« of 
Shintô from everything related to Buddhism. Finally, in the Meiji Restoration, this 
national-religious movement was actively implemented. 
Even – and especially – Mount Miwa provided an example of the coexistence 
of these religions and for the close, seemingly inseparable combination of Shintô, 
Buddhism and folk religion that appeared to be resistant to such religious fanati-
cism.281 And yet the »separation« – that is to say, the elimination of all historically 
                                                                                                                                                  
kansuru) chokugo) are performed, e.g. on October 30, 1990 as part of a centennial celebration ; cf. OJ 
1968-91, bekkan 2: 174. 
280 For further research on Buddhist-Shinto syncretism cf. Breen, Teeuwen 2000; Naumann 1994; 
Teeuwen 1996, 2000; Teeuwen, Scheid 2002;  cf. Antoni 2001c. 
281 Cf. in particular the collected sources published by Ômiwa-jinja itself (OJ 1928; OJ 1968-91), edi-
tions (OJ 1968-91), collections of academic essays (OJ 1968-91), monographs (OJ 1975) and periodi-
cals (Ômiwa); source materials can also be found in Ueda 1989. For an introduction to this area, cf. 
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developed Buddhist elements – was so thoroughly implemented at this shrine 
around 1868 that today nothing remains of the shrine’s great Buddhist syncretis-
tic past. Only a single building remains of the formerly three jingûji of Miwa 
(Daigorinji, Jôganji and Byôdôji), the main building of the former Daigorinji. 
Since the time of the Meiji Restoration, this building has been located on the 
northern edge of the compound, far removed from the main part of the shrine 
precinct, and the trained eye will recognize that its architecture does not belong 
to the Shintô tradition, since it is built in the so-called irimoya-zukuri style.282 Since 
this time, it has functioned as a branch shrine of Ômiwa-jinja – called Wakamiya, 
and also known as Ôtataneko-jinja – that is dedicated to the ancestor of the family 
of priests at Ômiwa-jinja, and the descendant of the god Ômononushi no kami, 
called Ôtataneko. However, this designation has existed only since the spring of 
1868. Up until that time, this building housed the principle object of worship 
(honzon) of the Buddhist Daigorinji, a statue of the eleven-headed Kannon (jûichi-
men-kannon, Sanskrit: Ekadasamukha) from the Tempyô era (729-748), which is of 
great artistic value, and thus served as a main hall (hondô) of this temple, one of 
the jingûji of Miwa.283 
With the shinbutsu-bunri decree by the Meiji government, the long Buddhist 
syncretistic tradition of the Daigorinji came to a brutal end. Already on March 17, 
1868, an order of the new central government demanded the defrocking of the 
bettô and shasô, the Buddhist priests who served at shrines. These priests were 
now required to perform their services in the white (meaning of neutral rank) 
garb of Shintô priests. The implementation of these measures at the individual 
shrines was to be administered at the local level.284 
Shortly thereafter, the »separation edict« of March 28, 1868, was issued. In 
Miwa a final report on the inspection of the shrine of the »honorable divine im-
ages of Ôtataneko no mikoto« was written (Ôtataneko no mikoto go-shinjiku no 
kiji),285 in which the fact that this »shrine« was actually the main place of worship 
for the syncretistic Buddhist Daigorinji was no longer acknowledged at all. An 
investigator from the newly created jingikan by the name of Ôtani Shûjitsu had 
visited Ôtataneko-jinja/Daigorinji for this purpose and led the investigation 
                                                                                                                                                  
Kubota 1968-91; OJ 1975, chapter 7 (»Chûsei no Ômiwa-jinja«) and 8 (»Kinsei no Ômiwa-jinja«); 
Yoshida 1991; Abe 1984-85. Ponsonby-Fane’s work (1968-91 [1939]) reflects the official Japanese 
doctrine of the pre-war era and is of no academic value today. 
282 Detailed architectural drawings of the building can be found in Ômiwa 76, 1989: 24-25. 
283 On the Daigorinji, cf. Ikeda 1992; Ikeda, Ôya 1968-91; Kawagishi 1991; Kubota 1968-91, 
Kuramoto (no year); Murayama 1990; OJ 1975; Yoshida 1991; Ueda 1989: 77-79. 
284 Cf. Tsuji, Murakami 1926; for the regulations relating to Nara Prefecture, ibid. Vol. 2: 2-166; see 
also Lokowandt 1978, doc. 6, 7, 8, 10, 11. 
285 Text in Ueda 1989: 77-79; OJ 1968-91, Vol. 4: 826. 
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there. Due to the large scope of the material, he immediately sent a special mes-
senger for the painter Okamoto Tôri, who (supposedly) was in the service of the 
Imperial Bureau of Graves. This painter recorded the artworks. 
In this context, it is worth noting that this report was included in the volume 
on Ômiwa-jinja in the collection of source materials Shintô-taikei (Sakamoto 1989, 
Vol. VI/12). However, there is no historically critical commentary on the history 
of »Ôtataneko Shrine« – actually the Daigorinji – or of the details of how this re-
port came to be written. Thus, to this day all references to the main place of wor-
ship at the Daigorinji from the time have been lost (cf. Lokowandt 1978: docu-
ments 4 and 11). 
Only a short time later, also in April 1868, the final defrocking of the monks of 
the Daigorinji took place. From then on, they were to serve as kannushi or shajin 
according to the Shintô laws of the new government (OJ 1968-91, bekkan 2: 133). In 
the following month, the removal of the treasures from the temple began. 
It has not been made fully clear whether all of the temple’s treasures were 
saved, but the location of the most important and valuable pieces is known. The 
most important possession of the Daigorinji, the statue of the eleven-headed 
Kannon, was brought to the nearby Shingon mountain temple Shôrinji, located 
south of the city of Sakurai. This is where the impressive statue is kept today as a 
kyaku-butsu, or »guest Buddha,« located in its own building, although its origins 
in Miwa are not mentioned in the temple’s publications.286 It also attained art-
historical prominence through a painting by the American artist, philosopher and 
art historian Ernest Fenollosa (1853-1904), whose efforts for the preservation of 
traditional Japanese art were influential beyond the artistic development of the 
Meiji period. His painting of the eleven-headed Kannon can be viewed today in 
the hondô of the Shôrinji.287 
In late summer of 1868, the policy regarding the former Daigorinji, as well as 
the other jingûji of Miwa, which will be covered later, became stricter. On Sep-
tember 27, 1868, permission was obtained from Nara Prefecture to level the entire 
complex of the Daigorinji, including the three-story pagoda and the prayer hall 
(gomadô; OJ 1968-91, bekkan 2: 134). Although such extreme measures were not ac-
                                                 
286 Illustrations of the Kannon of Miwa are also prominently featured in writings without direct 
reference to Ômiwa-jinja (for example, Ômori 1992: 185; Nara-kenritsu Nara-toshokan 1992 [title 
page]; Tsuji, Murayama, Vol. 2: plate I). Cf. Ikeda 1992; Kawagishi 1991; Kubota 1968-91 and ibid.: 
»Shôrinji-Kannon no koseki« in: OJ 1969-91, Vol. 4: 1022-1026; Kuramoto (no date); Momobashi 
1984-85; Shôrinji (no date); Yoshida 1991: 34. 
287 Based on oral reports and the author’s own experience at the Shôrinji, Sakurai, Nara-ken (Sep-
tember 1992). 
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tually covered by the decree for the separation of Buddhism and Shintô288, and 
the government had strictly forbidden attacks on Buddhist complexes already in 
April of the same year, the application on behalf of Ômiwa-jinja was apparently 
approved, since one year later, on October 8, 1869, the final remodeling of the 
only remaining main building of the former Daigorinji began based on Shintô de-
signs. On this day the festival of the enshrining of the deity in the new shrine 
(shinzasai) was celebrated (OJ 1968-91, bekkan 2: 134). A few months later, in 
March of 1870, the transformation of the temple into a shrine was completed both 
in the spiritual and theological sense and in concrete architectural terms. This 
formerly important temple complex of the Daigorinji, the center of (despite its 
name) syncretistic Buddhist Miwa (-ryû) Shintô, was transformed into a small 
branch shrine called Ôtataneko-jinja, or Wakamiya, on the periphery of the in-
creasingly important Ômiwa-jinja. One year later, on May 14, 1871, Ômiwa-jinja 
was elevated to the highest of the newly created shrine ranks, kanpei-taisha.289 The 
Daigorinji and the other jingûji of Miwa were no longer referred to by these 
names. 
The main building of the Daigorinji probably only remained intact – although 
under completely different religious pretenses – because it was designated a Wa-
kamiya of Ômiwa-jinja290 in earlier times according to the syncretistic tradition of 
Miwa. This path was not open to the other jingûji of Miwa. Not a trace of them 
remains to this day, despite an obscure recent attempt to revive them (cf. Antoni 
1993a: 33ff.). 
Today only part of the name of one of the smaller branch shrines of Miwa, the 
Jôgan-Inari-jinja, is reminiscent of the second most important Buddhist place of 
worship in Miwa, the former Jôganji.291 Jôgan-Inari-jinja is a shrine to Inari on the 
southern edge of the complex (cf. Kikuchi 1987: 36-38, »Jôganji-Inari«). Until the 
Meiji Restoration, the Buddhist convent of Miwa was located here. This convent, 
which was administered by the Daigorinji during the Edo period, was placed un-
der the direct supervision of the Saidaiji in Nara, the main temple of the 
                                                 
288 Already on April 10, 1868, the new government saw it necessary to issue a decree strictly for-
bidding violent attacks on Buddhist institutions. It states with surprising openness: »[...] because 
Shintô priests (shajin) and Buddhist monks have been at odds with one another since ancient 
times and are like ice and coal [oil and water], today, now that the Shintô priests have suddenly 
gained authority, actions are being taken ostensibly to protect the government, but which actually 
serve to satisfy their own private grudge. This is not only a hindrance to the imperial policies, but 
also necessarily causes unrest.« (Lokowandt 1978: 251, doc. 8) 
289 OJ 1968-91, bekkan 2: 135; cf. Mori 1992: 36; Umeda 1975: 319-321; see also doc. 29 in Lokowandt 
1978.  
290 Cf. the study by Murayama 1990; references in OJ 1968-91, bekkan 1: 43-44. 
291 On the former Jôganji, cf. Yoshida 1991: 37; Mori 1992; Kubota 1968-91, OJ 1975: 223, 231; OJ 
1968-91, bekkan 1: 16; source material also in OJ 1928: 752-785. 
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Daigorinji, at the request of Ômiwa-jinja on May 12, 1868, as a result of the events 
of that spring. But only five days later, on May 17, 1868, Ômiwa-jinja sought offi-
cial permission to defrock the nuns (OJ 1968-91, bekkan 2: 134). 
Apparently this unusual question created problems, since, a short time later, 
on September 8, 1868, a new request was made to the city government of Nara 
(Nanto-yakusho; l.c.). Specifics about the course of events up to the temple’s end 
are unknown. Even a recent publication mentions only briefly that this temple 
was dismantled in the year Meiji 2 (1869) together with the Daigorinji (Yoshida 
1991: 37). The renovation of the former convent as a shrine to Inari must also have 
occurred during this period. Although the historical materials published by 
Ômiwa-jinja do not give any information on this subject, the extensive archives of 
the library of Nara Prefecture, which are available for further research, may pro-
vide additional clues (cf. Antoni 1993 a: 33, note 46). 
While the Daigorinji and Jôganji can hardly be located today, this applies 
even more to the last of the three jingûji of Miwa, the Byôdôji.292 This temple 
complex, once the largest in Miwa and historically even larger than Ômiwa-jinja 
itself, has completely vanished from the face of the earth, despite recent attempts 
to revive it.  
Not a trace remains of the original temple grounds, which measured over 500 
meters in length on the east-west axis and 330 meters on the north-south axis and 
was located on the southern slope of Mount Miwa. The complex once contained a 
great number of buildings, including a hondô, gomadô, miedô, issaikyôdô, kaizandô, 
akamon, shôrôdô and many others.293 The forest, interrupted by orchards, has taken 
over the area that once, together with the Daigorinji, represented the center of 
Buddhist syncretistic practice in Miwa. But this temple complex, as opposed to 
the Daigorinji, did not belong to the Saidaiji, the main temple of the Shingon-
Ritsu School, but rather to the main temple of the Hossô School, the Kôfukuji in 
Nara (see below), which itself suffered great damages in a conflict with the Ka-
suga-taisha during the shinbutsu-bunri period.294 
The official written history of Ômiwa-jinja (1968-91, bekkan 2) is remarkably 
taciturn on the subject of the end of the monastery, compared with its statements 
on the Daigorinji. Although in size, number of monks, buildings, temple treasures 
                                                 
292 On the historical Byôdôji, cf. Kikuchi 1987: 35-36; Kubota 1968-91: 970-973; Maruko (no date); 
OJ 1975: passim, especially 226-229; Sakurai-shi-shi-hensan-i’inkai 1977, Vol. 1: 845, 1218-1220; Yo-
shida 1991: 34-37. 
293 L.c.; the size of the complex can be inferred from historical maps and pictures contained in the 
appendix of the collection Miwa shôsho (OJ 1928). 
294 On this topic, cf. Tsuji, Murakami 1926, Vol. 2: 5-108; Iwai 1984; Nara-kenritsu Nara-toshokan 
1992: 1-3. 
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etc. it was far more important that the Daigorinji, only a few details on the mon-
astery are given. For example, it states that on September 20, 1868, the jingikan 
approved the request by Ômiwa-jinja to defrock the monks of the Byôdôji. How-
ever, the monks were actually converted to shajin only two years later, in April of 
the year Meiji 3 (1870). This fact was announced in a declaration by the office of 
the jingikan on December 27, 1870 (OJ 1986-91, bekkan 2: 135). 
This marks the end of the discussion of the Byôdôji in the current official his-
tory of Ômiwa-jinja. The name of this temple complex is not mentioned again in 
the history of the shrine, which extends to November 23, 1990, the day of the dai-
jôsai of Emperor Akihito.295  
On what must have been the dramatic circumstances of the complex’s de-
struction, it merely states that in April 1870 the temple buildings were »removed« 
(tori-harau – harau meaning »to expel, drive out, purify«) along with the defrock-
ing of the monks. An attempt by the members of the community in July of 1870 to 
rebuild at least one of the buildings (the kaizandô) apparently failed (OJ 1968-91, 
bekkan 2: 134f.). 
Even Yoshida Yasuo (1991: 37) merely remarks that the Buddhist implements 
of the monastery were removed in the year Meiji 2 (1869), the main hall of the 
temple was demolished in the following year, and in April of 1871 the temple 
grounds were finally nationalized. Umeda and Nishino write in the official »His-
tory of Ômiwa Shrine« with the utmost brevity on the end of the Byôdôji that the 
temple was »swept away« (haku, meaning »to sweep«) – that is to say, it was 
razed to the ground. The main hall (hondô) of the Daigorinji, however, was re-
modeled as Ôtataneko-jinja, or Wakamiya (Umeda 1975: 314). In accordance with 
the decree for the separation of Buddhism and Shintô of March 1868, all Buddhist 
devotional objects at the Byôdôji were removed from Miwa. Among them were 
such valuable items as a copy of the Daihannyakyô (Sanskrit: Mahâprajna-
paramita Sutra) in 600 maki from the late Heian period that was brought to the 
Honganji of the nearby town of Kashiwara-Tôichi.296 
The most important work of art and main statue of the former Byôdôji is a 
figure of a sitting Fudô-myôô (Sanskrit: Acalanâtha), which functioned as the ex-
ecutor of the punishments of the Dainichinyorai in esoteric Buddhism and was 
one of the five (or eight) Dai-myôô (cf. Ômori 1992 a: 198f.). 
                                                 
295 Even a »reestablishment« of the Byôdôji on Mount Miwa is not mentioned; cf. Antoni 1993 a: 
33ff. 
296 In 1964 the rolls were returned to Ômiwa-jinja, a fact that is seen by the shrine as proof of the 
newly relaxed relations with Buddhism. Cf. OJ 1975: 697; Yoshida 1991: 37 (»Afterword«). 
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Although the sculpture of the eleven-headed Kannon, which functioned as 
the Daigorinji’s honji-butsu (»Buddha who is the original source«), was taken into 
the protection of the Shôrinji, its history immediately thereafter is unknown. 
However, in the year Meiji 6 (1873), this work of great art-historical importance 
(which was declared a »national treasure« (kokuhô) in 1908 and has been deemed 
an »important cultural property« since the end of the war) was brought to one of 
the most famous temples in Japan since antiquity, the Hase-dera (also called 
Chôkokuji).297 This temple complex, located on the southern slope of the Yamato 
mountain range, not far from Mount Miwa, is rightfully considered to possess 
one of the most beautiful landscapes in Japan and is the eighth station on the 
Buddhist pilgrimage route in western Japan (cf. Hirakata 1992: 60-65, no. 8). The 
main devotional image (honzon) of this main temple of the Buzan School of Shin-
gon Buddhism is a statue of the eleven-headed Kannon from 1538 that, at a height 
of 10.8 meters, is the largest wooden statue in Japan (cf. Hase-dera (no date): 11). 
However, the Fudô-myôô statue of the Byôdôji of Miwa did not remain in the 
Hase-dera, but rather in a small branch temple a short distance from the main 
temple, the Fumonin (Hase-dera-tachû-fumonin) whose head priest, Maruyama 
Tsuranaga, accepted the statue on January 14, 1874 and made it the honzon of the 
temple in the following year.298 This is where the statue of the terrible Fudô-myôô 
of Miwa is kept until today. 
 
2. 2. 1. 2. Conclusion 
 
On a pleasant fall day, the beauty and tranquility of Mount Miwa and the 
shrine complex are remarkable. Old shrine buildings, the famous cedars of Miwa 
(mi no kamisugi), in front of which worshippers place offerings of sake and raw 
eggs for Ômononushi no kami – the deity that, according to an age-old belief, ap-
pears as a snake at the foot of the tree – these are all arresting sights. For those 
familiar with the religious significance of the place, it calls to mind the myths of 
the Kojiki, the inseparable connection of Miwa to the myth of Izumo, and the great 
subjects of ancient religion evidenced in the iconographical link between tree, 
snake and the drink of life (cf. Antoni 1988). 
At places such as the modern-day Ômiwa Shrine, however, the seemingly in-
surmountable obstacles to understanding the real development and true history 
                                                 
297 On the Fudô-myôô of Miwa/Hase, cf. Ikeda 1968-91: 1206-1208, Maruko (no date); Hase-dera-
tachû-fumonin (no date); OJ 1975: 701. The historical dates in these works differ from one another 
in some cases. 
298 Cf. Ikeda Ôya 1968-91: 1206; Hase-dera-tachû-fumonin (no date). 
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of Shintô in modern Japan are also apparent. The past often appears distorted, as 
if glimpsed through frosted glass; the misleading archaisms and invented tradi-
tions of the Meiji period cloud our vision for the authentic traditions. Today 
Miwa appears to its visitors to have been a genuinely Shintô place of worship 
whose history apparently extends continuously from ancient times to the present 
day. And yet large parts of this picture were filled in later, modified and falsified. 
In order to understand these enormous manipulations, it is necessary to examine 
their spiritual and intellectual background and motives. This religious and ideo-
logical foundation was provided by Shintô according to the interpretation of the 
late Kokugaku (i.e. Hirata Atsutane) and the Mito School. Ironically, the body of 
thought that resulted from these two schools, which was devised by small circles 
of scholars during the Edo period, was ultimately applied in the modern Japanese 
state. Therefore, in order to understand modern Japan, one must first take these 
indigenous religious and ideological constructs into account. 
 
2. 3. The Great Teaching (daikyô-senpu-undô) 
 
The separation of Buddhism and Shintô in the first phase of the Meiji period 
alone did not lead to the events hoped for by supporters of the Shintô restoration. 
The Buddhist influence on Shintô was too great to be wiped out in one blow, and 
the ideals of the restoration most likely contained little of interest to the common 
people. There was no religion that could seriously replace Buddhism. For this 
purpose, the jingikan had already created the institution of the so-called »propa-
gandists,« or »[Shintô] missionaries« (senkyôshi). This term was used by the 
authorities and others to refer to all shrine priests. On February 3, 1870, an impe-
rial decree declared the beginning of the »movement for religious, moral and po-
litical enlightenment« (daikyô-senpu-undô), which was based on the doctrines of 
Hirata Shintô (cf. Muraoka 1988: 205). 
As Lokowandt (1978: 58ff.) writes, the Great Teaching (daikyô) considered the 
propagation of the Japanese concept of the kokutai to be a matter of education, 
and it attempted, on the basis of the aforementioned decree, to indoctrinate the 
entire populace. Although the term is not mentioned explicitly, the decree con-
tains the most important components of the concept of the kokutai. According to 
Lokowandt,  
»it includes the following ideas: a) the divine origin of Japan and b) of the 
imperial dynasty, c) the uninterrupted reign of the imperial household, which 
d) ruled and still rules under the mandate of the divine ancestors, which is 
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expressed in e) the unity of religion and government, although f) the religious 
side is accorded greater weight; g) according to this correct policy, both the 
political principles of the rulers and the customs of the people existed in their 
original purity, and h) the people were unanimous.« (Lokowandt 1978: 59). 
This purely Shintô-based campaign for »enlightenment,« however, was modi-
fied in March of 1872. Under the new term »ethics teacher« (kyôdoshoku), Buddhist 
priests were also charged with the propagation of the Great Teaching. Two essen-
tial factors led to this decision: the rural population with its long tradition of 
Buddhism was hardly amenable to Shintô indoctrination, and, just as important, 
the number of Shintô priests was not nearly sufficient to carry out an effective 
campaign of education. 
The inclusion of the Buddhist priests made sense for another reason as well: 
unlike the Shintô priests, they were accustomed to teaching people. In order to 
avoid deviations from the Shintô program, however, on April 28, 1872, the newly 
founded kyôbushô declared three tenets to be spread by the ethics teachers, the 
»three rules for teaching« (kyôsoku sanjô, also sanjô no kyôken): 
»1. The spirit of worshipping the gods and love for the homeland is to be in-
cluded and accepted. 
2. The laws of nature (tenri) and the rules of man (jindô) are to be made ap-
parent. 
3. In honor of the rule of the emperor, it must be ensured that the emperor’s 
will is followed.« (Lokowandt 1978: 148; 293f., doc. 50) 
As Lokowandt (l.c.) remarks, religious beliefs that contradicted these rules 
were not allowed to be taught. In order to make these rules for teaching more 
specific, in 1873 the government drew up the so-called »11 topics« (kendai), and 
later added a further 17 topics (cf. Lokowandt 1978: 58, 148).299 As Muraoka (1988, 
chapter VI: 206) writes, these topics form the basic principles of Hirata Shintô. At 
the request of the Buddhists, the government established a large educational facil-
ity (daikyôin) in 1873 as a training center for the ethics teachers. Sixty-two mid-
sized (chûkyôin) and 227 smaller (shôkyôin) such facilities were also created. This 
area cannot be covered in detail in the present study. However, it is worth men-
tioning that one of the national educational facilities established throughout the 
country by the Meiji government, after its ultimately failed attempt to establish 
                                                 
299 Lokowandt summarizes the content of the »11 topics« as follows: »The power of the gods and 
the mercy of the emperor; the immortality of the human soul; the creation [of the world] by the 
heavenly gods; the separation of the world into this world and the afterlife; patriotism; holy cere-
monies; the appeasement of souls; [the relationship between] ruler and subject; [the relationship 
between] father and son; [the relationship between] man and woman; the ôharai (purification 
ceremony)« (Lokowandt 1978: 148). 
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»pure Shintô« as the state religion, was located at Mount Miwa. These facilities 
served to spread the Great Teaching (daikyô) as a mandatory state ideology, but 
were ultimately based on the tenets of modern Shintô thought, especially in re-
gard to the position of the emperor.300 Under the leadership of Ise-jingû, similar 
educational facilities (kyôin) were established throughout the country. And even 
in Miwa, although somewhat later, on February 18, 1880, a »small educational fa-
cility« (shôkyôin) was founded, and in 1882 it became »Ômiwa Church« (ômiwa-
kyôkai).301 However, this concentrated initiative by Buddhists and Shintô priests 
did not last long. It was brought to an end already in May of 1875. One of the 
biggest problems of the campaign was that the ethics teachers used it for their 
own purposes. Although they were expected to overlook religious differences 
and only preach the national religion as embodied by the Great Teaching, they 
were not able to fully suppress their own religious identities. The Buddhists were, 
as previously mentioned, the better preachers and were not able to resist the 
temptation to preach a version of Shintô in which the Bodhisattvas were equated 
with the kami, as was the case before the Meiji Restoration. Thus, the govern-
ment’s plan to unite Japan under the banner of Shintô through religious, political 
and moral instruction with the help of Buddhism was destined to fail from the 
very beginning. Time and again after 1872, disputes emerged between the Shintô 
and Buddhist clergies. In the end, the Buddhists were not able to accept an official 
subordination of their religion to Shintô, despite all far-reaching attempts at ac-
commodation. 
But even the Shintô clergy themselves were far from being united on basic 
theological questions. The followers of Hirata Atsutane fought with the students 
of Ôkuni Takamasa, who was also a former student of Hirata’s.302 Moreover, in-
dividual shrines also attempted to promote their own interests. Due to the con-
stant ideological and personal conflicts within the daikyôin, government bureau-
crats called it the »Department of Indecisiveness« (injunkan) or »Ministry of 
Naps« (hiruneshô, cf. Fridell 1975: 154; Hardacre 1989: 44). These quarrels finally 
led to the end of the Great Teaching. This was triggered by a dispute between the 
two highest-ranking Shintô places of worship, the shrines of Ise and Izumo. 
 
 
                                                 
300 Cf. Hardacre 1989: 42-59; Hori, Toda 1956: 65-84. 
301 Even after World War II, this church remained intact as a religious institution independent of 
Ômiwa-jinja. Cf. Ômiwa-kyô hon’in (no date) a/b: passim; Hardacre (1989: 82) also mentions 
Miwa as an example of such an educational facility. 
302 On Ôkuni Takamasa cf. Inoue 1994: 502; Brüll 1966. 
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2. 3. 1. The Pantheon Dispute 
 
Beginning in 1875, the so-called Pantheon Dispute (saijin-ronsô) also caused a 
split among the Shintô priesthood (cf. Hardacre 1989: 48ff.). The head priest of the 
Great Shrine of Izumo, Senge Takatomi (1845-1918), had attacked the superior 
position of Ise-jingû and now demanded that the main deity of Izumo Shrine, 
Ôkuninushi no mikoto, be adopted as ruler of the underworld in the official state 
pantheon. His counterpart at Ise-jingû, Tanaka Toritsune (1837-1897) rejected this 
request. This was the origin of a dispute that finally split the world of Shintô into 
two camps. 
As Muraoka Tsunetsugu (1988: 217f.) writes, Senge Takatomi advocated the 
worship of Ôkuninushi no kami together with the three creator-deities and the 
sun goddess, in order to correct the foundation of the official tenets of Shintô. (See 
also Philippi 1995) His opponents, Tanaka Yoritsune and others, who represented 
the position of Ise Shrine, voiced their concerns with this proposal, and further-
more, Tanaka in particular was of the opinion that the conception of Ôkuninushi 
no kami was an imitation of Jesus! Ochiai Naoaki (1852-1934) criticized Senge Ta-
katomi’s Shintô yôsho (»Main Points of Shintô«) in his work Shintô yôshô ben for 
equating the Izumo deity Ôkuninushi with the sun goddess and ancestral deity of 
the imperial household. Yokoyo Nagatane, who had at first agreed with Senge 
Takatomi, later also distanced himself from his theory, stating that it had no basis 
in the historical tradition (Muraoka 1988; chapter VI: 219). 
In order to resolve this debate, the case was presented to the emperor in Janu-
ary 1881. However, his reply turned out to be completely different from what was 
expected. Instead of a decision for or against the adoption of the Izumo deity, 
priests above a certain rank were simply forbidden to continue in their function 
as ethics teachers or carry out religious services such as Shintô burials. The logic 
behind this astonishing decision implied that a priest who does not carry out bur-
ial ceremonies would have no reason to take sides on the matter of which deity 
rules the underworld (Hardacre 1989: 49). 
The effects of this decision were sweeping, since the general acceptance that 
the Shintô priests had worked to promote through the Great Teaching depended 
in particular on the introduction of Shintô funerals, with the intent of breaking 
the population’s ties to the Buddhist temples. At first, many Shintô priests were 
reluctant to carry out burials, on the one hand because they saw themselves as li-
turgists and not as ministers, and on the other hand because they considered con-
tact with death to be impure – a core principle of all Shintô theology (cf. chapter I: 
3. 2. 3.). They agreed with the emperor’s decision, since they did not consider 
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such services to be compatible with what they saw as their own crucial function 
in the state. However, some priests protested, albeit in vain, against limiting of 
their activities to purely ritual acts. Ultimately, some of them founded their own 
independent Shintô sects. 
Thus, the emperor himself intervened in the conflict, though not as a theolo-
gian, but as a politician. In 1884 the Ministry of the Interior recognized the dis-
crepancy between the privileges of state sponsorship and the emptiness of Shintô 
teachings. The kyôbushô was replaced by a new agency, the shajikyoku (»Bureau 
for Shrines and Temples«; cf. Lokowandt 1978: 378, 210), which was conceived as 
an administrative office for the areas of Buddhism and Shintô and whose duty 
was to deal with religion only in matters relevant to the state (Lokowandt 1978: 
205). 
 The Shintô religion, in the sense of a theologically based state religion, and 
its spiritual leaders had shown themselves in the public opinion to be too weak to 
direct the movement for religious, political and moral enlightenment, and thus 
also the state. The movement for enlightenment was suspended and the govern-
ment began to work toward a separation of religion and state. 
 
2. 4. The Hirata School: failure of Shintô as a state religion? 
 
Within Shintô research this development is widely considered as an impor-
tant victory for the Hirata School, since the state-supporting, liturgical function 
triumphed over the state-religious, ministerial aspects: 
»This view of Shintô and the nature of the priesthood represented a defeat for 
that sector of the Shintô world that favored promulgation of Shintô as a na-
tional creed and a pastoral role for priests. Thus the Ôkuni line of National 
Learning thought suffered a major defeat, and the priest-as-liturgist view, 
represented by the Hirata line of National Learning, gained an important vic-
tory.«303 
Other commentators, however, take an opposing view, focusing on the failure 
of Hirata Shintô in the first half of the Meiji period. Since the Hirata School of Ko-
kugaku Shintô cannot be equated with a purely ritualistic position – as this 
study’s further investigation of the kokutai and Kokutai Shintô from the late Meiji 
period to the end of World War II tries to show, some questions remain. The core 
of Hirata Shintô was especially its clear theological and ideological worldview, 
                                                 
303 Hardacre 1989: 49. On the connection between Hirata Shintô and the Meiji Restoration see also 
Sakamaki 1985. 
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which declared Shintô to be the metaphysical source of all existence, not just of 
Japan. Thus, it would seem to be generally problematic to speak of mere ritualism 
in this case. 
But why does the generally accepted opinion assume the failure of Hirata 
Shintô as a state religion in this period? Muraoka Tsunetsugu (1988: 203-229, 
chapter VI) in particular formulates this widely accepted theory. He emphasizes 
the fact that the most important spiritual foundation of the restoration of imperial 
rule was contained in the teachings of the Kokugaku, and especially in the Hirata 
School. In July of 1867, Hirata Kanetane (1799-1880) was asked by Iwakura To-
momi, a supporter of the restoration under the concept of the rule of Emperor 
Jinmu, about his opinion on the situation. Kanetane recommended reviving the 
jingikan and suggested not to attack Buddhism directly, but rather to work to-
ward a process of self-destruction. In the same year, the policy of saisei-itchi, with 
an emphasis on Shintô, was described in detail in Yano Harumichi’s work Kenkin 
sengo (see chapter II: 5. 1. 3. 2.).304 Later followers of Hirata Shintô, led by Fukuda 
Bisei (1831-1907), played an important role in the government’s attempts to con-
trol the spread of Christianity. 
The Hirata School also played a central spiritual role in the campaign for the 
spread of the Great Teaching: although the »three principles of education« (sanjô 
kyôken) of April 28, 1872, (see above; cf. Muraoka 1988: 206) applied to both the 
Shintô and Buddhist clergy, according to Muraoka the »11 topics« pertaining to 
the government embodied the basic principles of Hirata Shintô (as well as the 
concept of the kokutai in the sense of the Imperial Rescript on Education; cf. Mu-
raoka 1988: 207).  
According to Muraoka (1988: 210ff.), various internal and external factors con-
tributed to the early end of Shintô indoctrination. The first argument he advances 
is that the policy of Shintô indoctrination was not in tune with the enlightenment 
movement led by scholars such as Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834-1902). In his work 
Bunmeiron no gairyaku (»An outline of the theory of civilization«) of 1875, Fuku-
zawa advanced the opinion that Shintô has no developed teachings, and that Ja-
pan can only attain international independence if it learns from Western civiliza-
tion, studies Christianity and throws off the shackles of its ancient traditions (cf. 
Muraoka 1988: 210). But Fukuda Bisei, a leader of the »progressive« element 
within the Hirata School, also advocated involvement with Christianity (Muraoka 
1988: 221f.) and advanced the opinion that the modern-day efforts toward »civili-
zation and enlightenment« were in harmony with the great Kokugaku scholars of 
the Edo period. 
                                                 
304 On Yano Harumichi cf. the study by Michael Wachutka (2013: 21-28, 288, and passim). 
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The second reason for the failure of Shintô indoctrination was, according to 
Muraoka, Shintô’s »immaturity.« He writes that Hirata Shintô originally devel-
oped out of Motoori’s Kokugaku Shintô, and Hirata Atsutane and his followers 
attempted to formulate their own theology. Hirata was a fervent advocate of the 
emperor and the restoration of imperial rule, but he was not able to gain any con-
trol over Shintô.305 This underdevelopment was also the reason for various inter-
nal disputes within the world of Shintô, which the author describes in some detail 
(among others, the Pantheon Dispute over the position of the Izumo deity 
Ôkuninushi). 
The third reason for the failure of the movement, according to Muraoka, can 
be seen in the failed attempt by the Meiji government to elevate Shintô to the 
state level by political authority, since this led to the confusion of politics and re-
ligion (Muraoka 1988f.). There were indeed many opponents of this policy – all of 
them educated in the West – who raised objections to such a policy of religious 
indoctrination. Nakamura Masanao (1832-1891), for example, supported the sepa-
ration of state and religion, and none other than Mori Arinori (1847-1889) sup-
ported the freedom of conscience and especially of religion with the argument 
that any involvement on the part of the government in religion is bound to fail. 
The freedom of religion was finally guaranteed by Article 28 in the Constitution 
of Feburary 11, 1889, and Muraoka writes that the adoption of the Constitution 
marked the definite end of the policy of indoctrination (Muraoka 1988: 228). 
Without settling the matter definitively here, it seems to me that the general 
view that Shintô failed as a state religion in the early Meiji period is hardly con-
vincing. Especially the late Meiji period, beginning with the Constitution and the 
Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyôiku chokugo) of 1890, shows quite clearly that the 
beliefs and maxims of Hirata Shintô and the Mitogaku – that is to say, the concept 
of the Japanese kokutai – were officially declared common spiritual beliefs and the 
foundation of the Japanese national interest. The mere fact that Shintô was pro 
forma declared a »non-religion« for pragmatic reasons (in order to guarantee the 
freedom of religion under the Meiji Constitution) does not prove the theory of 
Shintô’s failure as a state religion. Rather, the opposite could be seen to be the 
case here: in order to save the Shintô foundation of the modern Japanese empire 
from the pressure of opposition both from within and outside Japan – liberalism 
from within and imperialism from without – the government decided on the 
                                                 
305 This statement by Muraoka is contradicted by the fact that the Hirata school officially contin-
ued the tradition of the Edo period Shirakawa and Yoshida schools. 
     CHAPTER III: MEIJI RESTORATION AND MEIJI PERIOD  n  203 
 
supposedly ingenious solution of making Shintô a non-religious state religion.306 
This fact has been a focus of discussion especially among foreign commentators, 
as will be covered later in this study. 
Overall, I tend to agree more with the opinion of an exceptional expert on the 
topic and a contemporary witness of the events, D. C. Holtom (1922), who, in the 
course of his intensive studies, reached the conclusion that Shintô continuously 
spread in its function as a state religion between the years 1880 and 1920, and that 
this spread occurred relatively steadily over the course of the entire period.307 
And finally, the spiritual and political developments of the 1930s and early 1940s 
show how strongly the ideologization of government and society progressed un-
der the tenets of (State) Shintô. Overall, this can be seen more as a triumph than a 
defeat for the Hirata School, in actual rather than ritualistic terms. 
The Meiji Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on Education formed the spiri-
tual basis for these further developments. Therefore, these areas will be examined 
more closely in the following discussion. 
 
 
                                                 
306 In recent studies this problem has been widely discussed. Michael Wachutka (2013: 52-69) 
dedicates a whole chapter of his study to the topic »The shift from Shinto as the State Religion to 
the Imperial Way as public morality.« Maxey (2014) recently debated the matter in extenso and 
stated, for example: »By rejecting the catergory of religion, the shrine priests and their allies could 
employ the Imperial Diet to represent their cause as national cause.« (Maxey 2014: 214) 
307 Holtom 1922: 47. In his review of the work of Ernst Lokowandt (1978), Peter Fischer (in NOAG 
131-132, 1982: 147-156) emphasizes that he was unable to find any proof that Shintô was a non-
religious cult as early as the 1880s. He continues: »Thus, Shintô studies should focus on the 1890s 
and more strongly emphasize aspects of foreign policy, which was of great importance to the re-
ligious development of Japan in these years.« (l.c., 150) 
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3. SHINTÔ AND KOKUTAI IN THE LATE MEIJI PERIOD 
 
3. 1. The Meiji Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on Education 
The end of the enlightenment movement and the closing of the kyôbushô in 
1884 marked the beginning of the final phase in the development of Meiji-period 
State Shintô. When this phase came to a close in 1890, State Shintô was fully de-
veloped as a state cult that was officially considered non-religious in contents and 
structure.308 It remained largely unchanged in this form until the end of World 
War II in 1945. 
After 1884, Shintô split into the non-religious State Shintô (or Imperial 
Household Shintô) that was mandatory for every Japanese, and the religious 
Shintô of the various sects. Already in May 1882, all Shintô sects were required to 
be registered. From then on, their places of worship were no longer called jinja 
(»shrine«) but kyôkai (»church«). This was an affront to the sects, which had sup-
ported the Great Teaching campaign both personally and financially. 
Beginning in 1882, Shintô priests were gradually stripped of their status as 
civil servants, although this did not affect shrine priests serving at places where 
»rites of the state« (kokka no sôshi) were performed such as Ise and Izumo (cf. Lok-
owandt 1978: 230). The smaller shrines no longer received financial support from 
the state, and they had no choice but to find new sources of funding. Conse-
quently, in these times one could find small rental houses, schools or police sta-
tions, rest areas and parking spots for rickshaws, market stalls etc. within the 
formerly sacrosanct shrine precincts (Lokowandt 1978: 220). 
The great national shrines, on the other hand, such as Izumo, Ise and Ya-
sukuni, were lavishly expanded. The ceremonies at these places of worship were 
perfected and made one of the most important pillars of State Shintô. But the po-
litical class noticeably lost interest in Shintô during this time. In 1887 there was 
even a revision of the state’s financial contributions to the great shrines. The sup-
port was to be paid for only for the next 10 to 15 years and was then to be discon-
tinued, barring any formal extension. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
308 Maxey (2014: 6) sees the year 1900 as a starting point »for anything resembling State Shintô.« 
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3. 1. 1 The Meiji Constitution 
 
But while interest in Shintô as a state-supporting religion faded on the sur-
face, its spiritual foundations, which were rooted in the Kokugaku as well as the 
Mito School, gained ground in politics. This is best exemplified by the Constitu-
tion, which was promulgated on February 11, 1889, the same day that, according 
to mythical tradition, the founding of the empire by Jinmu-tennô supposedly 
took place in the year 660 B.C. Although the word »Shintô« does not appear in 
the Constitution, the central tenets of the concept of the kokutai and State Shintô 
are contained in its first articles. 
The sovereign position of the emperor is established primarily in Articles 1 
and 3 of the Meiji Constitution.309 Article 1 reads: »The Empire of Japan shall be 
reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.« In 
Article 3 this principle is made more precise: »The Emperor is sacred and inviola-
ble.«310 In his »Imperial Oath at the Sanctuary of the Imperial Palace« at the 
promulgation of the Constitution the emperor stated the following principles: 
»We, the Successor to the prosperous Throne of Our Predecessors, do humbly 
and solemnly swear to the Imperial Founder of Our House and to Our other 
Imperial Ancestors that, in pursuance of a great policy co-extensive with the 
Heavens and with the Earth, We shall maintain and secure from decline the 
ancient form of government.«311 
In the Meiji Constitution, the position of the emperor over all other political 
entities was defined as holy, absolute and unlimited, by virtue of his divine de-
scent. The emperor ruled the country and the people by uniting the executive and 
legislative powers in himself. However, according to chapter IV (Articles 55-56) 
of the Meiji Constitution, the emperor was not accountable for political decisions, 
since it was his ministers’ duty to advise the emperor and take responsibility for 
their advice. In chapter II of the Constitution (Article 28), the freedom of religious 
belief was declared »within limits,« meaning, as long as the religion in question 
did not pose a contradiction to the imperial household and (Shrine) Shintô – a 
clause that was aimed directly at Christianity. The religious Shintô of the sects 
                                                 
309 Ienaga 1967 provides a comprehensive discussion of the Meiji Constitution; see also Röhl 1963. 
On the topic »100th anniversary of the Meiji Constitution: state, society and culture in Japan dur-
ing the Meiji period« an academic symposium was held in 1989, the results of which were pub-
lished in the journal OE (vol. 33/1, 1990).  
310 Wittig 1976: 87, doc. 26; cf. Miyazawa 1986: 291. 
311 Cited by Itô 1906: 167. 
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was given no rights as a state religion under the Meiji Constitution. The only re-
ligion of political relevance was the worship of the emperor.312 
The Meiji Constitution of February 11, 1889, which was in part influenced by 
Prussian constitutional law, accorded the emperor a holy, inviolable position that 
was exempt from any responsibility, thus following in the tradition of the nation-
alist schools. And yet, the document also contains elements aimed at preventing 
imperial despotism.313 
Thus, the Constitution was in fact the product of competing interests and 
ideas in Meiji-period Japan, situated between the two poles of the Shintôist ideol-
ogy of the land of the gods and contemporary liberal thought on constitutional 
law. The final victory of the conservative powers is apparent in a further docu-
ment that, more than any other, influenced spiritual life in Japan until the end of 
World War II: the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyôiku [ni kansuru] chokugo) of 
October 30, 1890. 
But before turning to this central document of imperial state ethics and doc-
trine we will discuss some aspects of political mythology, being of fundamental 
importance in this context. 
 
3. 1. 2 Political mythology and the legitimation of imperial power – the case of the 
Jinmu-tennô myth 
 
1889, the year of the proclamation of the Meiji Constitution, generally marked 
a turning point in the history of modern Japan, as the Japanese historian Kokaze 
Hidemasa (2011) points out. It was a series of ritual events and state ceremonies 
of that year which marked the end of the age of the Meiji Restoration and the 
birth of the modern Japanese state. In the center of these ritual state ceremonies 
stood the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution on February 11, 1889. By this 
ceremonial event the Empire of Japan was established as a modern constitutional 
state, which could face the Western powers in an equivalent position from now 
on. Since the restoration of the year 1868, the new Japanese Empire had endeav-
ored to be recognized as equal in relation to the European powers and the United 
States. In particular, the revision of the »unequal treaties« represented an ultimate 
goal of foreign policy efforts. However, a prerequisite was seen in a structure of 
                                                 
312 For a detailed discussion of the Constitution, cf. Beasley 1989: 663ff. See also Itô 1906. 
313 Cf. Meiji Constitution, Article 4: »The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself 
the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitu-
tion.« (Itô 1906: 7) Article 5: »The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the 
Imperial Diet.« (Itô 1906: 10) Johannes Ueberschaar (1912: 14) uses the term »limited constitution-
alism« to refer to this form of Constitution. 
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the state corresponding to international standards. In this context, the existence of 
a formal Constitution was seen as of central importance. Under the leadership of 
the statesman Itô Hirobumi (1841-1909) the text of the Constitution had been 
drafted over several years. 
European constitutional concepts served as models, and it is known that for-
eign advisors (yatoi) in the service of the Japanese government played a major 
role in the drafting of the Constitution. These were, among others, the German 
constitutional lawyers Albert Mosse (1846-1925) and Hermann Roesler (1834-
1894). Their work demonstrates the significant proportion of western thought in 
the construction of the modern Japanese Constitution. Therefore the importance 
of foreign contributions to the development of the Meiji Constitution is usually 
emphasized within international research. 
But in its essential core the Meiji Constitution was ideologically based on in-
digenous Japanese political and religious ideas as well, especially with regard to 
the position of the Tennô. The emperor became defined as sacred, and it was him 
alone who occupied the position of the sovereign. This basic idea was expressed, 
as already shown, in Articles 1 and 3 of the constitution.  
These statements were based on the concept – or ideological construct - of an 
allegedly special Japanese national polity, its kokutai. The idea of kokutai rooted, as 
was pointed out, in religious and political concepts of modern Shintô as well as 
Neo-Confucianism, postulated a sacred position of the Tennô, based on an alleg-
edly direct blood line to the founder of imperial Japan in the archaic days: Jinmu-
tennô. According to the written sources of antiquity (especially the Nihonshoki, 
720 A.D.) the Imperial Japanese state was founded by Jinmu-tennô in the year 660 
B.C.  
The Nihonshoki states on the founding of Kashihara palace which marked the 
beginning of Jinmu’s reign: 
»Year Kanoto Tori, Spring, 1st month 1st day. »The Emperor assumed the 
Imperial Dignity in the Palace of Kashi(ha)-bara. This year is reckoned the 
first year of his reign. He honored his wife by making her Empress. The chil-
dren born to him by her were Kami-ya-wi-mimi no Mikoto and Kami-
nunagaba mimi-no Mikoto.Therefore there is an ancient saying in praise of 
this, as follows: »In Kashi(ha)-bara in Unebi, he mightily established his pal-
ace-pillars on the foundation of the bottom-rock, and reared aloft the cross 
roof-timbers to the Plain of High Heaven. The name of the Emperor who thus 
began to rule the Empire was Kami Yamato Ihare-biko Hohodemi.«314 
                                                 
314 Nihonshoki, Vol. 3, Jinmu-tennô, 1/1/1 = NKBT 67: 213/2-5 and 214/1-3; Aston 1956, 1: 132. 
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This episode is reported much shorter in the parallel mythological source 
book Kojiki (712 A.D.), vol. 2, Jinmu-tennô: 
»Having thus subdued and pacified the unruly deities and having swept 
away the defiant people, he dwelt in the palace of KASIPARA at UNEBÏ and 
ruled the kingdom.«315 
Modern historical research has proven the absolute fictivity of this alleged 
Jinmu-tennô - who is known in the sources by his personal name Iware-biko only 
-, and consequently of his founding of the state. Nevertheless, modern Japan of 
the Meiji period took these mythical events as historical facts. The early years of 
the Meiji period witnessed the emergence of a veritable Jinmu cult. A question of 
particular importance was the fixation of an exact date for the alleged founding of 
the empire by Jinmu.Hence, the date of February 11, 660 B.C. was derived from 
the ancient sources as the foundation date of the early Japanese empire. This date 
also formed the basis for a new national holiday introduced in 1873, the National 
Foundation Day (kigensetsu). 
 
3. 1. 2. 1. Excursus: On the kigen calendar 
 
Here we are confronted with a specific, particularly Japanese calendar, which 
is no longer in use, but was quite popular in wartime Japan - the so called kigen 
calendar, a linear chronological system, starting with the date of the alleged 
founding of the Japanese Empire (kôki) by the so-called first Emperor Jinmu-
tennô. In this calendar, the year of his accession to the throne and founding of the 
empire corresponds to the Western date of 660 B.C.316 As is well known, this date 
must be regarded as purely legendary, having been designed artificially by the 
compilers of the earliest Japanese classics which date from the 8th century. This 
central concept was based on the first histories of the country, namely the Kojiki, 
dating from 712 A.D., and the Nihonshoki, dating from 720 A.D.  
Especially the Nihonshoki followed chronological speculations in accordance 
with the Chinese 60-years cycle. As John Brownlee (1991: 31) points out, the year 
601, which was the ninth year of the reign of Empress Suiko, »provided a basis 
                                                 
315 Kojiki, NKBT 1: 160/7-8 and 161/7-8; Philippi 1968: 52/62:177; cf. Antoni 2012a: 105 
316 The method of counting years from the legendary founding of Japan (in 660 B.C.) was begun in 
the early Meiji period (1868–1912) and commonly used until the end of World War II, when it was 
abandoned. To find the Western equivalent for a year, simply add 660 to the number. The word 
kigen (the beginning of the dynasty) or kôki (imperial era) is sometimes prefixed to such dates to 
differentiate them from years of the Christian era.« (Herschel Webb: »Calendar, dates, and time«. 
In: KEJ, 1983, vol. 1: 232) 
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from which to calculate backwards.« Using a combined system of cycles with a 
year called ippô as »a time of great change,« the compilers of the Nihonshoki calcu-
lated back for a period of 1,260 years, »and arrived at 660 B.C. for the ippô, which 
had to be the year of accession of Emperor Jinmu.«317 
In the Meiji period, this date became a sacrosanct founding date for the Japa-
nese empire,318 and was not historically questioned until the end of World War II.  
Even in present-day Japan, it constitutes the symbolic starting point of the history 
of the Japanese state, and is commemorated on February 11th as the national holi-
day Kenkoku Kinen no Hi, the direct successor of the Meiji-period holiday of Kigen-
setsu.319 As Brownlee (1991: 32) states, »the accession of Jinmu in 660 B.C. became 
an established truth, which no historian in traditional Japan would ever have 
thought of questioning.« Although the findings of archaeological research and 
comparative history since the end of the 19th century had definitely proven the 
wholly legendary nature of this founding date, it did not lose its significance as 
an ideological construct in modern Japan from the Meiji period until the end of 
World War II. It was the eminent scholar Basil Hall Chamberlain, the first transla-
tor of the Kojiki into a Western language, who mentioned already in his still 
highly valuable320 »introduction« to the work and in presentations before the Asi-
atic Society of Japan on April 12th, and June 21st, 1882,321 stated that the real history 
of the Japanese state must be regarded as »more than a thousand years later than 
the date usually accepted« (Chamberlain 1883 (1982): lxx). »400 A.D.,« he contin-
ued, «is approximately the highest limit of reliable Japanese history« (Chamber-
lain 1883 (1982):  lxxxvii). Chamberlain reached a highly modern conclusion by 
theoretically opposing the idea of Japanese cultural homogeneity and exclusivity 
and stating, »in almost all known cases culture has been introduced from abroad, 
and has not been spontaneously developed« (Chamberlain 1883 (1982):  xciii). 
This is a remarkable standpoint for the 1880s, one that seems to anticipate mod-
ern comparative cultural studies.  
Historical and archaeological research since Chamberlain’s time has proven 
these statements to be correct. But for official Japan, the illusion of a monogenetic 
foundation through Jinmu-tennô never became obsolete.  
                                                 
317 Cf. Brownlee 1991: 31. 
318 »The chronology which fixes the date of the accession of Jimmu Tennô at 660 B.C. is officialized 
in modern Japanese law and in imperial edict alike,« (Holtom 1922: 189). 
319 Cf. Hardacre 1989: 101, Kigensetsu »Commemorating the founding of the Yamato dynasty by 
Emperor Jinmu«; cf. the Kigensetsu-controversy on the reestablishment of this holiday after the 
war. 
320 Cf. Naumann 1996: 19. 
321 Chamberlain 1883 (1982): i – ci. 
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That the Meiji Constitution was proclaimed in 1889 on February 11 thus had a 
deep symbolic meaning. With this date, the proclamation of the Constitution was 
directly linked in terms of ceremony to Jinmu-tennô as the founder of the impe-
rial line. Jinmu-tennô was accepted as the historical founding figure, having de-
scended in direct line from the divine ancestors with the Sun Goddess Amaterasu 
as ultimate source.322 Through the selection of this day for the promulgation of 
the constitution, the basic ideas of kokutai thought found their way directly into 
the ceremonial festivity for the promulgation of the Constitution. 
The design of the of festivities’ program was the responsibility of the Ministry 
of the Imperial Household (kunai-sho) which was headed by the very statesman 
who had already played a major role in the drafting of the constitutional text: Itô 
Hirobumi. To support this task, foreign advisors (oyatoi) had been hired, who 
were to contribute to the design of state ceremonies by introducing adequate 
European models. One of these western advisors was the German diplomat Ott-
mar von Mohl (1846-1922), who stayed in Tôkyô in the service of the Ministry of 
the Imperial Household for two years (1887-1889), being responsible for the 
transmission of Prussian and other European court ceremonial into the ceremo-
nial regulations of the Meiji imperial house. 
 
3. 1. 2. 2. Ottmar von Mohl and the promulgation of the Constitution 
 
Born in 1846 as son of the famous expert in constitutional law and professor 
for political science, Robert von Mohl (1799-1875), at the University town of 
Tübingen, von Mohl attended law school in Bonn, Heidelberg and Munich, be-
fore he entered the diplomatic service, becoming an attaché at the Foreign Office 
in Berlin in 1870. This was followed by positions as cabinet secretary for Empress 
Augusta and consulate offices in Cincinnati and St. Petersburg. From 1887 to 
1889, von Mohl, accompanied by his family, stayed as an adviser to the Imperial 
Household Ministry and the imperial court in Tôkyô, where his duty was to ad-
vise members of the Japanese court in questions of European etiquette and cere-
monial and thus help to modernize the court according to Western models. His 
wife, Wanda von Mohl (née Countess von der Groeben), also served at the impe-
rial court as a court lady for the Empress Shôken (1849-1914). In 1904, fifteen 
years after his return from Japan von Mohl published memoirs of his service in 
Tôkyô under the title Am japanischen Hofe (»At the Japanese Court«). In 79 more 
or less detailed chapters he recollected his and his wife’s experiences in Japan. 
These recollections are based on entries taken from the diary he kept during his 
                                                 
322 On the »Jinmu-tennô revival« in Meji-Japan cf. Wachutka 2013: 11ff. (chapter 1.2.). 
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stay in Japan. Besides descriptions of his duties as an advisor for the Imperial 
Household Ministry, as well as for Itô Hirobumi himself, von Mohl especially 
provides detailed accounts of the Japanese imperial court life of the time and the 
culture of the country. The most notable event of his whole work is the solemn 
proclamation of the Japanese Constitution on February 11, 1889, which von Mohl 
attended and describes in his memoirs. 
But Ottmar von Mohl was not such a humble man as to see his own role at the 
imperial court just as that of an advisor, instead he always stressed his own im-
portance and personal contribution in the process of introducing modern court 
etiquette to Meiji Japan. This is especially true for the major national event of the 
constitutional promulgation on February 11, 1889. In his memoirs he writes on 
the process of preparing the Program for the celebration of the Constitutional Procla-
mation (ch. 73): 
»We started our zealous look in the new Palais and started to design the plan 
for the prospected constitutional proclamation and inauguration of the first 
Japanese parliament.« (von Mohl 1904:219) 
»[...] I was responsible to design a program for the court. This program for the 
constitutional proclamation was designed following the models of similar 
celebrations as they often occurred in recent years in Berlin, and the corre-
sponding draft of the Ministry of the Imperial Household found the approval 
of the Tenno.« (von Mohl 1904: 220) 
»For the celebration itself February 11, the anniversary of the accession of 
Jimmu Tenno, was elected, i.e the founding of the Japanese monarchy.« (von 
Mohl 1904:220) 
Reading this and other passages of his memoirs one gets the image that it was 
mainly von Mohl himself who was responsible for the key decisions. It was him, 
he writes, who was responsible for some classical Japanese parts of the program, 
which were included against the will of Itô Hirobumi. As von Mohl points out in 
some other parts of his memoirs, Itô strictly rejected any traditional Japanese 
ceremonial parts within the modern court ceremonies, wishing to make clear this 
way that Japan was a modern state now, equal to the great European powers of 
his time.  
The already mentioned historian Kokaze Hidemasa (2011:119) states in this 
respect: »The promulgation of the Meiji Constitution on 11 February 1889 […] 
served to demonstrate to the Western powers that Japan was now a modern 
state«. But Kokaze, in his essay »The Political Space of Meiji 22 (1889): The Prom-
ulgation of the Constitution and the Birth of the Nation« does not even mention 
von Mohl’s part within this process, except in one case, when he cites a passage 
from von Mohl’s memoirs concerning the status of the empress (without men-
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tioning the role of von Mohl’s wife): »The model for the empress was none other 
than Augusta, the German empress and Prussian princess.« (Kokaze 2011:125) 
This shows that Kokaze is well aware of the existence of von Mohls memoirs 
which were translated into Japanese in 1988, with a new paperback edition in 
2011. An English translation of this work is still missing.  
Kokaze discusses the role of the kokutai in this context and points out the so-
cio-political role of ceremonial in general, stating:  
»My argument is that 1889 was the year in which the post Restoration politi-
cal conflicts dissolved in a cycle of political ceremonial, the pivot of which 
was the Constitutional promulgation itself.« (Kokaze 2011:131)  
In his final conclusion Kokaze suggests to see the modernization process of 
this epoch as a part of a global phenomenon, namely:  
»The process whereby ‘native’ turns ‘national’ was a ‘relativisation’ of the 
universal values of the nineteenth century West [...]. It was a restoration of 
the ethnic and the romantic; an attempt in brief to establish a Japanese na-
tionalism«. (Kokaze 2011:139) 
In an even more recent contribution to the topic, an essay titled »February 11, 
1889. The Birth of Modern Japan« dating from 2014, Lionel Babicz, states that it 
was the day of the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution »which was to mark 
the official birth of a ‘civilized’ Japan.« Highly interesting in our context, he con-
tinues: »This was the emergence of a new political system based on national my-
thology and fervent patriotism, but also on the rule of law.« (Babicz 2014:22)323 
As to the importance of the very date of the ceremony of promulgation Babicz 
concludes:  
»February 11, 1889, was not chosen by accident as the day of promulgation of 
the Constitution. By selecting the 2,549th anniversary of the mythical acces-
sion of Jimmu to the throne of Japan, the Japanese leadership was stressing 
that Japanese modernity was linked to the most remote origins of the impe-
rial dynasty. February 11, 1889, was to mark the official birth of modern Ja-
pan. The two decades since the 1868 Meiji Restoration were defined as a mere 
prologue, a period when modern Japan was erected step by step. The Consti-
tution was crowning that edifice and opening a new and brilliant chapter in 
Japan’s immemorial history.« (Babicz 2014:22) 
                                                 
323 Babicz mentions also Kuga Katsunan, who was already discussed by Kokaze (2011:138). But 
Babicz seems to be unaware of Kokaze’s publication, since it does not appear in his bibliograpy. 
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The promulgation of the constitution, as »a result of the ‘advance of civiliza-
tion’ [...] was not meant to cut Japan from its origins«. The day of kigensetsu, the 
day of founding the empire by Jinmu-tennô, was chosen »to anchor Japan in its 
most remote past«. (l.c.) 
In the same way as Kokaze, Babicz does not discuss the role of Western mod-
els for the promulgation ceremony, which clearly could be seen as an impressive 
example of an Invented Tradition. Needless to say that he, of course, does not 
mention Ottmar von Mohl in this context at all. Just in one single sentence the ex-
istence of »foreigners employed by the government (oyatoi gaikokujin)« (Babiczs 
2014:26) is addressed, giving the information that those people, as well as some 
journalists, »where also allowed to witness (haiken) the ceremony« (l.c.).  
Already von Mohl himself expressed some frustration in this respect in his 
memoirs, since he was dismissed from service at the imperial court soon after the 
ceremonial events from February 11, 1889 had ended, having to return with his 
family to Germany, where a new phase of his career started. His name was never 
mentioned in Japan again. 
 
3. 1. 2. 3.  Further ideological developments 
 
It was only much later, in the era of early Shôwa State Shintô and official koku-
tai-nationalism, which we will deal with in chapter IV, that the day of the anni-
versary of the foundation of the Japanese Empire on February 11, eventually be-
came a central topic and event in Japan. The affirmative reception of the alleged 
Jinmu-tennô served as a basic pillar for the 1930s’ and early 1940s’ war propa-
ganda, especially at the festivities for the 2,600th anniversary in the year 1940 
(which were held in Berlin too). Official propaganda scriptures, as Kokutai no 
hongi (1937) or Shinmin no michi (1941/1943)324, emphasized the importance of 
Jinmu-tennô for the present Japanese empire.  
The Kokutai no hongi declares:  
»The Emperor Jimmu ascended the Throne with such a deep august mind as 
this, and with a great spirit [which had in mind] the uniting of the whole 
realm and the mantling of the whole world.«325 
And in the Shinmin no michi we read on the war time slogan of hakkô ichiu, 
which referred to a saying by Jinmu-tennô in the Nihonshoki:  
                                                 
324 Cf. Shinmin no Michi 1943 (2003) and Tolischus 1943. 
325 Kokutai no hongi, part II, cf. Kokutai no hongi 1937: 68; Gauntlett, Hall 1949: 108. 
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»[...] The eastward expedition of Emperor Jimmu was carried out, and this re-
sulted in the pacification of the great eight provinces and the consequent se-
lection of his capital at Kashihara in Yamato Province. [...]  
The Imperial spirit of expanding the Imperial tasks is mainly based on this 
spirit and policy [of the Emperor Jimmu] at the time of the Empire-founding. 
The succeeding Emperors have been ruling over the Empire in observance of 
these precepts. The Imperial Rescript granted by His Majesty the Emperor at 
the time of the conclusion of the Japan-German-Italian Tripartite Alliance 
mentioned the following: ‘It has been the great instructions bequeathed by 
Our Imperial Foundress and other Imperial Ancestors that our grand moral 
obligation should be extended to all directions, and the world be unified un-
der one roof. This is the point We are trying to obey day in and day out.’«326 
After WWII the state holiday for the commemoration of Jinmu’s accession to 
the throne on February 11th, kigensetsu was abolished in 1948. But in the year 1966 
this festival date was revived as national holiday in the new form of a »National 
Foundation Day«, kenkoku kinen no hi.327 Thus, although without the pre-war na-
tionalistic agenda, February 11 still serves today to commemorate the mythical 
foundation of the Empire in present day Japan. 
In conclusion, it may be remarked that the modern Empire of Japan was es-
tablished after the Meiji Restoration by taking recourse to the historical construct 
of a mythical-legendary empire, which allegedly was founded by a certain 
»Jinmu-tennô« in mythical times. It cannot be stated often enough, that this al-
leged founding of the empire is not supported by any historical or archaeological 
evidence. The real emergence of the Japanese state in prehistory was an evolu-
tionary one, occurring about 1,000 years later than the mythical date of 660 B.C. 
The mythical story of this foundation is told in the oldest Japanese source books, 
dating from the early 8th century. After the decline of the imperial state during 
the Middle Ages, this myth was actively revived by the authorities of the new 
Empire. Consequently the Meiji Constitution was promulgated on the day of ki-
gensetsu, the anniversary of this supposed foundation date (February 11, 1889), 
and in 1940 the 2,600th anniversary of this mythical event was widely celebrated. 
One of the basic functions of myths and mythologies is to provide the political 
sphere with structures of (sacred) legitimacy. And Japan can be regarded as an 
outstanding example for the political functionalization of myths in the past as 
well as in the present.  
                                                 
326 Shinmin no Michi, part II/1, cf. Shinmin no Michi 1943 (2003): 32, 33; Tolischus 1943: 423. 
327 Although the fictional nature of the event and especially the date has long been known in his-
torical science, this holiday, which was of great ideological importance in pre-war Japan, was re-
instated after the war. A discussion of the field can be found in Lokowandt 1981: 15, 17, 153-172 
(collected material on the topic of the National Founding Day). 
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3. 1. 3 The Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyôiku [ni kansuru] chokugo)  
 
Only one year after the promulgation of the Constitution, in 1890, an even 
more important document for the development of imperial ethics and State 
Shintô followed, the »Imperial Rescript on Education« (Kyôiku [ni kansuru] cho-
kugo).328 The Rescript was seen as an addendum to the Meiji Constitution. Both 
documents define the position of the emperor in the Japanese state – the Constitu-
tion by establishing an institutional framework, and the Imperial Rescript 
through spiritual and moral means. This decree emphasized the uniqueness of 
Japan and its ruler, as expressed in the concept of the kokutai. Since the contents 
and intention of the Imperial Rescript were identical with the goals of State 
Shintô, it became the central written work, the »Bible,« of State Shintô. Copies of 
it, along with portraits of the emperor, were objects of worship in Japanese 
schools. As a document of State Shintô, the text concisely explained to the people 
the basic moral foundations on which the Japanese government and the concept 
of the state (kokutai) had rested since ancient times (Lokowandt 1978: 237f.). 
Aside from basic Shintô tenets on the founding of the state by the imperial 
ancestors and a reference to the eternal imperial dynasty, the Imperial Rescript on 
Education is largely influenced by Confucian values such as loyalty, respect for 
the Constitution and the subordination of the individual for the good of the 
community. Modern patriotism and Confucian state ideology were united in the 
Kyôiku chokugo and directed at the emperor. 
The purpose of the Imperial Rescript on Education was originally only to de-
termine the pedagogic goals for education in Japanese elementary schools by of-
fering guidelines for mandatory moral instruction (shûshin329). However, the true 
significance of this document extends far beyond this. The Rescript actually pro-
vided the moral foundation for the late Meiji state and thus formed the official 
basis of kokutai thought until the end of World War II as a »non-religious relig-
ion« of »magical power,« as the philosopher Maruyama Masao states.330 
The truly mythical nature that was even attributed to the text itself is appar-
ent in the fact that the official copies of the text were added as a second holy ob-
                                                 
328 Text published in Ôkubo 1969: 425. Translations: Wittig 1976: 89-91, doc. 27; Tsunoda et al. 
1964, Vol. II: 139f.; Lokowandt 1978: 345, doc. 113. Cf. Sugiura Shigetake: »Vorlesungen über das 
Erziehungsedikt« (1914) in: Wittig 1976: 118-125, doc. 32. 
329 On moral instruction, cf. Wittig 1972: 119ff. and (same) 1976, doc. 35 and 38; Foljanty-Jost 1979: 
13ff.; Weegmann 1935; Wray 1973; Fridell 1970. 
330 Maruyama 1971: 31; cf. Maruyama 1988: 45. 
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ject of worship in schools, after the portrait of the emperor, already three months 
after its promulgation in January 1891. Thus, the Rescript itself was the object of 
quasi-religious worship under State Shintô as an incarnation of the spiritual es-
sence of Japan, its kokutai. 
Upon first examining the text, however, the reader may be surprised to find 
that it is far from being a demagogic pamphlet of ultranationalistic navel-gazing. 
Instead, its moderate tone is reminiscent of a merely moralistic guide for living a 
decent life: 
»Know ye, Our subjects: Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire 
on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted vir-
tue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation 
to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the funda-
mental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our educa-
tion. 
Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and 
sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear your-
selves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue 
learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and per-
fect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common 
interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emer-
gency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and 
maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and 
earth. 
So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious 
the best traditions of your forefathers. The Way here set forth is indeed the 
teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by 
Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all 
places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, 
Our subjects, that we may thus attain to the same virtue. 
 
The 30th day of the 10th month of the 23rd year of Meiji. (October 30, 1890) 
 
(Imperial signature and imperial stamp).«331 
However, a closer analysis of the text reveals a clear structure and statement 
of views in the tradition of the Kokugaku, and even more so of the Mito School. 
At the very beginning, the Rescript reveals the core of the Japanese kokutai, its 
‘original essence’: the Japanese empire was founded by the gods according to 
mythical tradition. The imperial line, in stark contrast to the classical Chinese 
concept of governance, has been virtuous from the beginning as the universal ba-
                                                 
331 Official translation of the Rescript in: »The Imperial Rescript on Education translated into Chi-
nese, English, French & German« (Tôkyô 1931). Cf. Lokowandt 1978: 345.  
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sis of the way of the emperor. The ruler and his subjects are connected through 
the absolute loyalty of the people, which in fact is identical with the love of a 
child for his father. 
Thus, the nation itself is depicted as a great family – not in a metaphoric 
sense, but in the sense of being directly related to one another by the collective 
divine ancestors. However, in order to manage social coexistence, ethical princi-
ples are needed. These the Imperial Rescript largely borrows from Confucian 
teachings – also in the tradition of the Mito School. 
The scholar Yamazaki Ansai (1618-1662), the founder of Suika Shintô, already 
strove to reach a synthesis of Confucianism and Shintô, and can thus be consid-
ered one of the predecessors of the Mito School. Citing Chu Hsi directly, he ar-
gued that the Five Virtues for managing the Five Relationships should be the ba-
sis of any decent education (Tsunoda et al. 1964, Vol. I: 355f.). 
In the Meiji-period Imperial Rescript on Education, these Five Values and so-
cial relationships are joined by a series of modern, Western constitutional norms 
for regulating a modern government, such as the commandment to respect the 
Constitution and the laws. 
In the last paragraph of the document, the topic covered at the beginning is 
taken up again: once again, it emphasizes the eternal existence of the single impe-
rial dynasty. The »way« was bequeathed by the ancestors, and it applies to the 
whole nation – to the ruler as well as his subjects. This motif can also be found in 
the thought of the Mito School, for example, in the work of Aizawa Seishisai, ac-
cording to whom the Way exists inside every Japanese.332 
The Imperial Rescript on Education specifies the essential and classical ele-
ments of kokutai thought as follows: 1) the religious core of the concept – bor-
rowed from Shintô – of the divinity of the imperial dynasty; 2) the Confucian Five 
Virtues and Relationships for managing society; and 3) combining the first two 
elements, familism – that is, the concept of the Japanese nation as an actual fam-
ily. 
These measures marked the completion of Meiji-period State Shintô. For the 
common Japanese, this was manifested in the traditional relationship between the 
state and the larger places of worship; in state holidays, the content of which was 
determined by the imperial household and Shintô; in the treatment of Shintô 
myths as the historical truth in the teaching of history; in Shintô-based moral 
education; in the mandatory annual shrine visits by school classes; and in the re-
ligious worship of images of the emperor and official copies of the Kyôiku chokugo. 
                                                 
332 Shinron , Mitogaku-zenshû, vol. 2, 1933: 7; cf. Hammitzsch 1940: 70; Hammitzsch 1939: 57 gives 
further examples of this view in writings of the Mito school. 
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Thus, the teachings were made obligatory and their spread among the people 
was ensured through moral education and military training.333 
 
3. 2. Morality as a means to national unity: the case of Inoue Tetsujirô334 
 
The historian Irokawa Daikichi (1985: 280ff.) differentiates between four con-
stituents of the state, which was based on the concept of the kokutai: 1) the myths 
relating to the imperial household, 2) ancestor worship, 3) the transfer of struc-
tural principles of the family to the state, and 4) a universally mandatory system 
of national morality. 
In order to ensure national unity and hinder the efforts toward freedom and 
civil rights circulating in Japan at the time, the political leadership used means 
that the historian Kôsaka Masaaki (1958: 374ff.) summarizes under two terms: 1) 
»law« and 2) »morality.« The nation was organized according to the ideology of 
familism, based on the principles of »law« and »morality.« The highest expres-
sion of the legal basis of the state – the »law« – was the Constitution of the Empire 
of Japan that was promulgated on February 11, 1889. This document, which syn-
thesized heterogeneous systems of government, gave the young empire a secure 
legal foundation for the state. 
And yet the ideology of State Shintô was only officially justified and spread 
among the population through mass education after the introduction of the 
Kyôiku chokugo in 1890. The Imperial Rescript on Education canonized the core, 
classical elements of the concept of the kokutai. While the Constitution provided 
the basis for the area of the »law« in the late Meiji state proposed by Kôsaka, the 
Imperial Rescript on Education formulated the credo of the universal »morals« as 
a mandatory national system of morality. The Japanese nation was understood to 
be a literal family, connected by the bond of a theorized common lineage of di-
vine ancestors. The unity of history and mythology, the idea of Japan as the »land 
of the gods,« ultimately led to the politically motivated view of Shintô as an 
authoritative state ideology. Since the nation itself, on the basis of mythology and 
history, was understood to be a family, it found its organizing structure in the 
moral principles of the family and interpersonal relationships. These were based 
on the maxims of the originally Confucian system of individual and social ethics, 
                                                 
333 Ethical education in the military was regulated by a separate decree, the »Imperial Rescript for 
the Military« (Gunjin chokuyu). For a detailed discussion of moral education in schools and the 
military, cf. Tsurumi 1970: 99-137. 
334 For Inoue Tetsujirô’s ideological foundation cf. Nawrocki 1998; Antoni 1990a and 1991: 76-99. 
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which, however, in the official Japanese view, were fully reinterpreted as genu-
inly Japanese values. 
For the purpose of indoctrinating the people, and especially for the ideologi-
cal training of the teachers who were to expand on and convey the entire mean-
ing of the short and rough-seeming text of the Rescript, a wide variety of official 
commentaries appeared during the Meiji, Taishô and early Shôwa periods that 
were initiated and published by the Mombushô, the Japanese Ministry of Educa-
tion. The most famous (and infamous) of these works is without a doubt the Ko-
kutai no hongi (»Cardinal Principles of the National Entity [of Japan]«) from 1937. 
This work covered all the elements of the Japanese missionary beliefs and na-
tional hubris based on the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 (see below). 
Just as the Kokutai no hongi marks the end of this series of official commentar-
ies, another work, which dates back to 1891, represents its beginning: the Chokugo 
engi (»Commentary on the Imperial Rescript [on Education]«) by the philosopher 
and Confucian scholar Inoue Tetsujirô (1855-1944). This work was the first in-
stance in which the spirit of the Rescript was officially interpreted and spread to a 
wide audience. It marked the beginning of the canonical interpretation of the 
Rescript and formed the basis for all further commentaries (cf. Antoni 1991a: 
81ff.). 
 
3. 2. 1. Chokugo engi: Inoue Tetsujirô’s commentary on the Imperial Rescript on 
Education 
 
A decisive experience for Inoue Tetsujirô (1855-1944) that influenced his en-
tire later life was a period of study abroad lasting several years, which he spent as 
a student and recipient of a Japanese government scholarship mostly in Germany 
from the winter of 1884 to the summer of 1890. There he pursued philosophical 
studies under notable scholars of the day, after already having completed a com-
prehensive study of Western philosophy (Inoue 1883-85). After his return to Ja-
pan, Inoue was immediately appointed professor of philosophy at the Imperial 
University of Tôkyô, to which he remained loyal throughout his entire career. 
Inoue influenced generations of young Japanese Tôdai philosophers, whom he 
taught about German idealism in particular (cf. Inoue 1935, among others). 
Directly after his return from a period of study in Germany, however, Inoue 
did not publish a work along these lines – his preferred area of study in philoso-
phy – but rather an ethical and ideological work, his Commentary on the Imperial 
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Rescript on Education.335 He was motivated to write this work personally by then 
Minister of Education Yoshikawa Akimasa (1841-1920)336, who apparently ex-
pected a result from Inoue that was in accordance with the state’s intentions. 
Inoue’s commentary was published in September of the year Meiji 24 (1891). 
It went on to remain the essential authority among the 600 commentaries pub-
lished before Shôwa 15 (1940). In the period between its publication and the year 
Meiji 40 (1907) alone, several million copies of this work were printed across 30 
editions (cf. Inoue 1983: 229). 
Inoue had feared that, in light of the influences from the movements for liber-
alism and enlightenment, the Kokugaku, Confucianism and Buddhism would 
completely lose their influence over Japanese society: 
»Such was the nature of the time that it was feared [in the government] that a 
commentary on the ‘Rescript’ would be met with little respect from represen-
tatives of Kokugaku or Sinology in light of the current circumstances in the 
academic world. For this reason, it was assumed that an appropriate com-
mentary could be produced by someone who himself had studied the West-
ern sciences. That was how it came to pass that I was chosen as the author of 
the commentary.« (Inoue 1973: 31) 
In this work, Inoue detailed the principles for a new kind of state morality 
whose main pillar was the demand for loyalty of the individual toward the state 
(Inoue 1983: 229). In his programmatic preface to the Chokugo engi, the author re-
marks: 
»The principle of the Imperial Rescript is to strengthen the foundation of the 
state by cultivating the finer virtues of filial piety, brotherliness, loyalty, hon-
esty (kô-tei-chû-shin), and by promoting the common feeling of communal 
love for one’s country, or patriotism (kyôdô aikoku), and thus to provide for 
unforeseeable events. Should all of our countrymen manage to live up to 
these principles, the hearts of the people will then unquestionably be 
united.«337 
Thus, Inoue clearly states that the essential points of the Rescript are, on the 
one hand, (Confucian) personal virtues, and on the other hand, the call to wide-
spread patriotism. But in his view, these two areas are not separate, but rather, 
                                                 
335 Text in: Chokugo engi 1891 and 1899. Reprint: Tôkyô 1939. Inoue’s programmatic preface is con-
tained in Vol. 3 of the series Nihon tetsugaku shisô zensho, (Heibonsha), Tôkyô 1956: 265-277.  
336 Inoue himself writes about this in his posthumously published autobiography (Inoue 1973: 31); 
cf. Ishizu 1983: 228. 
337 Inoue 1899 (1939): 231; cf. Inoue 1983: 229, see also Gluck 1985: 130; Yamazaki, Miyakawa 1966: 
120f. 
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they merge into an inseparable spiritual whole under the term chûkun-aikoku, 
»loyalty to the ruler, love for the country.« 
Upon closer examination of the ideological core of Inoue Tetsujirô’s kokutai 
thought, it becomes apparent that both ideological constituents, »patriotism« 
(kyôdô-aikoku) and »national morality« (referred to as kokumin-dôtoku in later 
works), originated from different sources. 
 
3. 2. 1. 1. »Patriotism« (kyôdô-aikoku) 
 
A competent account of Inoue’s life and work, which appeared in 1983 as part 
of the series Kindai bungaku shiryô sôsho (KBKS, Vol. 54), claims that Inoue made a 
compromise between modern and traditional thought (Inoue 1983: 229). The ex-
tent of the influence of modern European and especially German nationalism at 
the time on Inoue, on the other hand, is apparent in his own writings. 
From his memoirs it becomes apparent that the author returned from Europe 
not only as a proponent of the »pure philosophy« (junsei-tetsugaku) he himself 
propagated and a scholar of »identity realism« (genshosoku-jitsuzairon), but also 
brought back to Japan lasting impressions from Germany in the areas of national 
ideology and national morality, which were of great importance to him – impres-
sions that had a direct influence on his commentary on the Imperial Rescript on 
Education. In this context, Inoue writes: 
»During my studies in Germany I felt deeply that it was a time in which 
Germany, which had just defeated France in the war, had reached a position 
of extraordinary power. Wilhelm II followed Wilhelm I, and it was the era of 
Bismarck and Moltke. The nation’s prestige had grown and an era of great 
patriotism had begun. Upon closer examination of the condition of my own 
country, however, I concluded that after the Restoration it had submitted too 
far to Europeanization and was about to lose its spirit of autonomy and inde-
pendence. This was very dangerous for our country. 
In Germany, on the other hand, the spirit of autonomy and independence 
blossomed, and in the sciences, in the military, in education and various other 
fields, a great development was taking place. 
After some consideration, I recognized that Japan must stress its own 
strengths and especially foster a spirit of self-determination and independ-
ence. 
Because I returned to Japan with such thoughts, I felt that the promulgation 
of the »Imperial Rescript on Education« was something extraordinarily de-
serving of thanks, and I could not turn down the request of the Minister of 
Education Yoshikawa Akimasa [to write the commentary]; this is how I took 
on the task.« (Inoue 1973: 31f.) 
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This offers an extremely interesting perspective for the comparison of ideolo-
gies between Japan and Germany at the end of the 19th century. It is well known 
that Inoue Tetsujirô’s academic teacher, Katô Hiroyuki, as well as other important 
figures of Meiji ideology – Hozumi Yatsuka is also important in this context – 
were strongly influenced by intellectual developments in the nationalist ideology 
of the new German empire as well. In my view, this case demonstrates a concrete 
link between the German nationalism of the time of the German empire and the 
Japanese ideology of the kokutai, and I believe there is also a considerable basis for 
the later ideological development of »racial (völkisch) nationalism«338, which was 
largely congruent in Japan and Germany during the 1930s and ‘40s. In this con-
text, it is important to remember that »patriotism,« as one of the two ideological 
pillars of Inoue’s national thought, was based primarily on his concrete experi-
ence of modern nationalism, especially as it existed during the imperial era in 
Germany. 
 
3. 2. 1. 2. »National morality« 
 
It goes without saying that the moral basis on which the Imperial Rescript 
and Inoue operated was rooted in Confucianism. The terms kô (benevolence), tei 
(brotherliness), chû (loyalty) and shin (honesty), cover nearly the entire Confucian 
catalog of virtues. Inoue unites individual virtues with those of a communal sys-
tem of state ethics. The concept of familism is based on the principle of organiz-
ing society along the same moral guidelines as the area of interpersonal relation-
ships – that is to say, the family. Inoue remarks that only when the same princi-
ples apply to all areas – meaning, when the family and the state are in harmony 
with one another – can the nation be united as a whole. Following from this, he 
also arrives at an organic model for the state in which government and the family 
state are shown to be two sides of the same coin: »The house (i.e. the family), like 
cells in an organism, is the true basis of the state,« (Inoue 1983: 230). 
Inoue’s interest in Confucianism was deeply rooted and extended beyond the 
area of ideological exploitation. And yet, he continually sought to find a connec-
tion between scientific argument and national ideological education. Inoue pub-
lished a series of works on »national morality,« the most noteworthy of which 
was Kokumin dôtoku gairon (»Outline of National Morality,« or »Outline of the 
Morality of the Nation«) from 1912 (Inoue 1912). This work is a compilation of 
various lectures that were held in a teachers’ seminar and was published by 
                                                 
338 The use of this term (German: völkischer Nationalismus) follows Seifert 1997. 
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Inoue at the request of the Ministry of Education. It represents the final develop-
ment of the ethical ideas outlined in the Chokugo engi of 1891. Inoue’s Kokumin dô-
toku gairon is part of a whole series of similar works by various authors from 
around 1910 on the subject of the Japanese »national morality« (kokumin-dôtoku). 
This was occasioned by the school book reforms of 1910, which emphasized gen-
eral moral education (shûshin) at all public schools (cf. Morioka 1977: 188). At this 
time Inoue was considered the ultimate authority in this area (cf. Morioka 1977: 
192). 
Inoue’s work dedicates a chapter to each of the central thematic areas of the 
national ideology: the basic principles of the Japanese »national morality,« the re-
lationship between »national morality« and the kokutai (Chapter III), the impor-
tance of Shintô (Chapters IV and V), bushidô (ch. VI), the characteristics of Japa-
nese familism (kazoku-seido; chapters VII-IX) etc. (Inoue 1912; cf. Davis 1976: 17ff.). 
Inoue also emphasizes that the principles of the Japanese national morality are 
found in their purest form in the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890.339 
Thus, the connection between Inoue the academic and Inoue the national 
ideologue in this work from 1912 points to a fundamental problem in Inoue’s ar-
gumentation. This stems from the question of Inoue’s attitude toward the mythi-
cal and mystical foundation of Meiji nationalism, his relationship to the revital-
ized Shintô, which is strongly opposed to Confucian rationalism and claims the 
existence of a system of morality that is supposedly innate to the Japanese people 
and has nothing in common with Chinese (and therefore »foreign«) Confucian-
ism. 
 
3. 2. 1. 3. Shintô and the Kokugaku on the origin of morality 
 
At this point it is necessary to examine the religious components of the con-
cept of familism – that is, their foundation, which was generally shaped by his-
torical Shintô tradition. This is where the Kokugaku began to shape the system. 
The orthodox Kokugaku believed in the theoretical axiom of the historical 
truth and reality of the ancient historical myths, including the chapter on the 
»Age of the Gods« in the oldest annals of the Japanese empire. 
The myths were understood literally to be jijitsu, or »facts«; their account of 
the creation of the world, the divine and human spheres, the beginning of the 
                                                 
339 Inoue 1912: 6. As in later commentaries, such as the Kokutai no hongi of 1937, parallels are 
drawn between the Meiji-period Imperial Rescript and the so-called Seventeen-Article Constitu-
tion written by Shôtoku-taishi under the reign of the Empress Suiko (592-628); cf. discussion in 
Antoni 1991a: 53. 
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emperorship, the origins of the powerful clans – all these mythical and legendary 
events were considered by the scholars of National Learning to be descriptions of 
historical reality. When, for example, a theorist such as Hirata Atsutane called Ja-
pan the »land of the gods,« he was following a literal interpretation of the histori-
cal writings in the sense of an idea that could be called »Shintô fundamentalism.« 
In Atsutane’s work this view led to a fanatical nationalism and to his belief in the 
essential superiority of Japan over all other nations. In his view, the gods were 
»the beginning of all that is human, and just as the gods gave birth to the world, 
at the same time they also gave birth to humans,« (Hammitzsch 1936: 20). 
The question of the origin of ethics was also central to Kokugaku thought in 
this context. Unlike China, which in Atsutane’s view only learned the principles 
of virtue and morality through the teachings of Confucianism, Japan possessed a 
quasi-genetic form of ethics from the beginning of time. Due to the descent not 
only of the emperor, but also, according to the expanded kokutai arguments, of the 
entire nation, from the deities of the Japanese pantheon, Japan possessed an in-
digenous »way« of its own. Thus, Japan’s superiority to all other nations, and 
over China in particular, was based on the fact that in Japan the maxims of virtue 
and morality were realized intuitively, while China must resort to complicated 
systems of rationally based ethics in order to bring its supposed spiritual chaos 
under control. 
In the Mito School at the end of the Edo period, which aimed to synthesize 
the Kokugaku and Confucianism, the area of personal and social ethics was a 
great focus of attention. This school disproportionately emphasized and finally 
equated the categories of »loyalty« (chû) and »filial piety« (kô), which were hence-
forth considered to be the moral basis of the Japanese kokutai. Regardless of their 
origin in Chinese (i.e. Confucian) thought, in the Meiji period it was claimed that 
»loyalty« and »filial piety« were purely Japanese values. The further expansion of 
this ideology, which argued on the basis of national ethics, finally reached a point 
at which any elements of Confucianism in the principles of virtue and morality 
were officially negated. In line with the tradition of the Kokugaku, the kokutai 
ideology of familism saw these values as the common product of the Japanese na-
tion, manifested in their highest perfection in the person, as well as the institu-
tion, of the emperor. 
 
3. 2. 1. 4. Inoue’s attitude toward Shintô dogma 
 
Inoue writes in his memoirs that, before his departure for Germany, he had 
loose contacts with Kokugaku circles. But it is clear to the reader that his position 
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was basically quite distant from that of Kokugaku scholars. As a Confucian, phi-
losopher, and also a lyricist, he was at that time still quite oriented toward the 
West. 
Even his stated position toward Shintô in his earlier works shows a certain 
ambivalence, even distance, on the part of the author. The extent of the shift to-
ward radical Shintô nationalism in the later years of Inoue’s thinking is shown in 
a substantial study by Johann Nawrocki (1998), which will be discussed in the fol-
lowing. 
In his work on the history of Japanese Confucianism (Inoue 1908), Inoue also 
briefly discusses the Confucians of the Edo period who had worked most dili-
gently toward a synthesis of Confucianism and Shintô, Hayashi Razan and Ya-
mazaki Ansai. In his account of these two scholars, there is an element of modest 
criticism that is not evident in Inoue’s discussion of any other scholars. He con-
siders Hayashi Razan to be a great mind and the most capable student of Fuji-
wara Seika, but he also accuses him of a lack of tolerance toward those who think 
differently from himself, whether it be followers of the school of Wang Yang-
ming or even Buddhists and Christians; only toward Shintô does he appear to be 
open-minded. According to Inoue, Razan’s writings on ethics were merely copied 
from Chu Hsi and did not contribute any new ideas. Still, although he left behind 
no original ideas, he was at least the founder of the most important school of the 
Edo period, which definitely left its mark on the Japanese national polity (Inoue 
1908: 41). 
Inoue’s judgement of Yamazaki Ansai, the founder of the Confucian-
influenced Suika Shintô, was no more flattering. He too, in Inoue’s opinion, 
lacked original ideas, and his contribution consisted merely in writing school 
textbooks (kyôkasho) in which he explained the teachings of Chu Hsi. Later he 
made an attempt to bring Shintô and Confucianism into harmony, which, how-
ever, led to a further loss in the clarity of his teachings. After his death, however, 
his teachings spread widely and to a large extent were appropriated by the Mito 
School (Inoue 1908: 47f.). 
Finally, an entire chapter of his main work from 1912, Kokumin dôtoku gairon, 
is devoted to the relationship between »Shintô and the kokutai« (Inoue 1912: 86-
103). In this work, Inoue emphasizes the importance of the Divine Mandate, shin-
choku,,that is, Amaterasu’s mandate for the eternal rule of the Japanese imperial 
household. Inoue writes that the spirit of this mandate reveals the morality of the 
Japanese nation. It is entirely national in character (mattaku kokkateki de arimasu; cf. 
Inoue 1912: 87). Thus, Shintô, as Inoue (1912: 103; cf. Gluck 1985: 142) clearly 
states, is a »national religion« (kokkateki shûkyô). In the following chapter, which is 
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devoted to the origin of Shintô, Inoue declares that Shintô and the Japanese na-
tion both came into being at the same time; Japanese mythology possesses a 
unique character and forms the basis of Japanese ancestor worship (Inoue 1912: 
109f.). Inoue views this point as the actual – or sole – meaning of Shintô: ancestor 
worship in Japan – the basis of modern familism – also emerged alongside it. 
However, research has since been able to prove that much of the supposedly 
ancient Japanese ancestor worship was the product of the national ideologues of 
the Meiji period (cf. Morioka 1977), and it was Inoue who played an important 
role in the formation of these beliefs. Thus, in his view, the core of Shintô is ances-
tor worship, which in turn emerged from the mandate of Amaterasu ômikami to 
the heavenly grandson Ninigi no mikoto. According to Inoue, this proves the le-
gitimacy of the imperial household, and thus of the entire Japanese kokutai, both 
ethically and genealogically. Inoue the philosopher was always suspicious of 
Shintô as a religion. To him, the value of Shintô lay in the founding of the kokutai, 
not in its religious dimension. Thus, in later works, Inoue consistently speaks of 
Kokutai Shintô (see chapter IV: 2. 2.). 
Thus, Inoue’s answer to the question of the origin of the national ethics, or 
rather, the »national morality« of Japan, which, in the view of Shintô, is an essen-
tial question, avoids any religious interpretation. Far from denying the Confucian 
origin of ethics, or even disguising it, Inoue (1908: 30f.) gives the following expla-
nation: 
»In the 16th year of the reign of Emperor Ôjin – the year 285 according to the 
common [Western] calendar – the teaching of ju [Confucianism] was intro-
duced to our country. However, its true beginning was at least 120 years 
later. The adoption of Confucianism did not cause the slightest disturbance at 
the time. On the other hand, in the times when Buddhism and Christianity 
first entered our country, there was at first great outrage and unrest, which 
ultimately led to tragic bloodshed. Similar unrest did not occur in the case of 
Confucianism, because the teachings of ju were in harmony with the tradi-
tional character of our people in many areas.« 
Inoue’s high estimation of Confucianism’s significance at the time is evident 
in his further comments, in which he suggests that the adoption of Western civili-
zation after the Meiji Restoration was only made possible by the intellectual 
preparation through Confucianism during the Edo period (Inoue 1908: 59). He 
writes that, although Confucianism declined in the Meiji period, its teachings 
found their way into the national program of education. However, as Inoue (1908: 
61) remarks, this no longer occurred in the name of Confucianism itself; the teach-
ings remained intact, but their name, and thus the consciousness of their origins, 
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disappeared. Finally, Inoue clearly states the intellectual-historical facts: the value 
of Confucianism has always been to make moral education possible independent 
of any religion (shûkyô wo hanarete; Inoue 1908: 61). How this can be unified with 
shinchoku mysticism, toward which he showed himself to be increasingly open as 
early as 1912, and even more so in the 1930s and ‘40s, ultimately remains unclear, 
nor is it explained by the opportunistic workaround that Confucianism corre-
sponded to the original character of the Japanese people »from the very begin-
ning.« 
Due to his Confucian, rationalist view, Inoue, who had previously been 
among the most prominent pioneers of the nationalist state ideology in Japan, 
later became one of the persecuted. A work from the year 1926 entitled Waga ko-
kutai to kokumin dôtoku that deals with the area of »the kokutai and national moral-
ity,« which by that time had become a classic topic in Inoue’s writings, was seen 
by the newly dominant fundamentalist Shintô ideologues as a slight to the impe-
rial household, due to his rational interpretation of the imperial regalia. As Ya-
mazaki and Miyakawa (1966: 125) write, following this, Inoue withdrew from all 
government offices, even from the House of Peers, to which he had been ap-
pointed by the emperor in 1925. But both authors neglect to mention that Inoue’s 
attitudes ultimately did adjust to a large extent to the prevailing thought of the 
1930s. At this point, he saw Shintô as the means to the moral unification of all 
people; in his view, Shintô was the tool for Japan’s expansion in the world (cf. 
Davis 1976: 26f.). In the 1940s Inoue finally made a ultimate adjustment to the 
spirit of the times. Under the influence of the war and the supposed Japanese 
mission in Asia, he eventually reached the conclusion that the basis of his com-
mentary – that is, the ethical maxims of the Imperial Rescript on Education of 
1890 – applied not only to Japan, but also formed the foundation for education in 
the »coming Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.«  
This further development in Inoue’s thinking, which has not yet been suffi-
ciently acknowledged in academic research, is the focus of an impressive disserta-
tion by Johann Nawrocki (1998). The most important points of this study will be 
covered in the later discussion of the early Shôwa period. 
 
3. 3. Shintô and the state in the late Meiji period 
 
The Imperial Rescript on Education marked the completion of the basic struc-
ture of Meiji-period State Shintô, which remained in this form until 1912, and to a 
large extent even until the end of the war in 1945. 
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Japan’s aggressive policy of expansion, which began in 1890, was rooted to a 
great extent in religious nationalism and the belief in the superiority of the divine 
character of the nation, based on Shintô. The desire to rule as a superior »land of 
the gods« manifested itself in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Russo-
Japanese War (1905) and the subsequent occupation of Korea in 1910. The ten-
dency of the nationalistic, chauvinistic and militaristic traits of State Shintô be-
came more and more evident and continued after the Meiji period on into the 
Taishô and early Shôwa periods. 
However, political interest in Shintô did not fully ignite again until the begin-
ning of the 20th century. In the year 1900 the government separated the manage-
ment of shrines from that of other religions, including the Shintô sects. The Bu-
reau for Shrines and Temples (shajikyoku) became the »Shrine Bureau« (jinja-
kyoku), and a »Religions Bureau« (shûkyôkyoku) was created within the Ministry of 
the Interior. As Holtom (1922) writes, the rules regarding the separation of Shintô 
shrines and religious institutions were laid down in a separate imperial ordinance 
(Chokurei no. 163). Even the duties of the newly organized Ministry of the Interior 
were specified, and thus also those of the two aforementioned bureaus (Holtom 
1922: 28). According to the imperial ordinance, the jinjakyoku was responsible for 
matters relating to the grand shrines, government shrines, national shrines, pre-
fectural shrines, district shrines and so on. Additionally, all duties relating to the 
shrine priests fell under the responsibility of this bureau (Holtom 1922: 29). The 
shûkyôkyoku, on the other hand, was responsible for the Shintô sects, Buddhism 
and the other religious groups. The separation between official Shintô shrines and 
other religions was finally intensified in 1913 by the transfer of the Religions Bu-
reau from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Education (l.c.). 
The separation of the former shajikyoku into a bureau responsible for religions 
and another responsible for shrines also marked the official outward separation 
of Shintô from the religious realm. In 1918 Tsukamoto Seiji, then leader of the 
Shrine Bureau, finally wrote expressly that shrines were clearly not religious in 
character, but that this point had time and again led to misunderstandings by for-
eigners as well as the Japanese themselves (Holtom 1922: 44). According to Tsu-
kamoto, the shrines were already viewed as being non-religious even before the 
separation of the shajikyoku into the two separate bureaus in 1900. Theoretically, 
he writes, matters relating to the shrines could have been handled within the Re-
ligions Bureau, but in order to prevent the misunderstanding that the shrines 
were of a religious nature, the two bureaus were separated. 
Tsukamoto also attempted to explain the separate laws relating to Shintô 
shrines and Buddhist temples (Holtom 1922: 45). According to him, the nature of 
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both institutions and their relationship to the state are so different that it is im-
possible to apply the same rules and ordinances to both. Finally, only the matters 
relating to the shrines fall under the responsibility of the state; the same is true for 
the priests at these shrines, who, as opposed to leaders of religious organizations, 
are civil servants. 
According to Holtom (1922: 46), Tsukamoto wanted to show that the reason 
for the separation of religions and politics lay in the non-religious character of the 
shrine ceremonies. These were subsequently declared kokurei, or »national rites,« 
by the state, and this provided the legal basis for designating the shrines as non-
religious, national institutions toward which all Japanese citizens were obliged to 
show reverence (Holtom 1922: 27). This marked the final step in the appropria-
tion of Shintô by the state.340 
Since the Meiji Restoration, among other things, numerous new shrines had 
been founded in honor of war heroes and loyal followers of the imperial house-
hold. The most important among these shrines was Yasukuni-jinja in Tôkyô, 
which will be discussed later in more detail. Originally dedicated to those on the 
side of the imperial loyalists who died during the Restoration, the fallen soldiers 
of the Sino-Japanese (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese (1904-06) Wars were later 
also included. The emperor performed rituals at the shrine in honor of the dead 
who were worshipped there as kami. In this way, the novel idea of dying in battle 
for the sake of the homeland as an honorable deed spread among the people. 
On October 13, 1908, the government issued the so-called »Boshin Decree« 
(boshin-shôsho) in the name of Emperor Meiji that was directed against the liberal 
schools of thought in Japan at the time. The shrines were also more closely inte-
grated into society. The decree states that they were to play a part in the further 
unification of the country.341 As a first step in this direction, already two years 
prior to the decree, the smaller shrines were merged with larger ones by a sepa-
rate decree. The goal of this measure was to only allow one shrine per locality, 
and thus to bring the shrine and town organizations into line. Such measures 
were already a central point in the plans drawn up in Shintô circles during the 
Edo period. With the Boshin decree, the government supported attempts to create 
connections between shrines and other state-oriented organizations, such as na-
tional youth groups, women’s groups and army reserve units. It was hoped that 
the shrines would be useful in preventing social conflicts such as strikes and con-
flicts between landlords and tenants (l.c.). 
                                                 
340 According to Hardacre (1989: 5f.), only after this point in time did Shintô theologians begin to 
speak of »State Shintô.« 
341 Cf. Hardacre 1989: 38; KEJ 1: 165; Wagner 1991. For a recent study cf. Maxey 2014. 
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One of the most remarkable directives regarding the shrines dealt with public 
schools. Komatsubara Eitarô, then Minister of Education, announced in 1911 that 
all teachers were required to take their students on a visit to a public shrine so 
that they could pay their respects before the altar. According to the decree, a 
sense of reverence is directly interrelated with the feeling of respect for one’s an-
cestors and is thus extremely important for creating the foundation of a new na-
tional morality (Holtom 1922: 42). This is reminiscent of the efforts by Inoue 
Tetsujirô to create a Japanese system of ethics (Nihon-dôtoku). However, these 
mandatory visits were not uncontroversial. One of the most well-known exam-
ples in this context is the refusal of a group of Catholic students from Sophia Uni-
versity to bow before Yasukuni Shrine (1932). They justified their refusal by refer-
ring to the guarantee of freedom of religion in Article 28 of the Constitution. The 
Ministry of Education dismissed this argument on the grounds that shrines are 
clearly non-religious institutions whose primary purpose is to foster patriotism 
and loyalty. And because shrine rituals are non-religious, it is also permissible to 
make participation obligatory for all Japanese subjects. 
As Holtom (1922: 26ff.) writes in detail, in 1899 and 1900 the government thus 
undertook the last steps in order to give Shintô the status of a non-religion. The 
priests of Ise-jingû were pioneers in this regard in their claim that Shintô is 
merely a religion for the preservation of ancestor worship and the conservation of 
historical continuity in Japanese society. In anticipatory obedience, the leadership 
of this national treasure went as far as to submit a (successful) petition to re-
nounce their status as a religious organization and instead to adopt the legal 
status of a secular legal entity (zaidan-hôjin) with the title Jingû-hôsaikai (»Society 
for the Worship of the Illustrious Shrine [of Ise]«). 
According to Holtom, the religious changes of these years must be viewed in 
light of the general political situation of the time. As for the religious situation, 
the Constitution of 1889 guaranteed every Japanese citizen religious freedom, 
provided that their exercising of this freedom did not interfere with their duties 
as subjects. 
This made it possible for the government to maintain control over the Shintô 
shrines, which were so important for the image of the state, while at the same 
time the administrative measures could be declared independent of religious pol-
icy. The shrines functioned officially as state institutions for maintaining the con-
tinuity of Japanese history and the stimulation of loyalty and patriotism among 
the people. Thus, it was possible for the government to deny any accusations 
from within the country or abroad of supporting a state religion, while still main-
taining full jurisdiction over the shrines (Holtom 1922: 32). According to Holtom, 
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this did not do any damage to Shintô; on the contrary, the close relationship be-
tween the Japanese government and the religion of the shrines actually intensi-
fied after 1900. In 1902 the government announced detailed regulations regarding 
the ranks, appointments, duties and rights of the priests at all shrines on the gov-
ernmental and national levels. 
Further laws followed that regulated all matters of the shrines up to the 
smallest details (Holtom 1922: 32-34). These laws are a sign of the extent to which 
the nationalization of the shrines had progressed at the time (Holtom 1922: 40). 
And the determination to use the (actually religious) ideas, rites and customs of 
the shrines to promote national unity was underlined in official statements time 
and again. Thus, a document from 1908 states, among other things, that the feel-
ing of »reverence [toward God]« (keishin) is a special characteristic of Japan. It 
states that the Japanese kokutai, as well as the splendor of the nation’s history, are 
enhanced by further developing this spirit of reverence and using the shrines for 
promoting the unity of the state (Holtom 1922: 41). This reveals a direct link to the 
concept of the kokutai, and thus also to the content of the Imperial Rescript on 
Education! 
The extent of the expansion of Shintô as a national religion during the Meiji 
and Taishô periods can also be seen in the annual government statistics on the 
shrines (Holtom 1922: 47). According to these statistics, between the years 1880 
and 1920, an increase of 373 shrines of higher rank took place; the statistics on the 
priests show a similar development. While the priesthood was reduced at the dis-
trict level and below, the number of priests at shrines on the prefectural level and 
above rose by 362. According to Holtom, these numbers support the view that the 
national religion was mainly focused on the development of shrines of higher 
rank that could help unify popular opinion. 
 
3. 3. 1. The spread of Shintô abroad 
 
Inoue Nobutaka and Sakamoto Koremaru (1994: 22f.) point to the fact that 
since the middle of the Meiji period, a constant spread of Shrine Shintô took place 
abroad as well. A large number of shrines were established on the Korean penin-
sula, in Taiwan, Sakhalin and several regions of China. Taiwan-jinja was estab-
lished 1900 in Taiwan as a »First-Class Imperial Shrine« (kanpei-taisha). Later, sev-
eral other shrines were also established in Taiwan. The recently deceased Prince 
Yoshihisa Shinnô Kitashirakawa no Miya (1847-1895) was often chosen as the de-
ity (saijin) worshipped at shrines in Taiwan, since he had commanded the expedi-
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tionary troops in Taiwan as head of the Imperial Guard and died there after fal-
ling ill. This is a remarkable case of the deification of a newly deceased person. 
As for the Korean peninsula, Frits Vos writes of numerous shrines that were 
established there particularly during the Japanese colonial period (1905-1945), as 
Japanese customs were enforced (kôminka) by the Japanese authorities (cf. Vos 
1977: 218-224). Although a shrine dedicated to the god Ômononushi was built at 
the mountain Yongdu-san as early as 1678, as well as several shrines during the 
Meiji period by Japanese living in Korea (cf. Vos 1977: 220f.), it was only in 1915 
that shrines began to be established in large numbers there.342 In 1919, Chôsen-
jinja was established in the administrative area of Seoul as the main shrine in Ko-
rea, and it was completed in 1925. Under the name Chôsen-jingû, it was elevated 
to the status of kanpei-taisha.343 Subsequently, Shintô shrines were founded in 
large numbers throughout Korea.344 Japan’s defeat in August of 1945 also marked 
the end of the history of Shintô in Korea. In this context, Vos remarks: 
»Immediately after the announcement of Japan’s defeat, many Shintô shrines 
were destroyed by the Koreans as symbols of colonialist suppression. The 
first shrine that was burned down was Heijû-jinja in P’yongyang during the 
night of August 15, 1945. The Japanese held shôshin-shiki (ceremonies for 
»sending up the gods«) directly after the end of the war – that is to say, the 
gods were asked to return to Japan. Thus, the kami returned home before the 
people they protected.« (l.c.) 
In Sakhalin (Karafuto) a kanpei-taisha by the name of Karafuto-jinja was also 
built in 1910 in the city of Tôyôhara, today called Yugno-Sahalinsk, and during 
the Taishô period, several prefectural shrines (kensha) were also built there. Ando-
jinja was built in Manchuria in 1908, and after the »Manchurian Incident,« the 
number of shrines in Manchuria continued to grow up until the end of the war. 
In Okinawa, which has formally belonged to Japan since 1879, but which was 
culturally and politically unique in several ways, a state policy of »Shintôization« 
was also consistently pursued. For example, the most important place of worship 
in the Ryûkyû empire, Naminoue Shrine in Naha, was designated the central 
Shintô holy place in Okinawa Prefecture in 1924. Along with four kings from the 
                                                 
342 These shrine establishments were decreed in a separate directive by the Japanese government 
(Chôsen jinja sôritsu kisoku (»Regulations Regarding the Establishment of Shintô Shrines in Korea«), 
September 1915; cf. Vos 1977: 222).  
343 Cf. Inoue, Sakamoto 1994: 22; Vos 1977: 223. 
344 Inoue, Sakamoto (l.c.) state that »more than 50« shrines were established; Vos (1977: 223), how-
ever, cites much higher numbers: »In June 1945 there were two imperial shrines in Korea, the pre-
viously mentioned Chôsen-jingû and Fuyo-jingû, which was still under construction [...] , eight 
state shrines (kokuheisha) … , 69 ‘general’ shrines (ippan-jinja) and 1062 smaller shrines.« 
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island’s history, Minamoto no Tametomo, who was closely connected with the 
annexation of Okinawa to the Japanese empire, was also worshipped there (cf. 
Antoni 1983-86). 
After the Meiji period, shrines were also founded in the farthest reaches of the 
Japanese sphere of influence. For example, upon the beginning of the Japanese 
mandate after World War I, Shintô shrines began to be built in the South Sea on 
the islands of Saipan, Palau, Yap and Chuuk (Truk). Thus, the building of Shintô 
shrines in Asia and Oceania can be seen as being directly related to the expansion 
of the Japanese colonial sphere of influence at the time. 
The shrines established before the Pacific War in Hawaii and in North and 
South America were generally places of worship established by Japanese immi-
grants in these regions. In the case of Hawaii, immigration began after the signing 
of the immigration agreement between the Japanese government and the royal 
family of Hawaii, and around the year 1900, shrines were built on each of the 
Hawaiian islands (Maui, Hawaii and others). In this context, it is significant that 
the shrines spread along with the Buddhist Jôdoshû and Jôdoshinshû sects, 
among others, since the immigrants hoped to maintain their customs abroad. 
Elements of Sectarian Shintô and the Shintô-influenced new religions, which un-
fortunately cannot be further discussed in this context, had already sent mission-
aries abroad before the war. Among the »13 Shintô sects« (jûsanpa), the Tenrikyô, 
Konkôkyô, Shinrikyô, Kurozumikyô and other sects had established bases 
abroad. And Tenrikyô, Konkôkyô, Seichô no Ie and others undertook missionary 
initiatives not only in Asia, but in North America and Hawaii as well. 
The shrines that were founded abroad before the war have all but disap-
peared; not one remains in North America and Asia, and only a few shrines re-
main in Hawaii. It goes without saying that this is due to the fact that the shrines 
in Asia were seen as symbols of Japanese imperialism, and in North America of 
State Shintô. After Japan’s defeat on August 15, 1945, the short history of Shintô 
in these areas abruptly came to an end. 
 
3. 3. 2. The Shintô burial of Meiji-tennô 
 
Ceremonies clearly played a crucial role in State Shintô thought as manifesta-
tions of the familistic national unity. The importance of Shintô rituals to the state 
can be seen in the final ceremony of the Meiji period: the burial of Emperor 
Meiji.345 
                                                 
345 As source book cf. Meiji-tennô gotaisôgi shashinchô (no ed., Tôkyô 1912); cf. Antoni 1991a: 212-
220.  
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The burial of Meiji-tennô, who died during the night of July 29 to 30, 1912, 
was the first time an emperor was buried in a Shintô ceremony since the intro-
duction of the new political system in 1868. In accordance with legal regulations 
instated in 1909 (Kôshitsu fukumorei), the funeral ceremonies and the burial itself 
took place between September 13 and 15, 1912, in Tôkyô and Momoyama, outside 
of Kyôto. 
The funeral for the deceased emperor took place at the parade grounds that 
were located in Aoyama, Tokyô, west of the Imperial Palace. In the following 
years, these parade grounds were incorporated into the shrine dedicated to Em-
peror Meiji. The shrine itself was built on imperial land west of the Akasaka dis-
trict – what is now Meiji-jingû and Yoyogi Park. The nearby Aoyama parade 
grounds were designated the »outer garden of (Meiji) Shrine« (Jingû-gaien). Only 
in 1926, after the death of Meiji-tennô’s successor Taishô-tennô, was the construc-
tion completed. No shrine was built for Taishô-tennô after his death. 
Following the emperor’s wishes, the burial itself took place not in Tôkyô, but 
on a hill at Momoyama near Kyôto. After the conclusion of the funeral ceremo-
nies on the night of September 13 to 14, 1912, at the funeral hall (sôjôden) in 
Tôkyô, the coffin was brought to a specially built train station (Aoyama Station) 
and transported to its final resting place on a special train. Inhabitants of the town 
of Yase, the so-called Yase-dôji, carried the palanquin (sôkaren) with the emperor’s 
coffin in a procession from the station in Momoyama to the grave site. The town 
has been said to harbor a special loyalty toward the emperor since ancient times. 
Thus, its inhabitants have enjoyed the favor of the imperial household and served 
as bearers of the imperial coffin.346 
In general, the burial of Meiji-tennô served as a model for all subsequent 
burials of this kind up to the present day. In a nighttime procession, the coffin, 
hidden in a black oxcart, was brought to the burial site. The design of the sôjôden 
and the akusha tent halls for the funeral guests and diplomatic corps, like the 
placement of the two torii, also served as an example for the later burials of Em-
perors Taishô and Shôwa. At this funeral the colors black (the Western funeral 
color) and white (the traditional East-Asian funeral color) were used together for 
the first time. Also, in addition to the imperial gagaku music, Franz Eckert’s Kana-
shi no kiwami was played by the military bands. 
                                                 
346 This tradition can be traced to a story in which the inhabitants of the town supposedly saved 
the emperor of the Southern Court, Godaigo-tennô (1288-1339), from his opponent Ashikaga Ta-
kauji at the time of the imperial schism in the 14th century. Since the canonical decision in the 
Dainihonshi, the historical work of the Mito school, the Southern Court, which was of great impor-
tance for the institution of the emperor in the Meiji period, has been seen as the only legitimate 
line. 
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A short remark in the contemporary correspondent’s report in the Tägliche 
Rundschau (Berlin) on September 16, 1912, gives an idea of the authenticity of this 
ceremony. In his report on the funeral of Meiji-tennô, the author writes: 
»Aside from its wonderfully simple refinement, the funeral in Aoyama did 
not differ at all from the traditional burial ceremony according to the Shintô 
ritual.« 
This knowledgeable witness, whose name was unfortunately not identified, 
reached an unusually significant conclusion: such burial ceremonies were not 
limited to imperial funerals, but apparently existed within a larger context of 
Shintô burials of the Meiji period. Since it is clear that the propagation of Shintô 
was a crucial part of the state ideology, and that, to a large extent, anachronistic, 
supposedly ancient elements were reconstructed for this purpose, this fact can be 
seen as a key to understanding the development of the modern imperial funeral 
ceremony. 
Fortunately, two contemporary studies on this subject were published by E. 
Ohrt in 1910 and 1911 in the journal of the German East-Asian Society (OAG) in 
Tôkyô. One of these describes the »Burial Customs in Japan« in general (Ohrt 
1910 a), and the other covers »The State Funeral of Prince Itô« in detail (Ohrt 1910 
b). Based on these works, the following conclusions can be drawn: 1) The burial 
of Emperor Meiji was not an unusual ceremony that was limited to imperial buri-
als, but rather follows a custom of state funerals that began in the Meiji period. 2) 
The form of these funerals represents only one especially elaborate version of 
Meiji-period Shintô burials. 3) The general progression of a Shintô burial can be 
described as follows: 
»The religious part of a Shintô burial is split into four separate acts: Mitama 
utsushi, the transfer of the soul of the deceased to the tamashiro; shukkwan, the 
ceremonial removal of the coffin from the place of death; sôjô no shiki, the 
main ceremony for the entire burial procession; and maisô, the burial itself. 
The first two ceremonies are performed at the place of death, while the sôjô no 
shiki is usually held in a hall that is reserved for such ceremonies, or which 
has been specially built for the occasion, and the maisô takes place at the 
gravesite. [...] 
Foreigners who take part in a Shintô burial usually only attend the sôjô no 
shiki, unless several of these ceremonies are combined into one.« (Ohrt 1910 a: 
92) 
In fact, imperial funeral ceremonies followed exactly this outline of Meiji-
period Shintô burials. Ohrt’s mention of the role of foreigners in the ceremony is 
particularly interesting. They were only allowed to take part in the sôjô no shiki. 
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Thus, the diplomatic corps was only present for this part of the ceremony during 
the burial of Meiji-tennô (as well as the later burials of Emperors Taishô and 
Shôwa). 
The burial ceremonies for the outstanding statesman Itô Hirobumi, who was 
assassinated on October 26, 1909, and was brought to his final resting place al-
ready on November 4 in a large state funeral, provide an example of the full 
sôjôden ceremony. The ceremonies took place in Hibiya Park in Tôkyô: 
»At the southwest end of this square, a small hall in the style of a Shintô tem-
ple, which was open in front and on the sides, had been built in the style of a 
Shintô temple, which was used to store the body. At first, this hall was 
blocked off by a curtain. [...] 
Also, farther away from the temple hall, there were two long halls to the right 
and left and open on the sides, one larger than the other, to accommodate the 
burial procession.« (Ohrt 1910 b: 143) 
This design is exactly the same as the one used for the burial of Emperor 
Meiji. As for the role played by foreigners in this ceremony, Ohrt writes: 
»After the conclusion of the reading [of the eulogy by the head Shintô 
priests], tamagushi were offered by all those in attendance in the following or-
der: 
the representative of the emperor of Japan; 
the representative of the empress of Japan; 
the representatives of foreign heads of state – that is, the foreign ambassadors 
in attendance, the German chargé d’affaires, and the aforementioned Chinese 
prince [...] ; 
the envoy of the emperor of Korea; 
the representative of the crown prince of Japan. 
The envoys and ambassadors left the ceremonial grounds one by one after of-
fering their tamagushi and were led by a master of ceremonies to their 
coaches.« (Ohrt 1910 b: 149f.) 
Only after the departure of the foreign representatives did the other members 
of the burial procession, especially the family members of the deceased prince, 
step forward and offer tamagushi, branches of the sakaki tree decorated with white 
strips of paper. 
On the origins of these burial customs, Ohrt writes: 
»State funerals in Japan are an institution of the modern era. They were not 
known under the shogunate, and were adopted in the Meiji era along with so 
many other elements of Western culture. The first state burial took place in 
1883 and was for Prince Iwakura. [...] State funerals in Japan always follow 
the Shintô ceremony. This was also the case with Prince Itô, although he him-
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self was a Buddhist and his parents were buried according to the traditions of 
that religion.« (Ohrt 1910 b: 123) 
It is evident that state funerals, befitting the spirit of the times, were based on 
a concept of Shintô that is actually not regarded as a religion, but rather the sum 
of all Japanese customs, and therefore independent of the religious beliefs of the 
individual. 
Secondly, Ohrt’s remarks reveal that Itô Hirobumi’s parents were buried ac-
cording to the Buddhist ceremony. This shows that funeral customs underwent a 
fundamental change during the Meiji period, and that the tradition of the state 
burial according to the Shintô ceremony was a modern custom of the Meiji pe-
riod, despite Edo period precedents of Shintô burials (see chapter II: 2. 1. 2. 1). 
In the case of the Shintô burial ceremony, its intentions and methods pointed 
in a direction that absolutely conformed with the prevailing spirit of the Meiji era. 
Thus, in accordance with the general tendency toward »revitalizing« Shintô, dur-
ing this period an attempt was made to popularize the Shintô funeral ritual 
among the people. As is well known, however, the areas of death and burials 
have been the domain of Buddhism since ancient times in Japan. Particularly the 
religious aversion to the »impurity« of death and all dead things hindered the 
development of a unique Shintô burial ritual until that time. 
For instance, funeral ceremonies can never take place at a Shintô shrine. 
Cemeteries cannot lie within the shrine precincts, and it is often strictly forbidden 
even for Shintô priests to take part in funerals (Ohrt 1910 a: 87). This explains the 
overt tendency toward the »temporary« in Meiji-period Shintô burials: the 
sôjôden, where the burial ceremony takes place, must be temporary and is re-
moved afterward so that the community is not contaminated by death – even the 
highest one of all, that of the emperor. For this reason, even in the Meiji period, 
Shintô funerals were the exception; only the upper classes, especially in the capi-
tal, adopted the new custom – most likely for its prestige. The common people 
remained true to the older custom, which entailed not only a burial according to 
the Buddhist ceremony, but in most cases also cremation. Although in the late 
Meiji period this custom was increasingly justified as being more hygienic, as in 
the case of the 1897 law for the prevention of epidemics (cf. Pallester 1912: 11), its 
roots in ancient Buddhist tradition were in fact the true spiritual and religious ba-
sis for this practice. 
At first the authorities attempted to combat the custom of cremation by ad-
ministrative means, and in July 1873 (Government Decree no. 253), the custom 
was prohibited; however, already in May 1875 (Government Decree no. 89), the 
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prohibition was lifted.347 Over the further course of the Meiji period, community 
crematoriums began to outnumber the old cremation grounds, especially in ur-
ban areas. Additionally, the Buddhist custom of »separating the bones,« in which 
the bones and other remains are sent to the Buddhist temple Zenkôji on Kôyazan 
directly after the cremation, became increasingly popular even during the »anti-
Buddhist« Meiji period (cf. Inoguchi 1977: 109-120, among others). 
Therefore, it cannot be said that the Shintô funeral customs were widely 
adopted during this time; rather, these forms were limited to the court, the nobil-
ity and the urban bourgeoisie. But even Ohrt is mistaken in his view, expressed in 
an otherwise valuable study, that the centuries-long tradition of imperial burials 
served as a model for this custom, and that this custom merely spread to the up-
per classes during the Meiji period. In fact, even the imperial household did not 
conduct funerals according to the Shintô ritual in previous eras, despite the fact 
that this area represented a core point in the theological debate on Shintô during 
the Edo period. 
 
 
                                                 
347 For the details of these decrees as well as other laws and regulations regarding cremation dur-
ing the Meiji period, cf. Pallester 1912: 8-15. 
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4. RELIGION, IDEOLOGY AND TRADITIONALISM DURING THE  
MEIJI PERIOD 
 
The end of the 19th century saw ethnic conflicts throughout the world, cen-
tered around the emancipation of those regions that had until then been politi-
cally and culturally dependent on imperial powers. The revival of these regions’ 
own cultural traditions, a process called »nativism« in cultural anthropology,348 
played a central role throughout this process. In this phenomenon, the indige-
nous, usually strongly religiously influenced national traditions are contrasted 
with modern civilization spanning national borders. Thus, the area of tradition is 
defined as ethnic and authentic, while modernity is seen as potentially foreign – 
that is to say, supranational – and in opposition to the traditional, indigenous cul-
ture. 
Japan played a prominent role within this global process of religious nativ-
ism. Many commentators view Japan as a country in which the conflict between 
tradition and modernity, which is the bane of the rest of the world, is not destruc-
tive, but rather, quite atypically and yet with enormous success, that social pro-
gress actually results from this productive conflict. 
Thus, Thomas Immoos, a knowledgeable scholar of Japanese studies, gave a 
book of him the programmatic title Japan: Archaische Moderne (»Japan: Archaic 
Modernity«; 1990), and in another work (Immoos 1989) he speaks of a »regression 
of archaic structures« even in present-day Japan. The author ends this work with 
the following credo: 
»Once again, my thesis proves to be correct: Japan is the unchangeable nation 
that found its identity in early history and maintained it steadfastly through-
out all the changes in its violent history. All changes take place only on the 
surface. Shintô is not a denomination, nor a religion, but rather the expression 
of the Japanese identity.« (l.c.) 
This represents the most radical statement of the argument for the Japanese 
culture’s reliance on tradition: it claims that under a thin layer of (Western) mod-
ernity lies the immutable and thus ancient and timeless »eternal« Japan. This an-
tagonistic view of »tradition« versus »modernity« is widespread and has also 
                                                 
348 The term »nativism« was introduced to ethnology by Ralph Linton and defined as »any con-
scious, organized attempt on the part of a society’s members to revive or perpetuate selected as-
pects of its culture,« (Linton 1943: 230). In recent English-language literature, the term »nativism« 
in regard to Japan is used primarily to refer to nationally oriented Edo period schools of philoso-
phy (Kokugaku, Mitogaku; cf. Harootunian 1988, among others). 
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been used in modern Japan since the Meiji Restoration itself as a standard of self-
interpretation, as is evident in the slogans wakon-yôsai, or tôyô no dôtoku seiyô no 
gakugei. The expression wakon-yôsai (»Japanese spirit, Western skill (technology)«) 
was increasingly used in Japan during the Meiji period to indicate a constructive 
antagonism between (Japanese) tradition and (Western) technological and civili-
zational modernity. The similar expression tôyô no dôtoku saiyô no gakugei (»East-
ern ethics, Western science«) was coined by the Confucian scholar Sakuma 
Shôzan (1811-1864), on which Tsunoda et al. remark: 
»The formula proved workable enough to serve a whole generation of leaders 
during the Meiji Restoration, and to provide the basis for a modernization 
program of unparalleled magnitude in the late nineteenth century.« (Tsunoda 
et al. 1964, II: 100) 
Modernity as something (usefully) foreign stands in contrast to the indige-
nously defined tradition; a country such as Japan that is envied for its outstand-
ing success especially in the area of »modernity« thus excels as a model of alleg-
edly authentic culture that can ultimately be seen as an example of a new, »an-
cient« modernity.  
However, Immoos also points to an indisputable historical fact that portrays 
the idea of the »immutability« of Japanese culture in a different light. The author 
writes: 
»The so-called State Shintô was artificially created around 100 years ago. 
Only in the new Japan of the Meiji period did the emperor become the head 
of state, commander in chief and high priest in one person.« (l.c.) 
How can these two statements, which are representative examples, be recon-
ciled: on the one hand, the antagonism between tradition and modernity, and on 
the other hand, the acknowledgement of the lack of historical depth in just this 
crucial element of tradition, (State) Shintô? Without stating the problem directly 
(or perhaps even recognizing it), Imoos touches on the central conflict in the his-
torical analysis of modern Japan since the Meiji Restoration: apparently, the an-
tagonism between the two categories of tradition and modernity does not ade-
quately describe the true complexity of a cultural reality that, as the product of a 
historical process, includes basic traits that do not conform to this simple model. 
Thus, the essential question in this context is, how should we view cultural 
anachronisms, archaisms and historical elements that are still present to a large 
degree in present-day Japanese culture? Also, how are those »traditions« to be 
viewed that take such liberties with the body of traditional culture, and in so do-
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ing, paint a picture of Japanese culture that ultimately only consists of one thing: 
the ideology of the »eternal« Japan as a nation with a timeless, uniform culture? 
The previously discussed study by Eric J. Hobsbawm (1983) on invented tra-
ditions provides an excellent methodological basis for analyzing this problem. 
The term »invention« is crucial in this context. Thus, one speaks of intentionally 
»invented« or manipulated traditions whose traditional nature is merely as-
sumed. Hobsbawm focuses primarily on the areas of ritual and symbolism: 
»Inventing traditions, it is assumed here, is essentially a process of formaliza-
tion and ritualization, characterized by reference to the past, if only by impos-
ing repetition. The actual process of creating such ritual and symbolic com-
plexes has not been adequately studied by historians.« (Hobsbawm, Ranger 
1983: 4) 
In a study on this topic, the author covers the genesis and function of such 
rituals and symbols in several countries, including Italy, France, Germany and 
the United States. This is clearly also the pattern for developments in Japan dur-
ing the second half of the 19th century.349 
Especially remarkable examples of this phenomenon can be found in the ar-
eas of ceremony and rituals. Already in 1986 a dissertation by the historian Fuji-
tani Takashi was published at the University of California entitled Japan’s Modern 
National Ceremonies: A historical ethnography, 1868-1912.350 It covers some of the 
great national ceremonies that were introduced during the Meiji period. The for-
mation of a canon of state ceremonies was necessary for the process of Japanese 
nation building, particularly during the second half of the Meiji period. Accord-
ing to Fujitani, the new empire was confronted with two challenges: the need to 
establish national unity – that is to say, a common Japanese national conscious-
ness – and the need to demonstrate the power of the new nation-state of Japan to 
the rest of the world. These domestic and foreign-policy necessities resulted in 
the creation of a comprehensive national apparatus of symbols as the visible ex-
pression of the legitimacy to rule. This included the creation of a capital, Tôkyô, 
with all the attributes not only of a center of political power, but also as the spiri-
tual center of the nation. Fujitani (1986: 18) cites the work of Hobsbawm directly 
and concludes with unmistakable clarity: 
»During the period from the second half of the nineteenth century through 
the early-twentieth century, Japan’s governing elites also invented, revived, 
                                                 
349 Invented traditions, however, can be found also in earlier periods of Japanese religious and in-
tellectual history (cf. Antoni 1997b). 
350 Fujitani 1986, cf. Fujitani 1996. 
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manipulated and encouraged national rituals with unprecedented vigor. 
Through rituals the rulers helped to bring a country divided horizontally into 
regions and vertically into estates under one ruler and one legitimating sa-
cred order.« 
Upon closer examination, even the area of ceremonies and rituals shows no 
evidence of an »eternal« Japan; rather, it becomes apparent – in the case of Shintô 
funeral ceremonies, for instance – just how problematic their supposedly authen-
tic traditional nature is. 
Based on the previous discussion, in my view, two basic conclusions can be 
drawn here. Firstly, cultural elements in Japan during the Meiji period that ap-
pear to be traditional and even ancient cannot be taken a priori as remnants of 
earlier cultural strata, and must not be left unchecked as arguments for tradi-
tional authenticity. Rather, in each individual case it must be verified whether 
these cultural elements are not actually creations, or at least modifications and 
manipulations, that belong to the modern age – more specifically, to the devel-
opment toward the Japanese nation-state at the end of the 19th century. An ob-
server who is too easily blinded by the supposedly authentic traditional nature of 
such elements runs the risk of overlooking the ideological function of the Meiji-
era manipulation of such cultural elements. The unquestioning reception of na-
tional symbolism results in a kind of exoticism that ultimately threatens to lead to 
the cultural (self-) isolation of Japan. 
Secondly, this process of manipulating tradition was not by any means lim-
ited to Japan. The situation in the Meiji period in Japan is not the only case of a 
country in which tradition and modernity entered into a unique relationship. On 
the contrary, the case of Japan is an especially instructive example of a process 
that was underway throughout the world at this point in history and which can 
be understood within the context of the formation of nation-states at the end of 
the 19th century. The manipulation and even the creation of traditions was an es-
sential factor in this development. In this context, Japan does not appear to be a 
»belated« nation (like Germany)351, as is often supposed in discourse on moder-
nity. On the contrary, the formation of the Japanese nation-state, which could be 
said to be an example of what is called a »nativist regression« in cultural anthro-
pology, occurred simultaneously to similar developments in Europe and reached 
its first peak, as was also the case in Europe, at the end of the 19th century. This 
shows that Japan cannot be said to be unusual in its development in comparison 
with other countries, but rather, that it provides a nearly inexhaustible reservoir 
                                                 
351 For the concept of Japan and Germany as »belated« nations cf. Martin (ed.) 1987. 
     CHAPTER III: MEIJI RESTORATION AND MEIJI PERIOD  n  243 
 
of world-historical material relevant to the study nation-building beginning at the 
end of the 19th century. 
To state this in the extreme, the introduction of the National Foundation Day 
(February 11) in the Meiji period in Japan was not a case of specifically Japanese 
historical continuity, but rather the Japanese manifestation of a global phenome-
non (nation-building) that was characteristic of the time and sought to demon-
strate its regional authenticity using the religious inventory of the indigenous cul-
ture (Jinmu-tennô). As outlined in the previous discussion, the visible national 
symbols – monuments, ceremonies etc. – played a crucial role as mostly invented 
traditions in this context. However, upon closer examination, this does not de-
scribe the problem in its entirety. Symbols function as emblems of what are actu-
ally much more complex circumstances. Dietmar Rothermund takes the crucial 
analytical step in this context by synthesizing the areas of »artificial« and »true« 
traditions, regional special cases and universal structures, symbols and ideas. 
 
4. 1. The concept of »traditionalism« 
 
In Rothermund’s writings, the concept of »traditionalism« (see chapter I: 2. 2) 
is extremely useful for analyzing both real and »invented« traditions. Already in 
a work from 1970, Rothermund points to the universal character of the tradition-
alist construction as used in modern national ideologies: 
»Traditionalism is a phenomenon that can be observed in many nations in a 
transitional phase of cultural and political development. Tradition is a many 
splendoured thing, it encompasses a variety of social structures and ideas 
which are frequently contradictory. Traditionalism, however, is a conscious 
attempt at streamlining tradition so as to fit a particular need for a useful 
past. This need arises when a people wants to acquire a national identity and 
looks for some common denominator. This common denominator is usually 
found in a reconstructed tradition of social, cultural and religious solidarity.« 
(Rothermund 1970: 35) 
In a later work on this topic, Rothermund also points out that »modern tradi-
tionalism is universally important, and therefore it is not possible to conceive of 
‘universalism’ and ‘traditionalism’ as irreconcilable opposites,« (Rothermund 
1997: 188). Traditionalism plays a crucial role in the formulation of national iden-
tity. Traditionalists select, systematize and create ideological systems in which 
heterogeneous cultural traditions are reshaped into a homogenous national ide-
ology. The purpose of this search for identity is to project national solidarity, with 
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the aim of leveling existing social, religious and other differences. It becomes 
clear, as Rothermund writes, »that the search for identity is the conscious goal of 
the ‘traditionalists’ for the purpose of fostering solidarity,« (Rothermund 1989: 
147). 
Traditionalism is in many ways analogous to nativism as described by cul-
tural anthropology, as is evident in its »attempts to reconstruct a ‘pure’ tradition« 
(Rothermund 1989: 145). However, it is per se the instrument of a political ideol-
ogy whose goal is national consensus. The author mentions the ideas of the In-
dian national revolutionary Vinayak Damodar Savarkar as a concrete example of 
a truly »traditionalist« connection between the search for identity and fostering 
solidarity (cf. Rothermund 1997: 174-181, among others). 
Savarkar’s nationalism is centered around the concept of »Punyabhumi.« This 
word is a Sanskrit neologism that can be translated literally as »the country 
(bhumi) in which religious merit (punya) is earned,« (Rothermund 1989: 146). This 
expression implies »that this possibility only exists in this one specific country, 
India.« Rothermund continues: 
»Thus, Savarkar was able to unite the characteristics of the modern territorial 
national state under a common denominator that was in accordance with In-
dian tradition. This case reveals with particular clarity the connection be-
tween the search for identity and the fostering of solidarity. The clear and 
simple definition of the »Hindu« identity provides the foundation for wide-
spread solidarity. But this also implies an equally clear exclusion: the Indian 
Muslim, who obviously cannot view India as his »Punyabhumi,« is excluded 
from this solidarity.« (Rothermund 1989: 146) 
If nothing else, this account of a »religiously founded traditionalism of soli-
darity« must catch the attention of any scholar of Japanese studies, since the 
structures of modern Japanese kokutai thought are easily recognizable in it: the 
Japanese shinkoku (»land of the gods«) and the Hindu Punyabhumi appear to 
have the same basic structure. Rothermund (1997: 185) also remarks, while refer-
ring to research in Japanese studies, that the teachings of Hirata Atsutane »can be 
seen as a prime example of traditionalism of solidarity.« 
 
4. 2. »Familism« and the ideology of homogeneity 
 
The intellectual core of modern Japanese nationalism is the postulation of Ja-
pan’s ideological and religious homogeneity. Since the Meiji period, this idea has 
been expressed in the concept of »familism,« or the idea of Japan as a country 
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whose inhabitants are connected to one another in the sense of one great family. 
The emperor stood at the peak of this national family, functioning as its father. 
Remarkably, the most radical version of this ideology did not consider the inti-
mate relationship between the emperor and his subjects to be metaphorical, but 
rather an actual, ethnically and genetically defined extended family whose mem-
bers were linked to one another genealogically by their common descent from the 
divine ancestors. Thus, familism is inseparable from the custom of ancestor wor-
ship, which, regardless of its ancient appearance, in this form was also a product 
of the Meiji period. 
The following elements are among the basic ideological pillars of religiously 
based kokutai familism: the mythical founding of the empire by Jinmu-tennô, a 
calendar system based on the ruling dates of the emperors, national ceremonies, 
the position of the great shrines as symbols of national religion, and the divine 
position of the emperor within Shintô, which is elevated to the level of a state re-
ligion. However, intellectual-historical analysis shows that this religious and 
ideological system in fact was not the expression of an »ancient« Japan with a lin-
ear history centered around the institution of the emperor, but rather in its high-
est form the product of a – to adopt Rothermund’s term – »religiously based tra-
ditionalism of solidarity.« 
All the criteria of the traditionalism that Rothermund describes as universal 
were evident in the Meiji period in Japan, including the exclusivity of member-
ship in the national extended family: only those who were born into the circle of 
common descent from the divine ancestors could be considered members of the 
family, a fact that naturally led to enormous problems and discrimination against 
ethnic minorities in Japan. The Ainu, Okinawans and Koreans living in Japan 
were all by definition excluded from the national family. This problem becomes 
especially clear in light of the mythological tradition relating to the origin of the 
inhabitants of the Ryûkyû islands, which holds that they do not belong to the cir-
cle of genealogically legitimate Japanese.352 
And yet the Meiji-period conception of the family-state not only represents a 
grandiose example of a »traditionalist« construction, but also makes clear the dif-
ference between living, heterogeneous »tradition« and artificially homogenized 
»traditionalism.« Japanese nationalism stems from a rich source of heterogeneous 
intellectual-historical schools of thought. These include elements of the medieval 
concept of the shinkoku (land of the gods), along with Edo period Kokugaku in-
                                                 
352 On the origin of people in the Okinawan tradition, cf. the chapter »Genjin no mori« in Torigoe 
1966: 43-57, among others. For a contemporary source on the ideological exploitation of this topic 
in the 1940s, cf. Oshita 1943: 206-222; cf. Antoni 1983-86. 
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terpretations of Japanese mythology. Further elements include the concept of the 
kokutai from the late Edo period Mito School with its syncretistic combination of 
Shintô dogma and Neo-Confucian ethics. These indigenous intellectual-historical 
schools of thought, supplemented by various heterogeneous, traditional elements 
(generally in radically modified forms), were combined with the Western concept 
of the nation-state and ultimately led to the emergence of modern Tennôism, 
which, as Itô Hirobumi states, exploits the indigenous tradition from a rationally 
and intentionally argued point of view in order to provide the newly created cen-
tralized government with historical and religious legitimation. 
As has already been demonstrated in the discussion of invented traditions ac-
cording to Hobsbawm, national symbols and rituals took on a great significance 
in this context. But their true relevance becomes clear only upon examining the 
underlying spiritual and ideological intentions. In the case of Japanese familism, 
the goal was the creation of a Japanese national consciousness which sought to 
unite the members of this supposed national family both internally and in rela-
tion to the outside world. The indoctrination by schools and the military proved 
to be so successful that their ideological tenets became part of the common cul-
ture of the new nation state of Japan, and continue to influence nationalist dis-
course on an unconscious level to this day. 
Particularly the commentaries on the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 
(cf. Ôkubo 1969: 425), which reached their nationalist climax in 1937 with the Ko-
kutai no hongi (see below), propagated the image of a unified Japanese culture 
with a linear history, with the person and institution of the emperor at its center 
according to Shintô doctrine, inseparable from the homogeneous people, who 
were linked by a quasi-genetically inherited system of national ethics (kokumin-
dôtoku) such as in the work of Inoue Tetsujirô, as we have seen above. It seems 
that hardly any other country or culture besides modern Japan was capable of 
ideologically perfecting and actually implementing this »religiously founded tra-
ditionalism of solidarity« to such a degree within the state. 
In this context, the historical and archaeological facts, which contradicted the 
ideology of homogeneity, were largely ignored. The fact that, over the course of 
its history, Japan was a country that was particularly characterized by diversity 
and a fractured cultural, social and territorial landscape was so successfully sup-
pressed in the Meiji period that the new view of an ethnically, culturally, socially 
and linguistically uniform country became the absolute dogma of Kokutai Shintô. 
Although intellectual efforts to portray Japan as a unified country had been 
made since ancient times, especially in the circles of Confucian-influenced Shintô 
theology, the reason these constructs, which were inseparable from the idea of the 
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centralized government of the Ritsuryô period that was borrowed from Chinese 
Confucianism, were so attractive was because they never corresponded to the so-
cial, cultural and political reality of Japan. And after centuries of turmoil in the 
government of medieval Japan, it was particularly the government of the To-
kugawa period that gave the appearance of a strictly managed and thus hierar-
chically unified entity whose actual social and territorial fragmentation necessi-
tated unity in the national state. The utopia of homogeneity must have looked so 
promising to the new, Meiji-period centralized government especially because 
the country had previously always split into individual groups. 
Thus, the fact that the social, religious and political reality, especially in the 
Japanese Middle Ages, never corresponded to this ideal explains the existence of 
the idea of Japan as a country with a unified, common culture among national 
government theorists and religious nativists. Nativism influenced Japanese 
thought long before the encounter with Europe in the bakumatsu period across 
various intellectual-historical developments, and this is why it was able to so eas-
ily combine with Western, and especially German, romantic nationalism. Both 
these ideologies were based on similar approaches and goals and sought to trans-
form social, regional and linguistically fragmented cultural spheres into unified 
nations (it is worth noting that there are striking parallels between the nativist 
ideas of the Kokugaku and Johann Gottfried Herder’s romantic ideas on folklore 
and Kulturnation (»culture nation«)). 
In summary, the following elements contributed to the genesis of modern 
Japanese traditionalism: 1.) Indigenous nativism as an expression of an inde-
pendent national religious utopia, 2.) Living tradition as an expression of cultural, 
social and territorial heterogeneity, 3.) European nationalism as an ideological 
impulse toward the selective use of traditions within the modern nation-stat. 
Thus, traditionalism was able to harmonize indigenous Japanese develop-
ments with the global process of nation building at the end of the 19th century. 
Shintô plays a key role in this context, since the perception of this originally 
complex religious system, which was later simplified and declared the authentic 
Japanese religion, increasingly came to be identified with Japanese culture itself. 
In the world of Meiji and Shôwa-period State Shintô, Shintô was divested of its 
religious character and was declared the purest form of Japanese culture. None-
theless, or perhaps for this reason, in order to further analyze modern Shintô’s 
role within the larger intellectual and ideological context, it is first necessary to 
investigate the religious dimension of this supposedly indigenous religion of Ja-
pan. 
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1. THE HISTORICAL BASIS: THE PATH TOWARD »ULTRANATIONALISM« 
 
Meiji-tennô, who died on July 30, 1912, left his successor Yoshihito (Taishô-
tennô, 1879-1926, reigned from 1912 to 1926) an empire that was a modern super-
power in terms of its political and military importance (cf. Bersihand 1963, chap-
ter 14). The economic and political rise of the country continued in the following 
years, and World War I in particular was of great importance for Japan. As an 
ally of England against Germany, it occupied the area of Jiaozhou Bay (Qingdao), 
which had been occupied by Germany, and conquered the Mariana and Caroline 
Islands and others in the Pacific in October 1914. The Treaty of Versailles brought 
further advantages for Japan, which was a member of the League of Nations: the 
Japanese empire was given the German rights to the Chinese area. In 1922, how-
ever, Japan returned Jiaozhou to China. 
After World War I, Japanese society changed dramatically (cf. Besihand 1963, 
Mecklenburg 1990). By 1920 the population had grown to 55 million, the majority 
of which lived and worked in the cities. This led to the emergence of other groups 
besides the so-called »establishment,« which consisted of senior bureaucrats, the 
leaders of the zaibatsu, conservative party leaders, wealthy landowners and the 
military, who tried to promote their own interests. 
The world economic crisis of 1929 pushed Japan into a deep depression. The 
economy had not yet recovered from the earthquake of 1923 and the general eco-
nomic crisis (Inoki 1977: 138). Only a handful of large companies existed in Japan, 
and these companies developed at the expense of smaller, traditional enterprises. 
Therefore, wages and the standard of living for workers were low. The farmers’ 
situation was equally dismal. Their impoverishment was caused, among other 
things, by the rapid drop in prices for raw silk, a source of income that the farm-
ers depended on dearly at the time (Hall 1968: 306f.). 
The result was that unions and farmers’ organizations experienced an enor-
mous influx in membership and demanded political influence, meaning the right 
to vote. This social conflict threatened to throw the country into chaos. The high 
level of growth that Japan had experienced during and shortly after the war 
ended quickly as the Western powers, forced it out of the Asian markets, espe-
cially in China, which Japan had dominated during the war. The result was that 
demands for military expansion became more prominent, especially within the 
military itself (Togo 1958: 18f.). 
The political parties took a moderate course in domestic and foreign affairs 
during the 1920s. The Minseitô and Seiyûkai, the two leading parties, which gov-
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erned alternately, actually represented the interests of the establishment and were 
particularly close to the areas of industry and trade (Hall 1968: 309). But eventu-
ally they had no choice but to yield to the demands of the people for more politi-
cal influence, and in 1925 general suffrage for men was introduced. The global 
economic crisis and the growing power of the military eventually led, among 
other things, to the decline of the democratic parliamentary system. In general, 
parliamentarianism remained a superficial phenomenon in Japan. »The political 
influence of the parliaments was already extremely limited under the Constitu-
tion and could only have been expanded by a [...] new constitution,« (Martin 
1977: 104). The parties, which were not mentioned at all in the Constitution, had 
split into factions according to the loyalties of the various groups. Almost all of 
them lacked a basic program. The two strongest parties, the Minseitô and Sei-
yûkai, which were essentially the same, clearly revealed the »facelessness« of the 
parties, and both were closely connected to large-scale industry. »In the view of 
the Japanese, the political parties remained a foreign concept imported from the 
West. Japan lacked the requirements for the emergence of and responsible leader-
ship by political parties.« (Martin 1977: 105) In the most crucial areas, the parties 
always remained loyal to the government. 
 
1. 2. The Shôwa Restoration and the ni-ni-roku Incident 
 
The military’s strength was finally tested when the government, facing pro-
tests from the navy, ratified the London Naval Treaty of April 22, 1930, which 
specified a ratio of fleet strength for Japan to the United States and Great Britain 
of 5 to 5 to 3 (Martin 1977: 104). Admiral staff chief Katô Kanji saw this as an in-
fringement on the basic defense interests of Japan; he insisted on the military pre-
rogative of the emperor and disputed the cabinet’s authority over military mat-
ters (Martin 1977: 106). In the following years, the army attempted to achieve its 
goals using brutal force. On May 15, 1932, Prime Minister Inukai was assassi-
nated by a group of young officers. The influence of the parties began to weaken 
as large portions of the population turned away from them in disappointment be-
cause they were unable to overcome the economic crisis (Inoki 1977: 142). The 
people paid far more attention to propaganda claiming a conspiracy on the part 
of England and America or the communist Soviet Union. 
The unrest in China also stoked fears in Japan, and so the so-called »Manchu-
rian Incident« of September 1931 was viewed positively by the majority of the 
population as the upholding of Japanese interests on the continent. In 1936, after 
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a series of assassinations of moderate civilian politicians, the army made a further 
attempt to carry out the so-called »Shôwa Restoration.« 
In the 1930s the view had spread, especially in military circles, that a »na-
tional reorganization« such as the Shôwa Restoration was unavoidable. Many 
young soldiers and officers were among the supporters of the Restoration, since 
they had experienced poverty themselves during the economic crises, some 
among them having come from the lower classes. Kita Ikki (1883-1937), whose 
writings were initially banned, had developed plans for the national reorganiza-
tion of Japan that called for the military to take over leadership from the govern-
ment in order to free the emperor from his weak advisors and accord him his true 
place of power (Kita 1963: 22). 
Kita Ikki further demanded that the Constitution be suspended for three 
years and the parliament dissolved. The entire Japanese nation was to form a 
great community under the rule of the emperor in which there would be only one 
national will and no other views would be supported (l.c.). In order to achieve 
this great harmony, peerage was to be abolished, the emperor was to relinquish 
part of his fortune, big business was to be restrained, and the working classes 
were to be supported. Japan was to take on a leading role in Asia and free the re-
gion from the West.353 Ultimately it was the military that contributed most to the 
spread of nationalist and militarist thinking in Japan. Compulsory military serv-
ice and an almost mythical respect for members of the military among large parts 
of the population also played a role. Tachibana Kosaburo, an important leader of 
the agrarian movement of the 1930s, described the military as the leaders of this 
national reform movement. Otherwise, in his view, patriots could come from all 
classes of society, if only they were prepared to carry out the »will of Heaven« 
and sacrifice their lives for the greater goal of saving the country (Maruyama 1963 
b: 52). 
On February 26, 1936, troops of the first division, who were stationed near 
Tôkyô, attempted to organize a coup. They occupied the police headquarters, the 
Ministry of War, the headquarters of the General Staff and the new parliament 
building, paralyzing state functions for four days. Various high-ranking bureau-
crats were assassinated, including the Minister of Finance Takahashi Korekiyo 
(1854-1936), the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and former Minister-President 
Admiral Saitô, and the General Inspector of military training. The Prime Minister 
and the Grand Treasurer Suzuki narrowly escaped the slaughter due to fortunate 
circumstances (Togo 1958: 27). 
                                                 
353 On Kita Ikki’s plan for reorganization cf. Kita 1967: 219-281; Tsunoda et al. 1964, vol. 2: 268ff.; 
Hasegawa 1994; Wilson 1969, Hall 1968: 323; see also Rothermund 1997: 186. 
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The attempt failed due to the emperor’s declaration against the mutineers as 
well as the intervention by level-headed members of the military. Of the insur-
gents, 103 were imprisoned and 17 of the ring-leaders were shot. Although their 
attempt to reach their goal directly using violence failed, »the spirit expressed by 
their actions made a deep impression on the general opinion and served to pre-
pare the nation for the internal ‘renewal’ and further conquests in later years,« 
(Togo 1958: 28). The nationalist, war-oriented soldiery experienced a short decline 
from February 1936 to July 1937. The parties resurged for a short time and at-
tempted to suppress the influence of the military. 
However, this period lasted only a short time. The Hirota regime (cf. KEJ: 
»Hirota Kôki«), which came to power in 1936, openly fell into line with the mili-
tary and advocated an aggressive advance on Manchuria (Hall 1968: 330). Their 
successes in Manchuria raised the esteem of the army among the people and be-
came a cause célèbre for reaching strategic military as well as economic and ideo-
logical goals among all »true« patriots in Japan (Togo 1958: 28). 
Amid this »atmosphere of the glorification of militarism and violence,« (l.c.) 
Prince Konoe Fumimaro came to power in June 1937. As a member of the impe-
rial family, he was even better suited to lending these goals a »divine purpose.« 
Japan gradually undertook an intellectual de-modernization and returned to its 
supposedly original values (Hall 1968: 330). The Anti-Comintern Pact signed with 
Nazi-Germany in 1936 also appeared to set Japan on an authoritarian course in 
foreign affairs. Compared with the later war with the United States, the war with 
China began with a relatively unimportant skirmish on the Marco Polo Bridge 
outside of Beijing (Togo 1958: 29). Besides serving to control Northern China and 
its resources of cotton and coal as well as its enormous market for Japanese 
goods, the war mobilized the Japanese people as a »great family totally commit-
ted to the war,« the central ideological factor of which was the Shintô myth of the 
emperor (Martin 1977: 114). 
The war with China solidified the position of totalitarianism in Japan. Among 
other things, this included the superiority of the military oligarchy, the subordi-
nation of the civil government (Togo 1958: 39) and the creation of a centrally 
planned economy (Hall 1968: 332) in which the state-controlled war industry was 
given absolute priority. The state also determined wages and working hours, and 
thus exercised complete control over the economy (Togo 1958: 38). 
The National General Mobilization Law (Kokka sôdôinhô), which was ratified 
by the parliament in 1938, gave Prime Minister Konoe almost full political control 
over domestic policy. This law marked the end of parliamentary government in 
Japan. After this, the systematic creation of a »unitary state« began. In 1940 the 
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political parties were forced to disband and join the Imperial Rule Assistance As-
sociation (taisei-yokusankai). This association served to unite all bureaucratic and 
political efforts relating to the goals of the empire – that is to say, it was its re-
sponsibility to marginalize all »differences in opinion« for the benefit of the »sin-
gle common goal« and to suppress opposition and critical statements against the 
military strategy and the nationalist dogmas (Hall 1968: 334). 
After the creation of the united imperial party, the labor unions were com-
bined into a single patriotic association. Prime Minister Konoe announced the in-
troduction of a New National Organization (shintaisei) in order to transform Ja-
pan into an advanced »national defense state.« This marked the full military mo-
bilization and centralization of the economy of Japan. The people were advised to 
devote themselves entirely to the nation through nationalistic and patriotic slo-
gans. Japan was fixated on the emperor, the »national mission« and the »holy 
war.«354 
The more difficult Japan’s position in the war became, the more important the 
belief in patriotic solutions such as the »way of the emperor« (kôdô), the »spirit of 
Yamato« (yamato-damashii), the »imperial mission« and »the whole world under 
one roof« (hakkô-ichiu) became. In schools children were indoctrinated with the 
Shintô belief in the divinity of the emperor and the superiority of the Japanese 
people. Thus, one characteristic of this nationalism, which also functioned as its 
ideological foundation, was the teachings of Shintô relating to the spiritual per-
fection of the ruler and nation of Japan that had been elaborated since the days of 
the Kokugaku and Mito School. In accordance with the interpretations of the 
Hirata School, now the Japanese nation itself was also considered to be divine. At 
the latest since the 1930s, religion and nationalism entered into an inseparable 
ideological relationship. 
According to Maruyama Masao, the unifying element was the »magic« of the 
kokutai. The kokutai, the core of the state order itself, took on the role in Japan of a 
»spiritual replacement for Christianity, which formed the ‘axis’ of European cul-
ture for one thousand years.«355 This Japanese totalitarianism had developed an 
extraordinary record of bringing the public into line, in which the traditional 
myth of the emperor proved to be advantageous and only needed to be restated. 
Maruyama sharply criticizes the ability of the Japanese system to bring ideologies 
                                                 
354 For the concept of a Japanese »holy war« cf. the detailed and comprehensive study by Walter 
Skya (2009). 
355 Maruyama 1971: 30; 1981: 31; 1988: 45. 
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into line. He writes that »Japanese totalitarianism,« at least ideologically, »shows 
an ability to bring into line that even Hitler would envy.«356 
                                                 
356 Maruyama 1971: 34; 1981: 34; 1988: 48. The German translation appends a sentence to this re-
mark that is not contained in the original Japanese (Maruyama 1971: 34): »In Japan mußte man 
nicht erst einen ‘Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts’ neu schaffen; es genügte, den vor zwei-
tausend Jahren entstandenen Mythos zu mobilisieren.« English translation: »In Japan it was not 
necessary to create a new ‘myth of the 20th century’; it was enough to mobilize the mythology 
from two thousand years ago.« 
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2. THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOKUTAI CONCEPT  
 
The dogma of a specifically Japanese »national polity« thus formed the piv-
otal point in the ideological development of Japan at the time. What the Ko-
kugaku and Mito scholars of the Edo period had devised and the politicians of 
the Meiji period had enacted in a comprehensive »State Shintô« worldview now 
developed into a totalitarian, fundamentalist doctrine of salvation for Japan and 
the world. 
 
2. 1. The path to the Kokutai no hongi 
 
The intensely polemical debate on the position of the emperor in the 1920s 
and ‘30s centered around two opposing views stating that the ruler of the country 
was either merely an organ of the state, as the expert in constitutional law Minobe 
Tatsukichi (1873-1948)357 claimed, or the embodiment of the state, and thus above 
all nationality, as Minobe’s opponents Uesugi Shinkichi and Hozumi Yatsuka 
from the orthodox school postulated. 
While Minobe saw no difference between the Japanese and the European 
monarchies of the time, his opponents emphasized the »‘special character’ of Ja-
pan and valued the kokutai to the highest degree,« (Neumann 1978: 20). 
The result of this dispute, which so deeply influenced the intellectual devel-
opment of Japan until 1945, is well known: during the so-called kokutai debate, 
Minobe was accused in the Parliament of dishonoring the emperor; his works 
were banned and he was convicted and removed from the House of Peers. 
Now the path was clear for a form of government based entirely on the koku-
tai ideology. The writings of Uesugi Shinkichi (1878-1929), one of Minobe’s rivals, 
on the »Imperial Constitution« in 1924 give an idea of the mystical outgrowths 
that followed. Machida Sanehide (1930: 161f.) writes: 
»According to Uesugi the Japanese empire was founded when the heavenly 
grandson of the sun goddess was named ruler of Japan. By the divine man-
date of Amaterasu, Japan’s eternally unchangeable form of government (koku-
tai) was established and its ruler was designated. The Japanese believe that 
everyone achieves their own personal perfection and eternity by immersing 
themselves in the soul of the emperor, who, as a descendant of the divine 
original deity, inherits her soul and makes it his own. Only through the em-
                                                 
357 On the »Minobe case,« cf. Miller 1965; Röhl 1963: 52ff.; Neumann 1978; Skya 2009: passim. 
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peror can one achieve the ideal of the cosmos, perfection, and continue to per-
fect the nature of people to an even greater degree and develop further by be-
coming one with the emperor, that is to say, the divine original ancestor, for 
the Takama-ga-hara is the ideal government of the Japanese, the highest mo-
rality. 
[...] 
Japan on earth is the continuation of Takama-ga-hara. Just as in heaven sev-
eral gods form a single family, the head of which is Amaterasu, on earth the 
Japanese form (psychologically) a great family whose various wills are united 
and embodied in the emperor as the progeny of the god Izanagi. 
[...] 
The emperor is transcendent, and at the same time he contains everyone in 
himself.« 
Parallel to this development of the concept of the kokutai toward a religious 
mysticism with the emperor as its foundation, in the 1920s attempts were made to 
legally anchor the term kokutai and thus make it concrete. 
The second of Minobe’s opponents mentioned above, Hozumi Yatsuka (1860-
1912), played a crucial role in this process.358 He defined kokutai in general as the 
defining characteristics of a particular nation; the specific kokutai of Japan was 
characterized by the direct rule of the emperor. This »national body« was forever 
immutable (Röhl 1963: 47). In accordance with this definition, the term was first 
adopted in a body of laws, namely, Paragraph 1 of the law for »the maintenance 
of peace and order« (Chian ijihô) of April 22, 1925.359 An authoritative definition of 
kokutai as a legal term was only provided four years later by the Supreme Court 
in a decision on May 31, 1929. According to this decision, the Japanese kokutai 
represents a form of government in which »the emperor himself, belonging to an 
ancient, unbroken line of descent, graciously exercises authority over the gov-
ernment.«360 
Thus, for a long time, a theoretical anchoring of the term kokutai was con-
sciously avoided, because an exact definition would have taken away much of its 
ideological magic as, on the one hand, an intimidating instrument of power, and 
on the other hand, a force of integration uniting the emperor and the people. In 
this way, the concept of the kokutai revealed itself as a means for controlling 
popular opinion with the goal of bringing the entire country into line. 
                                                 
358 Cf. Röhl 1963: 47f.; on Hozumi’s role in the development of the concept of familism, cf. Fridell 
1970: 828, note 17; Miller 1965: 30; cf. Skya 2009: 53ff. 
359 Maruyama 1971: 33; 1981: 33, note 55; 1988: 47. On the chian ijihô, see also Worm 1981: 71; Eng-
lish translation in KEJ 6: 168. 
360 Maruyama 1971: 33; 1981: 33, note 56; 1988: 47. 
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Minobe’s defeat, Uesugi’s mysticism and the legal anchoring of the term koku-
tai according to Hozumi’s definition opened the way for the high point of kokutai 
thought, the »phase of hubris.« The concept of the kokutai was then expanded into 
a mandatory, totalitarian ideology of the absolute unity, unique superiority and 
quasi-religious holiness of the Japanese nation. 
In order to popularize this philosophical system, on March 20, 1937, an exten-
sive commentary on the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890 was published 
under the title Kokutai no hongi, »The Basic Principles of the (Japanese) National 
Polity.«361 This text, millions of copies of which were distributed in Japanese 
schools, and which was one of the two »ultranationalist« works banned under the 
American occupation,362 fills in the basic principles of kokutai thought in detail, as 
previously discussed. This work was intended for the ideological training of 
teachers.363 The original text was written by none other than Hisamatsu Sennichi, 
a professor at the University of Tôkyô and a respected authority on the Japanese 
classics. 
The superiority of the home country and its higher virtue compared to all 
other countries also became the justification for the Japanese claims of rulership 
in East Asia. Here too the mythical times of antiquity serve as a model. Regarding 
the wars with Russia and China, in which Japan was victorious, the annexation of 
Manchuria during the Meiji period, and the founding of Manchukuo, the Kokutai 
no hongi states that these occupations were merely the continuation of the spread 
of the Japanese people in ancient times, the battles against the Ainu and the Ku-
maso, and the campaign of the Jingû Kôgô against Shiragi (i.e. Silla): 
»The Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, the annexation of Korea, and 
the efforts exerted in the founding of Manchoukuo, are one and all but ex-
                                                 
361 Kokutai no hongi 1937; cf. Gauntlett, Hall 1949. Partial translations in: Tsunoda et al. 1964, II: 
278-288; Wittig 1976: 127-130, doc. no. 33. Cf. Antoni 1991: 50. 
362 See chapter V: 1.1; Shintô directive of December 15, 1945, entitled »Abolition of Governmental 
Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control and Dissemination of State Shintô«; cf. Gauntlett, 
Hall 1949: V. 
363 Roy Andrew Miller (1982: 92) remarks on the position of the Kokutai no hongi in relation to the 
Imperial Rescript on Education: »Since the Kokutai no Hongi consists of a discursive commentary 
upon various principles first supposed to have been enunciated by the Meiji emperor in his Impe-
rial Rescript on Education of October 10 (sic!), 1890 (another of the landmarks of Japanese fascist-
nationalist ideology), it was widely felt that this 1937 pamphlet shared in large measure the quasi 
divinity attributed to the Rescript on Education itself. This meant that the Kokutai no Hongi tract 
was often accorded the same worshipful honors as those that were extended to the Rescript. Like 
the Rescript, the Kokutai no Hongi pamphlet was frequently treated as a fetish object. When not 
actually being read or studied, it was reverently placed upon the kamidana, the ‘god shelf’ of 
Shinto observances, a small platform in a room just above eye level where fetishes, talismans, and 
other important cult objects are customarily placed for safekeeping when they are not actively be-
ing employed in religious observances.« 
260  n  KOKUTAI - POLITICAL SHINTÔ FROM EARLY-MODERN TO CONTEMPORARY JAPAN   
 
pressions of the great august Will replying to the august benevolence seen in 
the granting of the Land by the Imperial Ancestors to the Grandchild.« 
(Gauntlett, Hall 1949: 75; Kokutai no hongi 1937: 28) 
In a different passage, it states that the special spirit of Yamato, the land of the 
gods, recently came to power and was manifested concretely in the Sino-Japanese 
and Russo-Japanese Wars.364 It goes on to state that it is the army’s responsibility 
to maintain peace in Asia, as was the case in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-
Japanese Wars.365 
In order to demonstrate continuity of history that was so important for this 
ideology, the Kokutai no hongi consistently makes use of the same pattern: a few 
examples from archaic times, taken from the legendary stories of the Kojiki and 
the Nihonshoki, directly follow a corresponding event usually from time of Meiji-
tennô’s rule. In this way, the enormous historical gaps between these eras are 
conveniently bridged, and the illusion of a single, unbroken line of tradition is 
created. 
This concept was finally taken to even greater extremes in 1941. Under the 
slogan hakkô-ichiu, »the whole world under one roof,«366 the emperor-centered, 
hierarchical idea of the family was now applied to the world outside Japan in 
school textbooks for citizenship class (kokuminka367).368 The emperor, and thus Ja-
pan in general, took on the role of the head of the family; China, Manchukuo, Ko-
rea and Taiwan were understood to be the older brothers, while Thailand and 
others were the younger ones. In 1944 Madagascar and the countries of the Mid-
dle East were finally at least theoretically adopted into the extended kokutai fam-
ily (l.c.). The Japanese army advanced on the countries of Southeast Asia with an 
                                                 
364 Gauntlett, Hall 1949: 132; Kokutai no hongi 1937: 94. 
365 Gauntlett, Hall 1949: 171; Kokutai no hongi 1937: 141. Cf. Antoni 1988b. 
366 Even in the present-day political debate the topic may arise frequently. An example of this oc-
curred only recently, in March 2015, when the press reported the following incident: »During her 
question in the Diet last week, Junko Mihara, a member of the Upper House who belongs to the 
Liberal Democratic Party, employed a phrase closely associated with Japan’s militarism and na-
tionalism in the 1930s and ’40s — ‘Hakko Ichiu,’ which literally means putting all the eight cor-
ners of the world under one roof [...].« »The phrase was coined by Chigaku Tanaka, an activist of 
the Nichiren school of Buddhism, in 1913 by taking a cue from a remark attributed to Japan’s leg-
endary first Emperor Jinmu. Nihon Shoki (The Chronicles of Japan), an official history book com-
pleted in 720, quotes him as saying just prior to his enthronement in the legendary palace of Ka-
shihara in what is now Nara Prefecture: ‘I will cover the eight corners of the world and make 
them my abode’.« (Japan Times, »Wartime slogan should stay buried«, March 24, 2015) 
367 The subjects of ethics, geography, Japanese history and language were combined at public 
schools under this term from 1941 on. On the ultranationalist goals of this subject, cf. Foljanty-Jost 
1979: 18-19.  
368 Cf. Wray 1973: 85. »Under the Glory of the Throne it is our fixed aim that people of the world 
should become one big family.« Translation from a textbook for ethics class; cf. Nihon-kyôkasho-
taikei, vol. III, 1962: 432. 
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extensive propaganda campaign. »Asia for the Asians,« »Turn out the white bar-
barians,« and similar slogans and promises helped them secure a certain amount 
of support among the people, with the exception of the Phillipines. But the ideol-
ogy of the kokutai and hakkô-ichiu, with its strong Shintô and Confucian influ-
ences, could not be so easily applied to other countries and had to be reinter-
preted. Beasly (1987: 244) remarks unmistakably on this subject: 
»It was not possible there to appeal to a common confucian heritage. [...] 
Hakkô-ichiu, which Japanese could claim as a Shinto justification of empire, 
was sometimes translated ‘universal brotherhood.’« 
The universalization of the concept of the kokutai reached by Japanese expan-
sionism marked the completion of a development whose intellectual basis had al-
ready been prepared in the 18th century by the Kokugaku. Its leading scholar, 
Motoori Norinaga, had previously written in 1771: 
»Japan is the birthplace of the sublime ancestral deity Amaterasu ômikami. 
From this, it is especially clear why Japan is so distinguished compared to all 
other countries. After all, there is no country that is not touched by the power 
of this sublime goddess.«369 
Thus, the concept of the kokutai emerged strengthened and victorious from 
the constitutional debates of the 1920s and ‘30s, and it finally resulted in the to-
talitarian ideology of Japan during the war, when it formed the basis for the em-
pire. 
 
2. 1. 1 On the divinity of the Imperial line 
 
The core of the kokutai, which postulated a Japanese identity as a divine na-
tion, remained the same, despite all its development and expansion: it consisted 
of the idea of the divinity of the Imperial line. The following discussion will focus 
on this core idea. 
Although it was still necessary after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 for some 
government officials to educate the population about the pure existence of the 
emperor370 (since large parts of the population were apparently ignorant of this 
idea), only a few years later, this mythically based ideology that postulated the 
divine emperor as the nation’s mystical foundation – a »divine ruler« in the most 
literal sense – had succeeded in becoming the mandatory state ideology. 
                                                 
369 Naobi no mitama = KGS 10: 3, Stolte 1939: 193. 
370 Cf. Lokowandt 1978: 41. See also Worm 1981: 65. 
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Not only critical experts in constitutional law such as the aforementioned Mi-
nobe Tatsukichi, but also historians who sought to understand the true basis and 
beginnings of the imperial line using an objective, scientific approach lost their 
positions as well as any possibility of continuing their academic work. Just one 
example of such a scholar, mentioned here pars pro toto, is the most important 
figure among them, Tsuda Sôkichi.371 Research of this kind touched on the core of 
kokutai ideology: the mythically based divinity of the imperial household. 
The aforementioned Kokutai no hongi of 1937 stated categorically that the 
mandate to rule given by Amaterasu to her grandson Ninigi no mikoto, the di-
vine ancestor of the imperial household (as recorded in the Nihonshoki in the year 
720), represented the founding of the kokutai of Japan. And yet, hidden in a sub-
ordinate clause of the Kokutai no hongi is an extremely precise, most likely unin-
tentional account of the true, far more pragmatic basis for emperor worship. 
This section, which covers the constant love of the emperor for his people, 
states, among other things, that the moral principles of the Imperial Rescript on 
Education of 1890, which played a critical role in the formation of the kokutai ide-
ology, were granted to the people out of the emperor’s love for them. A related 
remark mentions a historical parallel: the Seventeen-Article Constitution (Kenpô 
jûshichiijô) written by Shôtoku-taishi during the reign of Empress Suiko (592-622) 
in ancient Japan.372 It is easy to overlook this comparison, but it appears to me to 
be the most important thing in the entire commentary, since it reveals the true in-
tentions of emperor-worship as being far from mere mythological and historical 
mysticism. 
The Seventeen-Article Constitution, written by Crown Prince Shôtoku in the 
year 604,373 determined the principles according to which the transformation of 
Japan occurred from a loose group of dynasties into a centralized state according 
to the Chinese model. The foundation of the new state in the 7th century, just as 
later in the 19th century, was the institution of the divine ruler: the emperor. Also, 
in these ancient times as well as in the modern era, the basic principles of Confu-
cian ethics and political science formed the basis for the organization of the state. 
                                                 
371 Tsuda Sôkichi (1873-1961) carried out objective, academic research on the orthodox history of 
the ideology of the kokutai and the land of the gods, and consistently reached the conclusion that 
the stories of the founding of the empire did not correspond to the historical facts, but rather 
served to secure power for the imperial line. In 1940 his most important works were banned, and 
he was removed from the famous Waseda University and imprisoned for a short time. After the 
end of the war, Tsuda turned down his nomination as president of the university. Cf. Tsuda 1967. 
372 Kokutai no hongi 1937: 32; cf. Gauntlett, Hall 1949: 78. 
373 Nihonshoki: Suiko 12/4/3 = NKBT 68: 180-186; Florenz 1903: 12-21. Cf. Tsunoda et al. 1964, vol. 
I: 47-51. 
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Thus far, the comparison advanced in the Kokutai no hongi may appear to 
make sense and serve the work’s aims, especially in linking the hallowed Rescript 
on Education of 1890 to a tradition extending back to the 7th century. But in reality, 
the comparison of the Rescript on Education with the Seventeen-Article Constitu-
tion written by Shôtoku-taishi contains in its core an outrageous attack on the 
foundations of the kokutai ideology that must have been evident to any observer. 
This attack can be inferred not from the Buddhist elements374 in Shôtoku’s text, 
which would have contradicted the anti-Buddhist politics of the Meiji period, but 
rather from the fact that not a single word mentioning the divine nature of the 
emperorship, the metaphysical core of the kokutai, appears in the Seventeen-
Article Constitution. According to this document, a central ruler is simply neces-
sary for the efficient leadership of a centralized government; only the institution 
of the emperor offers a guarantee for overcoming and eliminating the divergent 
interests of the clans. This is the actual, and incredibly sobering, beginning of the 
emperorship, and the readers of the Kokutai no hongi were more or less directly 
confronted with this fact. And yet, it may have been difficult for them to recog-
nize it, since they were caught up in a process that was astonishingly similar to 
that of the 7th and 8th centuries, namely, the process of the deification of the em-
peror.375 
The 7th century marked the beginning of a development, based on the prag-
matic views of Prince Shôtoku, that is essentially quite similar to that of the 19th 
and early 20th centuries. Although there is no record of the concept of the divinity 
of the emperor in the year 604, the first mention of this idea appears in an edict by 
Kôtoku-tennô (645-654) on the position of the emperor that has been dated to the 
year 647 : 
»In their capacity as gods – kamunagara means ‘to follow the divine way’ 
(kami no michi, shintô) and carry the divine way in oneself – my children shall 
rule the empire.« Thus commanded [Amaterasu ômikami]. Consequentially, 
it is a country that has been governed by rulers since the beginning of Heaven 
                                                 
374 Of all the 17 articles, the second shows a clearly Buddhist orientation: »Worship the Three Sa-
cred Treasures fervently. The Three Sacred Treasures are Buddha, the law and the priesthood. 
They are the last refuge of the four natures and basic principles of all countries. What generation, 
what people shall not honor these laws? Few are the people who are entirely bad; they can be 
taught and made to follow (the laws). How shall they be made right except by recourse to the 
Three Sacred Treasures?« (NKBT 68: 181; cf. Florenz 1903: 15). 
375 On the deification of the emperor in the Meiji period, cf. Lokowandt 1978: 42-47. As Nelly 
Naumann (1970: 13, inter alia) points out, the deification of the emperor can already be seen in ar-
chaic Japan. 
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and Earth. Since the time of our imperial ancestral rulers who first ruled the 
empire, there has always been harmony, and this has never changed.«376 
Thus, it is evident that, since the days of the pragmatic Seventeen-Article 
Constitution, a process of deification of the imperial line in the sense of the kami 
no michi (Shintô) was undertaken377 that began anew in the 19th and 20th centuries, 
following the decline of imperial power during the Japanese Middle Ages. 
The official commentary on the Constitution by Itô Hirobumi, one of the fa-
thers of the Meiji Constitution, shows that even the creators of the new Empire of 
Japan and its Constitution of 1889 originally took a similarly pragmatic view as 
the statesman Shôtoku did 1300 years before them. He remarks unmistakably, 
and with remarkable candor, that the emperorship was chosen as the foundation 
of the new state because Japan lacked a unifying, common spiritual guideline 
along the lines of Christianity in Europe, and that such an »axis« was essential for 
the desired form of government. In Japan, the religions had little power, and so 
the emperor was chosen for this purpose.378 
Thus, it is plainly clear that the creation of a functional centralized govern-
ment was also the principle necessity for establishing the modern empire, and 
only afterward did the question of its spiritual foundation arise. It was not the 
case that a suitable state was created for the emperor because people believed in 
the divinity of the imperial dynasty in a religious sense, but rather, because there 
was a need for a government that was suited to its time, when Japan began to 
deal with Western nations. 
Thus, it was necessary to establish a new imperial consciousness among the 
people. For the emperor’s subjects, the idea of being ruled by a divine emperor 
was in no way an matter of self-evident, immutable values as postulated by Ko-
kutai Shintô. This reveals an interesting paradox: it was necessary to undertake a 
campaign of indoctrination that spanned decades in order to popularize the con-
cept of the nation’s supposedly immutable traits. 
 
 
 
                                                 
376 Taika 3/4/26 = NKBT 68: 300-301; English translation from the German in Florenz 1903: 135 
(here incorrectly attributed as Taika 3/4/29). 
377 Due to terminological anachronisms the dating of some of Emperor Kôtoku’s edicts is doubtful; 
in this form the earliest they could have appeared is during the rule of Tenmu-tennô (673-686), 
and possibly not until the early 8th century. The process of imperial deification would have thus 
taken place over an even longer period of time ( cf. Naumann 1970: 7, 11, note 35). 
378 Cf. Maruyama 1971: 28ff.; 1981: 29ff.; 1988: 43ff.; cf. Pittau 1967: 177-178. 
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2. 2. Inoue Tetsujirô and the concept of Kokutai Shintô 
 
The already discussed philosopher and ideologue Inoue Tetsujirô played an 
important role in this context. He was mentioned in the previous discussion of 
the Meiji period as the author of the first official commentary on the Rescript on 
Education of 1890. However, Inoue’s work in the 1920s, ‘30s and ‘40s until his 
death in 1944 has so far received little attention in academic research. Some 
thoughts on Inoue’s later work can be found in a recent study by Johann 
Nawrocki (1998), which examines the ideological development of an important 
Japanese scholar at the time. 
Inoue Tetsujirô, who is known in academic circles mostly as a Confucian, 
Western-oriented philosopher and also as a poet, underwent a remarkable shift 
during the Taishô and early Shôwa periods toward a radical Shintô nationalism 
that precisely corresponded to the general trends in Japan at the time. The study 
by Johann Nawrocki represents a great achievement, since it is the first academic 
discussion and analysis of this fact. In a comprehensive discussion of the study’s 
sources, the author succeeds in demonstrating not only that Inoue underwent a 
consistent ideological development from his Meiji-period beginnings to a fanati-
cal, religious nationalism in the 1940s, but also that Inoue can be seen as the pro-
totype for conservative Japanese scholars and intellectuals during this period. 
It is even more astonishing that Inoue turned toward Shintô – that is to say, to 
the religious nationalism he himself called »Kokutai Shintô« – since this influen-
tial scholar had distanced himself from Shintô and the Kokugaku at the begin-
ning of his academic career, when he appeared to be entirely influenced by Chi-
nese and European philosophy (see chapter III: 3. 2.). But Nawrocki clearly 
documents the scholar’s philologically exact and historically stringent develop-
ment; the study demonstrates that Inoue Tetsujirô distanced himself from the ra-
tional approach of philosophy, only to become lost in the depths of the mystical, 
mythical irrationality of the kokutai. 
In the late Meiji period Inoue was particularly influential in the area of official 
ethics, which can be seen as one of the two spiritual pillars of the modern Japa-
nese state, along with the Constitution of 1889. At this time, the scholar Inoue was 
still solidly grounded in Confucianism and Western idealism, but he later un-
derwent an intellectual shift. Over the course of this change, Inoue developed an 
affinity for the official state ideology of the early Shôwa period to a degree that 
until recently was not considered possible, thus abandoning important positions 
in his originally conservative Confucian thought from the Meiji period. 
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In light of the advanced age that this thinker and ideologue reached while in 
full grasp of his health and creative powers (he lived from 1855 until 1944), his 
career is congruent with the intellectual history of imperial Japan from the Meiji 
period until the time of its collapse. Among the most important periods in Inoue’s 
life, from his childhood and schooling (1855-1875), through his studies and assis-
tant professorship at the University of Tôkyô (1875-1884), his stay in Germany 
(1884-1890), and the first years of his professorship (1890-1893), the topic of 
Shintô dogmatization (Nawrocki 1998: 121ff.) played a surprisingly important 
role in his thought as early as the late Meiji period, when Japan’s national profile 
was on the rise and the movement for popular morality was under way. As 
Nawrocki states, »In this period Inoue continues to make use of principles of 
Confucian ethics, [...] but, since he was carried away with the general enthusiasm 
and national pride at the time, he shifted his sphere of argumentation increas-
ingly toward Shintô tradition, which he saw as the main reason for Japan’s mili-
tary and political success« (Nawrocki 1998: 122f.). The fact that »in the propa-
ganda campaign that began after the annexation of Korea in 1910 [...] Inoue re-
sorted to the mystical, divine elements of Shintô mythology in order to justify the 
imperialist goals of the empire on the Asian continent in ethical and historical 
terms« (Nawrocki 1989: 123) shows how closely the political and military expan-
sion of Japan was related to Shintô in Inoue’s view. Nawrocki states that from 
this phase on, Inoue »often attempts to show the age of myths of the Kojiki and 
Nihonshoki in a sense as historical facts,« (Nawrocki 1998: 126); he sees Inoue as 
having »abandoned academic methods of thought and research« (l.c.) and finally 
reaches the conclusion that »over time, the mystification of Shintô in particular 
became increasingly important in his [Inoue’s] works« (Nawrocki 1998: 128). 
In the following years, Inoue continued moving toward a Shintô fundamen-
talist ideology. This finally resulted in the formation of a specific, national-
religiously influenced worldview whose core, in Inoue’s view, was the concept of 
Kokutai Shintô, which he »accorded the greatest importance among all the as-
pects of Shintô,« (Nawrocki 1998: 152). Particularly in his 1915 work Shakai to dô-
toku, from which Nawrocki quotes extensively, Inoue sketches a taxonomy of 
Shintô based on three categories. The aforementioned Kokutai Shintô takes the 
first rank, as a combination of all specifically Japanese values and aspects – that is 
to say, the »power that forms the Japanese nation and has made its existence pos-
sible up to the present day,« (Nawrocki 1998: 153). Thus, Inoue mystically ele-
vates the Japanese nation itself in a way that is similar to the traditional concept 
of the shinkoku. After Kokutai Shintô, the second most important area according 
to Inoue’s theory is Shrine Shintô (jinja shintô). Ceremonies are of primary impor-
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tance in this category, but the author also emphasizes the religious aspect of 
Shrine Shintô, in a blatant contradiction of the official view at the time, which 
maintained that State Shintô was non-religious. The third area covered by Inoue 
is Sectarian Shintô (shûha shintô): »This Shintô includes the various sects that have 
formed, such as Taishakyô or the Mitakekyô« (l.c.). 
This classification of three areas of Shintô represents the crystallization of 
Inoue’s thinking on Shintô. Although he emphasized the internal connections be-
tween the three areas, he did not allow any doubt – even in his later works – that 
the area of Kokutai Shintô is of the greatest importance. The question of the Japa-
nese kokutai had already played a central role in his earlier writings, but only 
from this point on did Inoue recognize an unambiguous religious connotation in 
this context. In the aforementioned work, he remarks unmistakably: 
»The origins of the kokutai, from a religious perspective, can be found in Ko-
kutai Shintô.« (Nawrocki 1998: 157) 
As Japan developed into a political and military world power, Inoue’s con-
ception of Shintô increasingly took a global view. Kokutai Shintô also plays a cen-
tral role in this regard. Although Inoue advocated peace and harmony, his vision 
of spreading Shintô harmony across the whole world »could only be achieved by 
accepting the use of military force« (Nawrocki 1998: 163). Inoue continued to ad-
vocate the idea of a Shintô world mission up to his death in 1944. 
In 1926 a mysterious affair caused Inoue to lose all his public offices, marking 
a dramatic turn in what had until then been a remarkably successful career. As if 
unable to rid himself of the ghosts he himself had summoned, he became the vic-
tim of a campaign accusing him of infringement of majesty due to a misinterpre-
tation of the Japanese imperial regalia. 
Finally, in a separate, detailed section, Nawrocki discusses Inoue’s ideology 
of the shinkoku in the early Shôwa period (1926-1945). In light of the »opportun-
ism« that he had previously demonstrated, it is not surprising that even this man, 
who was once held to be »the most important philosopher east of the Suez«379, 
and in spite of the embarrassments of the public campaign against him, actively 
took the final step toward nationalistic hubris. Although he was violently at-
tacked by radical forces under Kita Ikki and Ôkawa Shûmei in February 1929 and 
suffered a serious eye injury as a result (Nawrocki 1998: 196), »over the course of 
the 1930s, his Confucian ideology was replaced more and more by mythological 
elements of Shintô theology and the new imperialism, [...] inspired by the grow-
                                                 
379 Cf. Yamazaki, Miyakawa 1966: 120; Gluck 1985: 129; Antoni 1990a: 108. 
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ing imperial ambitions of the army« (l.c.). Nawrocki writes that, in Inoue’s case, 
this resulted »almost automatically in his own construction of a cultural-
imperialistic ideology of the shinkoku« (Nawrocki 1998: 197). 
Thus, Nawrocki provides a comprehensive picture of Inoue’s intellectual de-
velopment during this period. According to the author’s detailed analysis of 
Inoue’s ideology of the shinkoku, this thinking was expressed in the concept of a 
unity of »gods and people« (shinjin-gôitsu), a concept that is reminiscent of Hirata 
Atsutane’s national-religious theories. Following uncritically in Atsutane’s foot-
steps, in 1934 Inoue writes: 
»People from all over Japan are all realizing the divine nature, and thus, for 
the first time Japan is truly becoming a land of the gods.« (Nawrocki 1998: 
202) 
Logically, his thoughts focus on the emperor, whom he reveres as a »living 
deity« (arahitogami). This is also a basic tenet of the late Kokugaku. Nawrocki 
clearly points out these intellectual-historical antecedents: 
»As the Japanese empire expanded, Tetsujirô attempted, similar to Hirata At-
sutane one century before him in the Kodô taii, to extend the divine nature of 
the people and the individual beyond the Japanese nation.« (Nawrocki 1998: 
204) 
In accordance with criticism of Western civilization at the time, which was 
becoming increasingly radical, Inoue postulated an independent Japanese alter-
native based on the idea of Kokutai Shintô. The term kannagara no michi as an 
original term for Shintô played an increasingly important role in his thinking. 
Inoue saw this term as the basis for the specifically Japanese code of ethics as well 
as the kokutai, and he called the »way of the gods,« in an adaptation of Kant’s 
terminology, the »categorical imperative« of Japan (Nawrocki 1998: 211). The ex-
pansionist component of this principle always remained clear – for example, in 
Inoue’s 1934 remark: 
»The Japanese principle of leadership will spread around the world, lead 
people to the kannagara no michi, and finally realize the universal land of the 
gods.« (Nawrocki 1998: 213) 
As Nawrocki demonstrates, Inoue’s writings are »characterized by an esoteric 
Shintô belief in the shinkoku« (Nawrocki 1998: 216) that justifies the missionary 
role of Japan in the world. He views the »Japanese spirit« and the kannagara no 
michi (i.e. Shintô) as synonyms: 
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»Shintô is at the center of the Japanese spirit …. This refers primarily to the 
aforementioned Kokutai Shintô. Kokutai Shintô is the origin of the life-force 
of the nation of Yamato. Today the nation of Yamato is entirely based on Ko-
kutai Shintô.« (Nawrocki 1998: 221) 
In these later years, the relationship to East Asia and the creation of a 
»Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere« dominated by Japan played an impor-
tant role in Inoue’s thought. He wholeheartedly supported these plans (cf. 
Nawrocki 1998: 269, among others) and effortlessly connected them to his mysti-
cal theories on the »land of the gods.« While referencing great scholars of the 
past, such as Kitabatake Chikafusa, Nichiren, Yamazaki Ansai, Motoori Nori-
naga, Hirata Atsutane and Ôkuni Takamasa, he outlined an expansion of the con-
cept of Kokutai Shintô – once again in exact accordance with the prevailing opin-
ion at the beginning of the 1940s – into the concept of »the whole world under 
one roof« (hakkô-ichiu). As Nawrocki writes, according to Inoue, this radical view, 
which goes far beyond the contents of the Kokutai no hongi, became 
»… a plausible alternative development, not only for the Far East, but for the 
entire world.« The former Confucian and idealist philosopher euphorically 
states in 1942: »The imperial dynasty, whose rule has been uninterrupted 
since the founding of the empire, will continue to thrive for all eternity. Nor is 
there any doubt that such a country is capable of achieving the great ideal of 
the whole world under one roof.« (Nawrocki 1998: 278) 
In the remainder of his study, Nawrocki analyzes Inoue’s problematic rela-
tionship with contemporary National Socialism and Italian fascism. At first, Inoue 
distanced himself from these European counterparts to his national-religious 
teachings, but later, after the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 and the 
Tripartite Pact of 1940, and the early military victories of the Axis Powers, he 
viewed these similarities more favorably. Here too, an opportunism in Inoue’s 
thought is apparent that runs throughout his entire work. In 1942 he saw Hitler 
and Mussolini as the leaders of countries that, like Japan, were characterized by 
agreement and the inner unity of the entire nation. Inoue proudly remarks: »But 
in Japan this did not happen only recently; it has existed since the founding of the 
empire. No, even better: since the country’s creation, solidarity and harmony 
have been practiced horizontally and vertically,« (Nawrocki 1998: 273). In his last 
work published before his death in 1944, Inoue even praises the alliance with 
Nazi Germany in anthemic verse: 
»Our country of Japan is closely allied with Germany, together we will create 
a new moral world.« (Nawrocki 1998: 282) 
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2. 3. Mythology and fascism in Japan and Germany 
 
Thus, toward the end of his life Inoue once again dealt with a topic that had 
been evident throughout his entire intellectual development – at the latest since 
his first stay in Germany during the Meiji period: Japan and Germany, a fascinat-
ing topic that has been covered in great detail in numerous academic, popular 
and even propagandistic works. 
The topic of ideological similarities between Japan in the early Shôwa period 
and Germany under National Socialism is worth covering in depth in this con-
text, since it offers further insights on the basic elements of kokutai thought. Be-
yond the essential analyses of the historical facts, including the reasons that led to 
the war, the war’s development, diplomatic relations, etc., which have been pur-
sued by historians in great earnest, a further important area, is also worth exam-
ining in this context: fascist ideology (cf. Antoni 1991a: 100-121) 
 
2. 3. 1. Preliminary remarks 
 
Reaching a theoretical understanding of »fascism« in this context is a highly 
complex and extremely difficult problem (cf. Antoni 2004). Given the political, 
historical, ideological, and even emotional dimensions of the topic, we risk stray-
ing from the realm of serious academic research in using this term, particularly in 
attempting comparative studies. After the so called »historian’s debate« (Historik-
erstreit) in Western Germany during the mid 1980s it became a common conclu-
sion to regard this term as inappropriate in dealing with the historical reality of 
the highly diverse, so called »fascist« regimes of Germany, Italy and Japan, dur-
ing the 1930s and 1940s. The political argument that using the term »fascism« in 
taking a comparative approach ultimately would open the door for relativization 
of the horrors, especially those of German National Socialism had great effect. 
»To compare« could lead to relativization of the dimensions of guilt. Accordingly, 
the historian’s debate ended with a clear verdict against all comparative »fas-
cism« studies, a position still held by most German historians. While the term 
»fascism« might be applied to Italian system under Benito Mussolini, it could not 
be used to describe any other political framework of the time. Neither the Ger-
man Nazi system nor the Japanese emperor system of those dark days, should, or 
could, be subsumed under this descriptive term.  
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So the term »fascism« lost much of its academic distinctiveness in Germany, 
becoming just a catch phrase in political polemics, between »rightists« and »left-
ists«, Marxists and bourgeois. In the field of scholarly research comparative »fas-
cism« studies seemed to be out of bounds for all time. But American historians 
have carried on comparative »fascism« studies, even enlarging the cultural and 
geographical sphere to Asian countries. This definitely is a new and encouraging 
trend, showing that structural similarities and historical parallels between vari-
ous »fascisms« can be analyzed in comparative terms, without any attempt at re-
lativizing the singularity of »fascist« regimes.  
In this respect, a recent study by Harry Harootunian (2000) sets the standard 
for dealing with the Japanese case. In studying the »history, culture, and commu-
nity in interwar Japan,« as the subtitle of his enormous study states, the author 
clearly elucidates that for the Japanese situation »it is important to return to the 
question of fascism in the interwar period and its location in the cultural discus-
sions of the time.«380 We cannot, Harootunian argues, »simply ignore the question 
of fascism and its many inflections during the 1930s.« (l.c.) The author, of course, 
is clearly aware of the problems connected with defining this term, but he points 
out that such issues are not unique to fascism. To illustrate the point, he notes 
that »there are as many definitions and explanations of modernism as there are 
people willing to speak about it.«381  
Clearly, »fascism« was a reality in Japan of the 1930s and 40s, and was an im-
portant factor in the discussions of the distinctive and allegedly superior Japanese 
patterns of culture. Confronted with the Western concept of modernity, nativists 
turned to ideas of an allegedly pure, genuine and fixed Japanese culture and »in 
this way, the crisis was inflected into claims of cultural authenticity and diverse 
efforts to recall the eternal forms of community outside of history.«382 The con-
struction of a national history, and we may add, a national entity, essentially 
timeless and not subject to historical change, is a central point in this ideological 
world.  
In this approach, discussing »fascism« in a comparative fashion deals not 
mainly with problems of political organizational forms but with questions of ide-
ology. A fascist ideology embraces the idea of cultural or racial superiority, 
founded in an idealized and remote national past, serving as a model for the fu-
ture. Harootunian calls this »an ideological/cultural order calling for authentic-
                                                 
380 Harootunian 2000: xxvii. 
381 Harootunian 2000: xx. 
382 Harootunian 2000: xxvi. 
272  n  KOKUTAI - POLITICAL SHINTÔ FROM EARLY-MODERN TO CONTEMPORARY JAPAN   
 
ity, folkism, and communitarism« in pointing out fascism’s »ideological appeal to 
culture and community.«383 
Consequently the nativistic search for a unique national character, in combi-
nation with an aggressive idea of a nation’s superiority over others, in racist 
and/or culturalist terms, marks the core of any fascist ideology. In this respect, 
the term »fascism« may be used in comparative studies, and written even without 
quotation marks.  
 
2. 3. 2. German admirers of the Japanese kokutai 
 
Lacking democratic institutions for the freedom of expression, the National-
Socialist state in Germany resorted to domestic espionage in order to monitor the 
nation. This led to an enormous amount of background reports on the opinions, 
rumors and views on the current situation circulating among the people. These 
secret reports by the Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst) of the SS from 1938 to 1945 
were summarized and collected as Meldungen aus dem Reich (»Reports from the 
Reich«) and made available to those in power. 
Today these documents, which are stored in the German Federal Archives in 
Koblenz and are now available to the public in a seventeen-volume reference edi-
tion, represent an invaluable body of source materials on the actual state of mind 
of the German people during this period. 
They are also a rich source for anyone interested in Japan, since the relevant 
reports by informants also give a detailed picture of the image of Japan, Ger-
many’s allied power in East Asia, that emerged among the German people. Of 
particular interest is the report entitled »Report from the Reich« (»Meldung aus 
dem Reich«), No. 306, dating from August 6, 1942. It is divided into five (or four) 
chapters, the second of which is entitled »Cultural Areas,« and, as is evident from 
a heading contained within, focuses exclusively on the »View of Japan Among 
the People.« The report begins with the following remark: 
»Since Japan’s entry into the war, and particularly since its surprisingly rapid 
and far-reaching victories in the East-Asian sphere, many national comrades 
of all classes are increasingly considering the deeper reasons that have made 
it possible for the Japanese people to wage this new war, despite the long-
standing war with China, with astonishing power. Beyond superficial talk of 
the »yellow menace,« the national comrades are most often interested in un-
derstanding the mental and spiritual constitution of the Japanese, which they 
credit more strongly than the material potential for war as the secret of the 
                                                 
383 Harootunian 2000: xxix, and xxx. 
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Japanese advance. [...] The fact that in Japan life, politics and the war effort 
are shaped and defined by non-Christian religious and ideological beliefs, 
apparently with great success, has led to numerous comparisons with the 
ideological and religious situation in the [German] empire itself.« 
Overall, the text goes on to remark, certain developments in the view of Japan 
have emerged that will eventually require a certain correction. More precisely, 
this means that the exclusively positive elements of the German view of Japan 
that led to an idealization of Japan were viewed with increasing skepticism by 
those in power. 
The report, which is consistently written in the subjunctive mood,384 remarks 
that the Japanese soldiers’ readiness to sacrifice »has led to something of an ‘infe-
riority complex’« in Germany. It continues: 
»The Japanese presents himself as ‘Germans to the second power’ [»Germanen 
im Quadrat«], so to speak. It is thought that even today the Japanese possess 
characteristics attributed to the mythical heroes of prior centuries in our 
country. Along with slogans warning of the »yellow peril,« a certain pessi-
mism is spreading that in Japan the full power is still in effect that once char-
acterized our own history, the mythical greatness of which is not recognized 
in the battle currently being waged to the degree that it is in the case of the 
Japanese, and that perhaps the centuries under Christianity »cannot be com-
pensated for after all,« and that the Japanese power could one day be turned 
against us.« 
The absurd idea of the Japanese as the »German to the second power« reveals 
a certain amount of insecurity and anxiety, but also admiration. The text then 
turns to the question of to what extent Japan can serve as an example for Ger-
many. »Questions relating to the ideological and religious new order,« it states, 
»are discussed with great interest.« Finally, the text makes its core statement: 
»To the reader, the dominant impression is of Japan’s absolute internal cohe-
siveness. [...] Especially in the obvious comparison with developments in 
Europe, in which we have endured many hardships, many national comrades 
have formed the view that Japan has proceeded without internal breeches 
and that the entire Japanese people to this day are unified, lending the pre-
sent day in Japan a mythical greatness that, in our country, is only associated 
with historical eras of the distant past.« 
While referring to Kitayama’s book West-östliche Begegnung (»Encounters be-
tween West and East«), the question is posed of »whether the Japanese way is 
also feasible for us, and whether the Japanese methods of education could also be 
                                                 
384 Translator’s note: the subjunctive mood indicates indirect speech in German. 
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applied to our system of military education. [...] The book does not mention the 
National-Socialist forces of a new Germanic order even once. Compared to Japan, 
Europe appears to be a region that is being torn apart by various forces.« 
The »Report from the Empire« ends by stating that there is a danger that this 
»image of Japan without the clear and positive contrast of our own standards is 
making an increasingly strong impression« on the German people. The un-
abashed admiration for Japan that is evidenced in this report may have been met 
with worried skepticism within the security apparatus,385 but it was nonetheless 
shared at the highest levels of the government, including Hitler himself. 
In Henry Picker’s Tischgesprächen (»Table Talks«), Hitler mentions Japan and 
the Japanese on several occasions. Torn between the racist conceit comparing the 
Japanese with the devil, »with whom one would ally oneself in order to win,« 
(Picker 1983: 310) and admiration for their superior intelligence (Picker 1983: 404), 
Hitler spoke on April 4, 1942, for instance, on the »state religion, or rather, state 
philosophy« of the Japanese. The state philosophy of the Japanese, he says, is one 
of the essential reasons for their success, and the only reason it has remained the 
basic principle according to which the Japanese live is because »it was long pro-
tected from the poison of Christianity,« (Picker 1983: 184). 
Hitler’s admiration for Japan is particularly evident in Ernst Nolte’s essential 
work Fascism in its Epoch (1984). Nolte writes about Hitler: 
»His true partners, however, were the Japanese, and he was often obliged, 
even in his own remarks, to defend himself against accusations of betraying 
his own racist principles. But the pragmatic reasons that he occasionally of-
fers do not express what is most important, but rather, he genuinely admires 
this Far Eastern country. To him, Japan is a naturally fascist country, so to 
speak – having been untouched by Christianity, and with its inaccessibility to 
the Jews, and its internal cohesiveness and hero worship – that points the 
way for his own efforts.« (Nolte 1984: 501) 
 
2. 3. 3. Public reception and effects 
 
Thus the Japanese kokutai ideology did not fail to influence populist figures 
and those who subscribed to race theory. H. W. von Doemming writes in 1934, 
for example, in the first lines of his work Was will Japan? (»What does Japan 
want?«) on the supposed thinking of »the« Japanese: 
                                                 
385 Significantly, the Japanese views were not feared for offering opposition, but for their sup-
posed perfection, especially in comparison with the German national ideology. 
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»The sun goddess Amaterasu ômikami entrusted her descendants with the 
rulership of the Land of the Rising Sun with these words: ‘My children shall 
rule in their capacity as deities.’ This was 2500 years ago, and today more 
than ever, every Japanese, from the cabinet minister down to the last peon, is 
convinced of the truth of this mythological statement. After all, the entire 
Japanese people view themselves as ‘children of the gods,’ and their religion 
is called Shintô, the ‘way of the gods.’« 
He goes on to state that if Japan’s politics are not understood in Europe and 
America today, this is due to the fact that »Japan’s religion of race, that is to say, 
its racial-religious structure,« is not understood (Doemming 1934: 9), »since each 
Japanese does not merely believe, but knows that he is of divine descent and that 
no other race shares this advantage with him,« (Doemming 1934: 18). 
Full of admiration, he quotes from a speech by the Minister of War General 
Araki from May 16, 1931, in which he remarks on the ideology of the kodô, the 
»way of antiquity« and Japan’s resulting mission in the world: 
»When the country is again illuminated by the same great spirit in which it 
was founded, then the time will come when all nations of the world will be 
forced to look up to our kodô. The kodô, the great ideal of the Japanese nation, 
is so rich that it will be spread across the whole world and overcome every 
barrier – even by the sword.« (Doemming 1934: 19) 
It is not surprising that such Japanese national self-conceptions did not fail to 
influence Germany in the 1930s and ‘40s. After all, a parallel was recognized in 
Japan, which in many areas was far more advanced and possessed a deeper his-
torical foundation, that outshone Germany’s own ideological efforts as an un-
reachable ideal. 
Japan appeared to have already realized everything that the populist ideo-
logues in Germany strove for in such earnest: the uninterrupted homogeneity of 
the nation, the mystical unity of leadership and people, the dependence of virtue 
and general ethics on race and the resulting national polity rather than on indi-
vidual insight and learnedness, the rejection of everything foreign that in the past 
was culturally dominant, combined with the rejection of rationality and reason as 
necessary categories of thought, and in their place a propagation of »appropriate, 
intuitive« emotional perception. It was also possible to draw parallels to the 
German nation from these conclusions, for example, in the pursuit of the su-
premacy of the homeland, which was seen as superior within the region, com-
bined with the ideal of military heroism. 
But one area in particular justified the similarities on a basic level in spiritual 
terms: the ancient stories, myths and legends, whose function it was to establish 
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cultural independence and uniqueness. In this regard, Japan can actually be seen 
as having attained a nearly impossible ideal. The nation, with its traditions sup-
posedly spanning millennia and its legendary founding of political power by the 
gods of antiquity, was popularly held to be unassailable, and likely even invinci-
ble. 
Thus, the previously mentioned concept of the Japanese as »Germans to the 
second power« contains a far-reaching complex, as well as fear and admiration. It 
directly refers to the cult of the old Germanic peoples or teutons that was ram-
pant at that time in Germany, since the Nazi ideology also idealized antiquity as 
providing the concrete nativist goal of the »national essence« and sovereignty. 
 
2. 4. Commemorating the »founding« of the Japanese Empire and  
Kojiki studies in wartime Germany 
 
The highlight of the ideological cooperation between wartime Germany and 
Japan is represented by the year 1940.386 This year saw the 2,600th anniversary of 
the legendary accession of Jinmu and marked an ideologically extremely impor-
tant occasion in wartime Japan.387 Festivals and events throughout the whole year 
commemorated this date, since Jinmu, the so-called First Emperor, stood at the 
center of the ultra-nationalistic kokutai ideology of that period. Even a hymn to 
mark the 2,600th anniversary of the kigen (see above) was composed, to com-
memorate the founding of the Japanese empire.388 
As could be shown above the Japanese kokutai ideology of the 1930s and 1940s 
won high admiration in wartime Germany, not only among the ideologues of the 
contemporaneous National Socialist (Nazi) Party but among ordinary people as 
well. The 2,600th anniversary of the alleged founding of the axis partner in the 
East, Imperial Japan, was commemorated among interested Germans in 1940 too. 
                                                 
386 For this chapter see also Antoni 2011. 
387 On the year 1940 Brownlee (1991: 1, 2) states: »1940 - A Year of Singular Importance. The year 
1940 was the 2,600th anniversary of the accession of the first Emperor of Japan. Emperor Jimmu in 
660 B.C. The event was entirely mythical; yet, remarkably, the government of Japan was orga-
nized under a constitution of 1889, which accepted the event as historical. The unbroken succes-
sion of Emperors from Emperor Jimmu was the explicit basis for Japanese imperial sovereignty. 
His accession was recorded in two works of historical writing unrivaled in authority, Kojiki (Re-
cord of Ancient Matters, 712 A.D.), and Nihonshoki (Chronicles of Japan, 720 A.D.).« On the recep-
tion of the Jinmu-myth in Meiji-Japan cf. Wachutka 2013: 11ff. and passim. 
388 Cf. Weiner (2004: 50): »In 1940, ‘2,600 Years Since the Nation’s Founding’, an officially spon-
sored song commemorating the anniversary of the founding of the nation by Emperor Jimmu, 
captured many of the prevailing visual images of transcendence with ornate and appropriately 
archaic lyrics about ‘the glorious light of Japan,’ ‘pure gratitude burning like a flame,’ ‘the glisten-
ing national power,’ and ‘the rising sun of everlasting prosperity.’« (note 21) 
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There were festival activities in Berlin during that year and institutions of Ger-
man-Japanese cultural relations were active in commemorating this anniver-
sary.389 Especially notable is a joint publication project of the Japan Institute at Ber-
lin (»Japaninstitut zu Berlin«) and the Japanese German Culture Institute at Tôkyô 
(»Japanisch-Deutsches Kulturinstitut zu Tôkyô«). In 1940, in commemoration of 
the 2,600th anniversary of the Japanese Empire, both institutions presented an 
enormous work of philological research, a new edition of the Kojiki in two parts, 
and announced a plan for a complete translation of the text into German as part 
three. The main editor and translator of the whole project was a scholar quite un-
known today, Kinoshita Iwao (1894-1980). Because of the importance of his work 
for the reception of Shintô and the Kojiki, in Germany and Japan in the 1940s, I 
shall discuss Kinoshita’s life and work here in some detail. 
 
2. 4. 1. Kinoshita’s Kojiki 
 
Kinoshita’s work on the Kojiki consisted of three parts, a complete Japanese 
text of the Kojiki (Part 1, hereafter Kinoshita 1940a), a complete transliteration of 
this text into rômaji (Part 2, hereafter Kinoshita 1940b), and a complete translation 
of this text into German (Part 3). Unfortunately this third part, consisting of the 
German translation was lost - it was never published and was destroyed in a fire 
bombing of Tôkyô in 1944. The whole text of the translation as well as the notes 
and commentary were completely lost.390  More than twenty years after the war, 
Kinoshita began his translation project again, but as he was serving as the head 
priest (gûji) of the Shintô shrine Kashii-gû near Fukuoka – a position he had in-
herited from his father –, it took him until 1976 to finish and publish the transla-
tion. This edition, announced as the missing third volume of his Kojiki project, 
could not, of course, appear as a publication of the no-longer extant institutions of 
prewar and wartime Japanese-German relations. Hence Kinoshita privately pub-
lished his translation, sans commentary, as a publication of his Kashii Shrine in 
Fukuoka (Kinoshita 1976).  
In the preface to this work, the author comments on the 36-year delay of the 
publication. Interestingly, as he did with the first and second volumes in 1940, 
                                                 
389 Cf. Friese 1984: 276. For an ideological pamphlet in German commemorating the event cf. Heu-
vers and Uda (1940: 363) 
390 In the years 1984 and 1986 two further parts of the work were published. Although they were 
officially counted as volumes 4 and 5 of Kinoshita’s former work, (Kinoshita 1984 and 1986), in 
fact these volumes, posthumously arranged by Manabe Daikaku, did not comprise of Kinoshita’s 
lost commentary work but of various additional materials, such as astronomical tables and calen-
drical data. 
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Kinoshita dedicated this 1976 volume to a member of the imperial family, Prince 
Takamatsu no miya Nobuhito (1905-1987), the third son of Taishô-tennô, whom 
he highly revered.391 Nothing shows the continuity of Kinoshita’s work more 
clearly than his dedication to the prince, which reads: 
»His imperial Highness 
Prince Takamatsu Nobuhito 
I take with highest reverence the liberty 
to present the German translation of the Kojiki, volume three of the complete 
edition.  
Thanks to your benign courtesy I was finally able to accomplish the work. 
Kashii-gû, April 1976, Iwao Kinoshita.«392 
Kinoshita was completely unknown to research in Western Japanese studies, 
but first research on his person started in Japan some years ago.393 Most of the 
materials were published at Kyûshû University, by Yake et al. (2001).394 
Kinoshita Iwao was born in Fukuoka on March 7th, 1894.395 His father, Kino-
shita Yoshishige, was head priest of the same shrine where Kinoshita Iwao later 
served as gûji, Kashii-gû396, near Fukuoka. In April 1909, the young Iwao entered 
middle school, graduating in March 1914. In September of the same year, he en-
rolled at the private university Kokugakuin in Tôkyô, graduating from the faculty 
of National Literature in July 1918. In September of the same year, Kinoshita en-
rolled at the faculty of law at the private Nihon Daigaku. Although he returned to 
Kokugakuin as a research student in April 1920, Kinoshita graduated from the 
Nihon University faculty of Law in March 1921. In March 1922 he graduated from 
the research school (kenkyûka) of Kokugakuin University, and in the same year re-
ceived an order from the Institute of Imperial Classics of Kokugakuin University 
to study abroad. On August 22, 1922, Kinoshita embarked from the port of Yoko-
                                                 
391 Takamatsu (Teru) no Miya Nobuhito (1905-1987) was the youngest brother of the deceased 
Shôwa-tennô; since 1913 head of the Takamatsu family. 
392 »Seiner Kaiserlichen Hoheit, Prinz Takamatsu Nobuhito, Erlaube ich mir ehrerbietigst die 
deutsche Übersetzung des Kojiki, Band III der Gesamtausgabe, zu überreichen. Dank Ihres mir 
gewährten gütigen Wohlwollens konnte ich die Arbeit beenden. Kashii-gû, April 1976, Iwao Ki-
noshita.« (»Widmung«, in: Kinoshita 1976). 
393 Cf. Kinoshita 1984, 1986 and Yake et al. 2001; cf. Antoni 2011. 
394 Cf. Antoni 2011: 8. My thanks also to Professor Wolfgang Michel of Kyûshû University for the 
permission to use his materials. 
395 Yake et al. (2001: 1) provide two different dates: Meiji 37 (1904) and Meiji 27 (1894). From the 
context it becomes clear that 1894 must be regarded as the correct date.  
396 The Kashii-gû is one of the Shintô shrines of national importance. It is dedicated to the wor-
shipof the three Sumiyoshi deities as well as the legendary Empress Okinaga-tarashi-hime, alias 
Jingu Kôgo, her son Homuda-wake (the later Ôjin tennô), and her husband Tarashi-naka-tsu-hiko, 
alias Chûai tennô, whose tomb also is located here .  
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hama and traveled to Europe. More than one year later, in October or December 
of 1923, he enrolled at the Faculty of Philosophy at Friedrich Wilhelm University 
of Berlin, where he began to study the academic subjects of Philosophy, Sinol-
ogy,397 and History. This was the year that Kinoshita started his Kojiki translation 
project, which later became a part of his dissertation. The German side officially 
entrusted him with this enormous study, and Kinoshita worked with the Kojiki 
texts that he found in Berlin. The whole project was to be published in five vol-
umes  at the famous academic publishing house DeGruyter.  
In July 1929 Kinoshita finally graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy at 
Berlin University. Following an initiative of the Japanese philosopher Kanokogi 
Kazunobu, in the same year the »German Japanese Society« (DJG) was founded 
in Berlin. Until 1932, this society published the academic journal Yamato,398 which 
was succeeded by the journal Nippon. In the 1929 edition of Yamato, Kinoshita 
published an article on »primeval Shinto« (»Ur-Shinto«),399 which shows that he 
was abreast with the academic standard of his time. On May 28, 1929, the Japa-
nese Embassy in Berlin announced that His Imperial Highness, Prince Takamatsu 
no miya, would provide financial aid to the printing of the German translation of 
Kojiki. But in August 1929, Kinoshita was ordered to return to Japan, arriving 
there on of September 10. He received an order to study the Kojiki again, finan-
cially aided by Kuroita Katsumi,400 one of the main editors of the Kokushi taikei se-
ries. 
In August 1933, Kinoshita presented a new Japanese edition of the Kojiki, 
which was incorporated into volume seven of this series in 1936.401 In the same 
year, Kinoshita began his work on the rômaji transcription as volume two of his 
Kojiki project, based on the Kokushi taikei text. In 1940, both volumes were printed 
on the occasion of the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of the empire,402 with 
the Japanese text, being fully identical with the Kokushi taikei version, as part one 
(Kinoshita 1940a), containing various prefaces and addresses by well-known per-
sons of the era. The rômaji-edition was printed as part two (Kinoshita 1940b). But 
due to unknown reasons, the actual main body of the project, the third volume 
                                                 
397 In the same year, the famous sinologist Otto Franke (1863-1946) had received a call to this uni-
versity. 
398 On the journal Yamato cf. Walravens 2000: 13. 
399 Kinoshita 1929: 120 - 127. 
400 For Kuroita Katsumi cf. the recent study by Lisa Yoshikawa: Kuroita Katsumi and his state-
sanctioned national history, 1896-1937: Narrating absolute imperial sovereignty and Japan's civilizing 
mission in Asia as history (2007). 
401 Kuroita Katsumi et al. (eds.) 1936. 
402 Cf. Kinoshita’s preface to Kinoshita 1940a. 
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consisting of the German translation, was not published, probably because it was 
not yet finished in 1940. Unfortunately, the whole stock, as well as all the manu-
scripts and materials were burned and destroyed during a fire bombing of Tôkyô 
in 1944. Thus Kinoshita’s project remained incomplete. 
After the war, Kinoshita worked several jobs, but finally became the gûji at his 
home shrine of Kashii-gû in 1959. In 1967, two German Japanologists from West 
Berlin, Hans Eckard and Johanna Fischer, visited Kinoshita in Fukuoka, provid-
ing help for the plan of a new translation. Hans Eckard (1905 – 1969), being one of 
the most problematical German Japanologists both before and after the war,403 
died in 1969, but with the help of other well-known Japanologists, Kinoshita was 
finally able to finish his work, albeit only the pure translation, without any com-
mentary or bibliographical sections. In 1975, the private printing of his Kojiki 
translation began, and the work was published in 1976 as part three of the origi-
nal series. Four years later, on October 23, 1980, Kinoshita Iwao died at Kashii-gû, 
Fukuoka.404 
As can be seen from the biographical sketch given above, Kinoshita’s work 
was designed as more than the existing three volumes. Only the first and second 
volumes, which were printed in 1940, make special reference to the 2,600th anni-
versary of the Japanese Empire, as can be seen in the introduction to volume one. 
The philosopher Kanokogi, being one of the most important individuals within 
the German-Japanese relations of the 1930s and 1940s, underwent an intellectual 
conversion from philosopher to ideologue, as did many other Japanese and Ger-
man intellectuals of those days.405 Although the project of translating the Kojiki 
had started as early as 1923, long before the coming of the dark days of fascist 
axis fantasies, by 1940 the Kojiki translation project had obviously become a part 
of this ideological change.  
Looking at those two volumes - the Japanese text and the rômaji edition - one 
aspect becomes visible for the reader at first glance: in Kinoshita’s and Kuroita’s 
Kokushi taikei version, the Kojiki appears, with regard to language, as a nearly 
completely Japanese text. This is made visible by the furigana that run parallel to 
the Kanji scripture. Chinese characters in the Kojiki are not only transcribed, as 
                                                 
403 Before and during the war, Eckard seems to have been one of the most fervent axis believers 
among German Japanologists; nevertheless, he was appointed professor of Japanese Studies after 
the war, at the Free University of Berlin in 1964. This, among other events, caused an outburst of 
students’ protests, leading to the »student revolution« of 1968 in West Berlin. cf. Walravens 2000: 
15. 
404 Yake et al. (2001: 3) state that Kinoshita has died in the age of 87, but in regard to his lifespan 
the age of 86 seems correct. 
405 Cf. Teruko Yoh (1999) on the ideological transformation of Kanokogi, see also Zentrum für 
Sprache und Kultur Japans (ed.) 2006. 
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has been done in all editions since Motoori Norinaga’s philological reconstruction 
of the text, but it seems as if the editor(s) have composed an fully independent 
narrative in artificial archaic Japanese, running parallel to the textual body, thus 
creating another in contrast to the original’s appearance in Chinese characters. 
Through this, the Kojiki text increasingly loses its original Kanji, or better Chinese, 
appearance. This process of totally Japanizing the whole body of the text by de-
constructing its Chinese appearance reaches its final stage within volume two, 
where the complete text is printed in phonetic rômaji transcript only. In this vol-
ume, no visible trait of a basically Chinese writing of the narrative appears any 
longer, and the reader gets the impression of actually dealing with the original 
archaic Japanese narrative, written down in a phonetic style. Thus any former 
Chinese (con-) text is neglected.  
We probably do not do justice to Kinoshita Iwao’s basic intentions with this 
interpretation of the rômaji version, since in the 1920s he was a serious researcher, 
as we can see from his 1929 article in Yamato. Possibly he intended his rômaji vol-
ume as nothing more than a kind of a friendly aid for the foreign reader, as this 
was his second volume of the whole translation project, which he wrote com-
pletely in rômaji as well, including his introduction, the forewords, and so on. But 
in my view it does not seem an absurd interpretation to regard the importance of 
this phonetic transcript as going much beyond such purely pragmatic explana-
tions.  
But as was pointed out above (cf. chapter II. 5. 1. 2. 2. 3.), the question of lan-
guage, probably even in the magic sense of kotodama, was of utmost importance 
for the reception of the Kojiki as one of the main sources for modern Shintô, start-
ing with Motoori Norinaga’s masterpiece Kojikiden. Kinoshita Iwao, with his 1940 
edition of the text, stood in the tradition of this project. His rendering of the text 
into a purely ponetic form, his denial of the original Kanji text corpus and usage 
of phonetic rômaji, distanced the original text dramatically from any Chinese con-
text and »pollution« - a move which perfectly matched the ideologically set up of 
the time. Therefore I am convinced that this idea stood behind the decision of 
1940 to produce a phonetic rômaji version of the Kojiki, without, however, being 
able to present final evidence. 
 
2. 5. Kokutai Shintô and the concept of man 
 
The ideological interpretation of Shintô mythology is crucially important in 
the context of political Shintô in wartime Japan. Fujisawa Chikao, at the time a 
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professor at the Imperial University of Kyôto and one of the most outspoken and 
well known supporters of the Japanese national ideology in the service of the 
government in the 1940s (cf. Dower 1986: 225-228), writes in his essay »The Spiri-
tual Foundation of Japan« in 1936: 
»In its essence, Japan is a purely collective family state that emerged quite 
naturally out of a history of two thousand years. Thus, one must take into ac-
count that in this case myths actually extend into modern-day life. [...] Japan 
is a special kind of family state, and no other country in the world can be 
compared with it.« (Fujisawa 1936: 7f.) 
Thus, the special character of the Japanese state stems from its structure, 
which is unique in its religious legitimation. 
 
2. 5. 1. On the concept of the state and man 
 
Fujisawa mentions three basic pillars of the government according to this 
view: »the emperor as the head of the Japanese family-state, the subjects as mem-
bers of the Japanese family-state, and the way (michi), which is observed by the 
emperor and his subjects in perfect harmony with one another,« (Fujisawa 1936: 
8). 
He writes that the emperor is to be seen as the »spiritual and biological center 
of the Japanese national community,« whose primary role is that of a »national 
teacher«; Meiji-tennô for him clearly wrote in the »famous Rescript on National 
Education that the emperor as the moral leader and the people as his moral fol-
lowers must strictly observe the same way,« (Fujisawa 1936: 9). The second role of 
the emperor is that of a »father of the entire nation«; the relationship between him 
and his subjects is like the relationship between parents and children. The third 
basic value regarding the emperor is his »capacity as a ruler,« (Fujisawa 1936: 10) 
which is »very significantly symbolized by the sacred sword.«406 The position of 
the ruler is legitimated by the divine mandate of the sun goddess Amaterasu to 
her grandson Ninigi no mikoto to rule the empire through his descendants, who 
make up the uninterrupted line of the imperial household. 
Although Fujisawa’s remarks are hardly original in their content, this is pre-
cisely the aspect that makes his treatise so interesting and valuable as a source for 
the present study. His writings clearly outline the spiritual and ideological quin-
tessence of the Japanese concept of the family-state at the time, as well as State 
Shintô and the kokutai ideology. It consistently states the same points over and 
                                                 
406 The sword is one of the three elements of the mythical imperial regalia. 
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over again: the divine emperor is the center of the state; his subjects are like a 
great family to one another he is connected to them as their father; in the state, 
they function as the family’s children. 
However, this terminology begins to show serious terminological problems. 
Despite the clarity with which the position of the ruler is outlined within this 
thinking, the exact status of the other members of the »national family« remains 
vague. Are the subjects – the Japanese people – human beings who belong to the 
emperor only symbolically, or must their position be understood literally, making 
them related to the emperor in the sense of a real family? 
Fujisawa does not avoid making a clear statement on this important point. 
First, he refers to the central ethical norms of loyalty (chû) and filial piety (kô) as 
the »fundamental national virtues,« before pressing on into the metaphysical core 
of the issue. While referring to the »millions of gods [...] from whom the ancestors 
of the Japanese are descended« (Fujisawa 1936: 13), the author writes: 
»According to this myth, the empire and the emperor’s people are organically 
linked by one and the same divine blood, which represents the core principle 
of our national religion. [...] In Japan the divine is organically woven into and 
fused with the human.« (Fujisawa 1936: 14, 15) 
Another author, Machida Sanehide, remarks no less clearly on this point: 
»Thus, the Japanese myth of creation is not universal, but purely national. 
The concept of the people expressed in mythology, and which still thrives to-
day as its spiritual basis, is the idealized notion of the dynasty, the country 
and its people as the chosen ones. These three elements are, on the one hand, 
united in the belief in a common descent, and on the other hand, by the char-
ismatic ruler who is directly descended from the sun goddess and who is her 
embodiment on earth.« (Machida 1930: 168) 
Fujisawa and Machida’s statements show that the position of the people 
within this ideology is characterized by what at first appears to be ambivalence. 
On the one hand, the inhabitants of the country of Japan are full citizens and 
»subjects« according to the codified system of state ethics described in the Rescript 
on Education from 1890. On the other hand, the Japanese are accorded a kind of 
metaphysical status as a chosen people, based on the nation’s collective divine 
origins. 
While the Rescript on Education postulates a quasi-familial bond between ruler 
and subject by equating the core, originally Confucian virtues of loyalty and filial 
piety, an additional spiritual founding was necessary in order to imbue this so-
cial, earthly link with metaphysical and religious substantiation and legitimacy. 
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The question of the fundamental ideological arguments that made it possible to 
make a kind of divine being out of what was originally merely a good subject in 
the Confucian sense cannot be explained on the basis of Confucian individual 
and social ethics alone. In this context, it is necessary to examine the religious 
components of the concept of familism, which were to a large extent influenced 
by Shintô. 
The reception and establishment of the Shintô worldview in the modern na-
tional ideology of Japan was rooted primarily in Kokugaku thought. This school’s 
social ideals were anchored in the distant past and were found to exist in the 
conditions of ancient Japan, which was romanticized as an age of ethical and re-
ligious as well as political rule by the emperor. This view held that Japan was a 
»land of the gods« (shinkoku) – a concept that provided the intellectual-historical 
basis for the ultimate metaphysical exaggeration of the entire nation. When, for 
example, Hirata Atsutane called Japan the »land of the gods,« he was following 
the view expressed in the ancient written works. In the case of Atsutane, this 
view led to a fanatical nationalism and to the belief that Japan was chosen for its 
superior character to all other countries. In his view the gods were »the very ori-
gin of all humanity, and when the gods gave birth to the world, at the same time 
they also gave birth to humans,« (cf. Hammitzsch 1936: 20)407. According to Atsu-
tane, the way of »upright people is in reality the way of the gods,« (cf. Ham-
mitzsch 1936: 20). On the nature of the Japanese, he also writes: »We all are with-
out a doubt the descendants of the gods.«408 
The aforementioned examples give a comprehensive picture of the intellec-
tual-historical development that ultimately led to the formation of an ideologi-
cally influenced conception of man in which the »subject« was seen as basically 
divine, despite his inferior position in the state. In this way, the people were also 
elevated to the level of descendants of actual deities and they were viewed as 
subjects of an arahitogami (»currently visible deity«): the emperor. 
Aside from the written tradition of ancient myths, stories from the Japanese 
Middle Ages also functioned as sources for this view. The Shintô-oriented histori-
cal work Jinnô shôtôki by Kitabatake Chikafusa from 1339 is particularly relevant 
in this context.409 These stories formed the basis for the reception of the concep-
                                                 
407 To use Horst Hammitzsch’s publications in this context could be seen as problematical since he 
obviously had an affinity for the ideological sphere of the time. In this study his contributions are 
strictly used for his translations of Kokugaku works. 
408 Hirata Atsutane: Kodô taii, KGS edition, 10: 1. 
409 See also the excellent intellectual-historical overview in Worm 1981: 63. For a recent study of 
this text cf. Michael Wachutka: »‚A Living Past as the Nation’s Personality’: Jinnō-shōtōki, early 
Shōwa nationalism, and Das Dritte Reich«. In: Scheid (ed.) 2013: 203-236. 
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tion of man in the recent past, and provided legitimation for religiously moti-
vated nationalism, which could also be called Shintô fundamentalism. Thus, it is 
worth investigating what these sources actually say about the origin of human-
kind, in contrast to the ruler, who clearly takes on a mediating role between man 
and kami, a term that in this context clearly is to be understood to mean »deity,« 
and not »spirit.« 
 
2. 5. 1. 1. Excursus: on the human image in Japanese mythology410 
 
In his remarkable book on mythology and culture, the Romanian cultural an-
thropologist C. I. Gulian (1971) writes that primitive mythology concentrates »on 
the beginnings, the origin of things: the world, society, man and his creations.« 
This general statement also applies broadly to the Japanese mythological an-
thologies from the 8th century; they tell of the origin of the gods, the world, cul-
ture, the ruling house and its claim to power, and much more. On only one point 
are the myths silent: the origin of man. In these myths, which tell of the gods of 
heaven and earth, human beings are apparently too self-evident to merit men-
tioning. 
Upon reading the consecutive episodes of events according to the mythical 
chronologies of the Nihonshoki and the Kojiki, it becomes apparent that the gods 
whose deeds these works describe carry human traits both in form and character. 
These gods are anthropomorphic. Thus, directly after the separation of heaven 
and earth in the Nihonshoki, they appear under the terms »deity« (kami), »divine 
human being« (kami-hito), or simply »human being« (hito), depending on the ver-
sion of the story.411 Over the further course of mythical events, these deities also 
show human traits. Aside from their clearly anthropomorphic forms, they also 
consume and digest food. They are sexually active, susceptible to disease, and to 
a certain extent, even mortal. 
And yet, alongside the world of the gods, there is also the world of human be-
ings. This middle country of the three-tiered cosmos exists between heaven and 
the underworld, and yet it is only vaguely described and is hardly concrete. Only 
when the deeds of the gods extend into the human sphere to directly affect hu-
man beings are events on earth described in more detail. The relationship be-
tween man and the gods can be divided into four overarching areas under the 
terms »death,« »disease,« »nourishment,« and »genealogy.« 
                                                 
410 For this chapter see also Antoni 1990c. 
411 Nihonshoki, version NKBT 67: 76/77 and 78/79; cf. Aston 1956: 4-6. 
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A dramatic account of the beginning of human mortality is given during the 
underworld episode regarding the god Izanagi and his sister and wife Izanami, 
who has become the goddess of death. She curses him and announces her inten-
tion to kill 1000 people a day, to which Izanagi responds by giving life to 1500 in 
the same period of time. Thus, human mortality is inevitable, but so is the pri-
macy of life over death.412 A different myth focuses not only on human mortality, 
but also on the brevity of life. Once again, the curse of a goddess plays a central 
role in this myth. Later on, it is written that the deity Susanoo determined what 
kind of wood the coffins of humans should be made of. 
Thus, mortality is ultimately the defining characteristic of human beings. 
Death as an inescapable fate remains the common human destiny, and mortality 
is a curse from the gods. But the gods are also the source of all that is necessary 
for human life. It is Amaterasu herself who determines which foods are good to 
eat, and she is the first to create the divine rice fields as prototypes for those of the 
middle country. The deceased godess Ukemochi also turns out to be beneficial for 
humans, her body is a source of cultivated fruits and many cultural goods – a 
particularly old, so-called »ancient agricultural« element of Japanese mythology. 
The methods of medicine and medicinal baths are also divine gifts for the benefit 
of human beings (cf. Antoni 1982: 29-33). 
While the areas of death, nourishment, and disease show that the modalities 
of human existence are the result of divine actions – that is to say, they are deter-
mined by the gods – they do not provide any sign that the human race itself is de-
scended from the gods. This is covered in the fourth and last of the aforemen-
tioned thematic complexes: genealogy. 
Throughout Japanese history, it becomes apparent that an unusual amount of 
value has generally been accorded to genealogical thought. And mythology in its 
traditional, already critically ordered form serves the sole purpose of document-
ing the exclusive descent of the imperial household and a few noble families, thus 
legitimating their relative status within the social hierarchy. 
The Foreword to the Kojiki413 clearly states that this work, by order of the em-
peror, serves to summarize and organize the complex mythological tradition in 
order to provide a religiously based legitimation for the superior status of the im-
perial household. 
But even the earliest story in this work reveals the degree of uncertainty with 
which this kind of lineage, which so obviously existed to serve a purpose, was ac-
                                                 
412 On the myth of Izanami and Izanagi and the conceptions of death and the hereafter contained 
in it cf. Naumann 1971. 
413 For a comment on the Foreword cf. Antoni 2012a: 483-504. 
                     CHAPTER IV: THE TAISHŌ AND EARLY SHŌWA PERIODS  n  287 
 
tually viewed. Ingyô-tennô – the 19th emperor, according to the traditional order, 
who reigned from 412 to 453 – already ordered a review of the bloodlines of the 
nobility, since he was »lamenting the transgressions in the surnames and gentile 
names of the people of all the surnames and names in the Empire.«414 In his pref-
ace to the Kojiki, Ô no Yasumaro, the work’s compiler, also mentions significant 
doubts about the accuracy of the myths and quotes from Emperor Tenmu’s de-
cree, which states: 
»I hear that the chronicles of the emperors and likewise the original words in 
the possession of the various families deviate from exact truth, and are mostly 
amplified by empty falsehoods.«415 
Empress Gemmei also complained that »the ‘ancient tradition’ contains falsi-
ties and distortions, and she wished to set the errors [...] right.« (l.c.) Clearly these 
genealogies mainly served political and hierarchical intentions, with which im-
portant families sought to define their position within the newly created central-
ized government by claiming as close a genealogical link to the imperial house-
hold as possible – naturally, in the best interests of the clan in question. The ap-
peal to divine ancestors served as a means to this genealogical positioning, since 
in this way it could be argued that they were already closely connected to the dei-
ties of the imperial household during the »Age of the Gods.« A closer examina-
tion of the sources in question reveals three categories that define the relationship 
between a deity and a human family. I will refer to these by the names mentioned 
in the original text: »ancestor,« »offering,« and »child.« 
These terms refer to the fact that some families claimed certain deities as their 
own founding ancestors, while others merely worshipped certain deities and 
made sacrifices to them. The third category, »child,« refers to families who saw 
themselves as being directly descended from a certain deity. 
Bearing in mind these aspects, upon close examination the chapters in the Ko-
jiki relating to the «Age of the Gods« contain a surprisingly small number of cases 
in which any kind of connection between humans and gods is mentioned at all. 
Almost without exception, the genealogies in these sections concern the creation 
of new deities, and not the origins of human families. Kami are descended from 
other kami, and a vast number of gods reside in the takamagahara, the »plain of 
high heaven.« Once again, humans only play a marginal role (cf. Antoni 1991a: 
71, note 23). 
                                                 
414 Kojiki, edition NKBT 1: 292/293; Chamberlain 1883 (1982): 367, 368, n. 1. 
415 Kojiki, edition NKBT 1: 46/47; Chamberlain 1883 (1982): 3f., cf. below, n. 173. 
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Regarding the previously mentioned categories of »ancestor,« »offering« and 
»child,« the written sources show that a few ancient Japanese noble families, all of 
which are specifically named, claim to have their own divine ancestor. Usually 
this merely involves mentioning a clan name that has no internal connection to 
the mythical events discussed in the text. In the »Age of the Gods« in the Kojiki, a 
total of 28 clans are mentioned in this context, while in the Nihonshoki 18 are men-
tioned. Only 11 of the clans mentioned in both texts are consistent with one an-
other. One exception is the five attendants to Ninigi no mikoto, the grandson of 
the sun goddess and founder of the imperial household, each of whom is men-
tioned by name. They are the ancestors of the illustrious Nakatomi (who later be-
came the Fujiwara) and Imbe clans, who went on to be of great importance to the 
imperial family. 
The clan of the Azumi no muraji is an instructive special case. According to 
the Kojiki, this family has three female deities as its ancestral deities, the daugh-
ters of the goddess of the sea, Watatsumi no mikoto,416 and the clan is said to be 
the offspring of these goddesses. The Nihonshoki, on the other hand, merely states 
in this context that the family of Azumi no muraji worships these goddesses and 
makes sacrifices to them (itsuki matsuru).417 There is no mention of the family be-
ing descended from the deities in question here, but rather the description of an 
entirely different religious connection: a clan worships its »ancestral deity« as a 
»protective deity« that exchanges worship and offerings for divine protection. 
A close analysis of the sources reveals further similar cases in which the hu-
man-god relationship is always a relationship of sacrifices, in which a clan 
chooses a protective deity. And it can be concluded that the actual basis for the 
belief in so-called »ancestral deities« lies in ancient Japan. 
This concept relates to the second category, the offerings. The case of the 
Azumi no muraji as well as the Munakata no kimi418 and other families shows 
that the true religious core of the supposed lineage is found in the offerings given 
to a protective deity by the clan, and not in the concept of its physical descent 
from this deity. 
This is also confirmed by the last of the three aforementioned categories, the 
child. In fact there are only a few cases in the mythology in which a human is 
called the »child« of a deity. In these cases a human woman, who does not know 
the true identity of her lover, always appears in the act of love as being possessed 
by a deity (cf. Antoni 1991a: 73, note 27). The most famous mythical story in this 
                                                 
416 Kojiki, edition NKBT 1: 70/71; Chamberlain 1883 (1982): 48, n. 19. 
417 Nihonshoki, edition NKBT 67: 95; cf. Aston 1956: 27. 
418 Nihonshoki, edition NKBT 67: 95; cf. Aston 1956: 27. 
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complex of motifs tells of a man called Ôtataneko who appears in the sources as 
the founding ancestor of two noble families who are thus able to actually claim 
divine descent (the Miwa and the Kamo). We already discussed his shrine in the 
context of the shinbutsu-bunri complex in Miwa (cf. chap. 2.2.1.). 
Let us examine the specifics of this case. The aforementioned Ôtataneko was 
the offspring of the union of a deity and a human woman, in accordance with the 
basic idea of this motif, a union that the deity Ômononushi no kami attained sur-
reptitiously by hiding his true nature and form. In human form he drew close to 
the woman; and after the true nature of his identity was revealed the sources 
cannot emphasize enough the special, exceptional nature of this relationship and 
the resulting offspring (cf. Antoni 1988: 91-98, 106-108). Nowhere is it more clear 
than here that an unheard-of event came to pass in the conception of a human 
child by a deity. And nowhere is it more clearly documented that the human and 
divine spheres are separate from one another. 
But now after this necessary and insightful look at ancient Japan let us return 
to the original topic at hand. The question to be investigated is what sources pro-
vided the basis for the propagandistic, ideological claim that the people and the 
emperor were related to one another because they both were descended from the 
Japanese deities. 
The degree of importance of religious nationalism in the tradition of the Ko-
kugaku can be seen in the views of a contemporary German scholar of Japan, 
Horst Hammitzsch, who gave his remarks on the topic in 1936 with these ideo-
logically affirmative and contaminated words: 
»According to the Kojiki and the Nihongi, the ancient sources, the emperor 
and the people and the empire are an organism supplied with the very same 
blood and thus to worship one’s ancestors is to pay tribute to the gods, since 
gods and people are organically connected. [...] The Japanese state is one 
‘family.’« (Hammitzsch 1936: 25) 
Our investigation, on the other hand, comes to exactly the opposite conclu-
sion on this point. The certainty with which the emperor is held to be of divine 
descent according to the mythological tradition does not apply to the people. The 
tracing back of a few noble families to certain gods not only appears extremely 
contrived toward the end of reaching transparent political motives, but also 
shows itself upon closer examination to be less rooted in genealogy than in relig-
ion. 
Humans and gods are existentially separate from one another, and the events 
of the »Age of the Gods« do not tell of the two spheres being connected, but 
rather of their lasting and irrevocable separation. It is only the person of the em-
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peror that takes on a special role here, regardless of whether he is subject to mor-
tality. From a historical view this fact means that the imperial household was al-
ready able to anchor its mandate to power in the numinous sphere in ancient 
times, i.e. in Tenmu-tennô’s times.419 
The Japanese people, on the other hand, only played the role of »subjects.« An 
interpretation according to which they are also divine, such as was postulated by 
Kokugaku thinkers and ideologues in the tradition of Hirata Atsutane, remained 
an illusion and the ideal of the national theoreticians of the modern age. 
 
2. 6. Ideology and propaganda 
 
But not only the old myths played a key role in the context of nativist ideol-
ogy. The entire area of »authentic« folk stories was of prominent importance. By 
1945 schools represented the primary pillar of the nationalist education of the 
people. 
Especially primary school education played an important role in this context. 
Using centrally unified teaching plans and curriculum, regional and linguistic 
differences in dialect were to be leveled. National pride and a pan-Japanese feel-
ing of community were taught to the children using practice exercises in the 
»textbooks for elementary schools« (Shôgaku tokuhon).420 Thus it is worth examin-
ing these textbooks more closely, though our main focus will be the textbooks of 
the early Shôwa period, which, however, only show slight differences to those of 
previous periods (i.e. the Meiji and Taishô eras). 
The ten short volumes of the Shôgaku tokuhon from the years 1932 to 1937 
(Shôwa 7 to 12) covered a wide spectrum of subjects. They included various areas 
according to their appropriateness for children of this age-group. But the texts 
did not only have the duty of teaching children the basic cultural technique of 
reading, but also served, as is well known, to educate them ideologically accord-
ing to the Rescript on Education and its various commentaries. Thus, it is not sur-
prising that already the first text in the first book (Book 1, 1932) begins with a pic-
ture of the cherry blossom, the national symbol of Japan, followed by marching 
toy soldiers and the following text: Susume susume heitai susume (»Go forward, go 
forward, army, go forward!«) 
                                                 
419 For a discussion concerning Tenmu-tennô’s politics and the question of the so-called Tenmu 
Dynasty cf. Ooms 2009: passim. 
420 Cf. Mombushô 1932-38. 
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More »civilian« texts about nature, good behavior and technology (e.g. tele-
phones) follow. There are, however, always texts with clear political, national in-
tentions scattered among them, about the navy and the air force, for example. The 
result is the image of a patriotic, nature-loving, cultivated and always well de-
fended country – exactly the image of Japan and its national polity that is given in 
the official commentaries on the Rescript on Education. Thus, from the beginning, 
school education is made to serve the national ideology. 
Upon examining the other texts, it becomes apparent that in Books 1, 2 and 3 
a certain group of texts is especially well represented: folktales. Book 1 contains 
the folktales Shitakiri suzume, Usagi to kame and Momotarô; Book 2 contains four 
folktales: Saru to kani, Nezumi no yomeiri, Kobutori and hanasaka jiji; Book 3 contains 
the texts Issunbôshi, Kachikachi-yama, Nezumi no chie, Kin no ono and Urashima Tarô. 
Even those who are only vaguely familiar with Japanese folktales will recognize 
most of these stories. They form the cannon of Japanese »national folktales,« sto-
ries that every Japanese, at least at the time, was familiar with. Their great popu-
larity is due solely to the fact that they were included in elementary school read-
ers. In this way they attained the status of widespread, pan-Japanese folktales, re-
gardless of the question of whether these tales were limited to specific regions or 
only known in different variations. The schools served to standardize them and 
thus fulfilled their duty of fostering a common national consciousness. 
Book 3 is especially interesting in this context. Like the preceding books, it 
contains five folktales. Besides these, however, there is also a story entitled Ku-
nibiki that at first appears to be a folktale, but soon reveals itself to the attentive 
reader as a simplified form of the ancient Japanese mythical tale of »land pulling« 
(kunibiki).421 An examination of the next volume, Book 4, shows that this tendency 
continues here, and that the folktales are increasingly replaced by mythical topics. 
In this book there are not even any folktales anymore, but rather exclusively sto-
ries from the border areas of mythology, legends and stories adapted to simpli-
fied language for children such as Kaguyahime, Shirousagi, Yuriwaka and Hagoromo. 
Clearly these stories have replaced the folktales of the first three books. An ex-
amination of the following books confirms this trend. In Book 5 there are no 
                                                 
421 The mythical episode of the »land pulling« (kunibiki) is to be found in the Izumo-fudoki, where it 
is reported already at the beginning that the land masses of Shimane peninsula, the central area of 
the old Izumo province, had been drawn over from the continent in four parts by a deity in an 
enormous feat of strength and fastened to the country of Izumo. The first of these land pieces had 
been drawn over from the Korean kingdom of Shilla.  cf. Izumo-fudoki  (NKBT2: 99 -103); for an 
English translation (which is partly problematical because of being inaccurate) cf. Aoki, Michiko 
Yamaguchi: Izumo Fudoki. (MN-Monograph), Tôkyô: Monumenta Nipponica, 1971: 82 – 83. For the 
»land pulling« myth see also Antoni 2005: 4-6 and Carlqvist 2010. 
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longer any folktales and legends, but only the most important elements of tradi-
tional Shintô mythology. 
The stories contained in this volume outline important elements of Japanese 
mythology. But Books 6 and 7 form the peak of the entire series with stories about 
the »first emperor of Japan« (Jinmu-tennô) and finally the conquests and deeds of 
the first great Japanese hero, Yamato-takeru, the »valiant man of Yamato« with 
which the specifically »Japanese spirit« (yamato-damashii) began according to the 
mythology. 
It is clear that the folktales, legends and myths in these readers had a specific, 
clearly recognizable duty: they were intended to familiarize children with what 
the political leadership of the country saw as the core of the national tradition, 
equating the folktales with stories of gods, heroes and emperors of the oldest 
Japanese tradition. 
The close connection between various motifs and the contents of this tradition 
and modern Japanese nationalism will be shown using an example that clearly 
shows the function of folktales in this context: the tale of the »peach boy,« Momo-
tarô. 
 
2. 6. 1. The role of popular tradition 
 
Like in Nazi Germany (as previously discussed), the popular tradition also 
played an important ideological role in the general spread of the political world-
view at the time. This applies to the area of myths and legends to a much higher 
degree than for the more »apolitical« folktale. But the popular tradition of folk-
tales was also interpreted and used according to the nationalist view. Thus the 
Japanese folklorist Mizuyo Ashiya remarks in his dissertation on the topic pub-
lished in 1939 in Germany – and thus possibly even directly influenced by Na-
tional Socialism, Japanische und deutsche Tiermärchen, besonders Fuchsmärchen, in 
ihrem Wesen und nach ihrer volkstumskundlichen Grundlage (»The essence of Japa-
nese and German animal folktales, especially tales about foxes, according to their 
basis in folklore,« Cologne 1939), on the well-known Japanese animal folk tale of 
the »race between the fox and the tiger«: 
»The foxes appear here not as self-obsessed, deceitful animals, but rather as 
intelligent and capable animals that fought out the forced competition with 
the foreign opponent with a true sense of a common spirit. This well known 
animal folktale fits well with the patriotic feeling of the Japanese people. The 
tiger comes from Korea, and often from China and is closely connected to the 
idea of the enemy from the continent.« 
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The folktale appears here as an allegory for the political rivalry of the time. 
Japan and its continental enemies are identified with well-known figures from the 
tradition of folktales in a way that is easily understandable for the reader and 
thus subjected to the black-and-white ethics of the folktale of good versus evil. 
This function of folktales can be seen especially clearly in the case of the most 
famous Japanese folktale, »Momotarô.« No other subject from the tradition of 
folktales offered itself so conveniently to nationalist interpretation and war 
propaganda as the story of the little »Peach boy« who succeeds in conquering the 
powerful enemies from the land of the demons. 
In his book entitled War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, the 
American historian and scholar of Japanese Studies John Dower (1986) points to a 
remarkable circumstance in this context. 
Dower describes the function of racist propaganda on the American as well as 
the Japanese side over the course of the Pacific War. In the work the author also 
turns to what at first appears to be an unusual topic. Building on the folktale of 
Momotarô, Dower covers a specific aspect of Japanese war propaganda that he 
calls the »Momotarô paradigm.« 
Dower states that in all the Japanese magazine articles, caricatures and films 
during the war none other than the little Momotarô appears in the role of the pa-
triotic hero. The substance of these stories is always the same: Momotarô appears 
as the embodiment of Japanese heroic bravery who is able to conquer the enemy, 
analogous to the »demonic« enemy of the folktale – who appears to be of superior 
strength. 
In films and caricatures of this kind Momotarô always appears as a youthful 
and energetic embodiment of the »new« Japan, in sharp contrast to the Ameri-
cans and English, who are shown as »demons with a human face.« The propa-
gandistic identification of Momotartô with the young pilots of the »Special Attack 
Forces, tying on their headbands and preparing to depart on their first and last 
great missions« (Dower 1986: 256) was a popular motif in this context. 
The people of Southeast Asia, who according to Japanese doctrine of the 
»Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere« (Daitôakyôeiken, cf. Fujiwara 1989: 113-
152) were to be freed from Euro-American, »white« imperialism, appear in this 
conception either as Momotarô’s auxiliaries (in the role of the accompanying dog, 
monkey and pheasant of the folktale) or as childish and naïve natives oppressed 
by the »demons« that are freed from oppression by Momotarô and his helpers. 
In this way the events of the war could be presented in widely recognized 
and thus easily comprehensible categories. Momotarô is the »pure Japanese 
hero,« while the enemies are »foreign demons.« In the work Dower shows that 
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the Momotarô paradigm is based on an antagonism that can be described using 
the polar opposites of »the Pure Self« and »the Demonic Other.« (Dower 1986: 
205) 
These are the well-known supporting pillars of modern Japanese kokutai 
thought. A representation that gives the enemy a polar-opposite position within 
this concept and marks him as part of the »demonic other« must have shown it-
self to be a unusually useful as an instrument of propaganda, since the »purity« 
of the Japanese »self« could shine even brighter the more bleak the »demonic 
other« appeared to be. 
 
2. 6. 2. Momotarô and the »spirit of Japan«422 
 
As discussed above, the maxims of this religiously based nationalism were 
spread among the people at the latest since 1890, with the proclamation of the 
Imperial Rescript on Education, in schools (and the military). Elementary school 
textbooks played a crucial role here. They took on the function of propagating the 
basic principles (hongi) of Japanese ethics among children using vivid didactic 
texts. 
An analysis of the historical motifs shows that the collection of folktales, leg-
ends and myths in the form of reading passages for textbooks was in fact a subtly 
woven whole: the folktales with Momotarô took on a prominent place, followed 
by the most important examples from the legendary and mythological traditions, 
and finally the deeds of the great ancient hero Yamato-takeru. The two figures of 
Momotarô and Yamato-takeru complete the cycle. The figure of Momotarô in the 
school textbooks reveals himself as merely the childish, naïve form of the original 
Japanese hero and conquerer Yamato-takeru. The schoolchildren, who at the be-
ginning of their schooling were familiarized with Momotarô and thus made to 
identify with the child-hero, finally arrive at the end of this cycle, which was so 
important for the propagation of the Japanese national morality, with the mythi-
cal figure of Yamato-takeru. According to the mythological tradition he was the 
first to fully formulate the love of one’s country and the special »spirit of Japan« 
(yamato-damashii). And he was also the first to advance against the »foreign« at 
the edge of the known world, conquer its regions for Yamato and thus became 
the epitome of the brave, patriotic Japanese warrior who also belonged to the im-
perial family, as even his name, Yamato-takeru (»the brave one from Yamato«) 
shows. 
                                                 
422 For this section see also Antoni 1991b. 
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Yamato-takeru as a mythical figure is followed by the legendary heroes of the 
Japanese Middle Ages, Minamoto no Yoshitsune and Minamoto no Tametomo, 
while Momotarô is the young, stoic hero of folktales. The idea of the »foreigners« 
as the devil, uncultivated and inhuman, is an integral part of this complex. Thus, 
it is not surprising that Yamato-takeru and Momotarô were so readily adopted as 
subjects especially in imperialistic Japan during the modern age (1890-1945). 
The level of detail with which the historical pattern was adopted in wartime 
propaganda can be seen in the examples mentioned by Dower. The demons from 
abroad whom Momotarô encounters correspond exactly to the »demon islands« 
of Japanese legend. In the propaganda Momotarô meets demons that are charac-
terized by their outward appearance (a horn on their heads) and an incompre-
hensible language (English), typical characteristics of the »classical« island de-
mons. A further typical element of the »demon world« is the cultural underde-
velopment of the inhabitants of the »demon island.« In movies, the people of 
Southeast Asia are portrayed as culturally underdeveloped »demons.« However, 
the audience is invited to sympathize with them, since Momotarô, functioning as 
the classical culture hero, frees the uncivilized people and lifts them into true 
humanity, just as the legendary hero does with the inhabitants of the »island of 
the demons.« The demons in these movies are actually sympathetic figures, bur-
dened by the European, white imperialists who play the role of the classical de-
mon king Kanehira in the legend of Yoshitsune. Momotarô’s freeing of the people 
of Southeast Asia from the yoke of colonialism is analogous to the »deliverance« 
of Okinawa, Hokkaidô and other border areas from the condition of demonic 
non-culture by the archetypical Japanese »border heroes« of ancient times and the 
Japanese Middle Ages (cf. Antoni 1983-86). 
A comparison with further analogous cases shows that the functionalization 
of famous heroic figures and motifs from the Japanese mythological tradition 
within modern nationalism was not arbitrary or random, but rather served clear 
ideological intentions: the historical heroes and their deeds provided the pattern 
for the benefits demanded by the people at the time. 
The »pure« legendary hero Momotarô took on the important role of being the 
first in this series of didactic examples. Momotarô subtly provided the youngest 
Japanese schoolchildren with the essence of what the Japanese government saw 
as the goal of ideological education according to kokutai doctrine. The folktale of 
the »peach boy« opened the door to the »Japanese spirit.« 
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3. CRITICAL VOICES FROM ABROAD 
 
The development of State Shintô with its kokutai dogma thus continued pro-
gressing toward a »fundamentalist«423, emperor-centered state ideology in the 
Taishô and early Shôwa periods. Not much criticism from this period is known, 
since Japanese intellectuals generally at least came to terms with the spirit of the 
times - with the exception of an excample like Tsuda Sôkichi -, if they did not ac-
tively contribute to it. An example of this is Inoue Tetsujirô who, as we have seen, 
underwent a consistent development in the 1930s and ‘40s to become a fanatical 
Shintô nationalist. 
In the Meiji period, however, a large group of mostly socialist critics of the ko-
kutai ideology existed who were unable to come to terms with the Shintôization 
of daily life built around the emperor. Several such cases are documented in the 
extensive survey by Herbert Worm (1981), of which the case of the medical doctor 
and Christian socialist Ôishi Seinosuke (1867-1911) is the most remarkable. The 
scion of a family of academics, and educated abroad, Ôishi sharply criticized the 
kokutai doctrine and exposed its intellectual-historical fabrications. In a para-
phrase of the contents of Ôishi’s most important discussion, Worm (1981: 80f.) 
gives an overview of his argumentation. He complains among other things that in 
Japan »obstinate pedagogues and a narrow-minded government treat the image 
of the emperor as an idol.« He continues: »Only a people without self-confidence 
sends its academics to America in order to hold propagandistic lectures about the 
uniqueness of the Japanese kokutai and our morality.« As Worm (1981: 81) cor-
rectly remarks, the text »fundamentally contradicts the kokutai interpretation of 
[...] Hozumi Yatsuka.« 
With the intensifying political climate in Japan and the increasing spiritual 
and religious ideologization, critical voices increasingly fell silent, while to a cer-
tain extent warnings were voiced by foreign observers in Japan. Some of them 
had been well versed in events in the country for decades, but they were not sub-
jected to the same pressure to conform as their Japanese colleagues. Two authors 
are especially relevant in this context: Karl Florenz and Basil Hall Chamberlain. 
 
                                                 
423 On the term »fundamentalism« cf. the writings of Reinhold Bernhardt (1996), who remarks in 
summary: »Thus, Fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon: ‘modern antimodernism’ (G. Küen-
zlen) struggling against the worldview of the Enlightenment. Fundamentalism is a modern an-
swer to the existential fears brought about by the modern age. The answer lies in a ‘backwards-
looking utopia.’ [...] Fundamentalism has become more prevalent since modernism has become 
embattled,« (Bernhardt 1996: 29f.). 
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3. 1. Karl Florenz and Basil H. Chamberlain 
 
Only a few artists and scholars within and outside Japan voiced opposition to 
these subtle ideological constructions, like Karl Florenz did to a certain extent, 
who studied the historically authentic development of Shintô in detail already in 
the late 19th century. 
In his research on Shintô Karl Florenz applied strict academic and compara-
tive methods. In 1892, during his position as a lecturer in Japan, at a time when 
the cult of Jinmu-tennô and the mythological view of early history reached an 
early peak, he declared, on the basis of his historical and philological work, that 
the written histories (Kojiki and Nihonshoki) could only be »reasonably trusted« 
from the beginning of the 6th century on (Florenz 1892: IV). Thus, Florenz also 
sees it as self-evident that Jinmu-tennô is merely a »legendary« emperor. In most 
cases, however, he uses only the historical proper names of these mythical, leg-
endary figures –  in this context: Iware-biko. 
Finally, Florenz renders his unmistakable judgement – unfortunately not lack-
ing in a certain feeling of self-assurance: 
»The few insights on the true nature of ancient Japan that European research 
has been able to provide, however, reveal that the historical representation in 
the Kojiki and the Nihongi (on which all later claims by the Japanese are based) 
are steeped to their core in false principles.« (Florenz 1892: III) 
Florenz is entirely indebted to the European academic tradition of the late 19th 
century, not the ideological historicism of the time, and in this context he speaks 
of »evolution« and »critical research« (l.c.). Imperial mysticism and family-state 
ideology, on the other hand, are not present in his commentaries.424 Florenz’s 
great importance for the formation of critical Japanese research (Tsuda Sôkichi 
and others) was first outlined in detail in Masako Satô’s study from 1995. This 
area offers important points of departure for further research on the genesis of 
critical, academic Shintô research during the era of state dogma. 
But more important in this context are the writings of a further foreign scholar 
in Japan who dealt with this topic in a surprisingly pointed, even provocative and 
polemical way: none other than Basil Hall Chamberlain (1850-1935), one of the fa-
thers of historical and philological Japanese Studies. 
As an unsurpassed linguist and translator of historical sources, especially the 
Kojiki, which is so relevant to the present discussion, Chamberlain was one of the 
                                                 
424 A lively academic debate within German Japanese Studies developed around Karl Florenz in 
the 1980s; cf. Worm 1988; Naumann 1985a. 
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most knowledgeable people about the authentic cultural and textual tradition of 
Japan. But in the broader public he was better known as the author of the collec-
tion of miscellanea Things Japanese, a competent and often lighthearted and in-
formal guide to all »things Japanese«. On the other hand, it is hardly known that 
Chamberlain added an addendum to one edition of this work (5th edition, 1927) 
that does not fit the image of the lighthearted, enlightened scholar, but rather is 
perplexing to this day for its theoretical and verbal radicalness. In this essay, 
which was first published already in 1912 – tellingly in a publication with the 
name »Rationalist Press« – Chamberlain renders his judgment on contemporary 
intellectual developments in Japan in sharp, entirely undiplomatic words. The 
tone is set already in the title: »The Invention of a New Religion« (Chamberlain 
1927), anticipating the term »invention« that would later become so important in 
the work of Hobsbawm.425 
At the very beginning of the essay, Chamberlain (1927: 559ff.) remarks causti-
cally that contemporary Japan is a good example of how religion can be made to 
serve worldly purposes. He writes that although this also requires certain ele-
ments to be already in place, such as the worship of the emperor, the government 
bureaucracy seeks to combine existing ideas into new theories that benefit itself 
(and, in a broader sense, also the Japanese people; Chamberlain 1927: 561). 
Chamberlain writes on the religious situation of the time: »Shintô, a primitive na-
ture cult, which had fallen into discredit, was taken out of its cupboard and 
dusted,« in order to replace Buddhism, the true religion of the common Japanese 
people. Only the Japanese government, he continues, insists on doctrinaire claims 
of Shintô, such as the direct descent of the emperor, who is worshipped as a liv-
ing deity, from the sun goddess. Only in this context were Shintô priests given 
the right to carry out burials – and later, even marriage ceremonies – which were 
actually foreign to Shintô. 
And thus, he continues, Shintô pushes into more and more areas of daily life, 
and Japan’s political and military progress is traced back to the miraculous influ-
ence of the virtues of the emperor and his divine ancestors. In all important 
Shintô shrines, Chamberlain complains, canons seized from the Chinese and Rus-
sians have been put on display with the intent of identifying Shintô with national 
glory in the public perception. In schools, as well as the army and the navy, eve-
rything was aligned with imperialism (Chamberlain 1927: 562). 
Criticism of mythology was not allowed if it contradicted the so-called »his-
torical facts« such as the supposed founding of the monarchy in 660 B.C. Japanese 
scholars of the time were conscious of the fact that the first concrete evidence of 
                                                 
425 For a recent discussion of Chamberlain’s essay cf. Maxey 2014: 1. 
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Japanese history can be found in the 5th century A.D., but strict belief in every 
element of the national historical legends was required, and woe be to him who 
strays from this path. 
Since then everything has been based on these »absurd dates« (Chamberlain 
1927: 563), regardless of the fact that mythology and early history appear in the 
same sources and furthermore the earliest Japanese stories and customs were so 
thoroughly influenced by their Chinese models that it was no longer possible to 
tell to what extent »indigenous« thought was even contained in these fragments. 
And even the ethical ideals, especially those of loyalty and filial piety, which refer 
to the imperial offspring, originally came from China. 
»The new Japanese religion of loyalty and patriotism has emerged into the 
light of day,« and yet this simple ideal makes the Japanese capable of great deeds. 
The new Japanese religion consists of worshipping the emperor and his divine 
ancestors and the belief in the superiority of the nation above all other nations, 
since the emperor, in his divinity, is superior to other kings and emperors. Al-
ready the early history books report that Japan was created before all other coun-
tries. It would thus be seen as an act of gracious condescension if Japan were to 
associate with other nations and adopt their unimportant mechanical inventions. 
In fact, however, Chamberlain (1927: 565) continues, the common people, 
farmers, do not much identify with this new thinking and have held on to the 
Buddhist religion of their ancestors.426 Up to that time, the new religion still 
lacked a holy text; however, this gap was filled by the Imperial Rescripts, whose 
written style was incomprehensible to the people. Then Chamberlain turns to a 
point which is relevant in the present context. He remarks that one could easily 
assume that Japan must have had great difficulty in convincing foreign countries 
of the truth of these dogmas, but that in fact the opposite was true. Western na-
tions actually showed great interest in all areas of Japan’s legendary past and its 
great virtues, with which the Japanese government was happy to make them fa-
miliar. 
Thus, Japan took advantage of the credulity of the foreigners (Chamberlain 
1927: 568), who had to rely on these claims and were unable to examine the origi-
nal sources. Mastery of the language also represented a nearly insurmountable 
hurdle for foreigners. The result was that Japan knew everything about Europe, 
but that Europe only knew about Japan what served Japanese interests. For this 
reason, the neo-Japanese myths were able to make their way into English text-
books, newspapers and reference works. 
                                                 
426 Chamberlain 1927: 567; cf. in this context also Antoni 2008. 
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Europeans in Japan were angered by the bureaucrats’ actions with regard to 
the new religion, but it did not allow criticism and academic scrutiny. This also 
explains the rigorous campaign against Japanese liberals, who were declared trai-
tors. Chamberlain’s militant essay concludes by stating that it was of enormous 
importance to the government that their contrived religion reach widespread ac-
ceptance, even if they themselves knew that it did not correspond to reality. 
Thus Basil Hall Chamberlain concludes his essay. Decades before 
Hobsbawm’s pioneering research on »invented traditions,« Chamberlain presents 
us with a polemical work on modern Shintô as an »invented religion.« These are 
not the remarks of a critic safely distanced by historical perspective and geo-
graphical remove, but rather those of a factually competent contemporary wit-
ness whose views are based on direct observation and judgement, and who is fa-
miliar with the true history and is pained at the manipulation thereof. There was 
scarcely another scholar at the time as intimately knowledgeable about Japanese 
(religious) history and philology as Chamberlain. He was familiar with the his-
torical sources and it is this deeply rooted knowledge that lends his criticism such 
weight. Chamberlain does not make himself an accomplice to the spirit of the era, 
but takes his position in the current debate of his time based on his exact knowl-
edge of the historical sources. This is an especially clear warning from an enlight-
ened cultural scientist as someone who deciphers the ideological network of ar-
guments. As an active witness to history, Chamberlain thus makes clear how im-
portant knowledge of the historical sources is in order to understand the histori-
cal reality and constructions of ideology. 
But criticism of the increasingly religious and ideological indoctrination of Ja-
pan did not only form in circles of historians. The foreign Christians, who, it 
could be said, were by nature opposed to the Shintô dogma of the time, also had 
clear words to this effect. While making sure to take their own religious inten-
tions into account, material from this time can offer a vivid impression of the con-
temporary situation in Japan. Especially the regular reports of the Protestant 
»East Asian Mission« are worth examining in this context. 
 
3. 2. The East Asian Mission  
 
The »East Asian Mission« began in 1884, when the »General Protestant Mis-
sionary Association« (»Allgemeiner Evangelisch-Protestantischer Missionsver-
ein«) was founded in Weimar, Germany, led by the Swiss minister Ernst Buss (cf. 
Eger 1984: 57). As opposed to the existing missions in East Asia, this missionary 
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association was conceived as explicitly »non-partisan and supranational« from 
the beginning (Eger 1984: 58). According to Eger, the Mission’s work was divided 
into three phases, the first of which took place in the relatively short span be-
tween 1884 and 1900. Literary, spiritual and educational work was the focus of 
this phase, while the second phase (1900 to 1930) was »devoted to practical social 
work,« (Eger 1984: 59). In the third phase, which has lasted to this day, the focus 
lies in cooperation with local churches in China and Japan. Details about the his-
tory of the East Asian Mission in Japan can be found in Heyo E. Hamer’s writings 
(1984), which begin with the arrival of Wilfried Spinner on September 8, 1885 in 
Yokohama. 
The Mission attained lasting influence, which is also of relevance to the pre-
sent context, through the work of Emil Schiller (1865-1945), who was continu-
ously active in Japan from 1895 to 1931. Schiller’s reports, especially his annual 
reports from the 1920s, are a source of authentic, interculturally sensible and so-
phisticated insights into the reality of Japan at the time. This is a result of »the 
particular approach of the East Asian Mission dictated by its charter stating that it 
is the goal of the missionaries ‘not only to learn the spoken and written language 
of the people of the host country, but also to research their thought, especially re-
ligious thought, and form a deeper understanding of non-Christian religions,’« 
(Hamer 1984: 89). Thus, Schiller’s reports offer a chronicle of the directly experi-
enced encounter with the religious, intellectual and ideological events of the time. 
As an intelligent observer he perceives especially the development of State Shintô 
and the concept of the kokutai with open eyes and strives to objectively capture 
the circumstances of the time from a distanced standpoint. 
The fact that even the work of the East Asian Mission was not unaffected by 
the spirit of the time can be seen in the reports of a later successor to Emil Schiller, 
Gerhard Rosenkranz, whose report »Die religiöse Lage Japans in der Gegenwart«, 
dating from 1939 (»The religious situation of Japan today«; Ostasien-Jahrbuch 1939: 
1-19), for example, lacks any distance to the official ideologies of Japan and Ger-
many at the time. While Schiller’s immediate successor Pastor E. Hessel was »re-
moved from his position due to pressure from the state« (Hamer 1984: 95) as a 
leader in the Confessing Church in 1936 due to his critical opinions, Gerhard 
Rosenkranz, in accordance with the beliefs of the so called German Christians,427 
appears to have strived especially to reach a harmonization of the ideologies of 
Japanese Tennôism and German Nazism. Nothing more clearly documents the 
                                                 
427 Note 84 in Hamer 1984: 104: »DC (Deutsche Christen [translator’s note: German Christians]) 
was the name of a group of members of the German Evangelical Church [Deutsche Evangelische 
Kirche] whose goal was the transformation of the church according to Nazi Party thought.« 
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intellectual change of that time as a comparison of the reports of the two protes-
tant missionaries Schiller and Rosenkranz from Japan. Remarkably enough, 
Gerhard Rosenkranz apparently continued to influence the Mission’s basic prin-
ciples after the war in the 1950s (cf. Rust 1984: 113) and turned to be a respected 
scholar in Heidelberg and Tuebingen, even becoming rector of Tuebingen Uni-
versity in 1957. 
 
3. 2. 1. The reports of the East Asian Mission on the development of Shintô 
 
Thus, the reports published in the annual Ostasien-Jahrbuch of the East Asian 
Mission are a direct reflection of the circumstances of the time. Emil Schiller is a 
reliable witness who directs his gaze at the problematic aspects of the reality of 
Japan – decrying, for example, the poor treatment of the Koreans in the country, 
especially after the Great Kantô Earthquake of 1923, or reporting on the effects of 
the American Immigration Act of 1924 – while Gerhard Rosenkranz’s writings 
prototypically reflect all the clichés, images and dogmas of the official ideology of 
the day. Especially his reports on Shintô, as well as a resulting monograph from 
1944, are influenced by this spirit. In one crucial point, however, even Rosenkranz 
does not follow the official Japanese dogma: like Schiller, he also sees State (or 
Kokutai) Shintô as clearly being a religion: 
»And yet Shrine Shintô is a religion [...] because it is Kokutai Shintô.« 
(Rosenkranz 1944: 100) 
Thus, the reports of the members of the East Asian Mission, which for a short 
time also included Wilhelm Gundert, represent a rich source for our understand-
ing of the reality of the time, with Emil Schiller as the expert observer and 
Gerhard Rosenkranz as the involved ideologue. 
Let us begin our overview with a report by Schiller on »Japan in the years 
1921-22« (Schiller 1923). In the chapter »From the religious, non-Christian world 
of Japan« the author conveys the extent to which daily life was influenced by the 
maxims of (State) Shintô: 
»In the passed year, all sorts of movements in the area of Shintô religion have 
gained importance, which, due to its historical connection to the state and the 
imperial household, has continued to maintain its hold on popular opinion to 
such an extent that participation in this religion may be said to be one of the 
self-evident duties of the Japanese, even if this is limited to occasional pil-
grimages to the main holy place of the sun goddess in Ise, the ancestral deity 
of the imperial family, or the mausoleum of Emperor Meiji in Momoyama, 
outside Kyôto, or his temple in Tôkyô. This is an essential requirement for 
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bureaucrats, and Christian government workers justify it to themselves as 
participation in a kind of state worship and not a religious act.« (Schiller 1923: 
49) 
In fact, the author continues, the Japanese idea of kami does not correspond to 
the Christian idea of God, and for this reason it would be more appropriate to 
choose another Japanese word for the Christian term »God.« Schiller examines 
the origins of the state religion in detail as they appear to him (l.c.): 
»And also Professor Genchi Kato, the European-educated lecturer on com-
parative religious history at the University of Tôkyô not only declared in his 
book Waga kokutai to shintô (»our system of government and the religion of 
Shintô«) in 1919 that the two are inseparable, but also that the emperor is of 
divine nature, and that to worship him is thus a religious matter, and that it 
has always been the Japanese way to assimilate new religions arriving in Ja-
pan into this relationship and to include them in the practice of emperor-
worship. He goes so far as to argue that in 1912, shortly before Emperor 
Meiji’s death, when thousands of loyal subjects prayed on their knees for the 
emperor’s recovery outside the palace grounds in Tôkyô, they did not pray to 
another god for the emperor’s recovery, but rather to the emperor himself 
that he may return to health for the benefit of his people! This is the same as 
saying »Doctor, help yourself!« in other words. The Japanese people believe 
that the emperor is a god in human form, and the worship of him is the cen-
tral point of the Shintô religion, which can only be described as a religion 
(that is to say, not merely a state religion).« 
The author covers the role of Buddhism critically and is skeptical of its toler-
ance. Schiller points to the close relationship that Buddhism and the ruling con-
cept of the state entered into and refers in this context to 
 »… the journal of the nationalistically oriented Nichiren sect ‘Kokuju Shim-
bun’ in which the editor wrote that the historical Buddha is none other than 
an incarnation of the Japanese sun goddess Amaterasu, meaning that Bud-
dhism actually originated in Japan and not in India. He even has the audacity 
to claim that Christ himself handed down none other than the Japanese Con-
stitution in his sermons. The extent to which this kind of national chauvinism 
can go can be seen in the cover page of this journal, on which a motto is 
printed in Japanese that means in translation ‘May all the nations of the 
world abandon all other relationships and study Japan, for the light of the 
world emanates from here!’« (Schiller 1923: 50) 
After a detailed discussion of new religious developments of the time, espe-
cially the Ômoto(-kyô) with its kishin ritual, Schiller comes to his conclusion with 
regard to Christianity in Japan. He states that Christianity »cannot placate [the 
masses] [...] because as a world religion it is not able to make a compromise with 
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Japanese nationalism and emperor-worship,« (Schiller 1923: 51). This is where 
Schiller sees the insurmountable difference separating Christianity from Bud-
dhism, which is apparently more flexible in the question of emperor worship. 
The report (Schiller 1925) from the years 1923-24 is influenced by the effects of 
the Great Kantô Earthquake. Schiller describes the way in which he clearly ana-
lyzes the resulting social and spiritual changes in an equal amount of detail. In 
the chapter »Japan’s domestic situation before and after the earthquake« (Schiller 
1925: 57-61), the author covers the advance of socialist ideas in contemporary so-
ciety. He remarks that the »anthems of the red flag and May Day [...] could be 
heard everywhere,« (Schiller 1925: 57) and describes the government’s position 
on this. His clear analysis is worth quoting from in detail: 
»The main goal was the old means of organizing the people toward more pa-
triotic ends. Not only the schools, but also the government-sponsored youth 
groups in cities and the countryside, as well as the army and reserve units, 
contributed to this goal. Special organizations like the Fascisti, or Kokusuikei 
(national scouting organizations) were also convened. Pilgrimages to the an-
cestral temples of the imperial family were encouraged – especially to Ise, as 
well as to the Meiji Temple in Tôkyô and to the grave of Emperor Meiji in 
Momoyama, near Kyôto – by offering discounted tickets and various special 
subsidies. The graves of emperors scattered throughout the country, high 
burial mounds with old trees, in front of which stand Shintô gates (torii) and 
stone lanterns, are carefully maintained, fenced off from the outside world, 
and outfitted with watchtowers in order to ensure that the visitors conduct 
themselves respectfully. Woe be to him who neglects to remove his knapsack! 
New graves are also discovered by researchers and then managed by the 
government. The military spirit that was always cultivated in elementary and 
middle schools through military exercises conducted by reserve officers will 
now be fostered at universities. This, however, led to serious conflicts at the 
private Waseda University, whose political attitude is especially mistrusted 
(it was founded by Marquis Okuma), when military science was to be intro-
duced there in special courses. The entire nation is monitored for its political 
attitudes and its loyalty to the emperor by the aforementioned organizations. 
Socialist meetings are usually disrupted or disbanded, and in Ôsaka some 
overly ambitious patriots even went from house to house in order to call the 
heads of families to a monthly visit to the imperial ancestral temple, a Shintô 
temple.«428 
                                                 
428 Schiller 1925: 58. See also the following report from page 67: »In Kyôto the meeting of the local 
governor with Shintô and Buddhist leaders along with the directors of the national schools led to 
an agreement to urge the people to visit Shintô temples and imperial graves, which then led some 
overzealous people in Ôsaka to go around with lists of signatures of the fathers of families pledg-
ing to visit a temple once a month. Since the worship of the imperial ancestors, who have been de-
clared deities, represents an act of loyalty to the emperor, I should like to see a Japanese who 
would dare not to sign such a list.« 
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In the chapter »Japan’s religions« (Schiller 1925: 65-71) in the same report 
Schiller examines the religious situation in this state of change in more detail and 
also takes the opportunity to examine the question of the religious character of 
Shintô: 
»To better understand the above I would like to point out that the Shintô re-
ligion is divided into two parts by the state: 1) Shintô as a religion, namely the 
sects and temples, which have nothing to do with the imperial household. 
They belong to the Bureau of Religions in the Ministry of Education. 2) 
Stately Shintô [»der Staatliche Shintô«] with all the temples of the imperial 
ancestors and those that have been associated with the imperial household, 
for example, the temple in Ise, the Taisha in Izumo, the temples in Nikkô and 
Miyajima and countless others in cities and the countryside. These belong to 
the Bureau of Shrines and Temples in the Ministry of the Interior and receive 
subsidies from the state or are completely financed by public funds if neces-
sary. Above all the state offerings are given there. The state claims that it is 
not a religion (apparently despite the gods, prayer and offerings), but rather a 
form of state worship in which anyone may take part as he sees fit, which be-
comes a kind of duty in the military and in schools. Thus, the state attempts 
to claim a separation between church and state while at the same time foster-
ing patriotism and loyalty to the emperor through religious means. The peo-
ple of course are largely unconcerned with this distinction and indisputably 
view this worship to be of a religious nature, which in fact it is.« (Schiller 
1925: 67) 
The report on the year 1924 (Schiller 1926) is shaped by a different, but no less 
influential event, the new anti-Japanese immigration laws in the United States. 
The author describes the deep resentment of this exclusion, which was received 
as an embarrassment. Here too State Shintô is drawn upon in the statement of his 
protest: 
»On July 1, 1924, the day this ban on immigration took effect, the gods were 
officially informed of this scandal at the Shintô temples and were beseeched 
for a swift abolition of the law. The convened members of the Parliament pro-
tested unanimously against this American law that destroyed the friendship 
of 70 years between the two nations and called on the Japanese government 
to take the necessary steps for the arrangement of an amendment to the law. 
In Kyôto, as in many other places, the flags at city buildings were flown at 
half mast. In Ôsaka a protest march of 10,000 people took place in the streets. 
In Kyôto a demonstration of 5000 reservists took place in front of the main 
Shintô temple Heian Jungû. Everywhere patriotic organizations called on the 
Japanese people to return to the Japanese customs in hairstyles, clothing, fur-
niture and other things.« (Schiller 1926: 53) 
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Bearing in mind the military conflicts of later years the following remarks 
sound nearly prophetic, as Schiller warns that it should be taken seriously 
»… when the sober-minded newspaper ‘Ôsaka Mainichi’ points to the fate of 
hubristic nations in the editorial on May 30, 1924, as exemplified by Ger-
many, and then continues: ‘Today the United States does not behave better, 
but even worse than Germany before the war ….’ It then describes how the 
world order may someday change and closes with the words: ‘The time will 
come when America must reap what it has sown.’ Our intervention at the end 
of the Sino-Japanese War showed us Germans that Japan does not forget. It 
bides its time.« (Schiller 1926: 55) 
This report by Schiller also addresses the religious situation in Japan. In the 
chapter »Japan’s non-Christian religions« (Schiller 1926: 65-69) the author also 
deals with the situation of Shintô at the time in detail. Again he strives to high-
light the actually religious character of Shintô, regardless of the official definition: 
»To the foreigner the participation of the Japanese in the ancient national 
Shintô religion appears to consist mostly of the observation of outward forms 
and in the participation in its holidays and their recurring popular festivals. 
However, this is not the case. The feeling for the holy, numinous Shintô, 
which is to be worshipped, and the feeling of the dependence of one’s fate on 
the higher powers, who are beseeched for help, have a strong presence 
among the people. And this is still so deeply rooted that a difference is drawn 
between religion, meaning Buddhism and Christianity, and Shintô as an es-
tablishment that since ancient times has been a self-evident part of the Japa-
nese nation, to whose customs and demands every Japanese must submit, 
which Buddhism generally also tends to do. In order to appease the Chris-
tians and modern-minded Japanese, the government has set aside a kind of 
Shintô religion based on the sun goddess and the other imperial ancestors 
and everything related to this – however, this also includes the worship of 
Inari, which the Europeans often call the fox deity – and made it into a kind 
of state religion that supposedly has no real religious character, even if it is 
practiced in religious forms of offerings and prayers and the masses are in 
fact unconcerned with this difference. As an aid to fighting ideas that are 
dangerous to the state, such as democracy, socialism and communism, this 
form of Shintô is promoted in schools, government-organized associations 
and the military and was called in a petition to the House of Peers on No-
vember 23, 1923 the »founding of Japan« and »a system for the preservation 
of the characteristic spirit of the nation.« The Shintô temples are not consid-
ered a religion, but they are closely connected to religion! This Shintô relig-
ion, which is run and partly financed by the state, includes 114,548 temple-
shrines and 14,836 priests who, however, are considered bureaucrats. Every-
thing else is left to the customary Shintô as a true religion.« (Schiller 1926: 65) 
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The constantly increasing involvement of the State Shintô ideology in daily 
life is also reflected in Schiller’s reports. In the 1931 edition of the Jahrbuch, which 
focuses on the period between 1929 and 1930, there is even a separate chapter on 
the topic of »The Problem of Shintô.« Here Schiller deals with the history and the 
present form of the Japanese »national religion« in detail. Since these detailed re-
ports are an authentic primary source that gives us a direct impression not only 
of the problems, but also of the atmosphere of this period, Schiller’s remarks 
(1931) are quoted (in a shortened form) in the following. It is remarkable that, 
among other things, to him as a contemporary witness the term »State Shintô« is 
self-evident, thus proving wrong the oft advanced view that this is a coinage of 
the post-war era. The focus of his remarks is the central problem of the official 
view stating that State Shintô is not a religion. In lively and emotional words 
Schiller describes the confusion of a Japanese population that is oblivious to the 
fact that their ancestral deities are no longer religious: 
»Why does this matter [of the non-religious character of State Shintô] remain 
a difficult problem? Because such a declaration by the government cannot 
suffice to make the people believe that forms of worship that have been prac-
ticed at holy places since ancient times are no longer religious worship – that 
is to say, that Amaterasu no Mikoto, who is worshipped at the Daijingû in 
Ise, is no longer the ancestral deity as in ancient times, but merely the ances-
tral mother of the imperial family. (Schiller 1931: 85f.)  
[...] 
The government itself appears to sense the difficulty of the problem and for 
this reason convened a commission of 30 respected scholars, Shintô priests 
and members of Parliament, whose mandate it was to determine whether 
Shintô truly lies in the area of religion, which then, if this question were an-
swered in the affirmative, would have important consequences. For if Shintô 
is actually a religion and not only a matter of public state morality, the free-
dom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution would have to be applied so 
that schoolchildren could no longer be forced to go to the temples, and the 
State Shintô [orig. »Staatsshintô«] shrines could no longer be financed with 
public funds. The head of this commission, Professor Yamakawa, a member 
of the Privy Council, and a former president of the Imperial University of 
Tôkyô, declared that at least five years would be necessary for the commis-
sion to reach a conclusion! And the director of the Bureau of Shrines and 
Temples, Baron Kinoshi Ikeda, stated that the results of this commission’s 
work would then form the basis for a further commission that would perhaps 
be convened 40 years later!!! (cf. Japan Advertiser, December 11, 1929). It looks 
as if they are trying to buy time for a long time to come. (Schiller 1931: 86) 
[...]  
The extent to which the question is discussed can be seen in the debate held 
by the Kyôto magazine »Bunka Jippô« (»Magazine for Cultural Progress«) on 
February 17 of this year, to which respected Shintô and Buddhist priests, as 
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well as professors, a representative from Japanese Christianity, and as the 
only foreigner, the author of this report were invited. The problem of State 
Shintô [orig. »Staatsshintô«] was discussed from every possible angle. It was 
reassuring to me that the representatives of Shintô recognized and felt this 
problem. The Buddhists were of diverging opinions, because Buddhism takes 
a clouded, unclear position in all such questions, which is often falsely called 
tolerance. (Schiller 1931: 87) 
[...] 
Shinchiro Yamada, the head priest of the great Kitano Shrine in Kyôto, at-
tempts to solve this problem more superficially for outsiders (cf. Ôsaka Mai-
nichi, August 21, 1930). He states that it is the duty of every Japanese subject 
to obey the national rites (sic), since they represent the worship of the state 
and that one must therefore worship the gods, who are the original source of 
these state rites. He continues to say that it is wrong to view the freedom of 
religion as if subjects have the right to decline to worship at the Shintô 
shrines on account of their own religious beliefs and thus to show disobedi-
ence toward the institutions of the state bureaucracy!!!« (Schiller 1931: 87f.) 
This text, presented here in excerpts, marks the end of Schiller’s eyewitness 
reports on the religious situation in Japan.  
The next detailed discussion of the problem of Shintô is found not until sev-
eral years later, in the writings of Gerhard Rosenkranz from 1939. In the interven-
ing years the intellectual climate changed dramatically. Instead of the knowl-
edgeable and subtle reports by Emil Schiller, one finds in Rosenkranz’s writings 
on the »religious situation in Japan at the present« (Rosenkranz 1939a) ideologi-
cally highly contaminated sentences such as the following: »We Germans in par-
ticular have a sharp eye for what is important, and which forms the basis of na-
tional life: a völkisch and racially based mindset« (Rosenkranz 1939a: 3).429 In the 
chapter »Japanese nationalism and the religions, 1. Shintô and Japanese national-
ism« (Rosenkranz 1939a: 8) the author details his view of the Japanese »national 
religion.« Here one also finds the equation of State Shintô and kokutai as as the 
basis of Japanese nationalism. Rosenkranz’s remarks in this report, and even 
more so in his monograph from 1944, show the extent to which even the Christian 
East Asian Mission had drifted into the waters of religiously argued extremism. 
After a discussion based on Katô Genchi on primordial Shintô, the author 
turns to the historical development of what is in his eyes the original »religion of 
nature« into a »religion of culture.« These remarks are suffused with the spirit 
that even today is expressed in the idea of »the« Shintô as the »national religion« 
                                                 
429 Original wording: »Gerade uns Deutschen ist ja der Blick scharf geworden für das Wesentliche, 
das der Gestalt eines Volkslebens zu Grunde liegt, für eine jeweils völkisch und rassisch bedingte 
geistige Haltung«. 
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of Japan and only recently has been subjected to critical examination. Rosenkranz, 
who does not appear to possess a deep knowledge of Japan and cannot be com-
pared to his predecessor Schiller in this regard, is of course not conscious of the 
deep roots of his views in the theology and worldview of the Edo period Ko-
kugaku. Even when in another place, in a booklet dedicated to his own children, 
he remarks in 1939 that »the Japanese have a national religion. They say, ‘Our 
country is a land of the gods, and our people are descended from the gods,’« 
(Rosenkranz 1939b: 11), it is unlikely that he had Hirata Atsutane in mind. How-
ever, the author always insists on his view that State Shintô cannot be considered 
non-religious. Rosenkranz remarks on the spread of this »national religion« 
among the Japanese population in the terminology of the day: 
»This Shintô has now been made the national religion of Japan. [...] Today the 
propagandist of the belief that Japan is a land of the gods and the emperor is 
of divine descent, the beliefs on which the religion of Shrine Shintô is based, 
is the schoolteacher [my emphasis]. This religious instruction takes place in 
morality class. [...] It must be added that this class is not only limited to theo-
retical instruction, but is intended to foster practical action. ‘You children 
have learned,’ the teacher exhorts his students at the end of the third volume 
of the aforementioned textbook, ‘that Emperor Heika is the great ruler of the 
Empire of Greater Japan. The ancestor of the emperor is called Amaterasu 
ômikami. [...] Since she is the ancestor of the emperor, she is the most highly 
worshipped deity in our country of Japan. And since the Great Imperial 
Shrine (sc. in Ise) is the holy place where the Great Deity is worshipped, the 
Japanese, in addition to their obedience toward the emperor, must always 
honor and respect this shrine. Thus, when opportunity allows, you children 
should make a pilgrimage to the Great Imperial Shrine and, with a greater 
understanding of the majesty of the kokutai, pray for the prosperity of the im-
perial family,’ (page 54). A short note for the teacher follows that after this 
lesson he should instruct the students on the correct behavior at shrines.« 
(Rosenkranz 1939b: 53f.) 
Rosenkranz’s writings mark the end of the regular reports of the East Asian 
Mission on the religious situation in Japan. Especially the reports of Emil Schiller 
represent an informative first-hand account that gives direct insights into the 
ideological and religious situation of the early Shôwa period. With Rosenkranz 
the reports took a turn that fatally reflected the ideologies of their time, German 
as well as Japanese, but these circumstances make it possible to gain direct in-
sights into the intellectual situation of the era. 
As has become clear from various examples, Japan, similar to Nazi Germany, 
consistently marched on its way into the ideological abyss. At the end of this path 
lay not only the military defeat in the Pacific war, but the collapse of the entire re-
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ligious and ideological system of the Japanese »national polity« that had been so 
artfully constructed since the Edo period. 
On August 15, 1945, Japan experienced a turning point in history no less 
dramatic than the Meiji Restoration only a few decades before. State Shintô and 
the kokutai as specific characteristics of the previous Japanese national state 
abruptly came to an end. But a critical analysis reveals the question of whether 
the radical changes of the post-war era also represented the true end of State 
Shintô based kokutai thought. These questions will be the focus of the last part of 
our investigation. 
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1. THE END OF THE WAR AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE KOKUTAI 
 
After Japan’s defeat on August 15, 1945, the problem of Shintô was given the 
highest priority by the occupying powers. The American government and its al-
lies saw the influence of State Shintô on politics in Japan as the true origin of the 
spread of excessive militaristic and chauvinistic thought and action during the 
war era. Thus, they were determined to completely eliminate the effectiveness of 
this religion after Japan’s defeat, but there was great uncertainty regarding the 
measures to be taken. 
 
1. 1. The »Shintô Directive« 
 
Contrary to widespread radical views that aimed for the complete abolition of 
Shintô, more moderate forces prevailed that sought to remove nationalist thought 
from Shintô while allowing it to exist as a religion under civil law. President 
Truman and General MacArthur joined the moderate camp due to political con-
siderations, which were finally realized in the so-called »Shintô Directive.« The 
Directive was submitted to the Japanese government already on December 15, 
1945, only four months after the end of the war. According to the law of the occu-
pying forces it was to take effect and be applied immediately. 
There was hardly any reaction to the Directive among the Japanese people. But 
already in the spring of 1946 the Association of Shintô Shrines (jinja-honchô) was 
formed without hindrance. The jinja-honchô served to maintain the shrines and 
continued to recognize the shrine at Ise as the main shrine of Shintô due to its 
close relationship to the imperial household. 
Due to its historical importance, the complete text of the directive follows: 
»Directive for the disestablishment of State Shintô 
I. 
In order to free the Japanese people from the direct or indirect compulsion to 
believe or profess to believe in a religion or cult officially designated by the 
state, and 
In order to lift from the Japanese people the burden of compulsory financial 
support of an ideology which has contributed to their war guilt, defeat, suf-
fering, privation, and present deplorable condition, and 
In order to prevent a recurrence of the perversion of Shintô theory and beliefs 
into militaristic and ultranationalistic propaganda designed to delude the 
Japanese people and lead them into wars of aggression, and 
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In order to assist the Japanese people in a rededication of their national life to 
building a new Japan based upon the ideals of perpetual peace and democ-
racy, 
It is hereby directed that: 
a. The sponsorship, support, perpetuation, control and dissemination of 
Shintô by the Japanese national, prefectural, and local governments, or by 
public officials, subordinates, and employees acting in their official capacity 
are prohibited and will cease immediately. 
b. All financial support from public funds and all official affiliation with 
Shintô and Shintô shrines are prohibited and will cease immediately. 
(1) While no financial support from public funds will be extended to shrines 
located on public reservations or parks, this prohibition will not be construed 
to preclude the Japanese Government from continuing to support the areas 
on which such shrines are located. 
(2) Private financial support of all Shintô shrines which have been previously 
supported in whole or in part by public funds will be permitted, provided 
such private support is entirely voluntary and is in no way derived from 
forced or involuntary contributions. 
c. All propagation and dissemination of militaristic and ultranationalistic ide-
ology in Shintô doctrines, practices, rites, ceremonies or observances, as well 
as in the doctrines, practices, rites, ceremonies, and observances of any other 
religion, faith, sect, creed, or philosophy, are prohibited and will cease imme-
diately. 
d. The Religious Functions Order relating to the Grand Shrine of Ise and the 
Religious Functions Order relating to state and other Shrines will be an-
nulled. 
e. The Shrine Board (Jingi-in) of the Ministry of Home Affairs will be abol-
ished, and its present functions, duties, and administrative obligations will 
not be assumed by any other governmental or tax-supported agency. 
f. All public educational institutions whose primary function is either the in-
vestigation and dissemination of Shintô or the training of a Shintô priesthood 
will be abolished and their physical properties diverted to other uses. Their 
present functions, duties and administrative obligations will not be assumed 
by any other governmental or tax-supported agency. 
g. Private educational institutions for the investigation and dissemination of 
Shintô and for the training of priesthood for Shintô will be permitted and will 
operate with the same privileges and be subject to the same controls and re-
strictions as any other private educational institution having no affiliation 
with the government; in no case, however, will they receive support from 
public funds, and in no case will they propagate and disseminate militaristic 
and ultra-nationalistic ideology. 
h. The dissemination of Shintô doctrines in any form and by any means in 
any educational institution supported wholly or in part by public funds is 
prohibited and will cease immediately. 
(1) All teachers’ manuals and textbooks now in use in any educational institu-
tion supported wholly or in part by public funds will be censored, and all 
Shintô doctrine will be deleted. No teachers’ textbook or manual which is 
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published in the future for use in such institutions will contain any Shintô 
doctrine. 
(2) No visits to Shintô shrines and no rites, practices or ceremonies associated 
with Shintô will be conducted or sponsored by any educational institution 
supported wholly or in part by public funds. 
i. Circulation by the government of »The Fundamental Principles of the Na-
tional Structure« (Kokutai no hongi), »The Way of the Subject« (Shinmin no 
Michi), and all similar official volumes, commentaries, interpretations, or in-
structions on Shintô is prohibited. 
j. The use in official writings of other terms »Greater East Asia War« (Dai Tôa 
Sensô), »The Whole World under One Roof« (Hakko Ichi-u), and all other 
terms whose connotation in Japanese is inextricably connected with State 
Shintô, militarism, and ultra-nationalism is prohibited and will cease imme-
diately. 
k. God-shelves (Kamidana) and all other physical symbols of State Shintô in 
any office, school institution, organization, or structure supported wholly or 
in part by public funds are prohibited and will be removed immediately. 
l. No official, subordinate, employee, student, citizen, or resident of Japan 
will be discriminated against because of his failure to profess and believe in 
or participate in any practice, rite, ceremony, or observance of State Shintô or 
of any other religion. 
m. No official of the national, prefectural, or local government, acting in his 
public capacity, will visit any shrine to report his assumption of office, to re-
port on conditions of government or to participate as a representative of gov-
ernment in any ceremony or observance. 
II. 
a. The purpose of this directive is to separate religion from the state, to pre-
vent misuse of religion for political ends, and to put all religions, faiths and 
creeds upon exactly the same basis, entitled to precisely the same opportuni-
ties and protection. It forbids affiliation with the government and the propa-
gation and dissemination of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology not 
only to Shintô but to the followers of all religions, faiths, sect creeds, or phi-
losophies. 
b. The provisions of this directive will apply with equal force to all rites, prac-
tices, ceremonies, observances, beliefs, teachings, mythology, legends, phi-
losophy, shrines, and physical symbols associated with Shintô. 
c. The term State Shintô within the meaning of this directive will refer to that 
branch of Shintô (Kokka Shintô or Jinja Shintô) which by official acts of the 
Japanese Government has been differentiated from the religion of Sect Shintô 
(Shûha Shintô or Kyôha Shintô) and has been classified a non-religious cult 
commonly known as State Shintô, National Shintô, or Shrine Shintô. 
d. The term Sect Shintô (Shûha Shintô or Kyôha Shintô) will refer to that 
branch of Shintô (composed of 13 recognized sects) which by popular belief, 
legal commentary, and the official acts of the Japanese Government has been 
recognized to be a religion. 
e. Pursuant to the terms of Article I of the Basic Directive on »Removal of Re-
strictions on Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties« issued on 4 October 1945 
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by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in which the Japanese peo-
ple were assured complete religious freedom, 
(1) Sect Shintô will enjoy the same protection as any other religion. 
(2) Shrine Shintô, after having been divorced from the state and divested of 
its militaristic and ultra-nationalistic elements, will be recognized as a relig-
ion if its adherents so desire and will be granted the same protection as any 
other religion in so far as it may in fact be the philosophy or religion of Japa-
nese individuals. 
f. Militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology, as used in this directive, em-
braces those teachings, beliefs, and theories which advocate or justify a mis-
sion on the part of Japan to extend its rule over other nations and peoples by 
reason of: 
(1) The doctrine that the Emperor of Japan is superior to the heads of other 
states because of ancestry, descent, or special origin. 
(2) The doctrine that the people of Japan are superior to the people of other 
lands because of ancestry, descent, or special origin. 
(3) The doctrine that the islands of Japan are superior to other lands because 
of divine or special origin. 
(4) Any other doctrine which tends to delude the Japanese people into em-
barking upon wars of aggression or to glorify the use of force as an instru-
ment for the settlement of disputes with other peoples. 
III. 
The Imperial Japanese Government will submit a comprehensive report to 
this Headquarters not later than 15 March 1946 describing in detail all action 
taken to comply with all provisions of this directive. 
IV. 
All officials, subordinates, and employees of the Japanese national, prefec-
tural, and local governments, all teachers and education officials, and all citi-
zens and residents of Japan will be held personally accountable for compli-
ance with the spirit as well as the letter of all provisions of this directive. 
For the Supreme Commander: H. W. Allen, 
Colonel, A. G. D., Asst. Adjutant General«430 
In the directive State Shintô, in accordance with the wartime view, is desig-
nated a non-religious, national cult whose sole purpose is the glorification of the 
state and which is separate from the religion of Shintô. An understanding of the 
actual basis and intellectual-historical development of State Shintô and the ideol-
ogy of the kokutai remained outside the grasp of the authors of the Directive. They 
were too caught up in the Western conceptual categories of religion and moder-
nity to understand the reality of Japan. Thus, the Allies also remained oblivious 
to the fact that the Japanese were able to preserve large elements of Shintôist ko-
kutai thought in the post-war era under the cover of the Shintô Directive and 
                                                 
430 Quoted from Lokowandt 1981: 64-67; Woodard 1972: 295–298. 
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other measures by the occupying powers. This process will be the focus of the fol-
lowing discussion. 
 
1. 2. The kokutai after 1945 
 
With the total defeat and the relinquishment of the divine status of the em-
peror under pressure from the occupying forces, the kokutai became obsolete as a 
concept of the empire and a form of government. 
The democratic post-war Constitution of May 3, 1947,431 begins, like the Meiji 
Constitution, with a section on the emperor (Articles 1-8), but the emperor is de-
moted here to the status of a mere symbol (shôchô) of Japan; his position rests on 
the will of the people, who possess sovereign power (Article 1).432 Regardless of 
the fact that the first eight articles of the Constitution define the function of the 
emperor as purely ceremonial, discussions about the Constitution during the 
post-war era concentrated primarily on the questions of whether the emperor, 
beyond his status as a mere »symbol,« is also to be seen as the head of the Japa-
nese state and to what degree Japan should continue to be a monarchy. But this 
debate, which according to Neumann (1982: 108-120) is largely completed, does 
not approach the actual core of the kokutai problem. 
The abolition of the sovereign position of the ruler essentially struck down the 
ideology of the kokutai, and the Constitution itself could also hardly lead one to 
believe that the kokutai, specifically the State Shintô Tennôism of the Meiji and 
early Shôwa periods, survived the collapse of 1945 without injury. The questions 
of the inheritance, or the continuity of the ideology of the kokutai thus appears to 
have been already answered at this point. With regard to constitutional law, it 
must be said that the concept of the kokutai with its specific position of the em-
peror was apparently removed and replaced by a democratic constitutional form 
of government. And yet a closer examination shows that even in the case of the 
Constitution – that is to say, in the basic question of the position and concept of 
the emperor in post-war Japan – far more aspects of kokutai thought survived 
than was originally assumed (cf. Antoni 1995 a). 
Especially the death of Shôwa-tennô in 1989 and the subsequent enthronement 
of the current Emperor Akihito at the ritual daijôsai ceremony in November of 
                                                 
431 Text of the post-war Constitution in Nagai 1968: 252ff.; cf. Sakurai 1972; Hasegawa 1975; Neu-
mann 1982: 185-204. 
432 On the position of the emperor in the Japanese post-war Constitution cf. the study by Reinhard 
Neumann (1982: 108-120). 
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1990 unearthed the debate on the religious founding of the emperorship in Japan. 
In the wake of this event, numerous historical materials and overviews have been 
published433 that suggest a new interpretation of many questions relating to the 
imperial household and the problem of kokutai ideology in post-war Japan. 
Viewed from a purely legal positivistic perspective, the problem appears to 
have been solved with regard to Constitutional law. But other important docu-
ments from the early post-war years exist that suggest a more »traditionalist« (as 
in Rothermund 1989; Antoni 1992, see discussion below) interpretation of the 
term »symbol« and ultimately point to a continuity of the concept of the kokutai. 
The period between the end of the war in August, 1945, and the proclamation of 
the Constitution in May, 1947, as a transitional phase, is decisive here. Thus, we 
shall focus on two documents from this period in which the emperor himself de-
fines the spiritual orientation of the country after the defeat in the war as a man-
date to the nation. 
The first of these is the public declaration by the emperor at the end of the war 
on August 15, 1945 – Hirohito’s famous radio address – which announced Japan’s 
defeat to a deeply confused and uncomprehending nation, and the second is the 
address by the emperor on New Year’s Day of 1946, in which he renounced his 
divine status. These two documents contain extremely illuminating passages re-
garding a possible continuity of the concept of the kokutai even after the defeat. 
 
1. 2. 1. The »Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War« (shûsen no shôsho) 
 
The dramatic events of the night of August 14, 1945, in which an audio record-
ing was made with great difficulty in the Imperial Palace and prepared for broad-
cast the following day, merit their own investigation, but can only be outlined in 
brief here. In an account from 1988, Kôbayashi Kichiya describes the events of 
these days using the emperor’s own words:434 
»On August 14 the last imperial conference on the end of the war took place. 
His Majesty wore the uniform of the supreme commander of the army, deco-
rated only with the large chrysanthemum medal on his left arm. [...] Then His 
Majesty gave His final judgment: ‘If there are no other comments, I would 
                                                 
433 Cf. Itô 1989; Mayumi 1990; Takamori 1990; Yoshino Hiroko’s work (1987/1990) first appeared 
in 1987. See also the collection entitled Tennôsei to saishi by the historical journal Nihonshi kenkyû 
(no. 300/1987.8) with a panel discussion (zandankai) on the topic »Imperial rituals and the corona-
tion ceremony« (Tennô-saishi to sokui-girei ni tsuite) with the historians Iwai Tadakuma, Okada Sei-
shi and Kawane Yoshiyasu. 
434 Meyer 1989: 105f. On the problem of the traditional declarations and monologues by the em-
peror at the war’s end see also Bix 1992. Cf. Antoni 1995a. 
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like to present my view. I will not change my opinion any more. After con-
sidering the situation in the world and the conditions in our country I have 
reached the conclusion that a continuation of the war is impossible. There 
appear to be some doubts about the preservation of the kokutai. [...] But I want 
to save the life of the entire nation by all means. [...] The alternative would be 
the complete downfall of Japan. But if only a small core is left, we can begin 
to consider a reconstruction. At the time of the Triple Intervention, Emperor 
Meiji shed no tears and bore the misfortune. Now we must endure the unen-
durable, bear the unbearable; we must look toward the reconstruction in 
unity.’ [...] Finally His Majesty stood up and turned to the Minister of War 
Anami and said, ‘Anami, I understand your feelings well. But I am confident 
that the kokutai will remain intact.’« 
The radio broadcast of the »Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War« 
(shûsen no shûsho)435 on August 15, 1945, was at first hardly understood by the 
Japanese people, since it was written in an ancient form of court Japanese. But the 
text of the address was subsequently published and made accessible to the public 
by the press. Already on the following day an authorized English translation was 
printed in the English-language editions of the Japanese daily newspapers that 
continued to be published. 
Looking at the text from the angle discussed here, it becomes apparent that the 
question of the kokutai’s future plays a key role in it. This can hardly be assumed 
from the official translation, for example, as it appeared on the front page of the 
English-language newspaper The Mainichi on August 16, 1945436, since the term 
kokutai is generally translated as »Imperial State,« as opposed to the otherwise 
customary and correct term »national polity.« Only the Japanese original reveals 
that the emperor and the authors of the Rescript, especially the Minister of War 
Anami Korechika, who committed suicide,437 were not concerned with the pres-
ervation of a »form of government« (seitai), but with the survival of the specific 
»national polity,« the kokutai, with all the implications and connotations attached 
to this term at the time. 
Let us thus examine a few relevant passages of the Rescript in the original ver-
sion. At the beginning the emperor states: 
»To Our good and loyal subjects: After pondering deeply the general trends 
of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We 
                                                 
435 Rescript reproduced in Murakami 1983, no. 38: 319-321; cf. Meyer 1989: 109-113. 
436 »Imperial Rescript.« In: The Mainichi. A National Newspaper For International Readers. No. 
8019, Thursday, August 16, 1945: 1. 
437 A thorough account of the dramatic events of the time can be found in the study by the Pacific 
War Research Society (1984); cf. Storry 1960: 235-239; on General Anami’s suicide cf. ibid. p. 237; 
cf. Bersihand 1963: 509; Beasley 1963: 210. 
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have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an 
extraordinary measure.«438 
The emperor then declares that Japan is prepared to accept the Potsdam Decla-
ration. The course of the war is discussed in brief from the Japanese perspective 
and the threat against Japan by the enemy’s new atomic bombs is mentioned. The 
emperor continues: 
»Should We continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse 
and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total ex-
tinction of human civilization.« (l.c.) 
The emperor then states that it was Japan’s intention to free East Asia. He 
deeply regrets the victims who lost their lives or fortunes in the pursuit of this 
goal. Finally the Rescript reaches the statement that is relevant to this context. The 
emperor unmistakably formulates his mandate for the future of the country and 
the Japanese kokutai, which is officially translated as «Imperial State«; he says: 
»Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial 
State (kokutai 國體ヲ護持), We are always with you, Our good and loyal sub-
jects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity.« (l.c.) 
However, these words do not mark the end of the Imperial Rescript. In the 
Japanese original there is also a closing sentence: Nanji shimmin sore yoku chin ga i 
wo taiseyo, »Our subjects, obey Our will!« This closing sentence, written in the 
most pointed form of command – chin ga i wo taiseyo – shows that the Rescript is 
not merely the declaration of the emperor’s position on the defeat in the war, but 
rather a clear order to the nation regarding its future development. Notably it is 
this closing sentence that is missing from the official English translation of the 
Rescript. It ends with the words »… enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State 
and keep pace with the progress of the world.« Possibly it was thought that the 
commanding character of these statements was already contained in the transla-
tion, but it is nonetheless the case that neither this, nor any of the later transla-
tions, contains the express statement of a clear duty of the nation toward the em-
peror’s words. 
Against the background of our knowledge of kokutai thought, as it developed 
from the days of the Kokugaku and the Mito School and the Meiji-period Rescript 
on Education to the ultranationalist state ideology of the early Shôwa period, the 
                                                 
438 The New York Times, 15 August 1945: 3; cf. Murakami 1983, doc. 38: 319-321; cf. Meyer 1989: 109-
113; Antoni 1995 a: 56. 
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importance of the emperor’s command to his country requires no further empha-
sis. 
The emperor conceded military defeat at exactly the moment when total 
breakdown was at hand – the obliteration of the land of the gods and the »na-
tional polity« of the specifically Japanese kokutai. The survival of the people was 
doubtless an important matter to the emperor, but he ultimately agreed to a de-
feat in order to secure the spiritual core of the nation, its kokutai, for the future. In 
this context the excellent study by Peter Wetzler (1989) is worth mentioning, in 
which he states the following, well-founded thesis as a summary of his findings 
»on the political responsibility of the emperor in modern Japanese history«: 
»The emperor was neither for peace nor war, nor did he consider himself re-
sponsible for the Constitution or the »Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere.« His main consideration during a turbulent era was to secure the 
survival of the imperial line and the Japanese people.« (Wetzler 1989: 642) 
Herbert P. Bix reaches a similar conclusion in his study from 1992.439 
The emotional conclusion of this dramatic declaration, which in its moral im-
perative is only comparable to the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890, de-
clares all the classic elements of the State Shintô concept of the kokutai as the basis 
for post-war Japan. The emperor speaks of the Japanese nation as a family con-
tinuing from generation to generation, meaning that familism is a basic principle 
of the kokutai. He invokes the »unshakable belief in the immortality of the land of 
the gods and thus formulates the theological credo of Kokutai Shintô. Morality 
and conviction are also mentioned, which, as we have seen, functioned as a bond 
of unity between the emperor and the people in the Rescript on Education of 1890. 
In another place in the declaration he previously formulated his responsibility for 
the people before the divine ancestors. Finally the emperor mentions in a highly 
compressed form again in his closing sentence the entire credo of the concept of 
the »national polity« as it developed since the Meiji period. He commands that 
even in the future the »essence« (or »brilliance,« seika) of the kokutai be main-
tained and not fall behind the progress of the world.440 
The basic elements of the traditional kokutai dogma are unambiguously visible 
in these remarks, which contradict later declarations of the »new beginning in 
1945« in Japan. But let us continue to focus on the text of the Imperial Rescript. 
The concluding remark of the previously quoted proclamation regarding the 
                                                 
439 Bix (1992: 300-307) even programmatically calls a similar chapter in his work »Capitulate to 
Protect the Imperial Institution.« 
440 This term appears mainly in the Kokutai no hongi. 
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»progress of the world« appears at first strange and out of place. How does the 
backward-looking utopia of the land of the gods stand in relation to the »progress 
of the world,« one is likely to ask, perceiving a break in the argumentation. But it 
is just this closing sentence that demonstrates the astonishing and seamless conti-
nuity of the »Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War« with the spiritual 
world of the Meiji period. 
The crucial connection between the imperial line of Japan and the »progress of 
the world« mentioned at the end of the Rescript of August 15, 1945 can be found 
in a previous and far more well known document from the very beginning of the 
development of modern Japan. In this declaration the young Emperor Meiji pro-
claimed the founding of the newly created – or, according to the official view, re-
stored – Empire of Japan. This is the previously discussed »Charter Oath« from 
1868. We saw that the passage in question in this historical oath by Meiji-tennô in 
1868 established the connection between the »imperial household« as the essence 
of Japan and the »knowledge of the world« as a criterion for technological pro-
gress. 
In restating this conscious combination at the end, and as the high point, of his 
Rescript on the future of Japan after the war, the emperor places himself con-
sciously and concretely in the tradition of his great predecessor, Emperor Meiji, 
and the view that technological progress serves the greater good of Japan in the 
form of its imperial foundation. 
 
1. 2. 2. The »Humanity Declaration« (ningen sengen) 
 
A further important document in this context shows that this conclusion is not 
merely speculation, namely the previously mentioned proclamation by the em-
peror on January 1, 1946, in which he officially renounced his divine status. The 
rescript is entitled »Imperial Rescript on the Construction of a New Japan« (nin-
gen sengen).441 
The emperor begins his remarks, which historians have recognized as having 
played an essential role on the path toward a democratic post-war Constitution in 
Japan, remarkably with a direct reference to his close connection to the Charter 
Oath of his grandfather, Meiji-tennô, of April, 1868. Just as the emperor’s oath 
stood at the beginning of the Meiji state, it is again this historical oath that stands 
at the beginning of the new post-war Japan. Hirohito remarks unmistakably: 
                                                 
441 The Rescript can be found in Murakami 1983, no. 44: 333-336. German translation in Lokow-
andt 1981: 68-70. 
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»In greeting the New Year, We recall to mind that Emperor Meiji proclaimed, 
as the basis of our national policy, the Five Clauses of the Charter Oath at the 
beginning of the Meiji Era.« (Murakami 1983: 333) 
The emperor then directly quotes the five paragraphs of the Charter Oath (l.c.) 
and categorically states: 
»The proclamation is evident in significance and high in its ideals. We wish to 
make this oath anew and restore the country to stand on its own feet again.« 
(l.c.) 
After emphasizing the connection between the people and the emperor even in 
the difficult post-war era, the emperor nonetheless proclaims a brilliant future for 
the country »if the nation is firmly united in its resolve to face the present or-
deal.« On the relationship between the people and the emperor he finally states: 
»Love of the family and love of the country are especially strong in this coun-
try. With more of this devotion should we now work towards love of man-
kind.« (l.c.) 
After expressing his worries about signs of a moral decline in the country, the 
emperor then arrives at the core statement of his proclamation: 
»We stand by the people and We wish always to share with them in their 
moments of joys and sorrows. The ties between Us and Our people have al-
ways stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere 
legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the 
Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese people are superior to other races 
and fated to rule the world.« (l.c.) 
The text concludes with the repeated summons to the people to approach the 
demands of the future with unity and courage. At the end of his remarks, the 
emperor states pointedly: 
»We expect Our people to join Us in all exertions looking to accomplishment 
of this great undertaking with an indomitable spirit.« (l.c.) 
The text of this declaration was immediately made known around the world. 
The English-language translation appeared already on January 1, 1946, in the New 
York Times. The historian David John Lu remarks on the importance of this 
document: 
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»It was a necessary step in effecting the transition of Japan into a democratic 
society, and paved the way for making the Emperor a symbol of the state and 
of the unity of the people in the new constitution.« (Lu 1974: 190) 
While not seeking to detract from this statement, it seems important to reexam-
ine the contents of the document. Upon doing so, it becomes apparent that the 
emperor’s main focus is not the unity of the nation, as Lu formulates in a self-
fulfilling expectation, but rather the bond between the emperor himself with the 
Japanese people. The unbreakable nature of the bond between the people and the 
emperor, as we have seen, formed the very core of the concept of the kokutai prior 
to and during the war. 
The emperor’s proclamation on January 1, 1946, given only a few months after 
the Rescript from April 15, 1945, clearly seeks to save this last core belief of the 
kokutai. The relinquishment of the emperor’s divinity appears to be a bearable 
consequence. The doctrine of State Shintô before 1945 also officially negated all 
religious content in the concept of the kokutai and saw the rites and ceremonies of 
the state as merely »national customs.« This disguising of the religious basis of 
the state religion occurred, as we know, in the 19th century as a reaction to the 
pressure of the Western powers, who – especially in the interest of the unhin-
dered spread of Christianity – pressed for religious freedom and the prohibition 
of a Japanese »state religion.« And despite the pragmatic position of the Japanese 
state at the time, it appears that in the extremely vulnerable position after its loss 
in a war of aggression, the state once again reacted. The goal was, as the emperor 
stated on August 15, to save the basic elements of the kokutai; its core was the idea 
of the Japanese national family headed by the emperor. This central concept, 
which constituted the ideal of the kokutai, was successfully defended in the proc-
lamation of January 1, 1946, and declared the national basis for post-war Japan, 
even if the mention of the word »kokutai« itself was carefully avoided and this 
loaded term was banned from official discourse shortly thereafter, although it 
was frequently mentioned later too442 (cf. Antoni 1995a: 61, note 19). 
                                                 
442 Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko, declared in his address to the 88. Session of the Imperial Diet on 
September 5, 1945: »... It is the heavy responsibility of us all today to make our national polity  
shine forth more gloriously than ever by shouldering the burden and moving in the right direc-
tion. [...] It is duty of us all to conform absolutely with the Imperial Command, and never depart 
from it. In obedience to the Imperial Proclamation we should bear the unbearable, and suffer what 
is unsufferable.« (Contemporary Japan, no. 14.4 - 12 (Tôkyô, April-Dec. 1945): 280-288; cit. p. 285). 
Bix (1992: 303) refers to this speech, arguing that the primary concern had been »protection of the 
national polity«. He further declares: »In September 1945 it was still a crime to criticize the em-
peror and the ‚sacred national polity’ (kokutai), and hundreds of Japanese political prisoners who 
had opposed the war still languished in jail.« (Bix 1992: 305). Cf. Antoni 1995a: 61, note 19. 
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The designation of the emperor as the symbol of Japan and the unity of the 
Japanese nation in Article 1 of the Constitution of 1947 is to be seen as the logical 
consequence of this process. Although the people attained sovereignty, strictly 
speaking this sovereignty cannot exist without the emperor, since only he can 
symbolically represent and thus guarantee their unity. 
Thus, the pressure from the American occupying forces was cleverly countered 
and the core of the kokutai, in the sense of the Imperial Rescript from August 15, 
1945, was saved in its basic structure. 
The fact that the religious and mythological basis of the emperor’s position had 
to be sacrificed proved to be far less relevant. As we have already seen, questions 
of religiosity were officially removed from the concept of State Shintô before 
1945; rather the negation of an individually professed belief in the divinity of the 
emperor reflects basic Western, Christian beliefs and motives that do not actually 
apply to the value system of (State) Shintô. Far more important was the fact that 
the preservation of the imperial household after 1945 also meant that the formerly 
state-controlled area of Shintô ritual was preserved. Now ostensibly held as a 
private matter of the imperial household, it thus remained intact. Anyone who is 
knowledgeable about the importance of ritual in Confucian and East-Asian 
thought, and who takes into account their central function in Shintô, not only in 
the variant of State Shintô, will conclude that this alone meant that the true spiri-
tual core of the complex of the kokutai was preserved beyond the supposed turn-
ing point of 1945. 
However, only later did the full implications of this fact become clear. Only af-
ter the rituals surrounding the death of Emperor Hirohito and the enthronement 
of his successor Akihito in 1989 and 1990 did it become apparent that the imperial 
household by no means renounced its ritual function. The broken nature of the 
artificial and unconvincing separation between »public« and »private« rituals of 
the imperial household in this area can be seen upon examining the actual rituals 
in both cases. And it must be emphasized that in practice the important rituals, 
such as the burial ceremony (taisô no rei) and the enthronement ceremony (dai-
jôsai) remained intact and corresponded in detail to the (State) Shintô ceremonies 
of the pre-war era. The active participation of state representatives in these rituals 
shines a revealing light on the supposedly »private« nature of the area of cere-
mony (see below). 
It bears remembering that in the historical documents of the early post-war era 
the preservation of the kokutai represented the highest goal of the emperor, even 
though the term itself was no longer officially used after 1945. Apparently all po-
sitions that did not entirely serve this purpose – in consideration of the main goal 
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– could be abandoned. This applies especially to the question of religious belief in 
the divine character of the emperor, which was never relevant within State 
Shintô. In State Shintô of the pre-war era it was ritual that was truly important, in 
accordance with basic Shintô and Confucian beliefs. 
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2. THE YASUKUNI DEBATE 
 
The extent to which the religious definition of Shintô and shrines influences 
the present-day debate can be seen in an area that has become well known inter-
nationally: the Yasukuni Shrine in Tôkyô (cf. Antoni 1993c). All of the problems 
of the relationship between Shrine Shintô and the state since the end of the war 
converge here. 
On August 15, 1985 Japan commemorated the 40th anniversary of its defeat in 
World War II. However, the way in which this day of remembrance was officially 
handled by the Japanese government drew attention and caused irritation in the 
international community. The reason for this irritation was Prime Minister Naka-
sone’s choice of the symbolically charged location at which he paid his respects, 
Yasukuni Shrine in Tôkyô (cf. Antoni 1991a: 156). 
It was the first time since the end of the war that a Japanese politician overtly 
showed reverence toward this shrine in his official function as the head of state, 
which, as the place of worship dedicated to the soldiers killed in battle, is consid-
ered one of the centers of Japanese emperor-worship and its resulting aggressive 
nationalism.443 
The visit also drew vehement criticism from all of the opposition parties repre-
sented in the Japanese Parliament;444 this caused Cabinet Secretary Fujinami to 
give an explanation already on the day before the event, on August 14, in which 
the non-religious character of the visit was pointed out. The usual Shintô ritual, it 
was argued, would be very limited during the visit and thus stripped of its relig-
ious character. For this reason, the Cabinet Secretary emphasized, the basic prin-
ciple of religious freedom would not be injured. 
But these explanations completely miss the true core of the problem. It was not 
worries about limiting of religious freedom in Japan that had alarmed the opposi-
tion and the international press, but rather the fear that the visit might point to a 
rehabilitation or even a renaissance of State Shintô ideology, that is to say, the 
emperor worship of the pre-war and wartime eras. 
The matter was only able to attract such great attention internationally because 
Yasukuni Shrine is considered an apparently easily understandable symbol of 
                                                 
443 On the function of Yasukuni Shrine in State Shintô during the Meiji period, cf. Lokowandt 
1978: 96-100, among others; see also William P. Woodard 1968: 71-74. 
444 The Japan Times, no. 31.089, 89th year, Thursday, August 15, 1985. 
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past Japanese militarism and its ideology of the kokutai. But the Yasukuni debate 
revealed how complicated this problem actually is. 
The true core of the problem lies in the question of the religious nature of the 
shrine. Since it is formally and clearly a Shintô shrine – that is to say, a holy place 
of Japanese religiosity – in which the great number of soldiers killed in the wars 
are worshipped as deities, it would at first appear, paradoxically, that the relig-
ious character of the shrine is largely negated by the Shintô establishment itself, 
especially by the governing body of the Shintô shrines, the jinja-honchô. The po-
litical controversy around Yasukuni Shrine thus shows itself to be a direct func-
tion of its religious dimension, since a reevaluation of the shrine unavoidably 
raises questions of the rehabilitation of the State Shintô of the pre-war era in gen-
eral, which was defined as non-religious, and of the relationship between religion 
and the state in particular. 
The fact that the religious circles themselves postulated the non-religious char-
acter of one of the most important shrines in the country, while non-religious 
groups vehemently argued for the religious definition of Yasukuni Shrine, is the 
most confusing aspect of this matter for outside observers. Just how important 
this is to an understanding of the Yasukuni debate can be seen in an affair in the 
fall of 1985, following the »great« political debate about Yasukuni Shrine, that 
drew attention within Japanese academic circles, but which drew no notice at all 
outside the country. 
 
2. 1. Religion versus science 
 
In the September edition (1985) of the journal Sekai a writer named Shimagawa 
Masaji published an article entitled »Religion at Yasukuni and Science.« Shima-
gawa discusses the case of a Japanese religious historian from Kokugakuin Uni-
versity in Tôkyô, who, in the wake of his critical examination of the basis for re-
ligion at Yasukuni Shrine, was subjected to a severe backlash from the aforemen-
tioned governing body, the jinja-honchô, as well as from his own university. 
Shimagawa remarks in his introduction: 
»In the past few years the problems of Yasukuni Shrine and the separation of 
religion and state in general have attracted a great amount of interest. Since 
last year an attempt was made by those representing the Shintô shrines to in-
volve the universities. And yet hardly anything has been said about this 
event, which must be called an incident of the ‘hindrance of science and (free) 
speech.’« (Shimagawa 1985: 19). 
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Shimagawa had published a discussion of this topic, the details of which were 
called »unusual« by the jinja-honchô. The governing body lodged a formal com-
plaint with the university, which in turn called Shimagawa’s behavior incorrect 
and called for »an apology to the jinja-honchô« (l.c.). 
The protest was ignited by the topic of the work, which sought to »approach 
the nature of religion at Yasukuni from the point of view of Shintô as a religion.« 
»The author,« Shimagawa continues, »criticizes the frequent use of the term sukei 
[»respect«] instead of shinkô [religion] in regard to Yasukuni« (l.c.). The attempt to 
place the shrine outside the area of religion using a corresponding terminology, 
he writes, reveals the face of the State Shintô era. In State Shintô during the pre-
war era, according to which the shrines merely served the non-religious worship 
of the state with official priests as masters of ceremony, the viewpoint that »the 
people of the state have the duty to pay ‘respect’ (sukei) to Yasukuni Shrine, 
which does not belong to the area of religion« was dominant. The choice of words 
subtly shows the ideological background of the message. Shimagawa sees the 
protest of the jinja-honchô against the religious definition of the gods of Yasukuni 
as part of a campaign for the nationalization of Yasukuni Shrine: 
»Beginning with the successful reinstatement of the National Founding Day, 
and the amendment on the numbering of years according to imperial era 
names (gengô)445, the honchô gave its support to the movement for the revival 
of emperor worship and State Shintô. This movement’s core goal is the na-
tionalization of Yasukuni Shrine as an expression of appreciation toward the 
state.« (Shimagawa 1985: 20) 
The further details of the affair, over the course of which the academic in ques-
tion was stripped of his right to teach classes, are not as relevant here as the fact 
itself that a religious interpretation of the deities of Yasukuni could bring about 
such consequences. Shimagawa sees the ultimate goal of the campaign as the na-
tionalization of all shrines; according to this »domino theory,« Yasukuni Shrine 
takes on the function of the first domino unleashing a chain reaction. By declaring 
the religious ceremonies of the shrine »customs« (shûzoku), the debate on its relig-
ious character is reopened. 
»The consequences of this are the official visits to the shrine and ultimately a 
nationalization of Yasukuni Shrine. This is why the arguments for the nation-
alization of Yasukuni Shrine most likely serve to justify the nationalization of 
all shrines.« (Shimagawa 1985: 22) 
                                                 
445 The numbering of years according to imperial era names was reinstated on June 6, 1979. 
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The »Yasukuni problem« thus proves to be the focus of a sociopolitical contro-
versy that, beginning with the question of the relationship between state and re-
ligion in present-day Japan, questions the basis of the national self-conception. It 
becomes apparent that the root of the problem lies in the religious dimension, the 
concept of gods at Yasukuni Shrine. This point will be taken up in the following 
analysis. 
 
2. 2. The deities of Yasukuni Shrine 
 
The history as well as the legal and political position of Yasukuni Shrine have 
been covered in a series of studies and collections, of which especially the mono-
graphs by Murakami Shigeyoshi (1974), Ôe Shinobu (1984) and Ernst Lokowandt 
(1987 and 1981) are worth mentioning. Especially the collection edited by Lokow-
andt in 1981, Zum Verhältnis von Staat und Shintô im heutigen Japan (»On the rela-
tionship between the state and Shintô in present-day Japan«), offers an introduc-
tion to the »conflict on the transfer of Yasukuni-jinja into state control« in a dedi-
cated chapter (Lokowandt 1981: 173-198). The author remarks in agreement with 
the aforementioned view by Shimagawa: 
»And yet this especially great symbolic value [of Yasukuni Shrine] may not 
be the most important reason for the unusually strong resistance to all the 
plans for nationalization. More important is the fact that the nationalization 
of Yasukuni Shrine would mean a significant breach in the present system of 
the separation of state and religion, and that a revival of State Shintô would 
then only be a matter of time. For reasons of consistency the state would then 
be obliged to take over all the other shrines, as in the State Shintô of the pre-
war era.« (Lokowandt 1981: 21) 
The crucial element of the ideological system called »State Shintô« of the pre-
war and war eras was, as we have seen, the official negation of the religious char-
acter of Shintô and its rites, which were understood to be merely »customs.« This 
made it possible to declare Shintô a mandatory form of state worship according 
to the ideology of the kokutai with the emperor at its center, while formally side-
stepping questions of religious freedom. The fallaciousness of this construction is 
especially apparent in the example of Yasukuni Shrine. 
Originally founded under the name Shôkonsha (»Shrine for the summoning of 
the spirits of the dead«) in Kyôto for the soldiers fighting for the emperor and 
who were killed since 1853 in the turbulent last years of the Shogunate, the direct 
predecessor of the shrine was finally moved to Tôkyô in 1875 and renamed to Ya-
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sukuni-jinja by the order of Meiji-tennô.446 A rescript by Emperor Meiji addressed 
to the dead honored at the Shrine states the following about the meaning of this 
new name: 
»Loyal, upright and of a devoted heart are each of you deceased, not thinking 
of your home, sacrificing your life. The peace of our Great Empire rests on 
these great heroic acts. This is why We have renamed (this shrine) to Ya-
sukuni Shrine, ‘Shrine of the peaceful country’ and elevated it to an Imperial 
Shrine of Special Status (bekkaku kampeisha). We promise to bring offerings of 
paper and silk (mitegura) as well as congratulations and to worship you from 
now into eternity without interruption.«447 
While the original name of Shôkonsha contains a recognizable reference to es-
sential aspects of Japanese religiosity – the periodic inviting, regaling and final 
sending off of deities and ancestors, as can be seen especially clearly in the cus-
tom of the annual festival of ancestors called O-bon – the motives for renaming 
the shrine »Yasukuni-jinja« remain largely unknown, despite the rescript by 
Meiji-tennô. According to Murakami (1974: 109) the name refers to a term from 
the Chinese classic Ch’un-ch’iu (Tso-chuan), in which the composite character ac-
tually appears twice under the meaning »peace, tranquility of the state,« »peace-
fulness of the state.«448 
The establishment of the national Yasukuni Shrine in Tôkyô and Gôkoku-jinja, 
the »Shrines for the Protection of the Country« in the individual prefectures449 
marked the creation of a system of worshipping the war dead that, centered 
around Yasukuni Shrine, remained intact in all wars after the Meiji period. En-
tirely caught up in the ideological language of the time, Kurt Meissner writes in 
an article in 1939 entitled »Der Shintoismus als Quelle des japanischen Volk-
scharakters und Nationalgeistes« (»Shintôism as the source of the character of the 
Japanese people and national spirit«): 
»Upon doing something for his immediate home, the Japanese goes proudly 
to the town shrine. Upon going to war, the Japanese will die more at ease on 
the battlefield when he thinks of the reverence his progeny will show for 
those who died for the emperor and their home country. He will sacrifice his 
                                                 
446 Cf. document in Murakami 1974: 107; see Lokowandt 1978: 328f., D 94; Kawada 1982: 66ff. 
447 Quoted from Murakami 1974: 109; cf. Yasukunijinja-shamusho (ed.): 1975: 1. 
448 Cf. Ch’un-ch’iu, Tso chuan, Book 5, Duke Hsi (He), 23rd year and 27th year = Legge 1935 (1983): 
184, 200. 
449 In analogy to Yasukuni Shrine as a national shrine for the worship of soldiers killed in battle, in 
the prefectures the war dead were worshipped in so-called Gôkoku shrines. This category of 
shrines originated from the regional Shôkonsha, which were renamed in 1939. Today 52 of these 
shrines exist (Okada 1982: 161): cf. Lokowandt 1987: 96, note 351; Kawada 1982: 68. 
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life more at ease because he knows that he will be honored by the entire na-
tion and by the emperor himself at Yasukuni Shrine in Tôkyô.« (Meissner 
1939: 5) 
The aspect of being »honored« – Meissner’s term is suspiciously unclear here 
and thus corresponds to the »non-religious« linguistic conventions of the time in 
Japan – by the emperor himself was of the highest significance. The fact that each 
of the soldiers killed in service of the emperor, regardless of his previous social 
standing and moral conduct, was entered into the pantheon of Yasukuni Shrine 
as the »deified soul of a hero,« as well as the fact that the emperor himself paid 
tribute to them, was a source of deep pride for the soldiers and the families they 
left behind. Especially the removal of all social barriers and hierarchies in the em-
pire of the »divine souls of heros,« the fact that all fallen soldiers would be wel-
comed there – as the successors to the divine ancestors in the sense of the radical 
kokutai ideology, according to which all Japanese are of divine origin – served to 
lift the battle morale of the troops. This was reflected in the expression of soldiers 
leaving for battle that they would meet after the battle in Kudan, the district in 
Tôkyô where the shrine is located. The importance of this egalitarian aspect even 
to the most fanatical fighters of the Pacific War can be seen in a series of »Ya-
sukuni jokes« from the ranks of kamikaze pilots, who joked that their current 
commodore, since he would only later attain a heroic death, might only appear at 
Yasukuni as an adjunct or servant (cf. Morris 1975 (1980): 318, 454). In a diary en-
try quoted by Tsurumi Kazuko the critical voice of a »student soldier« is men-
tioned that not only reveals his own skeptical views, but also the prevailing 
mood: 
»Soldiers believe with extreme naiveté that they are heroes in the defense of 
their country. They are proud to be the saviors of their fatherland. That is an 
easy sentimentalism. But that is the anchorage of their emotion. […] Moreo-
ver, should they deny this belief, they would have nothing left to sustain 
them in their hardships.« (Tsurumi 1970: 125). 
The Kokutai no hongi, the programmatic work of the ideology of the imperial 
state, remarks unmistakably on this point: 
»[The emperor deigns] to worship those loyal subjects as deities at Yasukuni 
Shrine who have sacrificed themselves for the sake of the Empire since the 
Restoration, regardless of their class or profession, in honor of their contribu-
tions.«450 
                                                 
450 Kokutai no hongi 1937: 31; cf. Gauntlett, Hall 1949: 77. 
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No sophisticated speculation is necessary to determine that the honoring of the 
war dead by the emperor himself served to strengthen the concept of the dynasty. 
The belief that a deceased family member could become the protector of the fam-
ily (cf. Yanagita 1963: 561; Tsurumi 1970: 12), rooted in popular religion, was thus 
brought into the state context, according to the ideology of the family state, which 
stated that the principles of loyalty (chû) and filial piety (kô) represent the founda-
tion of the family and the state. Just as a single deceased family member protects 
the family, the entire group of those who died for the state protect it as well. 
Clearly, religious feelings stemming from popular belief were put into the service 
of the state. 
The relinquishment of the emperor’s divine status, declared in the previously 
discussed New Year’s address on January 1, 1946, and the Shintô Directive of the 
American occupying administration marked the abolition of State Shintô. Article 
20 of the post-war Constitution of November 9, 1946, specifies a strict separation 
of religion and state451, to which Yasukuni Shrine, now designated a »religious 
entity« (shûkyô-hôjin), is also subject. A new nationalization of the shrine would 
only be possible by renouncing its religious nature. Lokowandt quotes from a po-
lemical work by the jinja-honchô published entitled »Transfer Yasukuni-jinja to 
state control« which substantiates this argument by referring to the situation in 
other countries. The appeal begins with the programmatic statement that Ya-
sukuni Shrine – even in the present – is »the most important holy place for the 
Japanese people« (Lokowandt 1981: 193; one is left to wonder what status Ise-
jingû is given here). This shows the unusually high status given to Yasukuni 
Shrine in the entire Shintô debate. This argumentation immediately follows the 
thought of the pre-war era.  
2. 3. The heretical interpretation of the gods of Yasukuni 
 
Before undergoing a more detailed analysis, let us return to the current Ya-
sukuni debate sketched at the beginning. The central point of this academic affair 
is the religious definition of the gods of Yasukuni; this represents the primarily 
political level of the conflict. The aspect relevant to religious studies, however, is 
contained in the definition of the gods of Yasukuni. These views can rightly be 
called heretical. Shimagawa puts himself into the position of the soldiers killed in 
battle, especially in World War II; it states that they died a meaningless death un-
                                                 
451 The Constitution of Japan, Article 20: «Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious or-
ganization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority. No per-
son shall be compelled to take part in any religious acts, celebration, rite or practice. The State and 
its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.« 
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der false pretenses due to »mistaken politics.« »For this reason, the deities of Ya-
sukuni Shrine are ‘gods who profoundly hate war’« (Shimagawa 1985: 19). Their 
will to live was violated, and they themselves are full of hate. 
Based on these views, the author reaches a definition of the gods of Yasukuni 
as onryô-gami, »vengeful deities of the souls of the dead,« that is of great interest 
to religious studies. An earlier definition of the deities of Yasukuni as onryô or 
goryô can be found in Ôe Shinobu’s work on Yasukuni Shrine (1984: 107ff.). In the 
wider field of religious studies this category of bitterly hateful souls of the dead is 
referred to as the »terrible dead.« 
 
2. 3. 1. Yasukuni and the »terrible death« 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, this view results in far-reaching consequences. 
As we know, the Tennôist Meiji state was based on the ideology of »familism.« 
From the standpoint of an extreme Kokugaku, following the radical views of 
Hirata Atsutane, this system ultimately resulted in the construction of a familial 
relationship between the Japanese people and the imperial family that was seen 
as factually true. The legitimation for this was provided by the ancient myths. 
However, the logical consequence of this idea, in light of the previous discussion, 
creates dangers for the state and the nation resulting from the definition of the 
family state. For just as a single family can be threatened by the »wandering 
spirit« of a family member who has suffered a »terrible death,« the religious logic 
states that the greater group of those who died an early, violent death, the »terri-
ble dead,« pose a danger for the »family state« in its entirety. Ceremonies are car-
ried out, and a »house of souls« is built in order to appease and comfort them, 
thus, as Sell writes (1955: 39; cf. Antoni 1991a: 183), making them »harmless.« 
In the case of Yasukuni Shrine, this means that the country maintains its 
»peace« through the shrine because the deceased souls of the war dead, who 
could potentially represent a danger to the community, are subdued in it and 
thus do not represent a danger for the state family (see also Smith 1974: 58). 
Among other things, Emperor Meiji’s Rescript of May 10, 1868, on the found-
ing of the Shôkonsha in Kyôto supports this interpretation. Although it speaks at 
length of the emperor’s thanks for the loyalty of the dead soldiers, elsewhere the 
other, threatening side of the »heroic death« becomes apparent: the construction 
of the shrine is ordered »in order to make [the dead soldiers’] feelings known 
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throughout the Empire, and in the hope that the souls of the dead may be comforted 
[my emphasis].«452  
Also in the present this point plays a recognizable role at the center of the cur-
rent debate about the religious definition of Yasukuni Shrine. Significantly, the 
following statement on the function of Yasukuni Shrine is found in the very draft 
of the law that seeks to establish453 once again the non-religious nature of the 
shrine: 
»The purpose of Yasukuni-jinja is to express the people’s feeling of reverence 
for the souls of those who died in war as well as of the people who sacrificed 
their life for the country, to give thanks for their lasting contributions, to ap-
pease [my emphasis] them and to carry out ceremonies, celebrations, etcetera 
in honor of their deeds and thus to secure their place of honor forever in the 
memory of future generations.« 
Section IV, § 22, 1, II states even more clearly on the function of the shrine: 
»Remembrance of the lasting contributions of those who died in the war et-
cetera and the carrying out of ceremonies and celebrations in order to appease 
them [my emphasis].« 
However, the appeasement of the souls of the war dead is, as we have seen, an 
eminently religious idea that is based on the concept of the »terrible death«; citing 
it as the justification for the supposed »non-religious« status of Yasukuni-jinja 
represents an unsolvable contradiction. Yasukuni Shrine could only become a 
»war memorial« stripped of all religion if popular belief in the power and po-
tency of the souls of the dead came to an end.454 
 
 
                                                 
452 Lokowandt 1978: 259; the original document can be found in Murakami 1974: 28f. The verb na-
gusameru used in the text means, among other things, »to comfort,« but also »console,« »calm,« 
»solace.«  
453 The draft of a law on the transfer of Yasukuni Shrine into state control was first introduced to 
Parliament by a group of representatives from the ruling party Jimintô (LDP) on June 30, 1969 (cf. 
Lokowandt 1981: 18, 173-181). 
454 For a detailed discussion of the topic of Yasukuni Shrine in the present cf. the study by Frank 
Nitzsche (1993), which analyzes especially the coverage by the newspaper Asahi shimbun from 
1985 to 1993. 
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3. SHINTÔ, THE STATE AND THE END OF THE POST-WAR ERA 
 
With the death of Shôwa-tennô and the subsequent enthronement of his suc-
cessor Akihito, it was widely hoped in Japan that the post-war era had finally 
come to an end. In fact, however, both events sparked debates in Japan and 
abroad on the causes and background of the war to an extent not seen since 1945. 
The debates focussed on the figure (and institution) of the emperor, whose in-
volvement in the unfortunate history was now discussed far more openly than 
before. And more than ever, questions arose about a true break with the pre-war 
system and the position of the imperial household that resulted from it. 
In this context, two major ritual events in 1989 and 1990 influenced a new 
worldwide understanding of the issues surrounding the Japanese imperial fam-
ily. The burial ceremonies (taisô no rei, cf. Antoni 1990b; 1991a: 190-239) on Febru-
ary 24, 1989, marked Japan’s final farewell to Shôwa-tennô, who died on January 
7 of that year after a long illness. The sokui no rei (»enthronement ceremony«) on 
November 12, 1990, and even more so the daijôsai (»Great Thanksgiving Festival«) 
on November 23, 1990, marked the accession of the former heir to the throne.455 
 
3. 1. Shôwa-tennô’s illness and death 
 
The widespread sympathy among the people for the emperor’s illness and 
death again demonstrated their deep reverence for the emperor. At the same 
time, however, in Japan as well as abroad, especially among the former enemy 
countries in the war, the death of the emperor sparked a public discussion of 
formerly unseen proportions on the position and function of the imperial house-
hold in present-day Japan and the immediate past – in this case primarily regard-
ing the problem of the personal guilt or responsibility for the war (sensôsekinin) 
carried by the emperor during World War II. Japanese conservatives generally 
took the view that the death of the emperor marked the irrevocable end of an en-
tire era – the Shôwa period, with its entanglement in the war and its militarism – 
and that Japan could now look toward the future free and unburdened by the 
shadows of the past (cf. Mainichi-gurafu-kinkyû-zôkan 1989: 65, among others). 
However, it became apparent, not only from the critical comments from abroad, 
that wishful thinking and reality very nearly threatened to erupt into conflict. Es-
                                                 
455 On these ceremonies see also Rekishigaku Kenkyûkai (ed.) 1990: passim. 
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pecially on the occasion of the burial of the emperor, sensitive problems and 
questions regarding the imperial household were brought up again, and Japan 
appears to stand only at the beginning of a discussion that is far from being con-
cluded.456 
Two questions in particular emerge from the context of the public debate. The 
first of these, which has been intensely and controversially discussed, asks to 
what extent the emperor can or should be recognized as having a personal 
authority of decision and thus a responsibility for the course of the war during 
the 1930s and 1940s. In this context, the spectacular affair surrounding the mayor 
of Nagasaki, who charged the emperor with personal complicity, drew attention 
from abroad. Motoshima Hitoshi, a member of the governing party Jimintô (LDP) 
and mayor of the city of Nagasaki, publicly charged the emperor with responsi-
bility for Japan’s role in World War II before the city council and furthermore 
later declared that the dropping of the atomic bomb on Nagasaki could have been 
avoided if the emperor had ended the war earlier. Following these statements 
Motoshima suffered a severe backlash from within his own party and was inun-
dated with death-threats from radical right-wing organizations. Finally the »Mo-
toshima case« came to be seen as a touchstone for the freedom for speech in pre-
sent-day Japan. This unfortunate affair reached its climax in the attempted assas-
sination of Motoshima on January 18, 1990, from which the mayor escaped with 
serious injuries.457 
Secondly, since Emperor Hirohito’s death, the position of the imperial house-
hold within the Japanese state has been fundamentally disputed. This question 
emerged despite the change in the emperor’s position long since effected by the 
Constitution from that of a sacrosanct, divine sovereign as stated in the »Meiji 
Constitution,« which was valid until 1946, into a merely representative function 
in accordance with the post-war Constitution. Abroad as well as in Japan, the 
question was posed of whether in post-war and present-day Japan the emperor-
ship could possibly take on a far more important function than commonly be-
lieved; and furthermore why Japan has such difficulties in defining for the world, 
and possibly also for itself, the position of the emperor in its society. 
                                                 
456 The scope of the discussions within Japan can be seen in the articles translated in the topical is-
sues »The era of Shôwa-tennô, I« in the magazine Kagami (new series, volume XVI, issues 1/2, 
1989; Antoni, Worm 1989). 
457 The fact that the case drew such an unusual amount of attention can be seen, among other 
things, in a book that was published in Japan in 1990 with great success. It contains excerpts from 
a total of 7,300 letters that the mayor of Nagasaki was sent over the course of the affair by the 
Japanese people. Astonishingly, a majority of the letters express agreement with Motoshima’s 
views (Nagasaki-shichô e no 7100 no tôri no tegami. Tennô no sensô-sekinin o megutte, Komichi shobô, 
Tôkyô 1990). 
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These irritations stem from the fact that the enormous economic success of the 
post-war era also marked the emergence of a new image of Japan in the interna-
tional community. At that time, contrary to earlier clichés, Japan was seen by 
many as the embodiment of an exclusively economic and technological utopia, 
even as a »superstate.« But the international commentators appeared to have 
gone too far in imagining an exclusively Western and technologically oriented 
»modern« and rational Japan, since the international community was largely un-
comprehending in the face of the events surrounding the imperial household 
since the fall of 1988. Suddenly, »traditional« or even »archaic« elements in pre-
sent-day Japan were put forth by irritated commentators – factors that did not 
harmonize at all with the dearly held image of a coming »superstate of the 21st 
century.«  
It became apparent that the area of intellectual and religious history cannot be 
neglected in viewing present-day Japan, and especially the imperial household, if 
an accurate picture of reality in Japan is to be drawn. 
In this context, the deceased emperor’s burial itself, and especially the question 
of the manner in which the state burial should be conducted, played a key role in 
the debate. The debate concentrated on details of the burial ceremony that ap-
peared somewhat marginal, a circumstance that was often difficult for foreign ob-
servers to understand and thus requires explanation. But in fact, all of the prob-
lems of the separation of state and religion – also specified by the Constitution 
(Article 20, Section 3) – were contained in this single point. The concrete question 
was how the democratic nation of Japan should carry out the first burial of an 
emperor after the emperorship had lost its earlier position, which was based in 
Shintô. While the direct predecessors of Shôwa-tennô were buried according to 
the (State) Shintô ceremony with all its spiritual and ideological implications, 
those in power now had to face the complicated problem of which changes to 
make to the ceremony in order to make the changes stipulated by the Constitu-
tion clear to the outside world. 
This meant that the details of the ceremony’s progression played an eminently 
important, highly symbolic role and ultimately allow conclusions to be drawn re-
garding the position of the imperial household in present-day Japan. 
For this reason, it is worth analyzing the ceremony in question. Aside from my 
own notes and observations, the main sources for this discussion of the ceremo-
nies surrounding Shôwa-tennô’s burial were reports from Japanese and interna-
tional media (the press, TV and video). Additionally, official Japanese materials, 
which were provided to the author by the office of the Prime Minister, were also 
used (cf. Antoni 1991a: 190-239). 
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3. 1. 1. The burial 
 
Already during the celebrations on the occasion of Emperor Hirohito’s 86th 
birthday, on April 29, 1987, rumors of a supposed illness from cancer spread in 
Japan. But only one and a half years later, on September 19, 1988, did his serious 
illness become apparent. The emperor suffered a serious breakdown. But only af-
ter the emperor’s death was it officially acknowledged that the emperor had suf-
fered an incurable cancer of the duodenum. Crown Prince Akihito took over the 
official duties of his father, and the media prepared for the impending death of 
the emperor. But the emperor’s fight for survival, extended by regular blood 
transfusions, stretched over several months, during which public life in Japan 
was entirely taken over by the event and nearly came to a standstill. Daily press 
reports with detailed medical bulletins, including the exact amounts of transfused 
blood and so on, kept the public in bated breath. To a degree wholly unexpected 
by international observers, the nation of Japan appeared to have turned again to 
the – now dying – emperor.458 Images of the hundreds of thousands of people 
who wrote their well-wishes in the lists that were made available or who knelt in 
silence before the Imperial Palace in Tôkyô were circulated around the world. Al-
though at this point the debate within Japan about the imperial household had al-
ready begun, accompanied by occasionally rude attacks by the foreign, and espe-
cially the British, press (cf. Antoni 1991a: 192, note 4), the international commu-
nity was generally given the impression that Japan again stood in unity behind its 
emperor. For this reason, one of the largest daily newspapers, Mainichi shimbun, 
wrote in September 1988 with consternation: 
»If we do not react with more reserve, still other countries will begin to be-
lieve that Japan has not changed since the time before the war.« (Mainichi 
shimbun, September 28, 1989). 
Along with the emperor’s increasing agony, the political debate in Japan also 
intensified. Both sides accused one another of exploiting the situation for their 
own purposes, and depending on their position, of either supporting the revival 
of the imperial system of the pre-war era, or on the other side, seeking to com-
pletely abolish the emperorship. In this context, the relationship between the state 
and Shintô received increased attention. Already for some time before the em-
peror’s illness, there had been repeated attempts to harmonize politics and politi-
                                                 
458 Some in the press were of the opinion that the widespread interest was primarily the result of a 
»media event« without any true inner compassion among the people (cf. on this topic, among 
others, Soto kara mita ‘Tennôkyô,’ in: Bungei shunjû, March 1989: 402-409, especially p. 403). 
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cally oriented Shintô. Just one example of this is the previously discussed debate 
surrounding Yasukuni Shrine. In light of the situation, several conservative 
groups, such as the »Fellowship for fundamental questions of state,« which in-
cluded 43 LDP representatives, now concentrated on the goal of reconciling the 
state with Shintô (cf. Yomiuri shimbun, October 17, 1988). Thus, it was evident that 
the impending death of the emperor was of great political importance to the vari-
ous social groups in Japan. 
 
3. 1. 1. 1. The ceremonies up to the time of the burial 
 
On Saturday, January 7, 1989, Emperor Hirohito, posthumously known as 
Shôwa-tennô, died at 6:33 AM in Fukiage Palace in Tôkyô. Upon the emperor’s 
death, the preparations for the burial ceremonies as well as the enthronement of 
the new emperor began. On the day of Shôwa-tennô’s death, the transfer of the 
imperial regalia of the sword, copies of the jewels and the imperial seal to the 55-
year-old Akihito took place already at 10:01 AM in a short ceremony (kenjitô 
shôkei no gi)459 in the Matsu no ma hall of the Imperial Palace. The ceremonial 
transfer was conducted as a state ceremony by order of the government. Akihito 
is considered the 125th emperor in the history of Japan according to the traditional 
chronology, the early history of which, however, is fictitious. The inclusion of the 
government in this ceremonial enthronement (sokui) sparked criticism; in this 
context reference was also made to the upcoming religious festival of the daijôsai 
in the following year, in which the government had also announced its participa-
tion.460 On the afternoon of the same day, in accordance with legal regulations 
from 1979 (the so-called »gengô law«), the government announced the name for 
the Akihito era: Heisei, meaning »widespread peace.« The following day, Sunday, 
January 8, was declared the first day of the new era. On January 9, the new em-
peror gave the constitutional oath in a ceremony before an audience of represen-
tatives of the state (chôken no gi). 
At the same time, preparations for the state burial and mourning began. The 
Imperial House Act (Kôshitsu tenpan) stipulates in § 25 that upon the death of the 
                                                 
459 Article 4 of the Imperial House Act (Kôshitsu tenpan) states that upon the death of an emperor 
the crown prince is to immediately (tadachi ni) ascend to the throne, although no procedural de-
tails are given (cf. Kami 1989: 106). 
460 The »Great Thanksgiving Festival« (daijôsai) marks the high point of all the enthronement cele-
brations. In a secret ritual, revolving around the mystical communion of the new emperor with 
the sun goddess and other deities, the emperor receives spiritual legitimation for his rulership. Cf. 
Murakami 1990: passim; on the question of the original religious significance of the daijôsai cf. An-
toni 1988: 177-195. 
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emperor a »great burial ceremony« (taisô no rei) is to be carried out.461 However, 
the law makes no mention of the procedure and details of the burial; the job of 
determining these points is given over to a »burial committee« (taisô no rei iinkai) 
that is to be formed immediately. Already on the morning of January 8 the cabi-
net voted for the appointment of such a commission under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru. February 24 was decided on as the day of the 
burial.462 
Until that time, according to the regulations of the Imperial Household Agency 
(kunaishô), various religious ceremonies were to take place.463 A comprehensive 
program of ceremonies for the burial itself on Friday, January 24, 1989, was de-
termined, which consisted of a series of interrelated private, religious ceremonies 
for the imperial family and secular, state ceremonies. 
Since Article 7, Section 10 of the Constitution allows the emperor the »practic-
ing of ceremonial celebrations,« there is no fundamental obstacle to combining 
Shintô ceremonies with those of the state. However, the planned combination of 
these heterogeneous elements in the case at hand entailed fundamental problems 
and led to fierce controversy. For example, the Japanese Communist Party de-
clared its refusal to participate in any of the ceremonies. In November of the pre-
vious year, while Shôwa-tennô was still alive, Chief Cabinet Secretary Obuchi 
Keizo of the Takeshita government declared that a burial of the emperor would 
be conceived in harmony with the dictates of the Constitution as well as the tradi-
tions of the imperial household. Already at this time, scholars of constitutional 
law had voiced their concerns regarding such a combination.464 Extremist conser-
vative circles, on the other hand, expressed the opposite demand to the govern-
ment to carry out the burial ceremonies in complete agreement with the prece-
dents of the ceremonies for the Emperors Taishô and Meiji, and thus according to 
the supposedly historically traditional form. In this context, it was argued – in 
complete agreement with the maxims of the nationalist State Shintô of the pre-
war era – that Shintô was not a religion, but rather the expression of the »customs 
                                                 
461 Cf. Kami 1989: 106. The use of the expression taisô for a burial has been limited, since the war, 
to the emperor, the empress and the mother and widow of the emperor. Before the war, the term 
taisôgi was applied to an extended circle within the imperial family. 
462 This information comes from various Japanese newspapers; among these the reports in the 
Mainichi shimbun, most of which are signed Iwao Mitsuyo, proved to be especially valuable and 
detailed. 
463 According to Mainichi-gurafu-kinkyû-zôkan 1989: 145. 
464 Cf. Kusaoi Akiko’s detailed discussion of the topic (»Constitution's principles raise questions as 
imperial funeral and accession loom«) in: The Japan Times, November 12, 1988. 
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and ways« of Japan. According to this logic, a Shintô state ceremony would not 
violate the constitutional mandate separating the state and religion.465 
The government’s decision to combine both the official and private ceremonies 
of the imperial family represented a compromise between the two fundamentally 
opposed demands. 
 
3. 1. 1. 2. The ceremonies on February 24, 1989 
 
Already on January 11, 1989, before the program for the ceremonies was de-
cided, construction work began in the imperial gardens, Shinjuku gyôen in the 
district of Shinjuku, Tôkyô, for the location of the most important ceremonies of 
the burial festivities: the temporary funeral hall (sôjôden). On January 12 the 
group responsible for carrying out the »chapel rites« (sôjôden no gi) was deter-
mined; 86-year-old Nagazumi Torahiko, a companion of the emperor’s since kin-
dergarden, was appointed as its leader. On January 16 the condolence lists were 
closed. A total of 4,729,728 people had written in them since January 7 (Iwao Mi-
tsuyo in Mainichi shinbun, February 22, 1989). In the period from January 22 to 25, 
the people were given the opportunity to pay their respects to the deceased em-
peror. On the first day alone more than 160,000 people crowded into the part of 
the palace that was opened for this purpose. 
On January 24, the burial committee made its final decision on the procedure 
of the funeral rites. The ceremony was divided into seven sections, four of which 
were considered private acts of the imperial family, and the remaining three offi-
cial state ceremonies. 
The funeral area in the garden of Shinjuku gyôen was similar in design to the 
historical examples of the Taishô and Meiji eras. The funeral hall (sôjôden), which 
was built entirely out of Japanese cedar and corresponded in its construction and 
function to that of a Shintô shrine, measured 20 meters long, 10 meters deep and 
12 meters high. Up until the beginning of the state taisô no rei ceremony, a torii 
was placed in front of the funeral hall, in front of which two large ômasakaki 
branches were placed, both of which are prominent symbols used in Shintô cere-
monies. The area for the funeral guests was separated by a folded curtain (man-
mon). The entire funeral area was surrounded by a temporary fence (manmaku) in 
black and white. Perpendicular to the funeral hall there were two open tent halls 
(akusha) for the funeral guests invited to take part in the ceremonies. 
                                                 
465 Kusaoi Akiko is also the author of an informative and critical article on this topic: »Two-part 
funeral leaves both sides dissatisfied,« in: The Japan Times, February 24, 1989. 
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Although the motorcade, which was designated part of the state ceremony, 
was consciously kept simple in its conception, the short funeral procession (toho 
soretsu), which led from the entrance of the funeral area to the funeral hall, was 
based on historical examples and Shintô ritual. The beginning of the procession, 
which can only be discussed in its main features, was formed by the ceremonial 
ornaments (igibutsu) of the imperial household: five banners in the colors white 
and orange, two shields, four halberds and two imperial banners with the sym-
bols of the sun and moon. These ceremonial ornaments were followed by two 
large ômasakaki branches, priests and two artfully designed containers (gyosen-
pitsu) for the transport of the two kinds of offerings: foodstuffs (shinsen) and cloth 
goods (heibutsu). These were followed, along with more priests, by court musi-
cians playing traditional court music (gagaku) on classical instruments. At the cen-
ter of the parade was the massive sedan (sôkaren) carrying the emperor’s coffin, a 
palanquin in the classical (originally Chinese) style carried by 51 attendants, 
measuring 7 meters in length and weighing 1.5 tons.466 One of the emperor’s 
chamberlains followed the sedan on foot wearing a pair of white shoes. Finally a 
group of officials was followed by the members of the imperial household 
headed by the new emperor in his formal role as the chief mourner. The end of 
the procession, which consisted of a total of 225 participants and was 150 meters 
long, was taken up by a member of the funeral committee. 
The remainder of the ceremony followed the program as previously discussed. 
The core of the sôjôden ceremony consisted of, in addition to the offerings, the 
eulogy by the new emperor in his function as the chief mourner.  
As dictated by the program, following the imperial family’s private sôjôden no 
gi ceremony a seemingly insignificant change took place that was actually of 
great importance for the entire proceedings: the Shintô ceremonial symbols of the 
torii and ômasakaki were removed, and shortly thereafter the ceremony was con-
tinued, but now as an official state ceremony without any openly religious char-
acter. However, there was no change of location, nor were any further adjust-
ments made to the facilities. The sôjôden funeral hall, the central location of the 
proceedings, as well as the other elements including the akusha tent halls, the 
manmaku fences and so on, were kept without making any changes. Only the re-
moval of the torii and the ômasakaki served to signify the end of the religious part 
of the proceedings and the secular character of the taisô no rei ceremony that was 
to follow. 
                                                 
466 Sôkaren: historically a covered, closed sedan (koshi) reserved for use by the emperor and select 
members of the imperial family, also called sôka no koshi. The name, which refers to the shape of 
an onion (negi no hana, or sôka) is attributed to the onion-shaped golden roofs of the sedans. 
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After the completion of this ceremony, which involved the largest showing of 
royalty, heads of state and other foreign guests of honor ever seen in Japan, the 
emperor’s coffin was transferred back to the hearse (jisha), a black automobile, 
and the motorcade proceeded to bring the coffin to its final resting place, the Mu-
sashino mausoleum at the Imperial Musashi Cemetery (Musashi ryô bochi) in the 
town of Hachiôji, which belongs to the metropolis of Tôkyô. Like the journey 
from the Imperial Palace to Shinjuku-gyôen Park, this trip over a distance of 
about 45 kilometers was considered an independent state ceremony (taisô no rei 
gosoretsu). 
Upon arriving at Musashi Cemetery in Hachiôji, which until then had only 
housed the mausoleums of the parents of Shôwa-tennô (Taishô-tennô and his 
wife Teimei – Meiji-tennô having been buried according to his own wishes in 
Momoyama, near Kyôto, as discussed above) the coffin (reikyû) was brought in a 
procession to its final resting place. However, it remained in the hearse and was 
not transferred to a sôkaren palanquin. The following rites and ceremonial acts, as 
well as the burial itself, proceeded according to the program. 
In front of the gravesite itself, a building (osuya) in the form of a Shintô shrine 
was constructed at the time of the burial that resembled the sôjôden, the tempo-
rary funeral hall in Shinjuku-gyôen Park. After the conclusion of the ceremonies 
and a period of time in which the people could pay their respects at the grave-
side, this building was removed and the area around the grave was closed to the 
public. Only after the completion of the mausoleum was the area reopened. 
The burial took place in the presence of only the closest members of the impe-
rial family. This included transporting the coffin to the location of the elevated 
stone chamber on specially constructed tracks (cf. Mainichi shimbun, February 22, 
1989). Supposedly 100 items were included with the coffin as burial objects (cf. 
Yomiuri shimbun, February 23, 1989). 
Already on the day before the burial, February 23, the spirit of the deceased 
emperor had been ceremonially brought into a special chamber of the grave (gon-
den, or karidono, the »temporary residence«) in a Shintô ritual to remain there until 
the burial mound was complete. 
The removal of the burial objects (teppeisen) in front of the temporary grave 
structure (osuya) marked the end of the 14-hour-long burial ceremonies. During 
the first year of mourning a large number of other ceremonies and ritual acts 
were to take place, but the ceremonies of February 24, 1989 represented a whole 
complex of events that now came to an end. 
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3. 1. 2. The historical dimension 
 
As previously discussed, the preparations for the funeral and the state burial 
were accompanied by a variety of public discussions. Since the ceremonial ele-
ment carries a highly symbolic weight, the question of the separation between the 
»private« and »state« parts of the ceremonies was of great importance. Yet the 
more closely we examine this question, the more difficult it becomes to determine 
a true, clear separation between these two areas. Besides the unusually large fi-
nancial contribution from the state even for the ostensibly private events held by 
the imperial family, this is due among other things to such obvious circumstances 
as the burial site’s location and official name having been determined by the gov-
ernment, although this should be a purely private matter of the imperial family. 
But the ceremonial aspect of the burial festivities themselves, the proceedings of 
which were briefly sketched in the preceding discussion, proves upon closer ex-
amination to be by no means split into these two areas as the program states. This 
situation, however, cannot be viewed solely from the perspective of the burial of 
Shôwa-tennô; only upon comparison with the historical antecedents does the ex-
tent of continuity and discontinuity that characterized the burial become appar-
ent. Thus let us turn to a short comparison with the burial of Taishô-tennô (cf. 
Antoni 1990b).467 
 
3. 1. 2. 1. Excursus: the burial of Taishô-tennô 
 
On the morning of December 25, 1926, Emperor Yoshihito, posthumously 
known as Taishô-tennô, died in the Hayama Imperial Villa. Upon Yoshihito’s 
death, the honor of the emperorship went to Crown Prince Hirohito. The burial 
took place on February 7, 1927, according to the legal provisions established on 
October 21, 1926 (Kôshitsu fukumorei and Kôshitsu sôgirei). After the ritual paying 
of respects at the Imperial Palace, the funeral ceremony was conducted in Shin-
juku-gyôen Park in Tôkyô. It took place, according to tradition, at night. The 
transfer of the coffin from the Imperial Palace to the funeral area was accompa-
nied by more than 10,000 people in an official funeral parade following the 
hearse. Along with representatives from the armed forces, the police, government 
officials and members of the burial commission, Taishô-tennô’s funeral parade 
included the symbols already known from the burial of Meiji-tennô: halberds, 
                                                 
467 A compilation of the relevant legislation concerning the funerals of Emperor Meiji and Taishô 
can be found in Gendai hôrei zenshu, ed. Suehiro Itsutarô, Tôkyô 1937, Volume 1, No. 8: 297-355. 
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white and yellow banners, ômasakaki branches as well as banners with the sym-
bols of the sun and moon, which were a clear reference to the position of the im-
perial household within the state at the time and to the fact that the entire cere-
mony, in accordance with the State Shintô ideology of the kokutai, had the charac-
ter of state religion. 
A two-wheeled, black lacquered wagon in the Chinese style (karabisashi)468 
pulled by four decorated oxen served as a jisha, or hearse, on the way from the 
palace to the funeral area. The hearse was followed by a porter carrying the em-
peror’s sandals. Then followed Shintô priests, followed in turn by twelve gagaku 
musicians and military bands in the Western style. Only the new emperor was 
not present in the parade, and was represented by the Imperial Prince Takamatsu 
(see above). The emperor himself awaited the arrival of the funeral parade in 
front of the funeral hall (sôjôden) in Shinjuku-gyôen Park. 
Especially the apparently ancient hearse drew attention among the people; the 
correspondent from the Berliner Tageblatt, Leopold Winkler, wrote in a powerfully 
eloquent report in February of 1927: 
»And for a long time all ears, strangely touched, have been turned toward the 
distance: a groaning, moaning, whimpering makes its way through the night, 
never heard, perhaps in a clouded dream as a child, deeply primitive from 
the grey dawn of life, and yet cutting into the flesh like the mournful song of 
an old tree in a storm, or the helpless moaning of thousands of poor creatures 
– now all eyes fall upon this strange song of suffering. Very slowly, the 
heavy, powerful and dismal hearse rolls forward, pulled by four black buf-
falo in white straps, on only two enormous wheels. [...] Above all of this 
drones the great cracking and creaking of the wheels. [...] The inside of the 
wagon is hidden from view by blinds made of bamboo straw.« 
At 8 PM the parade reached the funeral area, where a Shintô shrine served as a 
temporary funeral hall (sôjôden), in front of which there were two large, open-
sided tent halls (akusha), each accommodating 5000 funeral guests. They also 
housed the foreign guests and the entire diplomatic corps. The entrance to the fu-
neral area as well as the funeral hall itself were each marked by a large torii. 
The further proceedings ran according to the already customary practice of the 
Shintô burial ceremony: tensenpei, the traditional offerings of cloth and foodstuffs, 
were brought forth; the norito was read, followed by the parting remarks of the 
                                                 
468 Also called karabisashi no kuruma or karaguruma (»chinese car«), this vehicle is a two-wheeled 
covered oxcart (gissha) that was used during the Nara and Heian periods and reserved for use by 
the emperor and empress. Vehicles of this kind fell out of use during the Kamakura period and 
were later only used for certain ceremonies and events. The design and name of the vehicle point 
to the strong influence from China in this area. 
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new Emperor Hirohito to his deceased father. Then followed parting remarks 
from the other members of the imperial family, led by the widowed empress. 
Then the representatives of the 55 states taking part in the burial ceremony pro-
ceeded in front of the funeral hall, followed by the members of the Japanese gov-
ernment. This marked the end of the ceremonies at the sôjôden funeral hall. At 11 
PM the curtain in front of the funeral hall was closed. 
At midnight the coffin, which had been transferred to a palanquin (sôkaren), 
was carried by 103 people to a specially built, temporary section of Sendagaya 
station, which was located next to the park. The bearers of the palanquin during 
the procession were again made up of young men from the town of Yase near 
Kyôto, the so-called Yase-dôji. The burial itself then took place at Taishô-tennô’s 
gravesite, called Tama no ryô, at the Imperial Musashi Cemetery in Hachiôji. 
As for our question regarding the examples for the burial of Shôwa-tennô, this 
account reveals that the 1989 funeral ceremonies largely followed the pattern of 
the State Shintô ritual since the Meiji period. The customs of imperial burials at 
the time were a hybrid mix of elements of varied provenience, as artificial as 
modern »State Shintô« itself, and more the expression of a modern, religiously 
argued ideology than of an ancient religious tradition. 
The defeat in World War II represented the official end of this ideology, and 
the burial of Shôwa-tennô on February 24, 1989, might have brought with it the 
possibility of rethinking this actually still young tradition of the modern imperial 
burial. On the contrary, those responsible decided on very cautious, merely for-
mal changes to the ceremony that on the surface acknowledged the demands for 
the separation of state and religion, but left no doubt as to the apparent ties to the 
burials of the Emperors Meiji and Taishô. 
 
3. 2. The daijôsai of Emperor Akihito in November 1990469 
 
Regarding the question of a renewed convergence of Shintô and the state in 
present-day Japan, as mentioned at the beginning of the discussion, the en-
thronement ceremony of the new emperor is of particular importance, including 
the sokui no rei of November 12, 1990, and especially the daijôsai of November 22 
and 23, which was extremely controversial in the Japanese political debate. These 
ceremonies were given a great deal of attention in the Japanese as well as the for-
eign press. It is astonishing that in light of these rituals, especially the daijôsai 
(»Great Thanksgiving Festival«) itself, previous concepts in the form of a sacral 
                                                 
469 Cf. among others Neues aus Japan, volume 331, November/December 1990: 2-15 and Neues aus 
Japan, special edition: Beginn einer neuen Ära, Heisei – Frieden und Eintracht (no year, no date). 
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interpretation of the emperorship, and thus the idea of the kokutai, were publicly 
and officially propagated in a form that had not been considered possible since 
the end of the war. 
A detailed analysis of the ceremony of the succession to the throne in Novem-
ber, 1990 has not yet been undertaken; Peter Fischer (1991) offers a discussion of 
the political function of the rituals. The special importance of the daijôsai for the 
problem of the sacred interpretation of the imperial household – and thus implic-
itly the problem of the kokutai – is generally recognized by recent research. Thus, 
Peter Fischer states as a summary of the aforementioned study (Fischer 1991: 
117): 
»Especially the enthronement ceremonies opened the door for a renewed 
convergency, or rather combination, of Shintô and the state more than at any 
other time in the post-war era.« 
Ernst Lokowandt (1992: 15f.) remarks on the aspect of constitutional law: 
»The position of the emperor is, as is now apparent from the procedure of the 
daijôsai, the first Shintô thanksgiving ceremony during the reign of an em-
peror, contradictory and ultimately unclear. [...] Article 20 [of the Constitu-
tion of Japan] requires a strict separation between the state and religion and 
prohibits any religious acts by the state. However, this article was violated by 
the daijôsai, which even the government was obliged to admit was a religious 
ceremony. This infringement is made all the more serious by the fact that the 
daijôsai is not just any religious ceremony, but one of the three ceremonies 
that establish the very position of the emperor. Thus, it can be asserted with-
out exaggeration that the holding of the daijôsai marked the rescinding [my 
emphasis] of Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution of Japan.« 
Finally the political scientist Paul Kevenhörster (1993: 23) writes clearly in a 
publication on this topic: 
»The connection between Shintô, the continued state support of which is pro-
hibited by the new Constitution, and the position of the emperor is a politi-
cally sensitive question. In contrast to the intentions of the Constitution, the 
ceremonies of imperial succession after Emperor Akihito’s (Heisei-tennô) ac-
cession to the throne in November 1990 again drew objections that they carry 
on and further establish the traditional mandate to power of the imperial 
household. In light of this tradition of rule and its historical and cultural ba-
sis, any renewed convergence of Shintô and the state must be seen as a dan-
ger to the democratic basis of legitimation in the Constitution: the more the 
position of the emperor is justified on religious grounds, the farther removed 
it becomes from the basic constitutional principles of democratic sover-
eignty.« 
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In the secret ritual of the daijôsai, the very sacred foundation of the emperor-
ship that appeared to have been renounced on January 1, 1946 was revived. The 
daijôsai, of religious importance as an sacrifice of first fruits and holy communion 
between deity and man, transforms the profane nature of the person called upon 
to rule by right of ancestry, the new emperor, into a sacred form of existence (cf. 
Antoni 1988: 183-185). Through the ritual connection of genealogical and mythical 
legitimation by the shinchoku (the divine mandate from Amaterasu ômikami to 
her »heavenly grandson« Ninigi no mikoto) with the holy rite of communion, the 
emperor is elevated to the status of a »living god« (arahitogami). It is simply not 
possible to deny the existential and religious character of this ceremony for politi-
cal reasons. Thus, even a state proclamation purely motivated by constitutional 
law cannot nullify the deeply religious nature of this ritual, which, regardless of 
its historically broken lineage,470 at its core (the central ceremony in the Yuki- and 
Suki-den) belongs to the authentic religious traditions of the imperial household. 
Despite the doubtless breaks in tradition, the daijôsai in particular is not merely an 
invented tradition in the sense of Eric Hobsbawm’s conception of the term, but 
rather a ceremony that has been altered and made ideologically useful in a »tradi-
tionalistic« sense (see discussion above) which was originally a real religious 
ceremony. The negation of the religious character of this ceremony therefore re-
veals an ideologically motivated interpretation according to the State Shintô doc-
trine of the kokutai from the Meiji and early Shôwa periods. 
What true value – the question is posed here in polemical exaggeration – can 
the relinquishment of the emperor’s divinity in 1946 be seen as having when the 
new emperor nonetheless conducted the secret ritual of the »Great Thanksgiving« 
(daijôsai) in 1990, a rite that is deeply rooted in the mythical and religious tradi-
tion and in which the designated ruler communes with the heavenly deities, thus 
receiving divine legitimation for his rule, and in this way also his sacred status? 
Thus, Akihito’s daijôsai represented the renewal of the supposedly unbroken 
divine legitimation of the Japanese imperial household. In this context the un-
critical use of the mythically founded chronology of the imperial family is also 
worth noting, according to which the emperor was welcomed as the 125th em-
peror. The official Japanese news organization Neues aus Japan remarked:471 
»On November 12, 1990 Emperor Akihito acceded to the throne in a festive 
ceremony at the Imperial Palace as the 125th Japanese monarch. [...] The cere-
monies reached a second high point with the enthronement, which stretched 
                                                 
470 For the origins of the daijôsai, cf. Antoni 1988, chapter C. 5; for the historical continuity of the 
daijôsai, cf. Liscutin 1990: 43-51. 
471 Neues aus Japan, volume 331, November/December 1990. 
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over several days, with the Daijosai festival of rice offerings made by the em-
peror to his ancestors in the night of November 22 to 23.« 
Following this, rites and ceremonies that were carried out in this context are 
described in detail. The new emperor is introduced here as »the 125th Japanese 
monarch,« thus implicitly recognizing the traditional genealogy of the imperial 
household as found in the Kojiki and especially in the historical work of the 
Dainihonshi, which was canonized by the Mito School. This legitimation also of 
the present emperor is thus rooted – in the sense of a »sacred monarchy« – in the 
ancient and traditional foundations of Shintô, including »traditionalistic« compo-
nents from the Meiji period. 
Overall the conclusion can be drawn that the state’s efforts were successful in 
their essential472 goal of maintaining the two main pillars of the kokutai: the un-
broken unity of people and emperor as well as the religious affirmation of the 
emperorship through ritual means, as modern Japanese theoreticians and ideo-
logues had formulated since the days of the Mitogaku and Kokugaku. 
 
 
                                                 
472 In this context the Japanese term seika, meaning »essence, quintessence,« or »flower, glory,« 
which had a constant presence in the kokutai debate, is fitting (cf. Kokutai no hongi 1937: 9, line 3). 
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4. KOKUTAI AND NIHONJINRON 
 
Japan’s defeat in World War II and the resulting end of the sovereign position 
of the ruler struck a lasting blow to the idea of Japan’s exceptional kokutai, but as 
we have seen in the previous discussion, essential aspects of this Shintô-based 
dogma have managed to survive into the present day. 
But even outside the area of the state, remnants or altered forms of modern ko-
kutai thought in present-day Japan can be observed. Especially in the wake of the 
country’s economic development in the post-war era, which was viewed as sensa-
tional not only abroad but also in Japan, since the 1970s the growth of a new na-
tional confidence has become apparent that can clearly be seen as a variety of ko-
kutai thought. 
But here it is not the emperor alone, in the sense of classical thought, who 
stands at the center of this conception, but rather it is the question of the sup-
posed anthropological exceptionality of the entire Japanese nation that moves the 
spirits. 
This debate, which is known by the name Nihonjinron, or »theories about the 
Japanese,« is related to kokutai thought in particular as an intellectual position 
that postulates specific characteristics of national singularity and applies them to 
the analysis of complex historical, economic and sociological problems as relevant 
categories, thereby emphasizing specific, supposedly purely Japanese traits that 
are not shared by other countries and cultures and on the basis of which Japan’s 
exceptional economic success is supposed to have been made possible. Thus we 
return to the area of cultural images and national stereotypes that were men-
tioned in the introduction (Chapter I: 2. 4) as being so relevant to this context. 
The sociologists Sugimoto and Mouer remark on this topic: 
»In the Japanese market of ideas, theories on the Japanese (nihonjin-ron) are in 
full bloom. One topic has been taken up in more or less the same way as the 
main assertion of these theories: how unique are the Japanese? There is 
probably no other society outside Japan in which so many hundreds of books 
have been published that highlight the uniqueness of their own national 
character and furthermore in which so many of these books have become 
best-sellers.« (Sugimoto et al. 1980: 25) 
Sugimoto and Mouer see continuity and common patterns of thought in regard 
to the nihonjinron theories of the pre- and post-war eras, »and an arc can be seen 
pointing to the assumption that from the indefinite past on into the present, in all 
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corners of the country, beyond time, space and the barriers of class, all Japanese 
possess a common form of thought and behavior (Sugimoto et al. 1980: 27). 
Obviously this is based on an approach already pioneered by the national 
Shintô philologists of the 18th and 19th centuries, namely the nativistically ori-
ented question of the definitively characteristic traits of Japanese culture (cf. 
Naumann 1987: 173-191), posed in light of what was perceived by Japanese soci-
ety to be a challenge from abroad in the form of foreign values and ways of life. 
The changes to the Constitution and the political development of the post-war 
era caused the ideology of the kokutai to become largely obsolete only outside na-
tionalist Shintô circles. In 1967, Mitsuma Shingo was able to declare at the »Sec-
ond International Conference for Shintô« (Sasaki 1967: 69f.): 
»The national character of Japan is the solidification of each individual’s 
common mind, which is rooted in Kannagara no michi. [...] In short, our na-
tional character keeps: 1. The unity of Shintô worship and government. 2. The 
reign of the emperor of one dynasty. 3. The oneness of the emperor and his 
subjects.« 
And the politician Hasegawa Takashi writes about Ise Shrine in 1985 in the 
publication of the Liberal Democratic Party (Liberal Star, vol. 14/159, April 10, 
1985: 15), in the manner of his predecessors: 
»Today, we in Japan must recognize the roots of our prosperity and must re-
gain the faith of our spiritual past. Ise Shrine is very moving both in its 
beauty and its power; it represents the stability and continuity of all the em-
perors who have served it since the birth of our nation.« 
 
4. 1. On the image of the emperor in post-war Japan 
 
The Japanese historian Suzuki Hiroo remarked on the image of the emperor in 
Japan of the 1980s: 
»Only a few Japanese in their mid-forties or older hear the word tennô with-
out being deeply moved. The variety and intensity of feeling depends on 
one’s personal background and experiences. Younger Japanese, on the other 
hand, feel nothing special in the word tennô, especially since they have been 
given a negative image of the emperor in history class in school during the 
post-war era.« (Suzuki 1980: 31) 
Opinion polls appear to confirm this development. Three times after the war, 
the Japanese newspaper Asahi shimbun conducted a survey on the question »How 
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much sympathy do you have for the imperial family?« during Emperor Hiro-
hito’s life. In the first survey in 1959, a vast majority voiced great sympathy for 
the emperor. Nearly two decades later, however, in 1978, the proportion of Japa-
nese between the ages of 20 and 30 who voiced »sympathy for the imperial fam-
ily« fell to only 20%, and, as the journalist Chikushi Tetsuya remarks in his study, 
among those between 30 and 40, »not even the 30% mark was reached. A shift 
had taken place,« (Chikushi 1983: 65). Finally in 1982, sympathy for the emperor 
had fallen even further to 15% among those between the ages of 20 and 30. 
The more the consensus in Japanese society has been seen as endangered, 
however, the more probing the questions of the historical and cultural basis for 
social consensus become. And it appears as though the emperor, as in earlier 
times, has been rediscovered as a unifying bond, to use the words of the Shintô 
specialist Ashizu Uzuhiko. 
»Already during the turbulent times after the defeat in the war, His Majesty 
tacitly took on the task of bringing peace to Japan. And to this day he embod-
ies this role of unifying the people. The symbol lies especially in this aspect of 
tacit duty.« (Chikushi 1983: 69) 
Remarkably, this development also appears to include the young. Despite all 
data on the disinterest of young people for the emperorship, the previously men-
tioned journalist Chikushi Tetsuya does not agree with the prevailing opinion 
that the imperial system has lost its importance for the younger generation and 
also belongs to the »nationalist core« of the past. He mentions research by Iro-
kawa Daikichi, then professor of modern history at the Tôkyô University of Eco-
nomics, who reached this surprising conclusion: 
»Into the 1970s I thought that the imperial system would simply dissolve. 
However, the beginning of the 1980s marked a change in circumstances: I 
clearly noticed a certain fascination for the imperial system among young 
people.« 
He continues: 
»Young people, exhausted by a society based on competition and tending to 
lose sight of themselves, began to adopt the order of the imperial system as a 
spiritual support.« (Chikushi 1983: 66) 
He writes that this trend appears to be taking hold especially among elemen-
tary school students. According to a representative survey, in 1983 54% of the 
elementary school students in their fifth school-year who were surveyed be-
longed to the »supporters« and only 21% belonged to the »non-supporters« of the 
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emperor; social psychologists such as Saito Tetsuo attribute this development 
surprisingly to the fairly large influence of grandparents on the generation of 
their grandchildren. He writes: 
»The imperial system of the pre-war era has thus quite unexpectedly flour-
ished among children and has thus, under the guise of power, authority and 
morality, been able to return repeatedly to prominence.« (Chikushi 1983: 67) 
Opinion polls from November, 1990 support this trend; according to them, in 
the intervening years a »vast majority of Japanese support the institution of the 
imperial family,« (Neues aus Japan, no. 331, 1990: 14f.). 
A social process may be underway that fundamentally follows the traditional 
historical pattern: while in ancient times it was Chinese culture and in the 19th 
century European culture that swept Japan, after 1945 the United States has taken 
over this function. After a phase of nearly uncritical enthusiasm for the new, Ja-
pan’s discomfort with the values of this Western culture of the late 20th century 
appears to be growing. With the age-old and yet eternally new question of the al-
legedly »true essence« of »the Japanese« we return again to the topic of the em-
perorship. 
It becomes apparent that the debate about the »essence« of the term »Japanese« 
leads directly into the question of the modernization of Japan in history and the 
present. The necessity for adaptation and modernization that resulted from con-
tact with the outside world – with China, the West and others – was already at 
work in ancient Japan and was always accompanied by the intention of defining 
an alleged spiritual basis of Japan’s own culture in contrast to the foreign one. 
The fact that the imperial household played a central role in this ideological con-
text is one of the recognizable constants in Japanese history. 
It appears that even within the present-day Japanese self-understanding, the 
emperor will again play an important role as a unifying symbol. 
A minor anecdote from recent times symbolically shows that this is not mere 
speculation. The topic of the decorative calendar that was sent by the Japanese 
foreign trade organization JETRO in 1988 to its trade partners abroad was not the 
country’s economy or science or art, but rather an unusual-seeming topic: the title 
reads »Yamato: The nostalgic home of the Japanese.« The accompanying text in 
four languages (English, German, French and Spanish) covers a song from the 
most ancient reaches of Japanese tradition, in which the mythical hero of early 
history Yamato-takeru no mikoto, the »brave man from Yamato« mentioned in 
the previous discussion of education and war propaganda before 1945 (see 
above), sings of his love for the homeland Yamato. It is clearly expressed by this 
                    CHAPTER V: LATE SHŌWA AND HEISEI PERIODS  n  355 
 
official organization that the idealized era of ancient Japan with its mythical, leg-
endary emperors and heroic figures who unified the country, among whom Ya-
mato-takeru takes a prominent place, could again serve as a model for Japan in 
the present and future. This example should not be over-interpreted, but the fact 
that the official Japanese foreign trade organization JETRO declared of all things a 
historical figure such as the legendary conquerer Yamato-takeru internationally 
to be the new guiding star of Japan appears from a historical perspective to be not 
unproblematic. At the very least, reference should be made to the fact that Ya-
mato-takeru, the »brave man from Yamato,« of whom his own father, Emperor 
Keiko, was terrified due to his wildness, was only stopped after he sided against 
the gods in his blind urge to conquer.473  
                                                 
473 Cf. the battle of Yamato-takeru with the snakelike mountain deity whom he takes to be that de-
ity’s servant and thereby insults (Nihonshoki, Keiko 40 / 10/7 = NKBT 67: 308/309, cf. Kojiki, 
Keiko: NKBT 1: 218/219). 
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1. THE INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL DEBATE 
 
Not only to pessimists does the world at the beginning of the 21st century pre-
sent disturbing, or at least confusing, images. As if the developments of the 20th 
century did not even take place, the present day is more reminiscent of the 19th 
century and the turn of the 20th century. National conflicts and religious and eth-
nic problems that were believed to be long forgotten surface from the past, and 
categories such as »ethnicity,« »cultural identity,« »traditional value systems« or 
»national religion« once again represent relevant criteria of international debate. 
It was the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington (1927-2008) who 
pointed out and theoretically sketched this development with great clarity in a 
controversial and much discussed essay in the summer of 1993 entitled »The 
Clash of Civilizations?«474 (cf. Antoni 1996). The author writes in the introduction, 
under the title »The next pattern of conflict,« that in his view, future international 
conflicts will mainly be based on neither ideology nor economic factors, but 
rather be »culturally« based (Huntington 1993: 22). The »velvet curtain« of cul-
ture (Huntington 1993: 31) now replaces the fallen »iron curtain« of ideologies. 
The criteria for differentiation between these cultural spheres, according to 
Huntington, are determined by the history, language, culture and, most impor-
tantly, the religion of the cultural spheres in question. »The differences,« 
Huntington writes (1993: 25), »are the product of centuries. They will not soon 
disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ide-
ologies and political regimes.« The author repeatedly emphasizes the role of re-
ligion in this context. 
According to Huntington, the world today is undergoing a fundamental proc-
ess of change. Anyone who does not belong to one of the cultural spheres he pos-
tulates will slip into an isolated, and thus necessarily vulnerable, position. Here 
too the author writes with remarkable clarity. He defines seven or eight global 
»major civilizations« on whose borders future conflicts will arise. These comprise 
the cultural spheres of the »West,« »Confucianism,« »Islam,« »Hinduism,« »Slavic 
orthodoxy,« »Latin America« and possibly also the »African world.« It quickly 
becomes apparent that these entities are in fact – geographically as well as cultur-
ally – extremely large and internally heterogeneous, dividing the earth into cul-
tural continents, without regard to problems with the details. 
                                                 
474 Huntington (1993: 23) gives the following definition: »A civilization is a cultural entity.« 
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And apparently the author identifies the geographic sphere of »East Asia« 
with the cultural sphere of »Confucianism.« 
Against this background it appears all the more remarkable that Huntington 
counts a further »civilization« among the cultural spheres already mentioned, in 
third place according to his ranking, after the »West« and »Confucianism,« which 
by no means fits the image of a civilizational continent: Japan. 
Indeed, the author mentions Japan as the only nation-state, of equal standing 
with and isolated among the other major cultural spheres, on whose borders fu-
ture global conflicts will develop. All other nation-states, nations and peoples of 
the earth are comparatively more rooted in their own cultural horizon, which 
provides them with an internal identity and external protection. Huntington 
(1993: 24) remarks: 
»A civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with Western, 
Latin American and Arab civilizations, or only one, as is the case with Japa-
nese civilization.« 
Huntington (1993: 28) laconically remarks on the reasons underlying Japan’s 
isolated position that »Japan is a society and civilization unique to itself.« 
This is the decisive keyword in this context: according to this view it is the 
»uniqueness« of Japan that prevents a connection with the other global cultural 
spheres – as the only national state in the entire world. 
The postulation of an indigenous, isolated Japanese »cultural sphere« by Sam-
uel Huntington shows how influential the traditional ideas and images, the cli-
chés and stereotypes regarding Japan (both within and outside the country) actu-
ally are. In exact accordance with the general theory of stereotypes, the extremely 
complicated interplay between cultural images of the self and the other, autos-
tereotypes and heterostereotypes, also plays a crucial role in the question at hand. 
Though Huntington’s unequivocal isolation of Japan can hardly be justified in 
factual terms, from the perspective of stereotype theory it is the only sensible 
conclusion. The Japanese self-image provides legitimacy here in a special way, 
since it represents an authentic, and thus – from an outside perspective – appar-
ently credible firsthand cultural statement. Thus, the Japanese image of the self is 
highly influential to the view of Japan abroad. Huntington could hardly have 
been aware of the fact that his categorization directly coincides with the Japanese 
autostereotype, that is to say, with modern Japan’s image of itself. Like a boomer-
ang, this image of a disconnected, isolated Japanese culture now returns to Japan. 
It thus becomes apparent that an analysis of this author’s theories is especially 
important in regard to Japan, since he isolates Japan as the only national state in 
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the world from all other cultural spheres. In a later publication Huntington ex-
plicitly and laconically calls Japan »The Lonely Superpower«.475 It now appears 
pertinent to investigate the deeper origins and background of the widespread 
view of Japan’s supposed cultural isolation that, according to Huntington, makes 
it the loneliest country in the world. 
 
1. 1. Culturalism, Asianism, Nihonjinron 
 
The name Huntington has become a synonym for the epitome of the present-
day »cultural debate.« But Huntington is ultimately only one representative of a 
now current – or perhaps merely fashionable? – discourse that, since the end of 
the antagonism of East and West, places the idea of culture at the center of public 
as well as academic debate. An article on this topic in the magazine The Econo-
mist476 published on November 9, 1996, points to the complexity of this debate. It 
states that in addition to the Huntington school there are three other schools of 
culture that differ merely in their areas of focus: 1) »culture and the economy,« 2) 
»culture as social blueprint,« 3) »culture and decision-making.« Of these three 
groups, the first is the most important. Probably the oldest »culturalist« school, it 
postulates a genetic relationship between cultural factors and the economic suc-
cess (or failure) of a society. The Asianization or Asianism debate of the late 1990s 
was an offshoot of this school, which can be traced back to Max Weber’s theory of 
the Protestant work-ethic. At its core, the concept of Asianism postulates the exis-
tence of certain Asian values that are usually equated with the values of »Confu-
cianism« and are cited as reasons for the economic behavior of Asian countries. 
In the case of Japan, it is especially interesting that in the discussion of Asian-
ism arguments are advanced that have long been used in the context of Nihonjin-
ron discourse in Japan. Just as the special position of Japan in the international 
context has long been justified on the grounds of its unique cultural foundation, 
we find similar, often even identical arguments advanced to explain the general 
Asian, and usually East-Asian, reality. In both cases it is the specific cultural val-
ues that are emphasized in contrast to the Western system, and often Western 
decadence. In this sense, international culturalism, Asianism and the Japanese 
theory of Nihonjinron are deeply interwoven. 
 
                                                 
475 Samuel P. Huntington: »The Lonely Superpower«. In: Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999 issue.  
476 »Cultural Explanations: The man in the Baghdad Café« in: The Economist, November 9, 1996: 25-
32 
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1. 2. Religion and culturalism 
 
So-called »values« play a central role within all of the discourses mentioned 
here. The term »values« is taken to mean the traditional norms of a society that 
are usually seen in stark contrast to Western universalism. This is the foundation 
of cultural particularism. Thus, it is hardly surprising that, as if in a further logi-
cal step, the traditional values of a culture are identified with their equally tradi-
tional framework, religion. Religions play a central role in this context, often to 
the great astonishment of the social sciences, which had long since categorized re-
ligion as a cultural or social phenomenon. In this seemingly ancient world with 
which we have suddenly been confronted again at the start of the 21st century, the 
religious basis of culture, as well as the cultural basis of religion, are suddenly be-
ing paid a great deal of attention in the cultural debate. 
Huntington also views history, language, and, most significantly, religion as 
the most important criteria for differentiating between the cultural spheres he 
postulates. In The Clash of Civilizations the author even dedicates an entire chapter 
to this question; he calls it, after Gilles Kepel, significantly »La Revanche de Dieu« 
(»The revenge of God,« Huntington 1996: 95-101). Huntington argues that there 
has been a general renaissance of religions at the end of the 20th century, a re-
vival of religion that »far transcends the activities of fundamentalist extremists,« 
(Huntington 1996: 96). »The cultural resurgence,« the author remarks regarding 
the development in East Asia, »in the secular Confucian culture takes the form of 
the affirmation of Asian values but in the rest of the world manifests itself in the 
affirmation of religious values« (l.c.). The ubiquity and relevance of religion, he 
writes, has become dramatically apparent in the formerly Communist states. Fi-
nally he concludes, »Religion takes over from ideology, and religious nationalism 
replaces secular nationalism« (Huntington 1996: 100). 
The overall criticism of Huntington’s book has tended to be quite negative. In 
particular he has been accused, not without reason, of creating new concepts of 
an enemy.477 However, these criticisms must be examined for hidden motives, 
since the »culturalist« or »cultural« approach radically questions the achieve-
ments of previous methods of interpretation. In our case it is only the structure of 
the interwoven arguments on which this debate is based that is of interest, espe-
                                                 
477 Cf., among others, Christoph Bertram: »The search for a new enemy. Samuel Huntington prom-
ises an up-to-date system of coordination for international politics. But he merely dredges up old 
fears of the foreign«. In: Die Zeit, no. 50, December 6, 1996: 3. 
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cially the reciprocal relationship between the factors of culture and religion. Re-
ligion is equated with cultural identity, and religion offers a frame of reference for 
a society’s values that are thought to be of essential importance. A Turkish guest 
commentator in the Asahi Evening News even recommended that Japan return to 
the Kokutai no hongi as a moral guideline in contrast to the West!478 
 
2. 1. Religions according to the Japanese culturalist interpretation 
 
Religions thus have a crucial function in the international cultural debate: they 
are seen as the frame of reference for values and cultural identity. Japan’s excep-
tional position, which led to Huntington’s – by no means original – claim that Ja-
pan is the loneliest country in the world, is also based on this concept. But we also 
know that this view not only stems from Western ignorance and arrogance, but 
also from Japan’s image of itself, which propagates itself internationally and fi-
nally makes its way back to Japan. 
Especially in the 1980s, when the debate on the Japanese economic success was 
at its height, proponents of the Japanese theory of Nihonjinron, on one side, and 
their grateful recipients and interpreters in the West, on the other, advanced their 
arguments and ultimately created a kind of »virtual« Japan that, due to its in-
comparable distinctiveness, fulfilled the need for (self-) mystification and exoti-
cism both within Japan and abroad. However, in the academic world serious at-
tempts have been made and are still being undertaken in order to sound out the 
role of traditional culture and especially religions over the course of the modern 
age in Japan. 
The Indian technical scientist Arunoday Saha (1994), who has also spent much 
time researching and teaching at institutions in Britain and the United States, of-
fers an interesting contribution in this context, which will be sketched here pars 
pro toto. In 1994 he wrote an essay entitled »Culture and Development of Tech-
nology in Japan« in which he comparatively examines the role of religions and 
traditional value systems. In his concluding remarks he writes: 
                                                 
478 Asahi Evening News (online edition), 27. Juli 1997, article: »‘Clash of civilizations’ argument is 
preposterous«; the unnamed author, »a scholar from Turkey, is a professor of cultural anthropol-
ogy at Harvard University and a member of Asahi Shimbun’s ‘Create 21, Asahi’ Forum.« He re-
fers to the »famous work ‘Kokutai no Hongi’. There has been much written about this work as be-
ing merely propaganda and the prelude to Japanese militarism in World War II. But rereading it 
after the interval of 70 years suggests that it is also an effort to express the will of the people of a 
major Asian civilization to resist Western domination.« 
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»Traditional Japanese culture has had a marked impact on that country’s ini-
tial absorption and later development of Western technology.« 
In his essay, the author explains in detail his theory that especially three ele-
ments of Japanese culture – Zen Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintô – made an 
indigenous Japanese contribution to the acceptance of modern technology in Ja-
pan. The remarkable thing about this model of explanation, which is presented in 
a serious manner and without sensationalism, is the fact that his theory is based 
on the same religious and intellectual trinity that is familiar to us from the tradi-
tional Japanese self-regard: Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintô. And even more 
remarkable is the fact that he relates these elements to one another using aspects 
of indigenous Japanese culture. This general view, Saha writes, is exemplified by 
one of the areas covered in his essay and which is especially relevant to our pre-
sent context: Shintô. In harmonious agreement with similarly stated arguments, 
he presents the image of a timeless, ahistorical and essentialist Shintô that func-
tions as part of the similarly timeless, ahistorical and immutable culture of Japan. 
According to the technical scientist Saha’s construction, this conception of Shintô 
serves to cover the area of »sensuality« in Japanese culture. 
Saha (1994: 238) offers in only a few lines the perfect image of a mentally dis-
posed, ahistorical Shintô that accordingly makes its contribution today to eco-
nomic and technological development. It would not be difficult to present further 
examples of this kind. In 1994 a dissertation by the sociologist Miyasaka Masa-
hide was published in German in Würzburg under the title Shintô und Christen-
tum: Wirtschaftsethik als Quelle der Industriestaatlichkeit (»Shintô and Christianity: 
economic ethics as the source of the industrial state«) in which »Shintô« even 
serves as the key to the mysteries of Japanese economic practices, similar in this 
aspect to a remarkable article by Michael Ashkenazi (1996) on the topic: »Some 
Influences of Shintô on Japanese Business Practices.« 
The static view of culture, religion, and ultimately Shintô has the consequence 
of presenting similarly formed models as images of reality. Not only the superfi-
cial observer gains the impression that these constructions actually represent real-
ity. In connection with the Japanese tendency toward clichéd self-interpretation, 
it results in autonomous stereotypes that are viewed internationally as categories 
of reality. In this case the image of Japan as the »loneliest country in the world« is 
not far. But let us focus on the case at hand, the role of »Shintô« in this discourse. 
At the very beginning, as the first sentence of his remarks on the contribution of 
Shintô to the Japanese culture of technology, Saha presents an apodictic view that 
apparently requires no questioning and serves to legitimate his writings as a 
sheer matter of course. The author begins with the axiomatic statement, »Shintô, 
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Japan’s indigenous religion …« In nearly the same words, Ashkenazi writes in his 
article from 1996, »The indigenous religion of the Japanese people, Shintô […].« 
Miyasaka (1994: 72) even writes in this context, using a terminology that is not 
unproblematic, that Shintô must »[above all] be described as a religion of the 
people.« These remarks touch on the most crucial area: the definition of »Shintô« 
as Japan’s quasi ethnically defined national religion. This labeling of Shintô re-
veals the well-known argument which claims that an ethnic conception of Shintô 
is merely another name for the whole of Japanese culture, or as another author 
programmatically writes in the title of his book, that Shintô is the »Way of Japan« 
itself (Ross 1983). 
 
1. 3. Shintô - the »national religion« of Japan? 
 
As previously discussed in our examination of the Meiji period, Basil Hall 
Chamberlain presented a polemical work on the topic of modern Shintô as an 
»invented religion« in 1927 (first published in 1912), decades before Hobsbawm’s 
monumental investigations of invented traditions. In present-day research, a his-
torically critical view of the question of whether Shintô can be viewed in essen-
tialist terms as a timeless, immutable, ethnically defined national religion of Japan 
has prevailed. In a programmatic essay on the historical development of Shintô, 
Kuroda Toshio (1993: 26f.) remarks that this conception of Shintô developed at 
the same time as the rise of modern nationalism: beginning with the Kokugaku 
up to Meiji-era State Shintô and the »separation of gods and Buddhas« (shinbutsu-
bunri). In light of the still dominant ahistorical, holistic and static view of 
Shintô,479 these kinds of academically founded approaches and historical and 
critical views rarely reach broad recognition and can hardly influence public 
opinion in Japan or abroad. 
Especially the problem of the extent to which ideological constructions since 
the Meiji period have influenced the present-day image of Japan, often uncon-
sciously, remains to be analyzed. In the previously mentioned article by Ashke-
nazi (1996: 143) the author also touches on the question of the nature of the rela-
tionship between the Shintô he describes and the ideology surrounding the con-
cept of »Japanese uniqueness« in general and Nihonjinron discourse in particular. 
On this subject he reaches the following remarkable conclusion: 
                                                 
479 The concept of Shintô as a timeless Japanese »national religion« was also advanced in modern 
times by researchers of Japanese ethnology, including Yanagita Kunio (koyû-shinkô, cf. Kawada 
1992); see also Göbel 1991: 40, 44ff.; on the contribution of Japanese ethnology to the debate on 
identity in modern Japan cf. Naumann 1987. 
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»Shintô lies at the center of the Japanese uniqueness storm because from the 
time of Hirata Atsutane, it has emphasized the mystic cohesion and unique 
nature of the Japanese [...].« 
However, the author views the influence of (Shrine) Shintô, which from the 
Meiji period until the end of the Pacific War was based on this school, as insig-
nificant in the context of his culturalist thoughts. »This is, at most,« he clearly re-
marks, »a minor factor.« (l.c.) 
It is necessary to voice significant doubts about such a statement. One wishes 
to recommend a text such as Basil Hall Chamberlain’s work of 1927 (see chapter 
IV: 3. 1.) as required reading for the present-day proponents of ahistorical cul-
turalist panaceas, which also include the aforementioned views on the role of 
Shintô in the Japanese economy. But it is not surprising that this illuminating 
work by Chamberlain was only added to a single edition of his popular Things 
Japanese. Demystification and deconstruction of ideological structures are of far 
less general interest than mystifying generalizations and supposedly holistic ex-
pert opinions. Indeed, an investigation of the role of Shintô in the modern age 
would have to begin with the analysis of the Hirata School, which Ashkenazi so 
grandiosely sweeps aside; following this, it would have to focus on the develop-
ment of the various schools of Shintô orthodoxy in the Edo period in historical 
regression, before finally analyzing the practical application of these concepts 
since the Meiji period. But such a philologically and historically oriented decon-
structive analysis is far more complicated an undertaking than a grand culturalist 
outline. As Chamberlain postulates in his polemical outcry, the only escape here 
is the arduous path of investigating the historically authentic tradition. In order 
to recognize the constructions of the modern era, we must turn to the »unfiltered« 
pre-modern era, the language and literary and documentary tradition of ancient 
and classical Japan, in order to comprehend the extent of »historical editing« that 
has caused pre-modern Japan to disappear as if behind a partition since the Meiji 
Restoration. In the context of Chinese intellectual history, the necessity of consid-
ering the »editing« of the Han period when viewing the classics is well known. In 
my view we have not yet fully comprehended the full importance of the Meiji era 
as a period of »editing« or rewriting and falsification of the Japanese pre-modern 
era. The most striking example of this process can be seen in the events surround-
ing the shinbutsu-bunri decree of 1868. Warnings such as Chamberlain’s at the eve 
of World War I take on a special significance in the present situation, in which Ja-
pan is increasingly forced into an isolated position in the international culturalist 
debate and this process is furthermore justified using direct, supposedly legiti-
mating statements from Japan. In this question, Japanese studies, as a historical 
                                                              CHAPTER VI: SHINTÔ AND THE INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL DEBATE n  367 
 
and critical cultural science, must make its contribution to enlightenment. At the 
latest since the debate on Huntington’s work, it has become all too clear that this 
is not merely an academic game. Simplistic and holistic images are becoming ever 
more powerful and are beginning to overpower the recognition of the complex 
reality. Huntington presents the image of the »lonely country« of Japan, and this 
image makes its impression on the global public like a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Images create their own reality. 
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1. GENERAL SUMMARY 
 
The subject of Shintô480 marks one of the essentials of Japanese cultural his-
tory. Inside and outside of Japan, Shintô is not only seen as the Japanese national 
religion, but it is often used as a metaphorical expression for the alleged immuta-
bility of the Japanese culture or even for the Japanese national polity (kokutai) it-
self. To give a popular example of this common view, let me cite Joseph M. Kita-
gawa, who wrote in the Japan-Handbuch (Hammitzsch 1981: 1633): 
»Shintô is in fact the underlying value orientation of the Japanese people, be-
cause it is a combination of divergent and yet unique Japanese sensitivities, 
religious principles and cultural attitudes, which have shaped completely the 
experience of the Japanese people from the earliest time until today.« 
Definitions like this one show the great dilemma of an approach, which tries 
to preclude the historical changes and fractures, unreflectingly postulating an 
ahistorically valid Shintô. Yet, this religious system has developed historically, 
and has united most heterogeneous elements throughout the course of its devel-
opment up to the ideology of the religiously based Japanese nationalism of the 
modern age (Kokutai Shintô). 
A generally valid Japanese national religion as postulated by Kitagawa and 
others, can therefore only be verified as an ideology and a construction of modern 
times. One author, the already mentioned Miyasaka Masahide, remarks in that 
context restrictively, that the term Shintô might only be used for the designation 
of religion in a narrower sense. He elaborates that »The term Shintôism on the 
other hand is only to be used if it concerns the shintôistic oriented social or na-
tional thought which developed out of ideologization and politicalization, respec-
tively.« (Miyasaka 1994: 236, n. 214). Yet, such a differentiation, which sets a po-
litically free Shintô – in the sense of a religiously indigenous folk religion – apart 
from its negative ideologically contaminated counterpart – the Shintô of modern 
times –, misjudges in my opinion the facts relating to its ideological and political 
history. The political aspect is constituent for the Shintô system from the begin-
ning on, and it cannot be separated from an idealized Japanese religion. Both con-
cepts represent two sides of the same coin, having originated during the nativist 
movements of the Edo period, after which they were finally put into practice dur-
ing the Meiji period and intensified to the point of absurdity during what is now 
                                                 
480 For this section see also Antoni 2002. 
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known as the ultra-nationalist era of the 1930s and ‘40s. Precisely such seemingly 
value-free assertions, like the one brought forth by Miyasaka in his work of scien-
tific standard, show how in the present time it is absolutely necessary to have a 
historical-critical study of this subject. 
Dealing with the Shintô, much more than with any other subject, means to 
question Japanese culture and its self-conception: Is it a national religion or a con-
struct of the modern age? Is it archaic ancestor worship or an all-Japanese folk-
lore? Is it an esoteric doctrinaire religion or syncretistic ritualism? Or, is it eventu-
ally an ethno-centrist nationalism or peaceful nature worship? 
Any cliché with regard to Japanese culture will also be found in the debate 
over Shintô: Shintô in the ideological development of the modern age has to func-
tion as a nativist synonym for the ‘unaltered’, ‘homogeneous’, ‘unique’, and fi-
nally ultimate Japanese culture, which is freed from all foreignness, allowing a 
view into allegedly true Japan. In this respect, the postulation of a Japanese na-
tional religion implicitly freed from all foreign elements, is already a product of 
this modern Japanese auto-stereotype, which, as the allegedly authentic form of 
cultural self-expression, is able to shape Japan’s image – also abroad – until this 
very day. 
On the whole, it demonstrates that an evaluation of the claim made by Shintô 
to represent Japan’s virtually natural national religion is not possible without a 
thorough examination of the historical development, as this study tried to point 
out.  
1. 1. Historical foundations 
 
Regarding the roots of political Shintô in antiquity, the mythologies of Kojiki 
and Nihonshoki played a crucial role, as was pointed out in the introductory chap-
ter of this study. But this mythology was only in later historical periods turned 
into a sacred tradition by Shintô theologians and ideologists. A homogenous »in-
digenous« religion as postulated by the Kokugaku (»National School«) of the Edo 
period, cannot be found in the old records. Shintô at the dawn of its well-known 
history presents itself in an ambiguous and manifold appearance – at this very 
early point, there was no hint of a uniform thread of a homogenous indigenous 
religion of Japan. Thus, if subjected to a thorough examination, the source mate-
rials show the diverse origins and homogenous character that were made into 
this allegedly single, uninterrupted tradition of mythological tradition by the 
compilers of the official documents in the 8th century. 
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The modern Shintô doctrine of one homogenous tradition primarily referring 
to the Kojiki – which was adopted by the Kokugaku of Tokugawa times and real-
ized in the Meiji period – is an illusion from its beginning on: something that was 
created artificially for the purpose of political authentication. 
Equally the idea of an incomparable unique national polity (kokutai) was 
eventually entirely based on legitimatizing statements of handed down mythol-
ogy from records of the 8th century. Apparent from several cases, an objective sci-
entific research of these myths – especially in an ethnological-comparative sense – 
was predestined to collide with the sacrosanct understanding of the state from 
the Meiji period to the year 1945: Any proof of connections between the native 
mythology to traditions of the continental mainland or the southern archipelago 
shook the dogma of a self-sufficient »land of gods«. 
Post-war research provided the comprehension of an extremely complex and 
historically thoroughly graded genesis of the Japanese culture, whose origins 
have been liberated from the artificially constructed isolation of the modern age 
after the year 1868 and put in an overall context, not only of the East-Asian his-
tory but also of human history in general. Therefore, the idea of Japan’s homoge-
neity, ideologically justified and rooted in the traditionalistic constructions of pre-
modern times, cannot be upheld anymore.  
A specific theology of Shintô did not evolve until the Japanese middle ages 
(cf. Naumann 1994). Although the emperor lost the direct ruling power to the 
military aristocracy and the bakufu, which ruled nominally in the name of the im-
perial house and continued to maintain this rule until the year 1868, a more and 
more prominent idea of Japan as a country under special protection of the gods 
(shinkoku) developed among circles of the Shintô theology. Extreme supporters of 
this way of thinking eventually concluded from the handed-down myths that not 
only the imperial house is of divine descent, but the whole Japanese nation (see 
above). For them, Japan was a country whose nature was different from all other 
parts of this world, being endowed with a unique, indigenous Japanese spirit – 
Yamato-damashii, the »spirit of Yamato«.  
On this basis, Shintô theology turned to politics since the 17th or 18th century 
at the latest.  
1. 2. Shintô in early modern and modern times 
1. 2. 1. Confucian Shintô 
 
At the beginning of this process stood Shintô-Confucian syncretism or Confu-
cian Shintô (juka shintô), which on a level of theoretical-theological discussions to 
374  n  KOKUTAI - POLITICAL SHINTÔ FROM EARLY-MODERN TO CONTEMPORARY JAPAN   
 
a large extent succeeded the Buddhist Shintô of the middle ages. The conception 
of a unity of Shintô and Confucianism (shinju-itchi) made (neo-) Confucianism the 
spiritual core and developed a definitely opposing attitude towards Buddhism 
(haibutsu). 
Influential Confucian philosophers of that period like Fujiwara Seika (1561-
1619) and Hayashi Razan (1583-1657), were representatives of this newly Confu-
cian oriented Shintô. The doctrines of Watarai- (Ise-) and moreover Yoshida 
Shintô of the middle ages were reinterpreted as well, and hence further devel-
oped in the sense of the new power relations in the Edo period. The house of Yo-
shida considerably shaped the development of Shintô in the early Edo period un-
der the influence of new social and political structures. The Yoshida doctrine 
logically also went through far-reaching developments in that context, at the end 
of which stood a Neo-Confucian shaped Shintô of modern times that hardly 
showed any correspondence to the medieval doctrines of Yoshida Kanetomo 
(1435-1511). 
Moreover, the Yoshida house received its outstanding importance for Edo-
period Shintô due to its particularly powerful position in the system of Shintô 
shrines, as well as due to its early-achieved closeness to the Tokugawa’s center of 
power of. 
 
1. 2. 2. The National School (Kokugaku) 
 
Confucian Shintô, on the one hand, which flourished together with Con-
fucianism of modern times, developed into the mainstream of Edo-period Shintô. 
Yet on the other hand, a new interpretation of Shintô in the context of the Na-
tional School (Kokugaku) slowly developed since the middle of the Edo period. 
The Kokugaku originated in a countermovement to the increasing advance-
ment of Japan’s Sinicization. This school – represented by its main supporters 
Kada no Azumamaro (1668-1736), Kamo Mabuchi (1697-1769), Motoori Norinaga 
(1730-1801) and finally Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843) – developed in the course of 
the Edo period from a purely philological-literary school to a deliberately politi-
cal-agitatorial ideology. 
The Kokugaku mainly chose native classical literature of Japan as their re-
search objective. The study of the literature of Japanese ancient times, especially 
the Kojiki, by Motoori Norinaga, a student of Kamo Mabuchi, led to the pushing 
aside of hitherto syncretistic interpretations of Shintô. Thus a nativist doctrine 
developed, i.e., a philosophical-political Shintô, which began to contest with the 
Confucian-Shintô syncretism over predominance. 
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On the basis of its philological and theological studies, the Kokugaku towards 
the close of the 18th century eventually tried to convert its postulates into politics 
by greatly emphasizing a renaissance of the Japanese emperorship according to 
the shintôistic doctrines of the imperial house’s genealogical origin. 
The Kokugaku regarded the principle of historical truth and reality of the old 
records, including the chapters concerning the »era of the gods« in the oldest 
Japanese documents, as their theoretical axiom. 
These traditions were understood, in its lexical meaning, as facts (jijitsu): the 
accounts on the origin of the world, the gods of heaven and earth, the establish-
ment of an emperorship, the origin of the powerful noble lineages – for the phi-
losophers of the National School all these mystic occurrences became descriptions 
of realities in a historical sense. When in that context Hirata Atsutane, an ex-
tremely influential theorist and ideologist of the late Kokugaku, called Japan the 
‘land of the gods’, he thus followed a literal understanding of the handed-down 
written records in the sense of a shintôist fundamentalism – if it was more schem-
ing or yet naïve remains to be seen. In Atsutane’s case, this viewpoint led to fa-
natical nationalism and to the conviction of Japan’s special status above all other 
countries. He was convinced, that »we all are undoubtedly descendants of the 
gods«. Therefore, even the people were elevated to divine descendants, and they 
regarded themselves adopted into the lineage of the Emperor as an arahitogami, 
i.e., ‘a deity that is presently visible as a human being’. 
 
1. 2. 3. The conception of national polity (kokutai) 
 
By the end of the Edo period, Kokugaku ideology entered into an astonishing 
combination with Confucian ideology, and again we meet the handed-down 
structures of Japanese syncretism. The core of those national-religious specula-
tions of the bakumatsu period was formed by the idea of a national polity (kokutai). 
This idea described all those national characteristics that a country ought to have. 
Japan’s national polity was seen to be based on the allegedly unique fact of being 
a »divine country« (shinkoku, kami-no-kuni), founded by the Sun Goddess 
Amaterasu, and being ruled by her direct descendants – the human emperors. 
Thus, the divine Tennô became the personification of Japanese identity. 
Historical analysis shows that the usage of the term kokutai as a synonym for 
Japan was already common at that time, at least in the circles of the imperial court 
of Kyôto. It should also be recalled that already Hirata Atsutane saw the true 
Shintô (makoto no shintô) embodied in the kokutai. Yet, the adoption of this concept 
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as a national religious state ideology by the majority of the people did not take 
place until after the Meiji Restoration. 
Three phases of kokutai-ideology can be clearly identified in my view: (1) for-
mative phase (approx. 1825-1890); (2) classic phase (1890-1937); (3) phase of hu-
bris (1937-1945). The beginning of the formative phase was the early 19th century, 
documented by Aizawa Seishisai’s work Shinron of 1825. The end of that period 
came in 1890, the year of the proclamation of the Kyôiku chokugo (»Imperial 
Rescript on Education«), which was decisive for the further development and 
which marked the beginning of the second, the classic, phase. 
By looking on these particular dates, it becomes clear that this first, formative 
phase falls into the era of the great transformations of Japanese history: the de-
cline of the Tokugawa state, the opening of the country to the outside world, the 
establishment of a modern Japanese empire with the Tennô being the sacrosanct 
head of state – even placed above the Constitution – as an incarnation of the 
state itself. 
As is generally known, the philosophers of the so-called Mito School (Mito-
gaku) had a substantially spiritual and political influence. Through their interpre-
tation of the National School, they broadened the land-of-the-god-doctrine of 
Shintô by the canon of Confucianist maxims, which dominated at that time. 
Herein lies the intrinsic difference to the purist national school, which strictly op-
posed all things of Chinese origin. 
In combination with the shintôist land-of-the-gods-ideology of the national 
school, this ended in a familistic conception of kokutai: a definition of the Japanese 
nation as a society of real descent, as a family of commonly divine origin with the 
emperor being the natural head. 
 
1. 2. 4. Religion and ideology in the Meiji period 
 
The spiritual core of modern Japan’s national idea was therefore last but not 
least given in the ideological-religious postulate of a homogeneous Japanese fam-
ily state. This idea found its formulation since the Meiji period in the concept of 
familism (kazoku-shugi), i.e., through the comprehension of Japan as a nation-state 
whose people are united by being one single family. At the head of this family, in 
the role of the father, stood the Tennô. It seems remarkable that the most radical 
version of familism did not understand this intimate relationship between tennô 
and people as family in a figurative sense, but more as a real ethnical-genetically 
defined extended family whose members are connected with each other through 
their same origin in the divine ancestors. 
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The picture of a Japanese culture that we can find with philosophers such as 
Inoue Tetsujirô, as being manifested in Shintô and excelling due to its history 
throughout which at its core stood the person and institution of the tennô who is 
inseparably connected with the – homogeneous – people by a quasi genetically 
transmitted national ethic (kokumin-dôtoku), was spread especially by the com-
mentaries on the Imperial Rescript on Education from 1890 until its nationalistic 
climax with the publication of the Kokutai no hongi  in the year 1937. 
Insights into the historical reality, which stood apart of the ideology of Koku-
tai Shintô, remained to a large extent unheard in this context. In the Meiji period 
it has been successfully ideologically dismissed that throughout the whole course 
of its historical development Japan always was a country mainly marked by 
complexity and disintegration in cultural, social, territorial, and especially relig-
ious regards – to an extent that the new view of an ethnically and culturally ho-
mogenous country could rise to the absolute dogma of Kokutai Shintô. 
Precisely because the country was always divided in particular groups, the 
utopia of homogeneity appeared very promising from the viewpoint of a new, 
central state in the Meiji period. In that context Shintô occupied a key position, 
because this religious world that used to be heterogeneous and complex, com-
prehended now as the only authentic Japanese religion, was more and more iden-
tified as spiritual core and foundation of the construct of a homogeneous Japa-
nese culture. Logically, this ended in a concept of Shintô embodying Japanese cul-
ture itself, as it shaped the country from late Meiji period until the decline in the 
year 1945. 
Despite the official renunciation of his divine status by Shôwa-tennô on Janu-
ary 1, 1946, the Japanese emperorship receives its whole spiritual and religious 
authority, now as before, from the religious-political ideology of Shintô. On a 
regular basis opinion polls proof the Japanese people’s great approval of the insti-
tution of the Tennô. According to this concept, Japan can be sure of its inner unity 
as long as the emperor resides in the mysterious seclusion of his palace, like on an 
island in the middle of Tôkyô, and performs his daily rites. 
 
1. 3. Résumé 
 
In the present study, the early historical process unfortunately could not be 
considered in more detail. 
Yet even a very short introduction to the problem conveyes at least an impres-
sion that an ahistorical-static approach cannot contribute to the understanding 
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and explanation of this question. It shows that Shintô just like Buddhism, Confu-
cianism and other complex systems, is neither clearly defined nor an invariable 
entity. However, it is still possible to determine characteristics, which document 
an undoubted continuity of the ‘system Shintô’. At the center of this continuity 
lies the function to legitimize the ruling position of the imperial house since the 
days of Kojiki and Nihonshoki. This political purpose – which outshines everything 
else – is the actual core of what we call Shintô. It can be seamlessly followed 
through the history of Shintô: from the constructions of a standardized mythol-
ogy of ancient times, via the shinkoku ideology of the middle ages and the nativist 
ideological concepts of the Kokugaku, up to the modern conception of kokutai. Of 
central importance in this context is the perception that the philosophical struc-
tures of modern-age Japan have their own differentiated development, reaching 
far back into pre-modern times, and are only to be comprehended from there. 
Thus, the philosophical structures of the Japanese modern age are founded on 
the development in Japanese pre-modern times – drawn up by theological and 
philosophical circles of Buddhism, Confucianism and Shintô – and were put into 
practice only since the Meiji period together with imported conceptions of the 
Western modern age. The world of Shintô was attributed with a decisive impor-
tance for the identity formation of modern Japan. 
As cultural scientists, we are called upon to undertake the arduous work to 
reveal these lines of traditions and fractures. In order to understand the construc-
tions of the modern age, we have to turn to the authentic sources of pre-modern 
times: the language and literary-documentary traditions of ancient and classic Ja-
pan. Thus, the hermeneutical analysis of pre-modern times supplies the most cer-
tain basis for the comprehension of the present. Even though such a philological-
hermeneutical approach is much more complicated on the whole than a great 
ahistorical design in the sense of Kitagawa’s definition of Shintô quoted above, 
science cannot withdraw from this challenge. Most of all, Japanology has been at-
tributed with an extremely important function. As a science about Japan, it is 
supposed to pursue unbiased fundamental research about this subject. A Ja-
panology however, which closes its eyes to the research of historical processes 
and their philological resources, cannot accomplish this task. 
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2. EPILOGUE  
 
In a review article with the title »State Shintô: an ‘Independent religion’?’« its 
author, Mark Teeuwen (1999), a noted researcher on medieval Shintô, offers a 
completely different view on Shintô than that of the book under review, which 
was nothing else than the original version of the present book (Antoni 1998).481 In 
fact, we might say that two highly diverse lines of argument met – or clashed? – 
here, and that the differences between them show some general problems of re-
cent academic trends in understanding Shintô, and also point to some fundamen-
tal difficulties with such understanding. Thus, it seems worthwhile to have a 
closer look at the reviewer’s arguments. Actually, the basis of those arguments 
became clearer to me only some time after the review was published, because of a 
further book on the topic, called Shintô in History: Ways of the Kami, co-edited by 
Teeuwen himself, and revealing the intrinsic background of the fundamental 
criticism voiced in his review from 1999 (cf. Breen, Teeuwen 2000). Only through 
reading this later book did it become possible, with the benefit of hindsight, to re-
alize and understand the deeper meaning of his criticisms, which point to a fun-
damental difference in our respective understandings of the subject.  
First of all, it is important to note that Teeuwen’s objections were not founded 
so much on any disagreements over facts. Rather, it is the general message of my 
study which the author rejects. He particularly criticizes its presentation of Shintô 
history as a straight, continuous development from pre-modern times to modern 
governmental State Shintô. He makes the following statement, as a negative cri-
tique from his point of view: »The consequence is a narrative that depicts the de-
velopment of State Shintô as an historical necessity, the logical, indeed inevitable, 
outcome of trends established in the Edo period or even before« (Teeuwen 1999: 
113). Teeuwen is quite correct here: this is indeed one of my principal conten-
tions! Although such an extreme reduction does not do justice to the full content 
of the work, nonetheless it is true that the display of religious, political and espe-
cially ideological continuities in the history of Shintô between the pre-modern 
and modern ages in fact forms the major »plot« of my work. My purpose was – 
and still is - to show the deep links between pre-modern and modern Japan in the 
intellectual history of Shintô and religious thought, especially by investigating the 
function of Shintô as a religious system to legitimize political, i.e., imperial 
power, a trend which culminated in the concept of a specific Japanese national 
                                                 
481 For this section see also Antoni 2004. 
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polity (kokutai) during late Tokugawa and early Meiji times. Though the main 
caesurae in the historical development of modern Japan, e.g. the Meiji Restoration 
of 1868 and the end of World War II in 1945, play a predominant role in this con-
text, my objective was to demonstrate some religious and ideological continuities 
which are of much greater importance in this respect than those historical frac-
tures postulated especially by western researchers on Shintô. Western moderniza-
tion theories posit that modern Japan was almost entirely based on western influ-
ence, especially in its idea of the nation-state. In contrast to this axiomatic and, I 
am convinced, historically incorrect viewpoint, it should be understood that the 
indigenous intellectual and ideological roots were at least as important for the 
formation of the modern Japanese nation-state as the intellectual imports from 
abroad. Within this context it was mainly the ideas and ideological concepts 
elaborated by nativist Shintô – and Confucian - thinkers during the Edo period 
which were transformed into political reality in modern Japan. 
Teeuwen also objects to my alleged neglect of Buddhism within the process of 
modern Shintô thought. He contends that I do not adequately portray the role of 
Shinshû Budhism within the context of Meiji ideology. On the Shintô side, some 
peculiar structural problems concerning shrines and priests during the Meiji pe-
riod are also said not to have been taken into consideration. Both points of criti-
cism are based on the arguments of two Japanese scholars of Shintô, Nitta Hitoshi 
(2000) and Sakamoto Koremaru (2000), as set forth in the above-mentioned work, 
Shintô in History, which was not published until nearly two years after his review. 
Nonetheless, his argument against traditionalist continuity of Shintô political 
thought becomes fully intelligible only after one has read the two articles by Nitta 
and Sakamoto in Shintô in History. 
 
2. 1. The Kuroda School’s View of Shintô history  
 
In his essay in Shintô in History482, Nitta Hitoshi, professor at the Kôgakkan-
University in Ise, focuses on the importance of the administrational bureaucrats 
and especially points out the »Buddhists’ role in the creation of what we now 
know as State Shintô,’« coming to the conclusion that »it is clear [...] that the ar-
guments defining Shinto as non-religious were the creation of Shinshû Buddhists 
[...]« (Nitta 2000: 10, 267). Nitta’s essay is highly instructive, in particular in its 
obvious purposes. The author regards the debate over »the expansion of the 
                                                 
482 Since I have already published a review of this book in the Journal of Japanese Studies, there is no 
need to present a detailed discussion of the whole work here again. See Antoni 2001c. 
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meaning of State Shintô and its application« to be generally »a result of the occu-
pation policies,« concluding polemically that: »State Shintô is, indeed, a case of ‘in 
the beginning was the word; all creation came from the word; nothing came into 
being that was not of the word’« (p. 268); therefore the idea of a real historical 
foundation of what is called »State Shintô« is rejected by the author in principle. 
But in fact not only the concept but also the term »State Shintô« goes back far 
beyond the »so-called Shintô shirei (Shintô directive’) issued by the American 
army of Occupation,« as Nitta contends. This is proven, interestingly enough, by 
another contributor to the same book, Sakamoto Koremaru, Professor at Ko-
kugakuin University. He shows that the term kokka shintô was used in Japan as 
early as 1882 (Sakamoto 2000: 273), but then argues that it was not earlier than 
1940 that »for the first time, ideology had been implanted in what had been State 
Shintô in purely institutional terms. Only now we can talk about State Shintô in 
the sense in which it is referred to in the 1945 Shintô Directive« (p. 289). So Saka-
moto concludes that »the institution of State Shintô could only function as an in-
stitution. It had no authority in the spheres of thought or ideology« (p. 290).  
Such an elegant and clever argument implicitly liberates »real« Shintô from all 
contamination with the dark spheres of ideological »State Shintô,« which here is 
constructed as merely a bureaucratic conspiracy without any authentic connec-
tion to the world of Shintô. The character of this argument is clearly shown by the 
author’s own conclusion:  
»The fact that after the war, not a single bureaucrat or priest from the Jingiin 
was ever purged is a sure proof of just how far removed the institution of 
State Shintô was from the ideologies of ‘ultra-nationalism’, ‘expansionism’ 
and ‘militarism’« (p. 291).  
Here we are confronted with an apologetic and historically white washing 
construction of political Shintô, which is represented as generally not responsible 
for any involvement in politics and especially in the militarist ideology of the 
1930s and 1940s.  
The view of Shintô as a seemingly »innocent« nature cult that was abused by 
sinister ultranationalist political and ideological forces in modern Japan is charac-
teristic of some other, though not all, contributions to the book Shintô in History. 
This is especially true for the article by a particularly important contributor, 
Sonoda Minoru, Professor at Kyôto University and Chief Priest of Chichibu 
Shrine in Saitama, who focuses on the relationship between shrine cults and »na-
ture,« which is seen by him »as one of the enduring traits of kami cults« (Breen, 
Teeuwen 2000: 8). This essay has a definite political and ideological connotation 
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as well, as when the author laments over the alleged »spiritual confusion« of pre-
sent-day Japan: »In the 1990s this has undoubtedly been one of the reasons for the 
frequent occurrence throughout Japanese society of events that borders on the 
pathological« (Sonoda 2000: 44). Sonoda recommends a rediscovery and revalua-
tion »of Japan’s ancient animistic view of life« (p. 45), taking »the recent grand 
rebuilding of the Ise shrines – which are representative of all shrines in the coun-
try« as a model. Sonoda thus draws a deliberately culturally pessimistic picture of 
contemporary Japanese society, reminding one more of essentialist Nihonjinron 
discourses than of serious historical research. 
As becomes clear, »Shintô in history« as conceived by this book hardly deals 
with the history of the political ideas of Shintô, which, of course, reach far back 
into pre-modern times. This kind of a general denial of »genuine« Shintô thought 
is also shared by Mark Teeuwen himself. His argument starts from a completely 
different point of view, but nevertheless meets Sonoda et al.’s line of argument on 
the crucial point of the historical liability of Shintô.  
In Teeuwen’s view a Shintô without Buddhism seems unimaginable, since, ac-
cording to him, it was the »new brand of Buddhist kami thought that lay at the 
basis of the first schools of Shintô thought’« (Teeuwen 2000: 96). Generally he sees 
Shintô as a mere product of esoteric Buddhism, an interpretation which basically 
rests on the well-known teachings of the late historian of thought, Kuroda Toshio 
(cf. Kuroda 1993 (1981)). This leads Teeuwen to ignore the main ideas of Shintô 
thought itself, as well as other forms of historical impact through Buddhism, not 
to mention Confucianism (and Daoism). Teeuwen clearly can be recognized as a 
general supporter of Kuroda’s theses, not only in the present work but also in 
some of his other writings (cf. Teeuwen, Scheid 2002).  
Not surprisingly, then, the editors’ introduction presents Kuroda’s view »that 
Shintô as the distinct, autonomous and independent religion we know today is an 
invention of the nineteenth century Japanese ideologues. Before the Meiji policy 
that authorized the separation of Shintô and Buddhism, Japanese religious cul-
ture had been to all intents and purposes defined by Buddhism. Shrines and 
shrine-based practice were nothing more than Buddhism’s ‘secular face’; kami, 
for their part, were understood to be manifestations of the Buddha’« (p. 4). In ac-
cordance with this fundamental claim that »Japanese religious culture had been 
to all intents and purposes defined by Buddhism,« the first contribution to the 
book, by Tim Barrett (2000), already formulates an axiomatic conclusion which 
can be readily applied to key parts of the entire work. Barrett too relies heavily on 
the investigations of Kuroda Toshio, elaborating Kuroda’s alleged central impor-
tance for today’s Shintô studies. He claims, for instance, that Kuroda’s investiga-
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tions have »the greatest direct bearing on our understanding of the nature of 
Shintô itself« (p. 13). 
In a more recent publication, Norman Havens (2006) speaks of such a funda-
mentalist interpretation as the »onion« definition of Shintô. »This definitional ap-
proach claims that once relieved of its historical accretions, little remains of an 
immutable entity worthy of the name Shinto, at least not until the creation of 
Shrine Shinto in the modern period. Needless to say, the person most closely as-
sociated with this kind of description is Kuroda Toshio« (Havens 2006: 18). Thus, 
Havens chooses for this part of his recent article on Shintô the ironic title »History 
begins at Kuroda.« 
With Kuroda and his followers pre-modern Shintô is reduced to a religious 
world of popular beliefs and practices, ultimately embossed by esoteric Bud-
dhism until the dawn of modern times. In their view modern Shintô received its 
peculiar character only through the indeed infamous constructions of the Meiji 
bureaucratic ideologues, which finally culminated in a nationalistic and imperial-
istic »State Shintô.« The entanglement of Shintô into the gloomy chapters of mod-
ern Japanese history might thus be seen as a kind of historical accident, as clearly 
shown by the fact that Shintô was declared an »independent religion« during the 
Meiji period. All its political and ideological elements, in particular the distinct 
and central emperor cult, are thus exposed as an artificial invention of the mod-
ern age. From this point of view, the idea of the historical continuity of political 
Shintô therefore becomes axiomatically impossible, since, according to the Ku-
roda school, a Shintô that was in any way politicized simply did not exist in pre-
modern times.  
 
2. 2. The denial of Shintô’s intellectual and ideological history 
 
The »orthodox« viewpoint on Shintô – as expressed, for instance, in the Nihon-
jinron-style writings of Sonoda Minoru (2000) – initially takes a completely oppo-
site position to that of Kuroda Toshio, arguing that Shintô did exist from the very 
beginning as inconvertibly a Japanese ethnic religion. Nevertheless, this orthodox 
line of argument ultimately comes to a very similar conclusion on the question of 
political Shintô as the Kuroda school. In its »essentialist« interpretation, Shintô is 
reduced to a static, ever-existing set of ancient customs of nature-worship and an-
cestor cults, of animistic spiritualism and of a primeval world of gods and divine 
emperors, all of which supposedly provided the Japanese nation with a distinct 
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and essentialist spiritual character throughout its history. The orthodox school 
takes those postulates for granted. 
Where could the link exist between these two interpretative worlds – in other 
words, between the »Kuroda faction« and the orthodox views of Sonoda Minoru? 
I think it can be found in one basic idea which is common to both approaches: 
both jointly reject the existence of a political, ideological and intellectual history 
of Shintô thought and, consequently, understand modern political Shintô as just a 
perversion of the historical fundamentals. In the eyes of traditionalists like 
Sonoda Minoru, »real« Shintô has to be understood as just a nature-loving spiri-
tualism, a completely non-political set of religious emotions and rituals, only hav-
ing suffered radical political abuse in the modern age, through contamination 
with post-1868 politics and nationalism. The Kuroda school, on the other hand, 
regards pre-modern »Shintô« (always put in quotation marks by these scholars) 
as a mere spiritualistic world, incomprehensible without the framework of eso-
teric Buddhism. Both views are strongly in agreement that Shintô in history did 
not contain any authentic religious, ideological or even intellectual thought. This 
denial of Shintô’s own intellectual development, its always utopian and in fact 
highly political core of thought, ultimately opens the way for an exculpating in-
terpretation that seems to be politically favored by some interpreters – particu-
larly because such an exclusively »spiritualistic« Shintô must be regarded as by 
definition free of all historical contamination with political ideology. 
This double strategy to »liberate« the world of Shintô thought from its political 
and ideological aspects – which are, in fact, an integral part of its fascinating his-
torical complexity – conforms quite well to the general restorative and conserva-
tive tendency within present Shintô studies, which openly aims to revalue Shintô 
and rescue it from its »dark« historical associations.  
 
2. 3. Political power 
 
After years of research into the topic, I am convinced, contrary to Kuroda’s and 
Teeuwen’s interpretations, that it is in fact the political aspect of Shintô thought 
which forms a constituent frame for the whole system of Shintô throughout his-
tory. This is not meant, of course, in the above-mentioned orthodox sense that 
understands Shintô as a static and essentialist »native« and »ethnically« deter-
mined national religion of Japan. Historical analysis shows that Shintô, like Bud-
dhism, Confucianism and other complex systems, is neither a clearly defined nor 
an invariably set entity, but rather has constantly changed throughout history. 
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Yet it still seems to be possible to determine some fundamental characteristics by 
documenting a continuity in the main features of Shintô thought. At the very cen-
ter lies the idea of the legitimization of political power, detectable since the days 
of Kojiki and Nihonshoki.  
It is not the idea of Shintô as the eternal »national religion« of Japan as alleg-
edly reflected, according to the orthodox view, in the historical facts; rather the 
central core of what must be summarized as »Shintô« should be understood as a 
never-ending »invention,« a continuity of constructs, the main purpose of which 
was the deification of the emperor in line with the utopian ideal of the ruler as a 
living god. From this viewpoint, the development of Shintô as a political con-
struct may be traced back to antiquity, even to pre-Nara Japan or, more particu-
larly, to the reign of Emperor Tenmu (reigned 673-686), as Nelly Naumann (1996: 
6-8) has already pointed out. Interpretations of Shintô’s political-dynastic aspects 
as mere modern »erroneous aberrations« from an originally spiritualistic or eso-
teric-Buddhist nature cult therefore must be regarded as historically unfounded. 
Shintô existed and, above all, was politically motivated ever since the days of 
early Japan, re-inventing its political functions again and again under different 
historical conditions over the centuries. This »political purpose« of Shintô was 
stressed by, among others, the late scholar Ôbayashi Taryô, a prominent Japanese 
ethnologist and specialist of comparative cultural studies at Tôkyô University. 
Ôbayashi always made clear his awareness that the role of »Shintô in history« 
was definitely political in nature, and that this political Shintô took shape in an-
tiquity, not during the few years of State Shintô in modern Japan. 
 
2. 4. Summary 
 
In my view historians are wrong to think that religious nationalism in Japan 
started only after contact with the West in the second part of the 19th century. Of 
course it is true that the European idea of the nation-state and romantic national-
ist ideologies deeply influenced modern Japanese nationalism since the Meiji pe-
riod. But a Eurocentric view of Japanese intellectual history is unable to account 
for the astonishing fact that, during Tokugawa times and even earlier, Japanese 
thinkers themselves had developed their own kind of ethnocentric »national 
idea.« It centered on the construct of a Japanese sacred community, seen as the 
shinkoku, »the country of the gods« (cf. Nawrocki 1998: 21-63), and later mani-
fested as the idea of a distinct Japanese kokutai, »national polity,« under the em-
peror’s rule. Among Shintô scholars and ideologues it was in particular the con-
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struct of a common origin of the Japanese people that was fundamental to this 
concept. This was based on the myth of the «Age of the Gods«, which was trans-
mitted through history and eventually elaborated into political radicalism most 
notably by Hirata Atsutane and his school. Though a religious concept, it always 
contained within it a clearly political dimension. 
The subject of »Shintô« therefore must form an essential part of any discourse 
on Japanese culture, but we must also be aware that this subject can easily give 
rise to clichés regarding said culture. This clearly shows the need for substantial 
scholarly research on the topic, and it also shows, implicitly, the great hurdle to 
understanding Shintô created by any approach that tries to preclude the dimen-
sion of its historical development and change. I very much doubt that the idea of 
political Shintô itself is purely an invention of modern times. All sources show 
the opposite: the enormous historical depth of this world of ideas. Meiji-era State 
Shintô was an invention in that it transmuted the political ideas of Shintô thinkers 
of the Edo and pre-Edo periods into the practical politics of the modern Japanese 
nation-state, painting the highly ideological picture of a Japanese national polity 
of divine origin. This was a completely new idea for modern Japan as a nation-
state, but a very old one for political Shintô thought itself.  
It is mostly the exoticism, in many cases the self-exoticism, of Japan that pre-
vents international research from regarding the Japanese case as extremely valu-
able for comparative analysis in general. Speaking about Shintô in this context 
means explaining it as an extraordinarily convincing example of a religious eth-
nocentrism which spawned a political and religious ideology that was able to 
found a modern nation-state like Japan. To declare that Japan is unsuitable for 
comparative research means to construct a self-sufficient nihonjinron exoticism. 
As many cases show, the study of Shintô at present often seems to return to such 
self-sufficient Japanocentrism, excluding the world and any comparative ap-
proach from our understanding of Shintô. Since the days of Yanagita Kunio and 
earlier, the idea of Japan as not being comparable to the »outside« world formed 
a main pillar in the traditionalist discourse on Japanese identity. Historical schol-
arly research should analyze this as a part of the problem, but not use it as a base 
for its own understanding. 
To return finally to the initial questions raised by Mark Teeuwen’s review of 
the German edition of the present book and by his later co-edited volume, Shintô 
in History, it seems to me that, in order to do full justice to the historical develop-
ment of Shintô, consideration must be given to the above-mentioned fields of po-
litical and intellectual Shintô. In particular, the centrally important relationship 
between Shintô and Confucianism should be taken into account, as well as the 
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highly relevant but complicated topic of nativism; in other words, Kokugaku, Mi-
togaku, and kokutai ideological constructs and political thought in pre-modern 
Shintô should be treated in a historically appropriate manner. More specifically, 
scholarly treatments of Shintô political history should aim for an objective repre-
sentation of the ideology of shinkoku thought, which has not only been a pillar of 
Shintô orthodoxy since the days of medieval times, but has even made its pres-
ence felt in recent international debates thanks to some politically thoughtless 
comments about »Japan as a divine nation« by a Japanese prime minister (cf. 
Nawrocki 2002). There is a saying that the only constancy in history is the con-
stancy of change. This is especially true for Shintô history. Denying the pure exis-
tence of Shintô, as does the »onion« model inspired by Kuroda Toshio, does not 
promote our deeper understanding of its historical process. The contributions of 
Kuroda Toshio to the field have been extremely valuable, since they opened our 
eyes to the importance of Shintô-Buddhist amalgamation during the Japanese 
Middle Ages.  
Nonetheless, it is also surely true that the history of Shintô does not »begin at 
Kuroda.« 
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